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In Plato’s Symposium, we get a pessimistic myth not only about love, but about the first 
experience of loss, in which we were once globular cosmic beings who were split in two by 
Zeus’s thunderbolts as punishment for not obeying the Olympian gods. Falling down to earth 
after the split, Zeus introduced eros out of pity for our condition. Our consolation was to find our 
other halves and hold on to them as a way of remembering what it was like when we were whole. 
But, as Allan Bloom notes,  
…man’s condition soon worsened. In the beginning, their real half was right there, and 
they could hold on to each other. But soon some of the halves died while others lived on, 
and in succeeding generations, the offspring of mixed couples reproduced together 
without necessarily being the true other half. Eventually there are no true other halves. 
The result is that men continue the quest, but it is hopeless. (108) 
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To Plato, wholeness is hopeless, and yet we still gesture to it in the act of love, even as we are 
doomed to fail. The pursuit of love coincides with the pursuit of truth—also a project doomed to 
fail. Socrates never arrives at any definition of Justice in The Republic. In Phaedrus, he offers an 
account of eros, but only to take it back and offer yet another account, ending the dialogue with a 
meditation on the limits of the written word and how this medium of language fails us. In the 
Symposium, rather than offering a definition of eros once and for all, Plato displays multiple and 
often contradictory explanations for it, ending with the distractions of a drunken mob. Truth 
stands always at a remove, as elusive as Virginia Woolf’s Lighthouse. The most we can do is 
approach it as an asymptote. What Plato leaves behind is the vehicle to approach it—the dialogue 
itself, literally two halves summoned together in intercourse, pursuing love and truth as 
interchangeable categories.   
That original separation, or Urteil in German—the word for “judgment,” our faculty for 
pursuing philosophy in the first place—reveals that eros is at the heart of philosophy. It is the 
nothing, the negativity, the lack that compels us to reach for what we have lost. Plato rehearses 
this split again in The Republic, when Socrates speaks of philosophy and poetry as lovers who 
have suffered a bad breakup. But the poetry Socrates is speaking of is “ordinary,” written in the 
language of average everydayness—ironically, the same kind of language that Plato uses in his 
own novelistic dialogues (602B). Plato, then, marks the fault-line between philosophy and the 
novel, a fault-line in which the novel is at fault. My dissertation charts their relationship across 
time as an erotic one, and as a pessimistic one. Behind the veneer of deduction and induction, 
philosophy—like the novel—operates primarily by seduction. This is the story of how both 
philosophy and the novel are seduced back to each other in modernity.  
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Before the criminal biography and the Renaissance anatomy give us the modern novel, 
one thread of its history can be woven through the Platonic dialogue, the medieval Romance, and 
the fairy tale, encompassing multiple genres in its quest to find its long-lost lover in the form of 
philosophy. I focus on three twentieth-century novels that, in dialogue with each other, narrate 
this progression. The structure of Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse is modelled on Plato’s 
Symposium; D.H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover is a modern version of the medieval 
Tristan Romance; and Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita is a fairy tale that reimagines Hans Christian 
Andersen’s “The Little Mermaid.” Each of these novels offers its own model of eros as a 
pessimistic phenomenon. 
I then bookend this discussion by coming back to Symposium as a model for Søren 
Kierkegaard’s pessimism and experimentation with form as a way to unite philosophy and the 
novel in his Seducer’s Diary and in his literary reviews. I argue that The Seducer’s Diary can 
also be read as a template for Lolita, and I explore how his reflections on the novel in his literary 
reviews prefigure the philosophy laid out by Martin Heidegger in Being and Time. Both 
Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s focus on the experience of “average everydayness” coincides 
with the overall project of the novel. This is where these two ancient lovers rediscover each other 
in modernity. I end the dissertation by exploring the novel as a pedagogical device that offers an 






The secret of every pessimist is that we are all closet sentimentalists. The honest ones 
acknowledge where truth intersects with schmaltz.  
Embedded in acknowledgment is knowledge itself, and whatever I have written in this 
dissertation comes from having absorbed knowledge from too many people to count, but some 
have contributed to this knowledge in ways that deserve to be honored right here. 
I would first like to dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Ron and Dafna Ribitzky, 
who were even younger than I am now when they emigrated to a new country, struggling with a 
new language, and in this new language would read me bedtime stories from Hans Christian 
Andersen’s fairy tales and Charles and Mary Lamb’s Tales from Shakespeare. Even when none 
of us knew certain words, stumbling our way through comprehension, you carved out the first 
and perhaps only world that feels familiar to me, a world you would later populate with other 
stories and books that have shaped and continue to shape who I am. I remember how fiercely my 
dad defended me against my first grade teacher, who told me in such anger that I would never 
learn English. Even as you were also trying to navigate your way through this new language, you 
encouraged me to think of language itself as something to play with, to have fun with, to explore 
with joy and humor.  
I also remember impatiently announcing that I was tired of being a child at eleven, so my 
mom took me to a second-hand book store to get me an old copy of Buddenbrooks, which you 
laughed about on our way back home, telling me that the Russians would come next. You’ve 
guided me through the classics ever since, from Plato and Spinoza to Edmondo d’Amicis, 
Balzac, Stefan Zweig, Jack London, Hemingway, and Steinbeck. It has been an education that no 
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school could ever live up to. You also introduced me to Elena Ferrante before anyone else did, 
and the winter break we spent reading her together, at the same time, you in Hebrew and I in 
English, talking urgently to each other about what we had just finished after each reading break, 
was one of the most beautiful experiences for me. You taught me that art isn’t just central to 
education, but to life itself. If I get this PhD, it really belongs to you. 
I also wouldn’t have been able to write this without my grandparents, Mirjana and Sasha 
Gross. My introduction to Kafka—before I even knew it was him—was in my grandmother’s 
kitchen when she would tell his stories to me and my brother with a kind of joyful humor and 
levity. My grandfather also couldn’t speak about Nietzsche without laughing. This is how I wish 
all literature could be encountered. My memory of their living room, like walking into a past 
century, feels like a scene from Fanny and Alexander, and it always begins with the bookcase to 
the left of the entrance, an entire shelf lined with old volumes of the complete works of 
Shakespeare translated into German by Schlegel. 
My sister Romy uncluttered my mind and helped me along the path of this dissertation 
over the course of our long phone conversations about pessimism and optimism. You were the 
one to teach me, from an early age, that precision in language is important and beautiful, and is a 
source of strength and dignity. Thank you for sneaking me into Baz Luhrmann’s Romeo + Juliet 
in 1996 when I wasn’t allowed to see it. 
My sister Laury is my favorite artist, my comrade pessimist, my beloved twin. You 
taught me how to read my first book (The Prince’s Tooth is Loose), and you’ve been continuing 
to teach me ever since. You’ve let me read entire swathes of this dissertation over the phone to 
you, and you make me a better thinker, writer, and human. 
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My brother Roy will never stop giving me grief over the fact that I wrote a dissertation 
about literally Nothing. You get to make fun of me about this forever now, and not let me get 
away with anything pretentious, mon lecteur, mon semblable, mon frère. 
My aunt Tifrah Warner gave me invaluable guidance, wisdom, and love—not just 
through this process, but through so much more. 
I owe a special thank you to my committee. John Brenkman’s mentorship has steered me 
through this project for the past several years, giving me crucial insight and advice, along with 
the space and freedom to explore and develop my own academic voice, to experiment with ideas 
that I would later discard or reshape into something altogether different, and you were patient 
and generous enough to walk me through it all. I am also immensely grateful to Richard Kaye, 
who published my first article, “Cosmic Pessimism in Lady Chatterley’s Lover: D.H. Lawrence’s 
Tristan Legend for the Twentieth Century,” in The D.H. Lawrence Review (41.2). Giancarlo 
Lombardi has been my mentor from day one, guiding me through my first presentation in 
graduate school (on Roland Barthes’s Writing Degree Zero) as an MA student to the finish line 
of the dissertation. It is because of you and all of your help that I pursued a doctoral degree in 
Comparative Literature.   
Mary McGlynn has also been my champion and mentor for years—thank you so much 
for all the support and encouragement you have given me. 
I was incredibly lucky to have taken Diana Toman’s German translation class early in 
graduate school. She brought her encyclopedic knowledge to bear on how Thomas Mann, Kafka, 
Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche orchestrate their artistry through rigorous investigations into their 
use of grammar, diction, and syntax. These close readings of hers were, in themselves, works of 
art.  
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While discussing Nabokov with Anick Rolland, she suggested that I go back to 
Kierkegaard (and Feuerbach) just to see if there’s anything there for this dissertation, leading me 
to discover the overall structure that holds this project together. Our weekly lunches talking 
about pessimism, tragedy, and how horrible the world is gave me the calm and peace of mind 
that’s so hard to find elsewhere. My understanding of Hardy is also indebted to you. 
Liza Shapiro has seen and guided me through the best and worst of this process. Through 
the tears and the writing paralysis, you were literally by my side each Thursday for an entire 
semester as we both made a pact to help each other get through this final stage of the Ph.D.  
David Bradshaw gave me my love for Virginia Woolf when I was a rudderless student in 
college, majoring in Pre-Med and International Affairs, both of which were not a right fit for me. 
Ahead of me was a life like Charles Bovary’s, in a field I didn’t understand and had no talent in, 
when I signed up for my first English class as a junior, while studying abroad. Professor 
Bradshaw is the reason why I am here and why I can write a single word about Woolf. There is a 
Woolfian mingling of grief and a subdued joy at the memory of spending an hour a week in his 
medieval office at Worcester College in Oxford University, where I would read my papers out 
loud to him, and he wouldn’t let a stray word pass his forensic scrutiny. I wish I could show this 
to you now, and listen to what you have to say one last time. 
Beatrice Hanssen introduced me to Kant, Kleist, Kierkegaard, Benjamin, and Adorno as 
an undergraduate. Each lecture of hers was a masterpiece of illumination and precision, by now a 
nearly lost art form that had always struck me as being a relic from a centuries-old European 
style of formal teaching, and I would hang on to her every word breathlessly. She deepened my 
love for Thomas Mann, and—even despite her reserved demeanor—generously tolerated my 
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juvenile discussions of how German techno music was similar in its structure to The Arcades 
Project. 
Eugene Thacker and Simon Critchley graciously allowed me to sit in on their classes, 
which I would look forward to with an embarrassing degree of enthusiasm—and they were 
always so warm and patient with me. My understanding of tragedy and pessimism belongs to 
both of you. 
Charles Snyder deepened my understanding of tragedy, of philosophy, and of their 
correspondence.  
I wouldn’t be able to get through this graduate program without the help and generosity 
of several administrators and staff who worked so hard to ensure that my material conditions 
could allow me to do this work. I am immensely grateful to Carol Pierce, Anne Ellis, Jane 
Tartaro, Matt Schoengood, Junior Borrero, Miguel Perdomo, and everyone who has been there 
for me over the years.    
Behind this work on the novel is an engagement with a particular production of Hamlet, 
directed by Sam Gold at The Public Theater in the summer of 2017. We were already half a year 
into the nightmarish presidency, and paralyzing reports were coming in about children being 
separated from their parents at the border, using the Nazi tactic of random selection in the 
concentration camps. I went to see this play around the time that Heather Heyer was murdered in 
Charlottesville by a Neo-Nazi as she was protesting the Unite the Right rally, which Trump 
defended by saying that there were “very fine people on both sides.” For months, we all knew 
that we were only in the beginning of a particularly horrific chapter in history, one we may not 
recover from. Seeing Oscar Isaac perform Hamlet, speaking of “the insolence of office” as 
Hamlet himself was navigating his way through the rot of a state disintegrating into tyranny, 
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gave this play an entirely new urgency for me. This production also gave me new energy to get 
back into the dissertation. Freud debated the differences between mourning and melancholia, and 
Benjamin saw this play as a Trauerspiel instead of a tragedy. Is Hamlet in mourning, or is he just 
melancholic, or both? Is this a tragedy, is this a Trauerspiel, or is this something else? Maybe it 
tapped into the kind of pessimism I was trying to work out in the novel—a pessimism that, like 
Hamlet himself, withdrew from action. And yet this inaction, also like the inaction of this 
particular Hamlet, was so energetically, athletically, and breathlessly staged. Pessimism clings to 
territory that tragedy lays equal claim to, and yet in doing so, there are surprising moments of 
genuine humor and even joy (as opposed to the patronizingly insufferable, over-acted, and 
heavy-handed humor that often ruins Shakespeare plays). Pessimism doles out reason after 
reason for why life isn’t worth living, just as Hamlet does—and yet, in doing so, maybe it’s 
performing the more strenuous work of trying to, as Nietzsche would put it, actually “say yes” to 
life, even in the face of the worst. Oscar Isaac made Hamlet’s struggle convincing and necessary 
in a way I have never experienced before. This production of Hamlet is the pessimistic 
affirmation I can hold on to as we continue our descent into the worst. Schlegel saw Shakespeare 
as providing one of the foundations for the modern novel; this production, in turn, is one of the 
foundations for my dissertation on the novel.    
I am grateful for the Dissertation Fellowship of 2019-2020, without which I would not 
have been able to finish this work.  
Thank you, also, to André Aciman, who accepted me as an M.A. student to the 
Comparative Literature department at the Graduate Center in the first place. And to Giancarlo 






In writing this dissertation, I’ve been spending a lot of time thinking about the 
devastating consequences of the World Wars—of Lukács’s pessimism, of Woolf’s grief, of 
Lawrence’s despair, of Auerbach’s and Nabokov’s exile, of Benjamin’s melancholia, of 
Heidegger’s shameful politics—and of the few stories that have passed down to me from my 
own family, especially in light of the rise of fascism in this country right now. My grandmother’s 
uncle, Armie von Meixner, wanted to carry the family’s tradition of artistry, having descended 
from the composer Johann Nepomuk Hummel—the disciple of Mozart, Haydn, and Salieri, as 
well as a friend of Beethoven, whom he had protected by championing copyright laws for artists 
after seeing the horrific demise of Mozart, left penniless in the wake of an illustrious career. 
Armie wanted to be an artist instead of a soldier when World War I broke out, a war he 
vehemently denounced. He was forced into fighting, and died from a wound to the stomach on 
the Eastern Front. His brother Egon, who later spoke out against the Nazis in Vienna, was 
subsequently arrested, tortured, and put into an insane asylum for his subversive politics, where 
he was killed.  
Their mother Juliana had kept a diary in verse documenting these horrors, as though the 
rigid verse form could provide some structure in the midst of chaos. The only other books we 
have of hers are a biography of Hummel and an illustrated copy of Andersen’s fairy tales in 
German, passed down through the generations. Juliana’s daughter Edith, the younger sister of 
Armie and Egon, went to art school in Paris, where she met Picasso, Miró, and Matisse, and then 
married Antonje Georgijević, a Yugoslav lawyer, economist, and mayor, who also spoke out 
against both fascism and communism in his country and was later imprisoned and murdered for 
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his opposition. Edith, having come from Austrian nobility, was left an impoverished widow with 
two young daughters in Communist Yugoslavia, one of them my grandmother, Mirjana Gross. 
After surviving both wars, Edith worked as a translator of German, French, and English in a 
quiet effort to piece the fragments of European culture back together. And even as her eyesight 
rapidly failed her, she painted until she could see no longer, and in her paintings, like Lily 







…[For] the readers who possibly could be harmed by reading the preface: they could skip over 
it, and if they skipped far enough so that they skipped over the essay as well, it is of no 
consequence. 





…[There] is a straight line of development between the gospel of happiness and the construction 
of camps of extermination so far off in Poland that each of our own countrymen can convince 
himself that he cannot hear the screams of pain. That is the model of an unhampered happiness. 
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LOVE IN THE TIME OF CORONA 
 
This dissertation was completed during the outbreak of the Coronavirus, a world event 
that is exposing the dangers of optimism—in our current infrastructure, our healthcare, our 
economy, our governments. This pandemic was entirely avoidable—it never needed to reach 
these global proportions. The U.S. saw what was happening in China for months, and then in 
Italy, and was fatally slow to react despite all the warnings, even as it began spreading here. In 
2018, the Trump administration “had fired the entire pandemic response chain of command, 
including White House management infrastructure” (Garrett, Foreign Policy). By December 
2020 the administration knew that the virus was going to be a major threat; in February, the 
World Health Organization had offered the U.S. testing kits for the virus, but Trump rejected 
them, “concerned that high infection numbers might dent his reelection chances” (Porter, 
Business Insider). As Politico reporter Dan Diamond told Terry Gross on National Public Radio, 
Trump “has also created an environment where his aides have been afraid to tell him bad news, 
and that has skewed what the Trump administration ends up pursuing. If the President is only 
willing to look at the most optimistic scenario, it makes it very hard to do worst-case planning.” 
This is the hell of optimism we are living and dying in. As the virus spread like wildfire 
throughout the country and the world, the Federal Reserve funneled $1.5 trillion into the Stock 
Market for a half-hour rise before stocks continued plummeting again instead of infusing this 
money into an emergency relief fund. Meanwhile, despite early and unequivocal calls from the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to stay at home at all costs to prevent the further 
spread of the disease, managers across the country demanded for weeks that staff continue 
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showing up to work. For those who live paycheck to paycheck, they had no say in the matter, but 
were forced to risk their lives for an ideology and an economic system that values profit over 
human life. This is as much a crisis of capitalism, of hubris, of lethal stupidity, and also of evil—
both banal and carefully orchestrated—as it is a crisis of public health.   
The Stock Market fiasco took place on March 11th, 2020, the same day that WHO 
declared this crisis a pandemic. Four days and 1,891 global virus-related deaths later1 brought us 
to March 15th, the anniversary of the Ides of March. As Julius Caesar made his way to the Senate 
on this day in 44 BCE, hoping to be declared king of Rome, a Greek scholar by the name of 
Artemidorus breathlessly ran after him in the hopes of putting an urgent letter in his hands. The 
letter warned Caesar of the impending plot to assassinate him, but the optimistic Caesar couldn’t 
be bothered to take it seriously. The foreign scholar did all he could to prevent the catastrophe, 
but was brushed off.  
In the figure of Artemidorus is the archetype, the fear, and the fate of perhaps every 
scholar in the humanities. To be a scholar is, to varying degrees, to be a pessimist—to devote 
one’s life to the pursuit of the truth and to see this pursuit trivialized, dismissed, and cast aside by 
those who could benefit from it most. There is a futility and an absurdity that haunts the life of 
the scholar, a life of meager wages—especially in the current market for positions in the 
humanities, coupled with insurmountable student loan debt that could have easily been 
discharged by the price it took to cause that thirty-minute blip in the Stock Market—but it is a 
life that nevertheless demands labor around the clock that, from the outside world, may seem 
entirely frivolous. Having to justify this work at all is itself a humiliating and pessimistic task. 
We will always be seen as outsiders, as foreigners, to what really matters. To be a scholar is to be 
 
1 “Corona Virus Death Toll.” https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/coronavirus-death-toll/. Accessed 20 
March 2020. 
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a Greek in Rome. It is to be convinced of the necessity and urgency of one’s own letter, of what 
one has to say, only to see it unacknowledged by the addressee. There is a difference, to be sure, 
between the scholar in a lab coat currently working on the Coronavirus vaccine, and the scholar 
who can reflect on similar circumstances through the works of Boccaccio and Camus. While 
there is no doubt that we need the scientists desperately searching for a vaccine, there still ought 
to be room in this world for the Boccaccio scholar. Maybe it’s because the world doesn’t heed 
the work of scholarship in the humanities that we find ourselves in the current predicament. And 
even if we do start paying more attention to this scholarship on a global level, probably little will 
change. A pessimistic outlook no matter how you see it. 
Georg Lukács, writing in a time similar to ours, when he saw the world collapsing in the 
First World War, another entirely avoidable catastrophe of unprecedented carnage, fought on the 
basis of stupidity, absurdity, and a nationalist fervor that now again is in the ascendant, turned to 
the novel as a way to articulate his pessimism. What he ended up writing in 1915 was the first 
systematic theory of the novel, the complete title of which is: The Theory of the Novel: A 
Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature. At first, he wanted to 
model it on Boccaccio’s Decameron, seeing his own political situation as analogous with the 
plague of Florence. But he scrapped that structure, taking his inspiration instead from Friedrich 
Schlegel, who only gestures to a possible theory of the novel in his Symposium-like “Dialogue on 
Poetry” in 1799.  
Chapter 1 of this dissertation, “A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Novelistic Form 
of Pessimism,” borrowing from the subtitle of his Theory of the Novel, is written in response to 
Lukács, and in the same pessimistic mood as his. In this chapter, I compare Lukács with Mikhail 
Bakhtin, both of whom were influenced by Schlegel. The story I tell about the history of the 
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novel is a somatic one, exploring how this genre is rooted in the body, which Bakhtin charts in 
his Dialogic Imagination. My story of the novel is one that emphasizes the physical sigh of 
disappointment, the Bakhtinian laughter of both joy and spite, and the aches and pains that begin 
and end with the feet—the ped- being the root of the word pessimism, that part of our body 
closest to the ground, under which we all inevitably will end up. Every step we take in life is a 
pas, a step toward our own negation.  
The original Decameron-like plan that Lukács had in mind for his Theory of the Novel 
came to fruition in Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain, published less than a decade after 
Theory of the Novel, and even includes a “fictionalized version of Lukács” himself in the 
character of Naphta (Arac 191). Set in a sanitorium, this novel explores the history of the 
Western intellectual tradition from the voices of characters who are constantly reminded of their 
failing health and their weak bodies. If their illnesses do not kill them, the impending First World 
War does. 
The Magic Mountain can be read as a palimpsest not only of the Decameron, but—like 
Schlegel’s “Dialogue on Poetry”—of Plato’s Symposium, with its attendant focus on the body as 
something inadequate and incomplete, even as it strives for pleasure and a fleeting, illusory 
fulfillment that can only ever be disappointed. The joviality of Plato’s interlocutors is 
underscored, as it is in The Magic Mountain, by the impending devastation of war, ushering the 
end of the Golden Age of Greece. In Symposium, which I argue is a novel, we get the narrative of 
how our bodies had been split in two, and how eros emerges from that rift as a pessimistic 
consolation. We have inherited the trauma of that split, spending our lives searching for other 
halves that do not exist, because the possibility of finding that other half was only ever available 
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to the first generation of those cosmic beings that were split in two. And yet we embark on this 
absurd quest nonetheless: this is what makes us human. 
That original separation, or Urteil in German—the word for “judgment,” our faculty for 
pursuing philosophy in the first place—reveals that eros is at the heart of philosophy. It is the 
nothing, the negativity, the lack that compels us to reach for what we have lost. Plato rehearses 
this split again in The Republic, when Socrates speaks of philosophy and poetry as lovers who 
have suffered a bad breakup. Aside from Schlegel, Bakhtin, and Julia Kristeva, what classical 
scholars have largely overlooked is that the poetry Socrates is speaking of is “ordinary,” written 
in the language of average everydayness—ironically, the same kind of language that Plato uses 
in his own novelistic dialogues (602B). Plato, then, marks the fault-line between philosophy and 
the novel, a fault-line in which the novel is at fault. My dissertation charts their relationship 
across time as an erotic one, and as a pessimistic one.  
Pessimism, like the novel, is kept at arm’s length from philosophy. It is not systematic 
enough, not rational enough; it is by turns whiny and furious, flippant and lethargic. It dwells in 
the genre of the rant and the insult. It comes off as juvenile and self-indulgent, as opposed to 
Kant’s injunction to grow up and be self-aware (“What is Enlightenment?” 18). It responds to the 
vision of the Enlightenment and self-improvement with conceptualizing the blind Will and 
annihilation. Pessimism works through the pent-up frustration that we see in the genre of the 
Renaissance anatomy rather than sober, philosophical analysis.  
Banned from Socrates’ ideal republic, despite the history of a complicated relationship, 
pessimism and the novel lie outside the law. They are criminalized. It is no coincidence that the 
modern novel, after its origins in Plato, emerges out of the confluence of the criminal biography 
and the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century anatomy, a genre also rooted in criminality until the 
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Renaissance. Pessimism and the novel find each other, gravitate to each other, and together find 
their way back into philosophy. From Socrates’ critique of ordinariness, folded ironically into 
Plato’s ordinary language, to Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s focus on the experience of average 
everydayness, I examine how the projects of philosophy and the novel overlap. Behind the 
philosophical strategies of deduction and induction, the method at work is actually one of 
seduction. Novels seduce us in the same way that Socrates seduces Phaedrus and Alcibiades. We 
are seduced by the eros that emerges in the tension between philosophy and the novel.   
I move from The Magic Mountain as a novel of failed theories to a number of failed 
theories about the novel. From there, I arrive at the conclusion that one of the consistent claims 
that can be made about the novel is that no other genre as a whole has encountered as much of a 
sustained backlash over the centuries. The word “novel” was used in the Renaissance as an insult 
to undermine the veracity of an account that lay claim to the truth, often in the context of 
criminal accounts. This insult emerges at the same time that the word “Machiavellian” also 
becomes an insult, coinciding with the newly literate readership due to the printing press. 
Machiavelli writes The Prince in the vernacular Italian for the “newly-risen man.” This “newly-
risen man” is not just the target reader of The Prince, but the subject of the modern novel, 
developing across the centuries until we get the idea of the “new man” as the “man-god” in Ivan 
Karamazov’s fever dream. By articulating this vision of a “new man,” the novel operates as a 
cultural seismograph that registers the changing power structures of a new world order. 
No shift in power and meaning was more cataclysmic than the Copernican turn of the 
Renaissance, later used as a metaphor for the Kantian Enlightenment. Under the Ptolemaic 
universe, all meaning could be decoded by the stars. But now that this system had been shattered, 
any transcendental meaning was in crisis, and the subject, as Bakhtin documents, turned inward 
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to the body to find meaning there instead. Centuries later, when Flaubert writes in Madame 
Bovary that language can only ever be “like a cracked kettle on which we beat out tunes for bears 
to dance to, when we long to inspire pity in the stars,” he is essentially writing the emblem of the 
novel writ large, as something that never strays far from the body, even in its doomed quest to 
inspire pity in the stars (167). But this movement from the stars to the body had already been 
narrated in Plato’s Symposium, where we are all reminded that we are descendants from the stars 
and planets, but are now left with no meaning to hold onto except for the loss inscribed into our 
bodies. The space of the novel accommodates the novelty of this predicament, a predicament that 
is always new every time we encounter eros. 
The history of the novel moves from the Platonic dialogue through the Romance and the 
fairy tale, encompassing multiple genres in its quest to find its long-lost lover in the form of 
philosophy. I focus on three twentieth-century novels that, in dialogue with each other, narrate 
this progression. The structure of Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse is modelled on Plato’s 
Symposium (Chapter Two); D.H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover is a modern version of the 
medieval Tristan Romance (Chapter Three); and Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita is a fairy tale that 
reimagines Hans Christian Andersen’s “The Little Mermaid” (Chapter Four). Each of these 
novels offers its own model of eros as a pessimistic phenomenon. 
In Chapter Five, I focus on Søren Kierkegaard’s pessimism and experimentation with 
form as a way to unite philosophy and the novel in his Seducer’s Diary and in his literary 
reviews. I argue that The Seducer’s Diary can also be read as a template for Lolita, and I explore 
how his reflections on the novel in his literary reviews prefigure the philosophy laid out by 
Martin Heidegger in Being and Time. In Chapter Six, I look at how Heidegger’s magnum opus, 
in its treatment of “average everydayness,” coincides with the overall project of the novel, which 
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articulates this same experience. In Chapter Seven, I look at the novel as offering an alternative 





A HISTORICO-PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON THE NOVELISTIC FORM OF PESSIMISM 
 
The Dissertation: A Genre of Failure 
How does one defend a dissertation on pessimism? In pessimism—what Eugene Thacker 
calls “the most indefensible of philosophies”—I would imagine, one can only hope to offend, if 
one can even hope at all (Infinite Resignation 38). But maybe pessimism is not quite so 
aspirational. Maybe, instead of seeking to offend, it would just rather fend off. It pre-empts and 
fends off criticism by hurling incendiary claims that may not even be substantiated, that may not 
necessarily rise to the level of an argument to be argued against, because what’s the point. 
Swatting away gadflies, all those Socrateses who are always so eager for a debate, pessimism 
instead disengages, withdraws, retreats into a hermetic space fueled by its own curmudgeonly 
disappointment—in the world, in itself. It fends off; it would prefer not to. “I know you… and I 
want nothing to say to you,” the voice of pessimism addresses its would-be interlocuter the way 
Bartleby addresses—and dismisses—the narrator of his own story at the end, when he is locked 
away in The Tombs (Melville 32). And instead of engaging, he just persists in staring out into 
the void, into the abyss, swallowed by silence. 
Where the dissertation aims at animating and enlivening a rich academic discussion, 
pessimism understands its destination to be the Office of Dead Letters. “What the title ‘PhD’ 
indicates” for Thacker is “much reading and little retention” (173). Where the dissertation makes 
a gesture toward the exhaustive, pessimism wallows in the exhausting. Where the dissertation 
aims at a logical, systematic treatment of a well-researched subject, pessimism sneers at such 
systematicity, suspicious even of logic itself. “Let it be the ambition of learned doctoral 
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candidates,” Kierkegaard taunts us in The Seducer’s Diary, “to avoid every contradiction” (112). 
So if there is any ambition in a dissertation on pessimism, not to be trolled by Kierkegaard, it 
would be the ambition to seek out and embrace the contradiction, the lacuna, the dead end. Its 
subject and its telos is failure. It is a literal Aufgabe—a task, but also an act of aufgeben, of 
giving up. It is a rejection of the maudlin, but unfortunately ubiquitous, interpretation of 
Beckett’s injunction to “Fail better.” Rather than making progress and getting better despite a 
series of setbacks or failures, I read Beckett’s advice more literally: to get better at failure itself. 
Failure is not a means but the goal. There is an art to it that, ironically, can be perfected. Perhaps 
this is the only aspiration that pessimism can allow itself. There is a “point at which writing 
about pessimism must become pessimistic writing,” so a dissertation on this subject—by 
embracing the Kierkegaardian contradiction, without resolution—would inevitably no longer be 
a dissertation (Thacker 38). Or it would just be a failed one. 
 It is only through irony, then, that the dissertation can be seen as an appropriate genre to 
approach pessimism, that mode of thinking which never quite sat comfortably in academia. The 
arch-pessimist of the twentieth century, E.M. Cioran, enrolled in a doctoral program at the 
Sorbonne when he was twenty-six just to use their cafeteria, waiting for them to catch on to the 
fact that he had never planned on writing, let alone finishing, an actual dissertation (they finally 
deactivated his student ID when he was forty). He hated university as much as he hated church, 
but would make his rounds to the Romanian Orthodox Church for their free dinners, as well, 
never missing a chance to insult anyone who had the stupidity to actually believe in God while 
he was there (Bradatan, LA Review of Books). His practice of biting the hand that feeds you 
turned that cliché into an art—perhaps this is the emblem of the spite at the core of pessimism 
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itself, and maybe it’s not even nearly as obnoxious as the smarmy, disingenuous rhetoric of 
gratitude peddled by optimists.  
The arch-pessimist of the nineteenth century, Schopenhauer—who labelled  optimism 
“not only a false but also a pernicious doctrine” (The World as Will and Representation II 584)—
takes an especially gleeful tone when he writes, “Your University professors are bound to preach 
optimism; and it is an easy and agreeable task to upset their theories” (4-5). Not the soundest 
advice, and maybe not even the most accurate of characterizations, but Schopenhauer lived by 
his word. He applied to teach at the University of Berlin so he could insult Hegel, that “clumsy 
charlatan”—who was not only on his search committee but also Chair of the Philosophy 
department and the most famous philosopher in Europe by that time—to his face (“On the 
Fourfold Root” xviii; Cartwright 363). The fifty-year old Hegel was so unimpressed that he 
couldn’t even be bothered to pay much attention to this ranting thirty-two-year old pessimist. He 
hired him, and Schopenhauer made sure to schedule his classes at the same time as Hegel’s, 
knowing full well that hardly anyone, if at all, would sign up for his own classes when they could 
attend the lectures of the celebrity thinker (Cartwright 363). All of Schopenhauer’s furious 
rampage failed to get a response in kind. Instead of the legendary showdown he had hoped for, 
he got a job offer instead, and Hegel neither avoided nor paid much notice to him, ultimately 
demonstrating the futility, the utter inconsequentiality, of pessimism at work.   
Obviously not everyone gets rewarded for such chutzpah with a professorship. 
Feuerbach, one student of Hegel’s who did show up to most of his lectures—all of them in a 
two-year period, except for the lectures on aesthetics, even though he sat through the lectures on 
logic twice—couldn’t find a senior teaching post after the publication of his first book, Thoughts 
on Death and Immortality (Michaud, Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Western Theology). 
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On top of this, he also sent a letter to Hegel explaining where he went wrong (no one is claiming 
that pessimists have the best tact). Maybe Feuerbach should have attended the lectures of his 
fellow atheist Schopenhauer instead.   
And then there are the scholars who famously had not even gotten that far, having failed 
their dissertation defenses. Mikhail Bakhtin’s defense consisted of “several stormy meetings (one 
lasting seven hours) until the government finally stepped in: in the end the State Accrediting 
Bureau denied his doctorate” (Holquist xxv). A decade before this, he had submitted a book-
length study on the eighteenth-century German novel, which had been accepted for publication 
before getting lost in the War. He used the only other copy for paper to roll cigarettes as the 
Germans invaded the Soviet Union (xxiv). He had abandoned other unpublished manuscripts in a 
rat-infested wood-shed, and would only agree to publish them decades later after being 
persuaded by his friends during “strenuous arguments” (xxv). Maybe this is what counts as 
failing better.      
Walter Benjamin’s awe-inspiring The Origin of German Tragic Drama was also rejected 
by his committee for being too weird, too much of a collage. But then, almost as a punchline to a 
joke, his response to being rejected for this bizarre method of scholarship was to come out later 
with the monstrously unwieldy Arcades Project. If The Origin of German Tragic Drama was a 
failure, then failure was an art that he would only continue to master, to perfect, and to expand in 
the form of a kaleidoscopic architecture on the largest scale that would force academics to 
rethink scholarship from the ground up.  
Benjamin’s defense was in 1923, as the Nazis were beginning to spread their tentacles 
throughout Germany. Ten years later, on the day that Hitler suspended democratic powers, 
Theodor Adorno’s dissertation on Kierkegaard appeared in bookstores (Hullot-Kentor xi). The 
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dissertation passed, but only after his first dissertation, on Kant and Freud, was rejected by Hans 
Cornelius as an “unworthy topic” (xii). Even so, this Kierkegaard study is hardly read today. 
Adorno himself tried to establish as much distance as he could from this early work, and even 
now not nearly enough research has been done into the effect of Kierkegaard on Adorno’s 
thought.2  
As for Kierkegaard himself, he described the work on his own dissertation as a “pursuit 
that does not interest me in the least” (The Concept of Irony 424). His public defense, like 
Bakhtin’s a century later, lasted seven and a half hours, and was his “first and last participation 
in the official academic life of the University of Copenhagen” (xi). He passed his defense just 
barely, and not without some censure over his “self-indulgent” style and “simple tastelessness,” 
as one of his committee members put it (qtd. in Pattison 46). He quickly turned back to his own 
pursuits, and churned out the more creative Seducer’s Diary four months later, including it in 
Either/Or, to be published a year after that (The Concept of Irony xxv). He drafted a postscript to 
Either/Or that read, “I hereby retract this book. …Yet I do not need to retract it, for I have never 
claimed to be its author” (The Seducer’s Diary viii). He never published that postscript, but 
Kierkegaard’s impulse to retract his writing can be traced to his first publication, a lengthy book 
review of Hans Christian Andersen. The review begins with, “Postscript for the readers who 
possibly could be harmed by reading the preface: they could skip over it, and if they skipped far 
 
2 Hullot-Kentor sees a continuity of interest in Kierkegaard throughout Adorno’s career: “In 1940 he gave a talk, 
later published in English as ‘Kierkegaard’s Doctrine of Love,’ to a seminar convened by Paul Tillich in New York 
City, where both had emigrated several years earlier. […] In 1963, six years before his death, he wrote ‘Kierkegaard 
One More Time,’ a study of Kierkegaard’s last publications, their political implications and his polemic against the 
established church” (xii). Adorno’s formative years coincided with the “Kierkegaard renaissance” of the 1920s that 
had also influenced Jaspers and Heidegger (xii). And from “a letter of Siegfried Kracauer to Leo Lowenthal, dated 
1923, it is evident that the twenty-year-old Adorno was already completely familiar with Kierkegaard’s writings and 
perhaps spoke an adolescent Kierkegaardese: ‘If Teddie one day makes a real declaration of his love… it will 
undoubtedly take such a difficult form that the young lady will have to have read the whole of Kierkegaard… to 
understand Teddie at all’” (xii). 
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enough so that they skipped over the essay as well, it is of no consequence” (Early Polemical 
Writings 59). Maybe this is the exhortation of all pessimistic writers: skip the introduction, skip 
the entire work if you’d like, skip the whole thing while you’re at it—it doesn’t matter. 
Georg Lukács, also one of the first philosophers in the twentieth century to take 
Kierkegaard’s thought seriously, articulated his own pessimism in his early work, The Theory of 
the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Literature, the first study of 
its kind to treat the novel as a subject worthy of rigorous philosophical inquiry, and sees it as a 
work of art that arises out of—and reflects—a world “beyond hope” (38). He identifies the 
“artistic task” of the novelist as “revealing the point at which such a character’s being-there and 
being-thus coincides with his inevitable failure” (116). This is a work “written in a mood of 
permanent despair over the state of the world” in the outbreak of the First World War (12). 
Reflecting on this work nearly fifty years after its first publication, Lukács himself rejected it as 
an “attempt which failed both in design and in execution…” (17). He explains that the “ethically-
tinged pessimism” in the book, 
vis-à-vis the present does not, however, signify a general turning back from Hegel to 
Fichte, but, rather, a ‘Kierkegaardisation’ of the Hegelian dialectic of history. 
Kierkegaard always played an important role for the author of The Theory of the Novel, 
who, long before Kierkegaard had become fashionable, wrote an essay on the relationship 
between his life and thought. (18) 
The Theory of the Novel and Adorno’s Kierkegaard dissertation belong to a pessimistic genre of 
works (often early in the writer’s career) that are not even as vehemently rejected by others—
whether it is the general public or other academics—as much as by the writers, themselves.  
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Not even half a century before The Theory of the Novel, Nietzsche published The Birth of 
Tragedy—the subtitle of which is Hellenism and Pessimism—in 1872, to be followed by his own 
relentless self-excoriation in the years after. At twenty-eight, he had already been the Chair of 
the Philology Department at The University of Basel for three years when he had published this 
book. But the future embarrassment he had felt must have been the equivalent of coming across 
his teenage diary—an extended love letter to Wagner, and now it was available for the world to 
see. It wasn’t enough for him to write, in a later edition, an “Attempt at a Self-Criticism” to 
dilute the fawning preface that had written in 1871. He had to follow it up with The Case of 
Wagner, in which he dismissed the composer as a disease—“une névrose,” using a Gallicism for 
this German who despised the French (§5, 166).  
It is worth noting, in this vein, that Erich Auerbach, writing Mimesis in exile—tracing the 
history of Western narrative from the Homeric epic to the modern novel with Virginia Woolf—
claims to give a comprehensive account of “Western Literature” in his subtitle, but not once does 
he focus on the Germans, erasing them from his history just as much as they tried to erase his 
from theirs with the rise of Nazism. He was tempted to label his research into narrative as 
“existential realism,” but “recoiled” from it, perhaps to avoid the language of his former 
colleague at Marburg University—and subsequent Nazi Rector of the University of Freiburg: 
Martin Heidegger (Mimesis 560).3 Nietzsche, however, wasn’t as subtle when it came to shading 
his own nemesis. The Case of Wagner itself is hardly long enough to be called a book, and yet it 
is composed of a Preface, and then a Postscript, and then a Second Postscript, and then an 
 
3 Auerbach comes close to using this Heideggerian language in Mimesis: “The serious treatment of everyday reality, 
the rise of more extensive and socially inferior human groups to the position of subject matter for problematic-
existential representation [problematisch-existentieller Darstellung], on the one hand; on the other, the embedding 
of random persons and events in the general course of contemporary history, the fluid historical background—these, 
we believe, are the foundations of modern realism” (491). He does, however, end with the term “modern realism” 
instead of “existential realism.” 
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Epilogue, as if to say, I am not done insulting you, I will never be done, and I can’t believe I 
wrote that awful, cringeworthy thing back when I was trying to make a career for myself in 
academia.   
What is it that makes an author reject their own work? Why would Chaucer lead us 
through the unfinished Canterbury Tales, in all its raucous, bawdy humor, only to abruptly end 
the manuscript after the dull, humorless “Parson’s Tale” with a note that he recants everything he 
had written there? Why did Fakhraddin Gorgani do the same thing at the end of Vis and Ramin, 
the precursor to the European Tristan legend? Or, more famously, Kafka on his death bed, 
insisting that Max Brod burn his remaining manuscripts, which would have deprived the 
twentieth century of some its most pivotal articulations of modern experience? Why did 
Nabokov, on at least two occasions that are known to us, take the only manuscript of Lolita that 
he had, and start feeding its pages to the garden incinerator before his wife Véra grabbed the 
charred remains with her bare hands and stomped on them to put out the flames? (Strong 
Opinions 105).4 Are these ironic performances of self-rejection rather than rejection itself? 
This gesture of self-rejection and self-contradiction—to take up Kierkegaard’s challenge 
of facing the contradiction head on—can be traced back to Socrates, especially in Plato’s 
Phaedrus. Socrates himself is at his most self-contradictory here. This is the only time we see 
him outside of the city walls of Athens: “…landscapes and trees have nothing to teach me—only 
the people in the city can do that” (230D). He is both outside and out of his element, literally in a 
state of ecstasy, but he still finds a comfortable place to philosophize under the shade of a “tall 
and very broad” plane tree—in Greek, a platonos (230B). Framed and enveloped by this 
platonos, by Plato himself, he reluctantly gives a speech, even though he is more comfortable 
 
4 Robert Roper points out that, “Véra came to the rescue because she was nearby; he did not start fires when his wife 
was out of the house” (149). Nabokov was most likely just being dramatic. 
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with the short interrogatory dialogue, the elenchus. But Socrates reads his audience well: 
Phaedrus is someone who likes speeches, so Socrates gives him what he wants. He delivers a 
speech about the evils of eros, about how it makes you go mad and do things you otherwise 
would not do.  
He hardly even makes his way to the end of the speech when an astonishing thing 
happens, which is rare for Socrates: he steps back, admits his mistake, erases everything he had 
previously said, and begins again—this time more eloquently, more lyrically, praising eros to the 
heavens, where our souls once had wings, and these wings allowed us to stare down cosmic 
distances so that we could see the spectacle of Truth and Beauty (all we know on earth—to 
Keats, at least—and apparently all we need to know). This spectacle was populated by the ideal 
Forms from which we derive all our understanding of the universe and our connection to it. It is 
only when we lose our wings that we fall down to earth, forgetting our cosmic past, but glimpses 
of beauty down here stimulate our memory, and we recollect that vision again through love.  
Socrates’ conclusion is that eros is divine; to speak ill of the deity or of the deity’s effects 
on us would be sacrilege. It is precisely this charge, along with corrupting the youth of Athens 
(which may or may not apply to what he is doing here with Phaedrus), that would ultimately lead 
to his fatal sentencing. Alexander Nehamas, for one, implicitly refutes this charge because he 
doesn’t interpret this dialogue as a case of Socrates as the older lover seducing Phaedrus as the 
younger beloved, but rather as a situation in which Socrates is essentially providing Phaedrus 
with a manual of how to be an older lover in pursuit of the beloved (xiv). This is the original 
seducer’s diary, and it is no coincidence that Kierkegaard chose Socrates as the focal point for 
his dissertation on irony as he was also working on his own Seducer’s Diary.  
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Socrates, the champion of reason, abandons the formal strategies of deduction and 
induction from his other dialogues and resorts to seduction as his ultimate strategy. He seduces 
us into philosophy. Philosophy is an understanding of who we are, where we came from, and 
maybe even where we’re headed. So what Socrates is doing is essentially seducing us not only to 
ourselves, but to the narrative of ourselves as we develop across time. Through philosophy, we 
fall in love with ourselves and our cosmic origins, just as the younger beloved, in the presence of 
the older lover, hardly realizes that “he is seeing himself in the lover as in a mirror,” which 
explains his concept of “backlove” (255D-E). Or, to use a more sinister phrase from Lolita, 
seduction is the process by which we become “safely solipsized” (60). 
The other Platonic text that illustrates eros and the nature of seduction is Symposium, in 
which we also see Socrates in a curious state of withdrawal, withholding his own speech about 
eros in order to ventriloquize Diotima’s narrative account of it as a contradictory being, the love-
child born from poverty and resource. Eros is the motor of irony; it pushes us outside of 
ourselves in order to rediscover ourselves. This point is most memorably illustrated by 
Aristophanes, the famous comedian who ironically delivers the most earnest speech in the text, a 
pessimistic myth about our fallen nature—about how we had descended from cosmic beings who 
were punished for not obeying the Olympian gods and were therefore split in half as we came 
tumbling down to earth.5 That first generation sought desperately to reunite with the other half; 
some succeeded in finding each other while others resigned themselves to dying alone or uniting 
with halves that didn’t belong to them. Eros is that weak consolation for having been torn 
asunder, and is just as much an expression of grief as it is of fleeting joy. Every succeeding 
 
5 Allan Bloom notes that, “Unlike the cosmic gods, Olympian gods demand worship. Socrates found it much less 
difficult to believe in the cosmic deities than in these Olympian ones. In the Apology he does not even attempt to 
prove that he believes in the Olympian gods, but he does say that he has never denied that the sun and moon are 
gods” (106). 
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generation functions as though they have another missing half to pursue, but that was only a 
possibility for the originally separated generation. We have inherited the trauma of this split, but 
are occluded from any true reconciliation. “Eventually there are no true other halves,” Alan 
Bloom explains. “The result is that men continue the quest, but it is hopeless” (108). And yet we 
are seduced anyways—to ourselves, or to a false image of ourselves, and maybe even to this 
pessimistic myth itself. 
 
From a Failed Theory of the Novel to a Novel of Failed Theories: Schlegel, Lukács, Mann 
 What are these texts that Plato wrote? They are classified as “dialogues,” for lack of a 
better word, even when they involve more than two speakers. It has become something of a 
cliché to note how similar the genre is to the genre of tragedy that Socrates reviled at the end of 
The Republic. Even as Socrates was fantasizing about exiling the tragic poets from his ideal 
republic, Plato himself was inscribing Socrates into a tragedy that also relied on dialogue, in 
which this historical figure reached a mythological status as a tragic hero, punished by the state 
as Antigone was, in pursuit of a higher, divine truth. Plato’s irony winks at us from the structure 
of these so-called dialogues, as when Phaedrus ends with a myth about the dangers of writing in 
a text that, obviously, is written.6 His Socrates hates drama but takes the leading role in the 
dramatic dialogues.  
But maybe this misses the point. Plato’s dialogues, even in structure, have little to do 
with drama. Nothing terribly dramatic or even theatrical happens here. In Symposium, we don’t 
even get the immediacy of a dialogue, but a narrated account, from hearsay, of what Aristodemus 
had told Apollodorus. The text is not even a secondhand account, but a thirdhand one—what 
 
6 Cf. Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy” (61-171). 
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we’re getting is not what Aristodemus tells Apollodorus, but what Apollodorus tells an 
anonymous friend, of a party he hadn’t even been to. The emphasis, then, is on fictional 
embellishment rather than on the kind of truth one would expect from a transcript—or a script of 
any kind. And in this narrated account, we just get a series of other narrated stories. And in all of 
these dialogues, we don’t get the stately verse of tragedy, but the ordinary prose of everyday 
speech. 
Ordinariness, it turns out, is what Socrates hates most about mimesis, other than the fact 
that it leads us away from the truth. “Therefore, imitation, an ordinary thing,” he tells Glaucon in 
The Republic, “having intercourse with what is ordinary, produces ordinary offspring” (602B). 
And in Plato’s typical irony, what he seems to be writing is a genre that looks much less like a 
dialogue, or a tragedy, or any work of drama, than it does the genre that thematizes ordinariness 
itself: the novel. Both Schlegel and Bakhtin suggest that Plato provides the foundation of the 
Western novel. Schlegel writes that, “Novels are the Socratic dialogues of our time,” and 
Bakhtin comes close to adding: vice versa (“Aphorisms from the Lyceum” §26, 112). In “Epic 
and Novel,” Bakhtin writes, “We possess a remarkable document that reflects the simultaneous 
birth of scientific thinking and of a new artistic-prose model for the novel. These are the Socratic 
dialogues” (24). By the time we get to Julia Kristeva, the connection is hardly even worth 
pointing out: “The resemblance between Socratic dialogue,” Kristeva writes, “and the 
ambivalent word of the novel is obvious” (81). 
We can certainly read The Republic as a novel in ten chapters that ends in failure, written 
in ordinary prose rather than dramatic verse, its hero not even a king as one would expect from 
tragedy, but someone more ordinary, if eccentric. Far from a king, this is a hero who never even 
becomes a philosopher-king, but just an old, barefoot man who rails at story-telling even as he 
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ends with a story of his own, narrating the myth of Er in the absence of arriving at a single 
definition of justice. The Republic is also a novel just as much about eros as Phaedrus and 
Symposium are, narrating the story of the bitter breakup between philosophy and the mimetic 
arts, two disciplines that used to regard each other as lovers. Socrates warns Glaucon: 
…just like the men who have once fallen in love with someone, and don’t believe the 
love is beneficial, keep away from it even if they have to do violence to themselves; so 
we too—due to the inborn love of such poetry we owe to our rearing in these fine 
regimes—we’ll be glad if it turns out that it is best and truest. But as long as it’s not able 
to make its apology, when we listen to it, we’ll chant this argument we are making to 
ourselves as a countercharm, taking care against falling back again into this love, which 
is childish and belongs to the many. We are, at all events, aware that such poetry mustn’t 
be taken seriously as a serious thing laying hold of truth… (608A-B) 
Socrates will be “glad” if the breakup between these volatile lovers turns out to be “best and 
truest”—but what if it doesn’t? In his fantasy of demanding an apology from the tragic poets, he 
is indulging in a fictional reversal of his own fate, in which he was forced to issue an apology to 
the state, itself a supporter of tragedy with its Theoric fund to subsidize farmers and the poor so 
that they could go to the theater, siding with tragedy against philosophy.  
Doesn’t something in Socrates secretly want these lovers to get back together? He can 
hardly contain his own admiration of Homer, and is looking for as many excuses as possible to 
admit the poets back into the Republic the way any jilted lover would—with apologies and 
praise: “Isn’t it just for it to come back in this way—when it has made an apology in lyrics or 
some other meter?” (607D). Or how about no meter at all? Maybe it doesn’t matter. The 
separation is final and decisive. Philosophy would move on through the centuries, and the novel 
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would remain its long-lost and long-forgotten lover. Perhaps this is why it goes by the name of 
Roman in German and French, and romanzo in Italian, as a reminder of its romantic past, of its 
broken engagement with philosophy, even as it struggles to find its way into new territory, into 
something novel. By forgetting this lover, philosophy also forgets the meaning of Being. 
Heidegger’s answer to recovering the meaning of Being from its forgotten state is to analyze it in 
its average everydayness—which has been the same project of the novel for centuries.   
Eros is at the heart of the novel; it is also at the heart of philosophy. Rachel Barney 
argues that the use of the term “compel” in leading us from the darkness to the light in the 
allegory of the cave, from Book Seven of The Republic, is an erotic force (1). We are driven to 
philosophy through eros, as Plato sketches in Phaedrus and Symposium. Our ascent from the 
cave mirrors Diotima’s “Ladder of Love” (2). “All I know is that I know nothing,” Socrates 
famously says in Apology (21D). But in Symposium, he says, “…I claim to have expert 
knowledge in nothing but erotics” (177D). Eros is precisely that nothing, the negativity at the 
core of philosophy, the lack that compels it to reach for what it has lost.  
Because love is central to philosophy, we are constantly reminded of its lost lover, and 
Plato can’t seem to get over the breakup, rehearsing it—and the failed hope of the lovers’ 
reunion—in the image of eros itself, as that thing which reminds us of our separation from our 
original nature in Phaedrus, and again as the violent rift in our selves, that original separation, 
which we see in Symposium. Maybe his entire project is like Hephaestus approaching the two 
fragmented lovers in Symposium desperately clinging to each other, trying to weld philosophy 
and the novel together in his own art. Maybe this is the expression of his own failure, 
sublimating his impulse to become a poet. Or maybe he is articulating precisely that poetic 
apology his teacher never got. 
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Despite the inner turmoil and longing for each other, philosophy and the novel have kept 
up their appearances of mutual animosity. Nabokov, for example, returns the favor. “I am afraid 
to get mixed up with Plato, whom I do not care for,” he said once in an interview, even though 
he couldn’t help describing his own process of writing a novel as first seeing it already written, 
“ready ideally in some other, now transparent, now dimming, dimension, and my job is to take 
down as much of it as I can make out and as precisely as I am humanly able to” (Strong Opinions 
69). But still, the “greatest happiness” for him is not the happiness of the philosopher who strives 
for understanding, but “when I feel I cannot understand, or rather catch myself not 
understanding…” (69). Even pessimism is allowed such a modest happiness. In another 
interview, his distance from Plato takes on a more aggressive tone: “I would say that imagination 
is a form of memory. Down, Plato, down, good dog” (78). 
All of Western philosophy after Symposium, meanwhile, seems to rehearse the same 
movement of the split, the romantic breakup, the original separation, with each new cataclysmic 
discovery. The “original separation” is the literal definition of the German word Urteil, or 
“judgment.” We exercise our judgment to compensate for this rift between subject and object, a 
rift that Kant had cast in cosmic terms with his Copernican turn, posing a crisis for future 
generations of thinkers to respond to, articulating their utopian fantasies of unification—or 
reunification—between subject and object, entailing detailed Absolute Systems and visions of 
totalities in lieu of an unsystematic, chaotic, and fragmented world (Critchley 99). But like the 
lovers in Symposium, Kant sees elements of the object in the subject, allowing the categories of 
the mind to correspond to the world in a way that gives us a glimpse of the truth into the order of 
things, even if we may not be able to access things-in-themselves.  
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The history of German Idealism is the history of answers to this rift (also a literal 
definition of the word “crisis”), and how it could possibly be bridged. Hegel’s response was the 
dialectic, a constant movement that shuttles back and forth between the subject and object. But 
when he was still in his late twenties, he wrote that love is what “cancels separation,” and that 
“in love, life is present as a duplicate of itself and as a single and unified self” (Hegel, “Love”). 
By the time he got to The Phenomenology of Spirit, he had de-eroticized the dialectic, which had 
always been such an erotically choreographed dance between subject and object since Plato. 
Philosophers ever since have been caught up in the same project, awkwardly speaking of love 
without the messiness of eros, like Nietzsche’s amor fati and Arendt’s amor mundi. Kierkegaard, 
though, breaks away from this tendency, and he does so in The Seducer’s Diary, which brings us 
back to the novel as a space to revisit the eros of our original separation.  
Schopenhauer attempted to address the crisis by rebranding Kant’s noumenon as “Will” 
and his phenomenon as “Representation,” but his World as Will and Representation, while it 
starts off with Kantian systematicity in the first volume, sputters out into something messier and 
inconclusive by the end of the second volume. Nietzsche’s response to the crisis was art, and 
specifically tragedy, as the art form to overcome this division, turning Plato on his head. It is not 
until Heidegger, under the heavy influence of Kierkegaard, that philosophy is dramatically 
reconstructed—or deconstructed—as fundamental ontology, as a way of thinking through 
existence not as a confrontation of subjects and objects, but of Being-in-the-world. To Milan 
Kundera, though,  
all the great existential themes Heidegger analyzes in Being and Time—considering them 
to have been neglected by all earlier European philosophy—had been unveiled, 
displayed, illuminated by four centuries of the novel… In its own way, through its own 
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logic, the novel discovered the various dimensions of existence one by one… (The Art of 
the Novel 5). 
Heidegger’s project in Being and Time is to raise the “forgotten” question of Being (21). But this 
question had not been forgotten by novelists. The novel is a way to dis-cover or un-cover, in the 
play of truth as alethea, the meaning of Being, which is why Nabokov sees this question itself as 
what distinguishes us from animals: “Being aware of being aware of being. In other words, if I 
not only know that I am but also know that I know it, then I belong to the human species” 
(Strong Opinions 142). The novel is the space for him to explore, in detail, what constitutes this 
Being, and the “gap between ape and man,” which he sketches in the ape-like qualities of 
Humbert Humbert in Lolita (142). 
Before Heidegger, who makes only a passing reference to the novel in a footnote in Being 
and Time, there was one German Idealist who did acknowledge the centrality of the novel as the 
answer to philosophy, as its long-lost lover, and maybe even as the specific answer to this 
Kantian predicament. In the late eighteenth century, Friedrich Schlegel used Plato’s Symposium 
as a model for his own “Dialogue on Poetry.” He abruptly interrupts the piece with a “Letter 
About the Novel,” which begins with a retraction: “I must retract, my dear lady, what I seemed 
to say yesterday in your defense, and say that you are almost completely wrong” (102). What this 
lady, Amalia, is apparently wrong about, is her assertion that Friedrich Richter’s novels “are not 
novels but a colorful hodgepodge of sickly wit,” and that they amounted to nothing more than a 
personal “confession” (113). Schlegel, through the figure of Antonio, defends this wit and 
“emphatically maintain[s] that such grotesques and confessions are the only romantic 
productions of our unromantic age” (103)—a statement that seems to prefigure D.H. Lawrence’s 
opening to Lady Chatterley’s Lover: “Ours is essentially a tragic age; so we refuse to take it 
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tragically” (5). Both statements, one about a novel and one in a novel, are refutations of the age 
in which they’re written. Schlegel laments “our so unfantastic age, in the actual estate of prose,” 
and detests “the novel as far as it claims to be a separate genre” (“Dialogue on Poetry” 108). 
Like the fantasy of a united self in Symposium, Schlegel imagines the novel as an essentially 
unifying and binding force that removes the distinctions between the other fragments of literary 
genres. To him, there is “so little contrast between the drama and the novel that it is rather the 
drama, treated thoroughly and historically, as for instance by Shakespeare, which is the true 
foundation of the novel” (108).  
Schlegel admits that he doesn’t “have the courage for a theory of the novel”—we would 
have to wait until Lukács in the twentieth century for that—but he imagines that such “a theory 
of the novel would have to be itself a novel that would reflect imaginatively every eternal tone of 
the imagination and would again confound the chaos of the world of knights” (109). This is a 
utopian vision that inevitably sets up every future novel and theory of the novel for failure, since 
no single one could possibly “reflect imaginatively every eternal tone of the imagination.”  
Maybe this is also why Lukács senses that his theory is a failure, too. He had originally 
planned a novel of sorts, himself, or at least a dialogue along the lines of this text from Schlegel 
or of Boccaccio: “At first it was meant to take the form of a series of dialogues,” he writes in the 
1962 preface, nearly half a century after its initial publication (11). A “group of young people 
withdraw from the war psychosis of their environment, just as the story-tellers of the Decameron 
had withdrawn from the plague; they try to understand themselves and one another by means of 
conversations which gradually lead to the problem discussed in the book…” (11-12). He dropped 
the polyvocal plan and wrote the monological text that we now have.  
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The plan he had in mind, though, seemed to come to fruition in Thomas Mann’s The 
Magic Mountain, published less than a decade after The Theory of the Novel. Taking his title 
from a phrase in Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy,7 Mann uses this novel to demonstrate the height 
of his ironic artistry. Hans Castorp withdraws from his familiar social setting in Hamburg to visit 
his ailing cousin at a sanatorium in the Swiss Alps. In this sanatorium, where patients are 
supposed to heal, Castorp’s health deteriorates, but in a way that he relishes, because it allows 
him to prolong his stay to what ends up being seven years full of lively Symposium-like 
conversations about philosophy, politics, and art. As a parody of Zarathustra, Castorp is finally 
healthy enough to descend the mountain at age thirty, but as intellectually enriched as he is, he is 
still the modern Everyman rather than the Overman. There is no pomp or grandiosity in his 
descent; he is still the embodiment of average everydayness, a concept that Heidegger would try 
to flesh out in the figure of Dasein three years after the publication of The Magic Mountain. And 
instead of Zarathustrian triumph, he comes down to a world that will kill him in a meaningless 
world war.  
Milan Kundera draws attention to one of the pivotal conversations in this novel that 
otherwise has no plot. It is the heated debate between the reactionary, autocratic Jewish Jesuit 
Naphta—a “fictionalized version of Lukács,” himself—and the humanist Settembrini (Arac 191). 
Over the course of their debate, their positions blur, making it difficult for the reader to follow 
who is arguing what anymore, but the aggression between them continues to escalate:  
…suddenly we understand that what sets men against one another is not irreconcilable 
ideological antagonism but an aggressivity beyond the rational, an obscure, unexplained 
 
7 “Now it is as if the Olympian magic mountain had opened before us and revealed its roots to us. The Greek knew 
and felt the terror and horror of existence. That he might endure this terror at all, he had to interpose between 
himself and life the radiant dream-birth of the Olympians” (§3, 42). 
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force for which ideas are merely a screen, a mask, a pretext. Thus this magnificent ‘novel 
of ideas’ is at the same time… a dreadful requestioning of ideas as such, a great farewell 
to the era that believed in ideas and in their power to run the world. (Testaments Betrayed 
163) 
Mann uses the novel form to articulate a pessimism of ideas themselves, engaging the long-
standing debate between philosophy and art inaugurated by Plato—a debate which, in its 
dizzying exchange of attacks and concessions over the millennia, seems to imitate this aggressive 
and vertiginous exchange between Settembrini and Naphta. To Schlegel, for instance, 
“Philosophy is the true home of irony, which might be defined as logical beauty: For whenever 
men are philosophizing in spoken or written dialogues, and provided they are not entirely 
systematical, irony ought to be produced and postulated…” (“Aphorisms from the Lyceum” §42, 
115). Mann demonstrates the opposite: that the true home of irony is in the novel.  
Kundera would agree, writing that, “the novel is, by definition, the ironic art” (The Art of 
the Novel 134). Lukács also sees irony as the “normative mentality of the novel” (Theory of the 
Novel 84). As an “epic in an age abandoned by God,” and an articulation of our “transcendental 
homelessness,” the novel employs irony to “see where God is to be found in a world abandoned 
by God; irony sees the lost, utopian home of the idea that has become an ideal…” (92). Bakhtin, 
too, identifies the novel as fundamentally ironic in its function of parody. And, to Lukács’s point 
of transcendental homelessness, Bakhtin notes how, “in ancient times the parodic-travestying 
word was (generically speaking) homeless” (Dialogic Imagination 59).8   
 
8 Bakhtin also writes, “The novel begins by presuming a verbal and semantic decentering of the ideological world, a 
certain linguistic homelessness of literary consciousness, which no longer possesses a sacrosanct and unitary 
linguistic medium for containing ideological thought…” (Dialogic Imagination 367). 
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Erich Heller, writing a critique of The Magic Mountain in dialogue form in order “to 
provoke memories of Plato or Dryden or even Friedrich Schlegel,” writes that, “Thomas Mann’s 
irony brings into question the very possibility of art” (166-69). His ironic art consists of 
mastering ideas in order to dismantle them—a seemingly Nietzschean maneuver, but in the genre 
that Nietzsche despised: “In that he is the very opposite of Nietzsche, whose ambition it was to 
say in ten sentences what anyone else would say in a book—‘and would not say in a book’” 
(168). Mann’s novel is a response to Schlegel’s wish for a “theory of the novel” that “would 
have to be itself a novel,” but it is a novel that literally amasses so many theories (Schlegel 
writes that he means “theory in the original sense of the word: a spiritual viewing of the subject 
with calm and serene feeling”), so many perspectives, “spiritual viewings” from the aerial, 
rarefied air of the mountain-tops, that this perspectival shifting unravels any theoretical cohesion 
whatsoever (“Dialogue on Poetry” 109). The novel’s “spirit,” to Kundera, is one of “complexity” 
and “continuity”: “…each work is an answer to preceding ones, each work contains all the 
previous experience of the novel” (The Art of the Novel 18). To this extent, every novel is itself a 
theory of the novel—another perspective, another take, another guest offering something else to 
say at the symposium. Kundera sees the novel’s only imperative as one of human discovery, but 
this imperative is by nature pessimistic, at odds with the world, undermining any illusion of 
progress. If the novel “is to go on discovering the undiscovered, to go on ‘progressing’ as a 
novel, it can do so only against the progress of the world” (19). What Kundera, Mann, Lukács, 
Lawrence, and Schlegel all have in common is that they envision the novel as a paradoxical site 




Failing at a Definition of the Novel: Some False Starts 
What, then, is a novel? And what makes it so pessimistic? To take Schlegel as a starting 
point, a novel for him is a “novelistic book” (“Ein Roman ist ein romantisches Buch”) (“Brief 
über den Roman”). Cute, but not terribly helpful. And yet there is a precise rigor here 
appropriate to the genre of the novel in its embrace of tautology, the bane of logical systematicity 
that resides on the other side of the philosophy-art faultline, and what, to Kierkegaard, “is and 
remains the highest principle, the highest maxim of thought” (Either/Or I.38). Ernst Behler and 
Roman Struc avoid the coyness of Schlegel’s definition in their translation: “A novel is a 
romantic book,” which takes away from the impact of his following sentence: “You will pass 
that off as a meaningless tautology” (108).  
But there is merit, however, in emphasizing the word “romantic” not even in the context 
of Romanticism itself, but in its erotic sense. This would be consistent with the first study of the 
novel as a genre, Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Lettre sur l’origine des romans (“Letter on the Origin of 
Novels”) as a preface to Madame de La Fayette’s Zayde in 1670: “We esteem nothing to be 
properly Romance but Fictions of Love Adventures, disposed into an Elegant Style in Prose; for 
the delight and instruction of the Reader” (qtd. in Mazzoni 98). Like Symposium, the novel 
delights and instructs; there is a propaedeutic element to it, teaching us the ways of love and 
performing this love on the rhetorical level of seducing us with its “Elegant Style in Prose.” 
Schlegel’s own “Letter About the Novel,” exemplifying this concept of romance, is an erotically 
charged work of fiction, a letter sent from Antonio to Alma, in which Antonio instructs Alma to 
read certain novels for her own edification.    
Huet’s definition ricochets throughout the history of the novel, as when Samuel 
Richardson writes in his Preface to Pamela that this novel aims “to Divert and Entertain, and at 
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the same time to Instruct, and Improve the Minds of the Youth of both Sexes” (3). In Diderot’s 
Encyclopedia entry for “The Novel,” written just over a century after Huet’s treatise, Louis 
Jaucourt refers to Richardson and Fielding when he writes, “Novels written in good taste are 
perhaps the last kind of instruction remaining to be offered to a nation so corrupt that any other is 
useless.” Mme. de Staël identifies the roman as “the only form that has allowed us to depict the 
passions” (Mazzoni 92-93). “Reading Huet’s treatise or looking at the way the education of girls 
is described in the works of Jane Austen a century and a half later, it is clear that novels were 
used to furnish models of behavior to women and young people” (121). And D.H. Lawrence 
writes of his own Lady Chatterley’s Lover: “It is better to give all young girls this book, at the 
age of seventeen,” for their own delight and instruction (“À Propos of Lady Chatterley’s Lover 
309). With overtones of Symposium, Lawrence also links his novelistic vision of eros with 
“completeness” after years “of honest thought of sex, and years of struggling action in sex,” 
which “will bring us at last where we want to get, to our real and accomplished chastity, our 
completeness, when our sexual act and our sexual thought are in harmony, and the one does not 
interfere with the other” (308). This echoes the position taken by the Marquis de Sade, who 
writes, “Wheresoever on earth he dwells, man feels the need to pray, and to love: and herein lies 
the basis for all novels” (99). Lady Chatterley’s Lover, if not all of D.H. Lawrence’s novels, can 
be read as a pessimistic prayer to love itself.  
Huet adds to his definition: “I call them Fictions, to discriminate them from True 
Histories; and I add, of Love Adventures, because Love ought to be the Principal Subject of 
Romance” (qtd. in McKeon 54). Translating “Roman” from French and German into English 
poses its own mess of problems, especially since, even as writers like Huet try to distinguish this 
term from “History,” for example, most seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers “often use 
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the terms ‘romance,’ ‘history,’ and ‘novel’ with an evident interchangeability that must bewilder 
and frustrate all modern expectations” (McKeon 25). But both Huet and Schlegel clearly identify 
eros at the core of the Roman, which Schlegel sees as a “hint of something higher, the infinite, a 
hieroglyph of one eternal love and the sacred fullness of a life of creative nature” (106-7). The 
novel functions as eros itself in the Symposium myth—as a gesture to the primordial unity of 
eternal love, which is how a tautology functions: the repetition dissolves the two sides of the 
statement into one. The fragment finds its missing but identical half, recognizing itself in the 
other, calling the other by its own name. Ein Roman ist ein romantisches Buch. The novel can 
only ever be itself.  
The novel for Schlegel is the apotheosis of all Romantic poetry. In an aphorism from The 
Athenäum, he writes: 
Romantic9 poetry is a progressive universal poetry. Its mission is not merely to reunite all 
separate genres of poetry and to put poetry in touch with philosophy and rhetorics. It will, 
and should, now mingle and now amalgamate poetry and prose, genius and criticism, the 
poetry of art and the poetry of nature, render poetry living and social, and life and society 
poetic, poetize wit, fill and saturate the forms of art with solid cultural material of every 
kind, and inspire them with vibrations of humor. […] The romantic type of poetry is still 
becoming; indeed, its peculiar essence is that it is always becoming and that it can never 
be completed. It cannot be exhausted by any theory, and only a divinatory criticism might 
dare to characterize its ideal. It alone is infinite, as it alone is free; and as its first law it 
recognizes that the arbitrariness of the poet endures no law above him. (126-127) 
 
9 We must keep in mind that this word can also be translated as “novelistic,” especially in the way Schlegel is using 
it. 
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The novel therefore is our key to freedom, replacing the Bible as the book of the world in a 
world “abandoned by God,” as Lukács would say over a century later (88). Through the novel, 
the “poet”—or novelist—is elevated to a divine status, enduring “no law above him,” returning 
us back to our cosmic origins of unity, the reunification of our fragmented selves reflected in the 
novel’s reunification of “all the separate genres of poetry,” and of poetry and “rhetorics” back 
with philosophy.  
This all sounds lovely, if not embarrassingly naïve—and rather overstated in its optimism. 
But maybe its naïveté is precisely what sets it up for failure. And the joy expressed in Schlegel’s 
accurate observation that “the novel cannot be exhausted by any theory” has been the source of 
frustration for every theorist—or attempted theorist—of the novel, and their readers, ever since. 
For one thing, no one can actually agree on a year, or even an era, that marks the birth of the 
novel. Lukács identifies Don Quixote as  
…the first great novel of world literature [that] stands at the beginning of the time when 
the Christian God began to forsake the world; when man became lonely and could find 
meaning and substance only in his own soul, whose home was nowhere; when the world, 
released from its paradoxical anchorage in a beyond that is truly present, was abandoned 
to its immanent meaninglessness; when the power of what is—reinforced by the utopian 
links, now degraded to mere existence—had grown to incredible magnitude and was 
waging a furious, apparently aimless struggle against the new forces which were as yet 
weak and incapable of revealing themselves or penetrating the world. (Theory of the 
Novel 103-4). 
The novel for Lukács arises at this pessimistic moment in history—a moment that has stretched 
four hundred years to echo the historical moment that he is writing this work in, as World War 
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One had just broken out. Both the novel and The Theory of the Novel articulate our existential 
loneliness and “immanent meaninglessness.” What he is doing is essentially restating the 
Kantian problematic of the subject-object split, but in gloomier terms, of “forces which were as 
yet weak and incapable of revealing themselves or penetrating the world.” Kundera echoes 
Lukács when he writes, in The Art of the Novel, “As God slowly departed from the seat whence 
he had directed the universe and its order of values, distinguished good from evil, and endowed 
each thing with meaning, Don Quixote set forth from his house into a world he could no longer 
recognize” (6). Don Quixote’s homelessness mirrors the Lukácsian “transcendental 
homelessness” of all his readers at this point in history.  
But the Marquis de Sade would object to this origin of the novel and its relationship to 
the divine, writing, “Let there be no doubt about it: it was in the countries which first recognized 
gods that the novel originated; and, to be more specific, in Egypt, the cradle of all divine 
worship” (98). For Ian Watt, the novel is born in England in the eighteenth century. McKeon, in 
his deceptively titled The Origins of the English Novel: 1600-1740, responds to Watt by 
addressing the origins not only of the English novel, but of the novel at large—and from the title 
at least, he pushes the date back from the earliest publications of Don Quixote (its first volume) 
by six years. What he actually ends up doing is tracing a dialectic of literary genres and political 
movements from the Greek Enlightenment and the twelfth-century Renaissance (which one 
could argue also overlaps with the Middle Ages) to a semantic instability between “novel,” 
“romance,” and “history” at around 1600 that then settles down to a more or less common usage 
of the English word “novel” in the sense that it is used today, which arises at around 1740. Guido 
Mazzoni, in his own Theory of the Novel, focuses on the year 1550 instead: “Around 1550, the 
word ‘novel’ referred for the most part to a narrowly defined, specific literary form,” which he 
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had previously defined, showing the influence of Schlegel and his concept of freedom, as “the 
genre in which one can tell absolutely any story in any way whatsoever” (66;16). Mazzoni then 
identifies 1800 as the year in which this word “referred to what it is today—a polymorphic space 
providing a home for stories of a certain length that do not fall within the confines of more 
rigidly codified narrative genres (epic poems, works of history, and the chanson de geste)” (66). 
Looking through these different theories, we see that the novel is both transcendentally 
homeless for Lukács, and a “home” for Mazzoni. We can trace its origins either to 1800, or 
1740, or 1616, or 1606, or 1600, or the twelfth century, or the Greek Enlightenment, or Ancient 
Egypt. Schlegel, Bakhtin, and Kristeva all settle on the Socratic dialogues as the origin of the 
novel. Schlegel envisions the novel as a space in which the “things of the past would live in it in 
new forms; Dante’s sacred shadow would arise from the lower world, Laura would hover 
heavenly before us, Shakespeare would converse intimately with Cervantes, and there Sancho 
would jest with Don Quixote again” (109). This kind of necromancy, of reincarnating these 
“things of the past,” seems to be realized in “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” and in 
Ulysses, where Joyce models his Circe (or “Night-Town”) chapter on Dante’s Inferno and 
Goethe’s Faust, introducing as many words into the English language in this one book as 
Shakespeare did in his entire career. But, unlike Joyce’s novel, Borges’s text is a short story, a 
form which Eikhenbaum claims is “not only different in kind but also inherently at odds” with 
the novel (qtd. in Holquist xxx). Lukács also points out the difference between the short story as 
an “abstract” genre and the novel as a genre of particularity, but Mazzoni maintains that a “rigid 
criterion is impossible to establish” between the two, and Kundera insists there “is no ontological 
difference between story and novel,” that the short story is just the “small form of the novel” 
(Theory of the Novel 51; Mazzoni 17; Testaments Betrayed 168). Are Cervantes’s Exemplary 
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Novels—Novelas Ejemplares in Spanish, some of them written as early as 1590—actually 
novels, or novellas, or short stories? Or what about the racy Les Cent Nouvelles that decoratively 
adorns Lord Henry Wotton’s tiny satin-wood table, in Oscar Wilde’s only novel—a novel that 
hardly even has a plot? (The Picture of Dorian Gray 39).  
If we’re alerted to some degree of pedantic caution in distinguishing the novel from the 
short story, a task that seems simple enough from afar, but frustrating (if not a bit comical) up 
close, then surely we can set aside the novel from drama with more ease. Not so fast, according 
to Schlegel, who insists that, “there is otherwise so little contrast between the drama and the 
novel that it is rather the drama, treated thoroughly and historically, as for instance by 
Shakespeare, which is the true foundation of the novel” (108). Bakhtin takes this further: “In an 
era when the novel reigns supreme, almost all the remaining genres are to a greater or lesser 
extent ‘novelized’: drama (for example Ibsen, Hauptmann, the whole of Naturalist drama), epic 
poetry (for example, Childe Harold and especially Byron’s Don Juan), even lyric poetry (as an 
extreme example, Heine’s lyrical verse)” (5-6). 
At this point, the novel as Schlegel’s emblem of freedom begins to look more like a free-
for-all. Marthe Robert says that the “novel is free, free to the point of arbitrariness or total 
anarchy” (58). Nabokov gleefully said in an interview that, “One of the functions of all my 
novels is to prove that the novel in general does not exist” (Strong Opinions 115). He doubles 
down on this assertion in another interview: “As soon as we start defining such terms as ‘the 
writer,’ ‘the world,’ ‘the novel,’ and so on, we slip into a solipsismal abyss where general ideas 
dissolve” (136). Maybe Schlegel was wiser than any other novel theorist for saying that he 
doesn’t have the “courage for a theory of the novel” (109). It’s easy to see why Henry James, in 
the preface to one of his own novels, was so exasperated in trying to pinpoint what  
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…such large loose baggy monsters, with their queer elements of the accidental and the 
arbitrary, artistically mean? We have heard it maintained, we will remember, that such 
things are ‘superior to art’; but we understand least of all what that may mean, and we 
look in vain for the artist, the divine explanatory genius, who will come to our aid and tell 
us. (The Art of the Novel 84) 
Here, James derisively shreds to pieces Schlegel’s effusions over the “divinatory criticism” and 
the novelist who “endures no law above him” with the withering epithet of “divine explanatory 
genius,” who is nowhere to be found when hard-pressed for an explanation of the art.  
To use the intrinsically novelistic metaphor—or, as Bakhtin would call it, 
“chronotope”—of the road, we’ve arrived at a dead end. Guy de Maupassant begins his only 
novel, Pierre and Jean (unless we are now to take his short stories as novels, too), by writing 
that, “the critic who… still dares to write, ‘This is a novel, that is not’ seems to me to be 
endowed with a perspicacity remarkably like incompetence… Is there a set of rules for writing a 
novel, any deviation from which would require a story to bear a different name?” (3-4). Maybe 
we should take his advice and just give up on trying to define something so protean, so slippery, 
as the novel?  
This is precisely Bakhtin’s starting point in “Epic and Novel.” He points out that the 
“utter inadequacy of literary theory is exposed when it is forced to deal with the novel” (8).10 It’s 
not just novel theory, then, but all of literary theory that gets thrown into crisis when it has to 
confront this baggy monster. Other literary genres are easier to theorize because they’ve already 
been formed, and by now are “sclerotic” (8; 292). It’s not so difficult when you have “a finished 
and already formed object, definite and clear” to deal with, especially when, right “up to the 
 
10 Yi-Ping Ong also comes to the conclusion that “virtually any plausible theory of the novel begins with the 
impossibility of giving an account of the novel in terms of its formal essence” (37).  
 38 
present day, in fact, theory dealing with these already completed genres can add almost nothing 
to Aristotle’s formulations” (8). Has Bakhtin gone a bit too far? Are other literary genres as 
“completed” as he maintains, especially when, later, he blurs the distinctions between them 
almost to the point of interchangeability? Has every literary theorist in these other genres really 
added “almost nothing to Aristotle’s formulations”? Michael Holquist comes to Bakhtin’s 
defense, arguing that other novel theorists “seek to elevate one kind of novel into a definition of 
the novel,” when Bakhtin is reworking literary theory itself from the ground up, arguing that the 
novel for him signifies “whatever force is at work within a given literary system to reveal the 
limits, the artificial constraints of that system” (xxvii; xxxi). 
Where Bakhtin’s theory runs the risk of being too fluid to demarcate the porous 
boundaries of the novel, Lukács risks being too brittle. Lukács drops the bombshell statement 
that “Dostoevsky did not write novels” at the end of his Theory of the Novel, while Bakhtin 
maintains, in his essay “Discourse on the Novel,” that the “works of Dostoevsky… can be seen 
to occupy an extraordinary and unique place” in the history of the novel (152; 349).11 Lukács is 
also quick to dismiss anything “narrowing reality so that the work become an idyll” and sinks “to 
the level of mere entertainment literature” (71). Bakhtin, however, does not dismiss the idyll 
from the genre of the novel, and reminds us that novels, by definition, “are mass produced as 
pure and frivolous entertainment like no other genre” (234; 9). Kundera sides with this statement, 
but with a modification on its frivolity: “The great European novel started out as entertainment, 
and all real novelists are nostalgic for it! And besides, entertainment doesn’t preclude 
seriousness” (The Art of the Novel 95). Furthermore, Bakhtin claims that one of the defining 
 
11 Stefan Zweig, writing five years after Lukács’s Theory of the Novel, also agrees that Dostoevsky’s works “are not 
novels in the true sense; rather are they heroic masses, no longer related to literature; they seem to be prophetic 
preludes to the saga of a new humanity” (200). In comparison, Sartre, in his essay on The Sound and the Fury, 
insists that Faulkner’s work is not a novel (271). 
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features of the novel is its polyphony, what he calls “heteroglossia”—but this is precisely the 
point that Franco Moretti disputes, arguing that, “rather than nourishing polyphony,” the novel 
“impose[s] a drastic reduction of it…” (Modern Epic 56). 
Trying to discern a theoretical framework for the novel is like looking into a funhouse 
mirror, where every element you want to focus on becomes distorted beyond all proportion. This 
theoretical mirror struggles to reflect the novel, which, according to Stendhal, is a mirror itself, 
“carried along a highway” (297). A mirror of a mirror, neither of which are fixed in place. We 
can no longer even count on our own sight to judge what counts as a novel, falling back on that 
lazy defense of the United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart when asked how to 
define pornography: “I know it when I see it” (“Movie Day at the Supreme Court”). To some 
readers—enough of them, at least, to warrant trials—Ulysses and Lady Chatterley’s Lover 
counted as pornography. The original readers of Prosper Merimée’s Carmen and La Guzla didn’t 
recognize those works as novels either when they saw them, reading them as horrifying 
travelogues instead (Merimée ix). And if we would like to think of those readers as gullible 
children of their time from a bygone era, we shouldn’t forget the indignant rage that Oprah 
expressed in 2006 when she found out that James Frey had “conned,” “duped,” and “betrayed” 
her—and her lucrative book club—into reading his book A Million Little Pieces as a memoir 
when it was later revealed to be a novel (Flock, The Washington Post; Wyatt, The New York 
Times).  
 
The Criminality and Illegitimacy of the Novel 
 James Frey, the accidental novelist, may actually prove to be more of the rule than the 
exception. The novelist as con-artist, as dupe, as prankster, trafficking in tall tales and lengthy 
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stories that are half-lie and half-truth hybrids, is one of the most ubiquitous characterizations of 
the novelist and the novelistic art that we have. Mazzoni points out that, “The hostility that 
accompanied the new genre for nearly three centuries is one of the most significant and 
symptomatic traits of its early modern history” (100). If there is any single aspect of the novel 
that is irrefutable, that every novel theorist can agree on, it is the fact that, despite its popularity 
and appeal to the mass market, its history as the receiving end of a hostile reception singles it out 
from any other literary genre. Mazzoni notes this most salient feature of the novel: 
Novelists were accused of spreading illicit behaviors, of neglecting important things to 
devote themselves to vain chimeras, of mixing truth with falsehood. The allegations 
appeared almost identical in texts belonging to different national cultures, and they 
emerged in substantially the same form between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. 
They were so widespread that it is difficult to find prefaces or treatises in which they do 
not appear, in more or less direct form, only to be denied or confirmed. (111) 
Maybe this is the only accurate starting point in arriving at a definition—and maybe even a 
theory—of the novel. While individual plays, poems, or other works may have garnered their fair 
share of notoriety, no genre as a whole has encountered as much of a sustained backlash over the 
centuries, continuing to this day in the form of critically dismissing, ignoring, or emphatically 
rejecting those novels that count as “romance”—its roots nevertheless firmly planted in the 
history of the roman at large—and other novels that fall under “genre fiction.”  
Sure, Socrates may have exiled the tragic poets and other mimetic artists from an 
imaginary republic, but a generation after Plato wrote down this fiction, his student Aristotle 
quickly restored their status in his Poetics. The “fierce criticisms” that the novel “received in 
institutional literary circles,” however, has lasted for centuries (100). And, Maupassant’s 
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dismissal of the novel critic notwithstanding, this “shows the reversed image of the written and 
unwritten rules that the novel ran up against” (100). Socrates was dreaming up a revenge fantasy 
against the state that forced him with the choice between exile or death, not the tragedians. The 
tragedians were never the criminals, the enemies of the state, that Socrates painted them out to 
be. But the early novelists, as well as their heroes or anti-heroes, frequently were. Gottfried von 
Strassburg may have endangered his life for threatening religion and the state with his unfinished 
Tristan, a work which “lies half-way between romance and novel” (Hatto 21). Chaucer, if he can 
be considered an early novelist, or at least a writer who provided a precursor to the novel, was 
tried for charges of rape. Boccaccio conveniently fled Florence after a failed coup, and Dante 
was exiled from that same city.12 Cervantes was also forced into exile, and John Bunyan wrote 
The Pilgrim’s Progress while serving twelve years in prison for non-conformist religious 
preaching. Rabelais was forced into hiding under the threat of being officially condemned of 
heresy over Gargantua and Pantagruel. A warrant was written for Aphra Behn’s arrest over 
unpaid debts, and Daniel Defoe served time for the same crime. Samuel Richardson’s novels 
were placed on the Catholic Church’s Index Librorum Prohibitorum, as were Voltaire’s, and the 
Marquis de Sade spent his adult life in and out of prison.  
This pattern even continues well into the modern era, defining each node in the history of 
the novel in terms of its offense to the state. In 1857, Flaubert was put on trial for Madame 
Bovary on charges of obscenity. These same charges would be brought against Ulysses, Lady 
Chatterley’s Lover, and The Tropic of Cancer in the twentieth century. Dostoevsky was 
pardoned at the last minute in front of a firing squad while imprisoned in Siberia, and 
Solzhenitsyn endured a similar fate, charting his experiences and those of other imprisoned 
 
12 Coincidentally, one of Nabokov’s ancestors, Can Grande della Scala, Prince of Verona, sheltered Dante in exile, 
and his “blazon (two big dogs holding a ladder) adorns Bocaccio’s Decameron” (Strong Opinions 188). 
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novelists and dissidents in The Gulag Archipelago. This is not just a symptom of autocratic 
regimes, though. More novels have been banned or censored in the United States public 
education and library system over the past century than any works from other genres of 
literature.    
Added to this criminalized history of the novel is the influence of the criminal biography 
itself on the novel’s development, rising in popularity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
(McKeon 96-128). This genre coincided with the new narrative mode of telling stories about 
pícaros like Lazarillo de Tormes in the eponymously titled book that can be traced back to 1554 
(although copies of it are likely to have circulated well before then). In this picaresque tradition, 
amiable thieves and rogues would deceive others in their quest for upward mobility. The 
criminal biography mirrored this narrative structure, which in turn looped back into enriching the 
picaresque, and both eventually paved the way for the modern novel. These genres traced how 
authority could be undermined. Authority itself, in both genres, “is an ambiguous conflation of 
divine and positive law, so that the unarguable will of God is burdened with the weight of what 
in other contexts might well be recognized as its antithesis, its deforming secularization” (98). 
Here is the site of the Deus absconditus that Lukács identifies as the pretext for the rise of the 
novel. Authority in these narratives moves away from God or any magistrate to the author. God 
is dead, and we have killed him—which lets us identify with the criminal on their fugitive 
journey that begins after they had left the scene of that crime, a journey that would be told by the 
novel. In this context, we can see how Anthony Cascardi defines the novel as “a genre whose 
form was determined by a crisis in the belief in any single, extraworldly source of authority” 
(173). To Yi-Ping Ong, “the problem of existence involves a crisis of authority that can be 
explored and exploded only from within the form of the novel” (239). 
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The protagonist of such a novelistic narrative, in both genres of the picaresque and the 
criminal biography, is often characterized as “both a noble hero and a villain” (McKeon 99). The 
novel arises out of ambiguity and irony, exposing all power structures as contrived fictions, as 
well—which is the source of the novel’s power and also of its threat to the social order. The case 
of Mary Carleton and her husband John Mandeville, both criminals who turned on each other 
when they got caught, yielded twenty-five pamphlet publications in the decade leading up to 
Carleton’s execution in 1673 (99). She was accused of defrauding men and landlords while 
posing under various disguises, including that of a German princess, which allowed her to mix in 
social circles that cut across class lines. As McKeon notes of her narratives, her “power derives 
not from state authority but from personal authenticity, and as long as she is telling her own story 
she resembles a self-constructed heroine more than an official example of the unregenerate” 
(100). But her husband dismissed her “personal history” as “a pretty Romance,” and as 
“innumerable cursed fictions” (qtd. in McKeon 100). Her biographer Francis Kirkman writes, “if 
I should promise to give you a true account of her whole life I should deceive you, for how can 
truth be discovered of her who was wholly composed of falsehood?” (qtd. in McKeon 100).  
The criminal biography, the picaresque, and the budding novel emerge from this crisis of 
truth against “Romance” and “fiction,” because the narrative strategies of documenting truth are 
parodied in the novel, and even in the biography. The novel blurs the distinctions between these 
categories, so that a “general Proverb” of the seventeenth century was “that Travellers may tell 
Romances or untruths by authority” (qtd. in McKeon 100). It is under these circumstances that 
we get the stories of Don Quixote, Robinson Crusoe, and Lemuel Gulliver—each adventurer in 
pursuit of his own authority, his own authorship—in the form of the novel, a genre that 
increasingly demanded the constraints of what Ian Watt calls “formal realism,” a narrative style 
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grounded in its legal history of the courtroom, where the truth or untruth of a crime could be 
discerned: 
The novel’s mode of imitating reality may… be equally well summarized in terms of the 
procedures of another group of specialists in epistemology, the jury in a court of law. 
Their expectations, and those of the novel reader coincide in many ways: both want to 
know ‘all the particulars’ of a given case—the time and place of the occurrence; both 
must be satisfied as to the identities of the parties concerned, and will refuse to accept 
evidence about anyone called Sir Toby Belch or Mr. Badman—still less about a Chloe 
who has no surname and is ‘common as the air’; and they also expect the witnesses to tell 
the story ‘in his own words.’ The jury, in fact, takes the ‘circumstantial view of life,’ 
which T.H. Green found to be the characteristic outlook of the novel. (Watt 31) 
The novel becomes the genre of particularity, heaping details upon details in a meticulous appeal 
to veracity (Ong 45).  
In a novel overwhelmed by details like The Brothers Karmazov, Dostoevsky draws our 
attention to the ambiguous space in which the novel and the court of law overlap. The trial of 
Fyodor Pavlovich’s murder begins with the prosecutor saying that, “Psychology prompts novels 
even from the most serious people, and quite unintentionally. I am speaking of excessive 
psychology, gentlemen of the jury, of a certain abuse of it” (728). The term “novels” is here used 
as an insult, one which is bandied back and forth between the prosecutor and the defense 
attorney, who retorts: “The prosecution liked its own novel” (731). He goes further: “And with 
such novels we are prepared to ruin a human life!” (731). He ends his final speech on this note, 
asking, “Is this not also a novel?” (734). And the charge is thrown back in the prosecutor’s 
rebuttal: “We are reproached with having invented all sorts of novels. But what has the defense 
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attorney offered if not novel upon novel?” (748). What Dostoevsky ultimately gives us is a novel 
that uses “novel upon novel” as a way to access truth, but the truth is irreducible to mere fact, 
and doesn’t coincide with justice. His novel is a pessimistic account of truth and justice 
themselves. In order to argue the truth, Dostoevsky seems to show us, “novels”—those things 
that always necessarily exceed and fall short of the truth they are trying to portray—are all we 
have, and they are hardly adequate as a defense. 
By the time we get to the twentieth century, the question no longer is a matter of who did 
the crime or whether or not we sympathize with the criminal, but what the crime actually was. 
They are already guilty, but for what? Josef K. in Kafka’s The Trial has no idea why he’s being 
arrested. And we learn, only at the end of Nabokov’s modern picaresque Lolita, that Humbert 
Humbert is not imprisoned for raping and kidnapping Dolores Haze, but for killing her other 
predator, Clare Quilty. Humbert himself taunts his readers as “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury,” 
drawing attention to the history of this epistemological crisis dramatized by the court of law in 
pursuing the truth (Nabokov 9). Humbert plays this game of veracity and falsehood from the 
other side, as well. When his wife Charlotte Haze discovers his diary, which exposes his sexual 
desires for her twelve-year old daughter, he gaslights her and says, “The notes you found were 
fragments of a novel” (96). This statement is clearly a lie, except for the fact that they are 
inscribed into a novel itself, so the lie actually becomes the truth. 
We are still working through this crisis well into the twenty-first century, with avatars of 
Mary Carleton appearing in news stories of people like the “SoHo Grifter” Anna Sorokin, a 
Russian immigrant who went by the name of Anna Delvey and—like Carleton—claimed to be a 
wealthy German heiress, convincing a bank employee to give her $100,000 that she never 
intended to pay back, while managing to stay in luxury Manhattan hotels for free and duping 
 46 
other banks and a private jet company out of an additional $100,000, not to mention the $62,000 
she had stolen from her friend on a lavish trip to Marrakesh and wasn’t convicted for. On top of 
this, she has admitted to writing bad checks in the amount of $160,000 (Palmer, The New York 
Times; Quintana, Distractify.com). 
What makes this news story relevant to the history of the novel is not just the similarity 
of her crimes with Carleton’s, and not even the deception at work that fundamentally lends itself 
to a fiction that tricked others into mistaking it for truth, but her careful attention to how the 
narrative of her story is told. She is currently working on a memoir, and is already planning a 
second book about her experience at Riker’s Island. As Kirkman notes about Carleton’s 
biography, the genre of the memoir authored by the same person who was guilty of passing off 
fiction for truth could slip into the territory of the novel. And in addition to these two books, her 
attention is now focused on who will play her in the upcoming Netflix biopic about her 
escapades. “She's like, Okay, as long as Jennifer Lawrence or Margot Robbie play me,” her 
friend Neff Davis reported to Paper Magazine, before adding, “So that's where her concern is” 
(Michael, Paper.com). Her concern has always been about the fiction, about the deception and 
the glamor, about the semi-fabricated narrative that will be told about her life of crime in an 
entertainment medium like Netflix rather than the facts of the crime itself. 
This story arrives also in the midst of a cultural moment when news reporting itself in 
this country seems to be called into question more than it has in recent memory. But the current 
epistemic crisis of “fake news” and “alternative facts,” consisting of malicious lies, technological 
manipulation, and falsified documentation to simulate veracity, is anchored in a history that tells 
the same story as the rise of the novel. The rise of the printing press helped begin the gradual 
process of untethering the word “romance” from “novel” so that “romance”—referring 
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predominantly to those prose stories in circulation before the printing press—was now 
periodized as a medieval genre (McKeon 45). The dichotomy between “romance” and “history,” 
as evidenced in Mandeville’s repudiation of his wife’s account, began to be replaced with the 
dichotomy of “news” and “novels.”  
Before the advent of the printing press, the “sermon had traditionally performed the 
function of news dissemination” (46). But in the growing secular culture, printed news started 
replacing the sermon, and “the claim to historicity has now become far more elaborate, 
exploiting especially the techniques of authentication by first-hand and documentary witnesses 
that have developed during the late medieval and early modern periods” (46-47). These 
techniques of authentication, though, could easily be replicated to brand fictional stories as real 
news. For Richard Brathwaite in the 1630s, the “newness” of the “newsmongers argues not truth 
but false invention, and he calls their works ‘novels’ in order to disparage them in this spirit” 
(47). Here we have the word “novel” used as a pejorative term, and “novelist” as a perpetrator of 
the truth. Brathwaite writes:  
My Contemporaries the Novelists have, for the better spinning out Paragraphs, and 
working down to the End of their Columns, a most happy Art in saying and unsaying, 
giving Hints of Intelligence, and Interpretations of indifferent Actions, to the great 
Disturbance of the Brains of ordinary Readers. (Qtd. in McKeon 50)  
The “novelist” in this sense is that pernicious charlatan who poses as a reporter of current events, 
who betrays the trust of the people in order to peddle sensationalist fictions and appeal to the 
lowest common denominator, the vulgar masses, the “ordinary Readers.”  
This pessimistic takedown reveals the novelist to be an embodiment of the worst in us. 
The association between the novel and the average everydayness of “ordinary Readers” finds its 
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history stretching back here, as well. “Ordinary” readers in the seventeenth century were 
essentially new readers—literally novel readers. Many of them had just learned to read as scribal 
culture had become replaced with print culture, a cultural shift that coincided with the rise of the 
middle class (Watt 35-59).  
The self-conscious awareness of a “new” class with “new” interests can be traced back to 
Machiavelli, who uses the phrase “newly-risen man” in The Prince, written in 1513 but 
published in 1532 (96). This “newly-risen man” would “introduce new laws and measures,” 
ushering in a modern world that would definitively break from its medieval past (96). In his 
chapter entitled “Of New Dominions Acquired by the Power of Others or by Fortune,” 
Machiavelli writes of these new men who “rise from private citizens to be princes” (23). 
Practices that may otherwise be deemed criminal for the former private citizen would serve to 
protect and benefit the newly minted prince.  
Crime, both in the Machiavellian scheme and in the novel, becomes an axiological pivot, 
soliciting a transvaluation of values based on who is committing the crime, and for what 
purposes. In his chapter on “Those Who Have Attained the Position of Prince by Villainy,” 
Machiavelli makes no moral judgments about the examples he offers of politicians who use 
criminal means to consolidate their power: “I will give two examples… without entering further 
into the merits of this method, as I judge them to be sufficient for any one obliged to imitate 
them” (31). As if fulfilling Socrates’ worst nightmare, he offers an imitation, in prose, of 
destructive political behavior that is specifically aimed for readers who, in turn, would “imitate” 
this behavior in life. From a Platonic point of view, this would spell out anarchy. The novel is 
precisely that anarchic vehicle to shake up the power structures in place. The term 
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“Machiavellian,” in response to this text written for “newly-risen men,” becomes just as much of 
an insult at the same time that the word “novel” does. 
It is from this Machiavellian groundwork that the novel emerges as an articulation of the 
“new man.” Even though Lukács didn’t believe that Dostoevsky wrote novels, The Brothers 
Karamazov fits his definition of the “epic in an age abandoned by God” by thematizing this 
absence of God itself in a novel about crime, and it is the absence of God that makes room for 
the “new man” to be explored by a new genre that lies between Machiavelli and Nietzsche, both 
of whom are engaging in the same project, over four centuries apart. In Ivan Karamazov’s fever 
dream, the Mephistopheles-like Devil tells him: 
…since God and immortality do not exist in any case, even if this period should never 
come, the new man is allowed to become a man-god, though it be he alone in the whole 
world, and of course, in this new rank, to jump lightheartedly over any moral obstacle of 
the former slave-man, if need be. (649) 
Another demonic creature who emerges in the absence of God is Dracula, who, in Bram Stoker’s 
novel, epitomizes not only the “man-god” as a “newly risen man,” but actually the late Victorian 
category of the New Woman. He is an androgynous figure who, embodying the Victorian fear of 
the vagina dentata, strikes more or less once a month, and sails along the schooner named 
Demeter—named after the goddess of fertility—to engender discord and chaos (79). Dracula is 
the personification of hysteria itself, a wandering womb that allows his victims like Lucy 
Westenra to indulge in a new, voracious, and highly sexualized appetite, as well as an atavistic 
lack of moral restraint. Vampirism abides by the principle of mimesis; the victim of the vampire 
becomes the new vampire—and Lucy’s vampish behavior embodies the political anxieties 
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surrounding the New Woman and the fear that this modern figure would replicate and spread 
beyond control, undermining the patriarchal foundations of civilization. 
Despite the countless reproductions of Dracula across various media, it is only the 1897 
novel itself that communicates the novelty of the situation, structurally shifting across various 
technological advances to narrate the story, from the phonograph to the typewriter and one of the 
first references in literature to the kodak camera, carefully calibrating the new experiences of 
average everydayness (29). Both Dostoevsky and Stoker use the novel to think through the idea 
of an entirely new kind of being, modelled on Machiavelli’s image of his Prince, whose power 
could overwhelm the law, whose criminality could itself become a law in its own right and alter 
the course of civilization toward apocalypse. Like Machiavelli, they both use the ordinary 
vernacular—the everyday language, and in Stoker’s case, the technology—to articulate ideas that 
are, or at least seem, stunningly new. Even though The Prince is addressed to Lorenzo di Medici, 
Machiavelli writes it in ordinary Italian rather than Latin—placing him in a tradition with Dante 
and Boccaccio two centuries before him—which makes this a text aimed more at a commoner 
than a Medici. McKeon notes that, “in counseling the new prince, Machiavelli is really 
counseling the ‘new man’ writ large, those whose upwardly mobile aspirations are unusually, 
even audaciously, ambitious” (185).  
The idea that long-standing regimes could potentially be toppled by these new, ordinary 
readers of the vulgar masses reading in the vulgate of their own spoken languages piqued a new 
interest in the new genres of the novel and the news about ordinary people just like them. By the 
seventeenth century, the pamphlets that would disseminate the news would also include 
serialized stories of fiction in the same publication, a practice that extended well into the 
nineteenth century, with the novels of Dickens, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy serialized in the 
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newspaper, so that “news” and “novel” would blur into each other. It is no coincidence, then, that 
news reporters in the early days of pamphlet dissemination were dismissed as “the Quixots of 
this age [who] fight with Windmils of their own heads” (qtd. in McKeon 48).  
By the end of the seventeenth century, “the idea of news already carries a double 
epistemological charge: the credible claim of objective historicity, and the claim demystified as a 
‘romance’ convention in disguise” (50). This double epistemological charge still holds. We read 
and watch the news to see stories of the worst—criminal behavior, corruption, scandals, updates 
on a world becoming increasingly uninhabitable due to ecological and political climate—and we 
also run the risk of coming across embellished or fabricated narratives written by reporters or the 
masters they serve who want to dupe us into mistaking their fictional authorship with real 
authority. A pessimistic dilemma if there ever was one.    
The war against the novel was waged on the streets, in the presses meant for mass 
consumption, and in the crowds. When Stendhal defines the novel as a “mirror moving along a 
highway,” he adds in its defense: 
One minute you see it reflect the azure skies, next minute the mud and puddles of the 
road. And the man who carries the mirror in his pack will be accused by you of 
immorality! His mirror shows the mud and you accuse the mirror! Rather you should 
accuse the road in which the puddle lies, or, even better, the inspector of roads who lets 
the water collect and the puddle form. (297)   
The prosaic mud of life—what other genre of literature would hold up a moving mirror to this in 
all its detail, all its squalor, in a form that ranges in scope from a narrative that could be 
consumed in a single sitting to one that could be serialized over several years? The novel resides 
in that paradox of truth-telling in the form of a deception, a con. And the truths they reflect can 
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be uncomfortable in their bleakness, a bleakness that sinks to the level of pessimism. “The 
pessimist is usually understood to be the complainer, forever pointing out what is wrong with the 
world without ever offering a solution,” just absurdly trying to hold up this shaking, unwieldy 
mirror to the world while in transit (Infinite Resignation 5). But this pessimist-novelist is not to 
blame as much as the “inspector of roads,” that person whose responsibility it is to rectify such a 
bleak situation—the kind of person who, coincidentally, so often gets offended by truth-telling, 
and uses the word “pessimist” in as insulting, as pejorative a way as the term “novel” has been 
used historically. 
Far away from the streets, from the commoners, from the open road of the novel, 
philosophy is shut indoors, enjoying its symposium among like-minded folk. Marx’s critique of 
philosophers, that they “have only interpreted the world, in various ways,” when the “point, 
however, is to change it,” goes unheeded (“Theses on Feuerbach” 145). If the inspector of roads 
is not going to do his job, then something needs to, in his italicized words, “change”—and 
drastically. Marx’s response was to write something that could arguably be read as a gothic novel 
of sorts: Das Kapital, a work that not only explicitly draws on Robinson Crusoe, but that is 
structured like a dilapidated, gothic cathedral, haunted by the vampire of capital itself. In this 
work, he defines capital as “dead labour, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour, 
and lives the more, the more labour it sucks” (362-363). Like Schlegel before him, Marx also 
envisions a future that could unify the outer world with the inner life of mind, and offers this 
semi-novelistic work as a template for what that would entail. 
But philosophy remains shut indoors. And here, Socrates focuses his ire on the tragic 
poets, banning them from his ideal republic. But for what it’s worth, at least they’re named as a 
worthy opponent of philosophy, of anyone who claims to be on the side of truth. Thacker defines 
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pessimism as “that gloomy late-comer to the banquet of philosophy,” but this could also double 
as a definition for the novel, as well—a genre denoted by its new arrival (29). Marthe Robert 
defines the novel as “a newcomer to the literary scene, a commoner made good who will always 
stand out as something of an upstart, even a bit of a swindler, among the established genres it is 
gradually supplanting” (57). Pessimism and the novel—these two late and uninvited arrivals at 
this banquet, this symposium—either ignored or condescendingly dismissed by the other 
philosopher-guests, definitely seem to notice each other, though. Maybe they exchange a sly 
smirk in solidarity out of the corner of their mouths; maybe also an eyeroll at everyone else in 
attendance, from Socrates to Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. 
“For whatever reason,” writes Joshua Foa Dienstag, “the idea of a pessimistic novelist 
has never been as illegitimate as the idea of a pessimistic philosopher” (6). Maybe not as 
illegitimate, but illegitimate nonetheless. And it’s precisely this illegitimacy fundamentally 
inscribed into the novel that binds it to pessimism. Pessimism is the up-ending of philosophy and 
all its elaborate systems:  
Pessimism abjures all pretenses towards system—towards the purity of analysis and the 
dignity of critique. We didn’t really think we could figure it out, did we? It was just 
passing time, something to do, a bold gesture put forth in all its fragility, according to 
rules that we have agreed to forget that we made up in the first place. (Infinite 
Resignation 20)  
The novel, too, shares that challenge to the authority of philosophical systematicity. It’s that 
thing that Emma Bovary herself turns to in her boredom, to pass the time, something to do—only 
to realize that it inevitably becomes a site of disappointment.13 “Maybe disappointment is the 
 
13 Paradoxically, Heidegger sees boredom as a way of accessing beings as a “whole,” what all previous systems of 
philosophy have aspired to explaining: “Even and precisely when we are not actually busy with things or ourselves, 
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fear of no longer belonging to a system,” G.H. tells us in Clarice Lispector’s novel The Passion 
According to G.H. (5). The novel itself is the site to explore this disappointment, this turn away 
from systematicity.     
Although it was a novel that made Kant break from his regularly scheduled walks (the 
only other time was the eruption of the French Revolution),14 he wrote that “it is important for 
morality to warn emphatically against such empty and fantastic desires, which are quite 
frequently nourished by novels… of superhuman perfections and fantastical bliss” (Critique of 
Judgment 32). In his treatment of aesthetics, he had more to say about mountains and storms than 
about the novel.   
Hegel, whose own Phenomenology of Spirit can be read as a Bildungsroman, ends his 
hefty, two-volume Lectures on Aesthetics with lyric and epic poetry, culminating in drama. 
Novel theorists like Mazzoni are eager to read his treatment of prose as an analysis of the novel 
in Volume I, but his “prose of thought” skips over the novel and enters philosophy itself: “Yet, 
precisely, at this highest stage, art now transcends itself, in that it forsakes the element of a 
reconciled embodiment of the spirit in sensuous form and passes over from the poetry of the 
imagination to the prose of thought” (89).15 When he asks, “What is poetry and what is prose in 
 
this ‘as a whole’ comes over us—for example, in authentic boredom. […] This boredom manifests beings as a 
whole” (“What is Metaphysics?” 87). 
14 Granted, the novel was written by the most eminent philosopher of his time, Rousseau. 
15 There is certainly a correspondence between Hegel and Lukács on the concept of a “problematic individual” 
pessimistically confronting a “contingent world” (Theory of the Novel 78). In his Preface to Theory of the Novel, 
Lukács writes that he was “in process of turning from Kant to Hegel” in this work, and maybe it was specifically 
this passage from Hegel that he has in mind: “…the individual as he appears in this world of prose and everyday is 
not active out of the entirety of his own self and his resources, and he is intelligible not from himself, but from 
something else. For the individual man stands in dependence on external influences, laws, political institutions, civil 
relationships, which he just finds confronting him, and he must bow to them whether he has them as his own inner 
being or not. Furthermore, the individual subject is not in the eyes of others such an entirety in himself, but comes 
before them only according to the nearest isolated interest which they take in his actions, wishes, and opinions. 
Men’s primary interest is simply what is related to their own intentions and aims. […] This is the prose of the world, 
as it appears to the consciousness both of the individual himself and of others:—a world of finitude and mutability, 
of entanglement in the relative, of the pressure of necessity from which the individual is in no position to withdraw. 
For every isolated living thing remains caught in the contradiction of being itself in its own eyes this shut-in unit and 
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art?,” the contrast he gives is between lyric poetry and painting rather than the novel (161-62). 
Prose for Hegel is too nebulous to be material as a literary form outside of philosophical prose, 
which is evident when he uses phrases such as “prose of spiritual existence” or “the common 
prose of life” (190; 245). His section on “Romantic Fiction” covers barely two pages on chivalric 
romance before charting the “Dissolution of the Romantic Form of Art,” citing Hamlet and 
Romeo and Juliet before returning back to his enamored Dutch paintings (592-598). There is a 
peculiar daftness to his ignorance of the novel in this seemingly comprehensive, encyclopedic 
account of the arts. His discussion of Don Quixote is in The Phenomenology of Spirit, not his 
Aesthetics, and only as a counterpart to the pursuit of the “deed” in Faust. The closest he gets to 
the novel in the first volume of Aesthetics, aside from a few nods to Goethe, Jacobi, Tieck, and 
Jean Paul, is how “wearisome… prose’s prolixity” is (218). It’s easy to see how frustrated 
Schopenhauer was with this man who couldn’t even take a cue from himself. The novel seems to 
occur to Hegel as an afterthought that he clumsily sweeps away when, after 1,100 pages of 
painstaking analysis of the other arts, he writes:  
In the other spheres of our present national and social life there is opened up in the 
domain of epic an unlimited field for romances, tales, and novels; yet I am unable here to 
pursue any further, even in the most general outline, the vast history of their development 
from their origin up to the present day. (II 1110) 
In short, Hegel is certainly no Schlegel. Nietzsche, for his part, has nothing but contempt for 
Victor Hugo, George Sand, George Eliot, and Émile Zola, writing Thus Spoke Zarathustra as an 
 
yet of being nevertheless dependent on something else, and the struggle to resolve this contradiction does not get 
beyond an attempt and the continuation of this eternal war” (Aesthetics I 149-50). While “the world of prose and 
everyday” certainly thematizes the novel, it is Lukács who makes this connection explicit, not Hegel. 
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anti-novel instead (Twilight of the Idols 78-80). And Heidegger, as we shall see, does his best to 
hide the influence of the novel—and of Lukács’s Theory of the Novel—on his own work.  
 
“Ridiculus Sum”: Cervantes, Flaubert, Bakhtin 
An awkward situation: maybe the affinity that the novel feels like it shares with 
pessimism is not quite reciprocated in the same way. Thacker writes that the “very term 
‘pessimism’ suggests a school of thought, a movement, even a community. But pessimism 
always has a membership of one—maybe two (one of them imaginary)” (Infinite Resignation 8). 
Is the novel that unacknowledged, imaginary double of this “membership of one”? Thacker 
makes a point of calling Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground as “one of the great anti-
novels,” perhaps in keeping with Lukács’s claim that Dostoevsky did not write novels, and later 
“think[s] of the great non-novels of the past century,” including Kafka’s The Castle, as if 
somehow the novel cannot attain greatness in the eyes of the pessimist in the way a “non-novel” 
can (23; 139). He goes on to say: 
The pessimist harbors no ideals concerning literary craft or ‘finding one’s voice’ as a 
writer. There is only what suffices, what is finished enough, what can be left off, cast 
away, abandoned, when it physically hurts too much to write so much and to sit for so 
long. This is the secret of the short form in Nietzsche (style as illness) and also in 
Schopenhauer (style as intolerance). (54-55) 
Pessimism clings to the short form—the fragment, the aphorism, the maxim, the joke, the insult: 
as far away in scope as possible from the novel. In Nietzsche, someone who hated novels, this is 
most apparent. Schopenhauer’s World as Will and Representation deceptively seems like a 
systematic work of Kantian philosophy, at least at first glance. But it gradually fails at this 
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system, and crumbles away, so that it can be read not just as a work of continuous prose, but as a 
series of barbed, short fragments that are closer in genre to his separately published aphorisms.  
Thacker clarifies the “two strategies” of writing pessimism, one literary and one 
philosophical: “For literary pessimism, there is the diary, the confession, the parable, the 
monologue” (65). As examples, he cites Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther, Hamsun’s 
Hunger, Lagerkvist’s The Dwarf, Hrabal’s Too Loud a Solitude, and other novels without ever 
naming the novel as a genre (65). What is left out from this list is a novel like Lolita, which is 
not an example of either the diary, the confession, the parable, or the monologue, but a work that 
makes use of all of these forms for a bleak vision of the world at its worst. The list of works he 
provides ostensibly demonstrates this literary strategy whereby “thought expands, cataloguing 
and accounting for a horizonless panoply of events, experiences, ideas, and affects, whereas in 
the philosophical strategy, thought contracts, condensed into epiphanies, maxims, and glimpses 
into the horizon of thought itself” (65-66). Doesn’t the expansive “cataloguing and accounting 
for a horizonless panoply of events, experiences, ideas, and affects” count not just as a literary 
strategy, but as a specifically novelistic strategy? This distinction between the novel and the anti-
novel made no sense to Nabokov, either, who said in one interview that, “This ‘anti-novel’ does 
not really exist,” and in another, “I just don’t know what an ‘anti-novel’ is specifically. Every 
original novel is ‘anti-’ because it does not resemble the genre or kind of its predecessor” (Strong 
Opinions 4; 173).16  
Thacker positions the novel at a remove from pessimism, but Sartre makes the opposite 
gesture, dismissing The Sound and the Fury as “un-novelistic” precisely because of its 
 
16 Nabokov is aware of the “anti-novel” and “nouveau roman” movement often associated with Robbe-Grillet, but 
insists on treating Robbe-Grillet as “one great French writer” rather than an exemplar of any movement (Strong 
Opinions 4). “The French New Novel does not really exist,” he clarifies, “apart from a little heap of dust and fluff in 
a fouled pigeonhole” (173). 
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pessimism (“Time in the Work of Faulkner” 271). “Faulkner’s despair seems to me to precede 
his metaphysics,” Sartre complains. “For him, as for all of us, the future is closed” (271). And 
Sartre then resorts to quoting Heidegger to justify his position: “The loss of all hope, for 
example, does not deprive human reality of its possibilities; it is simply a way of being toward 
these same possibilities” (qtd. in ibid. 271). But Sartre here, in his invocation of Heidegger, is 
assuming that the range of possibilities in human reality is something worth celebrating. 
Faulkner does away with this assumption, and in fact does the exact opposite of what Sartre 
accuses him of doing. He stretches the realm of possibilities both inside and outside of time 
itself, so that Benjy knows neither past nor future, and Quentin, in killing himself after smashing 
the watch his father gave him, liberates himself from the burden of any experience of 
temporality. Maybe it is this treatment of time, of hopelessness, of pessimism, that is—against 
Sartre’s claim—the novel’s most novelistic quality.   
This symptom of dismissing the novel appears again when Thacker chooses to write 
about how “farcical” Proust’s and Knausgaard’s works are—but he only refers to them as 
autobiographies, not the novels that they are (207). He returns to the question of literary 
pessimism in his introduction to “The Patron Saints of Pessimism,” where he catalogues another 
list of writers, many of whom are novelists. And without acknowledging the novel as a distinct 
genre yet again, he writes, “The list quickly expands, soon encompassing the entirety of 
literature itself. In the end it’s overwhelming; all of literature becomes a candidate” (250). 
For a work that so thoroughly refuses to acknowledge the novel as a privileged genre of 
pessimism, it is striking to see Infinite Resignation end on the following note, with a reference to 
Don Quixote, which Miguel de Unamuno also cites at the end of his own pessimistic work, The 
Tragic Sense of Life:  
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To ridicule. To be ridiculous. These are, for Unamuno, the only responses to the ‘tragic 
sense of life.’ The philosophy of ridicule, and also a ridiculous philosophy. ‘Don 
Quixote,’ Unamuno writes, ‘made himself ridiculous—but was he aware of the most 
tragic ridicule of all, the ridicule reflected in oneself, the ridiculousness of the human 
being in his own eyes?’ A Quixotic philosophy. (Thacker 386) 
Don Quixote fights “out of despair,” but “it is despair and despair alone that begets hope, absurd 
hope, mad hope” (Unamuno 324). For this reason, Unamuno tells us, Don Quixote “is not a 
pessimist” (326). But he repeats that he isn’t a pessimist four times on the same page, maybe 
protesting a bit too much. True, Don Quixote himself may be no pessimist, but the “absurd hope, 
mad hope” that he clings to offers the reader of Cervantes—and of Unamuno—little consolation. 
It is, as Unamuno admits, “ridiculous” (323).  
Quixote “fights against this Modern Age that began with Machiavelli and that will end 
comically” (326). The irony is that this protagonist who desperately clings to a world of 
medieval chivalry becomes the cipher of everything he fights against—modernity, newness, 
novelty, the novel. What he “bequeathed to Kultur” is “Quixotism,” a “whole method, a whole 
epistemology, a whole esthetic [sic.], a whole logic, a whole ethic—above all, a whole religion—
that is to say, a whole economy of things eternal and things divine, a whole hope in what is 
rationally absurd” (325). Quixotism, then, is what supplants philosophy itself in all its rationality 
and systematicity; the alternative vision that pessimism embraces is one that is sketched out by 
the novel, in all its ridiculousness. 
“Ridiculus sum” is the phrase that the young Charles Bovary, humiliated by his 
classmates at elementary school for stuttering and not being able to say his own name, is forced 
to write on the chalkboard, twenty times (Flaubert 5). Maybe all pessimistic writing is a way of 
 60 
repeating this refrain, adding new layers of meaning—or unraveling the meaning—with each 
repetition, struggling and failing to balance the cruelty of the world with a reciprocal response 
before we can hardly even name ourselves. Ridiculus sum, ergo sum. But, written by a pessimist, 
this phrase also means to say: as ridiculous as I am, at least I’m not as ridiculous as an optimist, 
as Leibniz, as Pangloss.  
The pessimist Jean Améry, in his novel-essay Charles Bovary, Country Doctor: Portrait 
of a Simple Man, writes from Charles’s point of view after the death of his wife, hurling insults 
at his creator like the Creature to Doctor Frankenstein, not forgiving him for the simple, 
reductive, ridiculous caricature of a man stuck in a “comedy of rage and pain” he is forced into 
(76). In a chapter called “Ridiculus Sum,” he positions Flaubert himself in that traumatic 
classroom scene, as one of the boys who had laughed at him: “Gustave Flaubert, I was nothing to 
you,” he writes (32). To Améry/Bovary, Flaubert’s “irony is hard, maybe even wicked, in any 
case profoundly unfair” (62). A former Resistance fighter in the Second World War, and a 
survivor of Auschwitz, Buchenwald, and Bergen-Belsen, Améry found life worth living in the 
novel, and in becoming a novelist. In response to a scathing review of his foray into literature by 
Germany’s leading critic Marcel Reich-Ranicki entitled “Terrible is the Temptation to the 
Novel,” he attempted suicide in 1974, and survived it only to write a defense of suicide and then 
this final work on Charles Bovary in the same year that he did end up killing himself, in 1978 
(ix).  
There is a point at which ridicule and rejection are too much to bear, and pessimism 
becomes the means through which one can think through, and perhaps even justify suicide—or 
justify the opposite of suicide, whatever that would be.17 In 1910, three days after defending 
 
17 Thinking of Werther while articulating an alternative to his ending, Barthes writes, “I have no hope, but all the 
same… Or else: I stubbornly choose not to choose; I choose drifting: I continue” (A Lover’s Discourse 62). 
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Persuasion and Rhetoric, a dissertation that aimed to prove the futility of human life, the twenty-
three-year old Carlo Michelstaedter committed suicide by gunshot (Ligotti 15-16). Philip 
Mainländer, obsessed with Schopenhauer, turned the philosopher’s concept of the “Will-to-Live” 
into a “Will-to-Die” in his 1876 book Philosophy of Redemption, where he wrote that “God is 
dead” years before Nietzsche plagiarized him (18). The day it was published, Mainländer took 
the hefty manuscript, stacked it up on the ground, and used it as a pedestal that he would kick 
away once the noose was firmly tightened around his neck. 
“Hang yourself, and you will regret it,” Kierkegaard writes in Either/Or. But he 
continues: “Do not hang yourself, and you will also regret it. Hang yourself or do not hang 
yourself, you will regret it either way. Whether you hang yourself or do not hang yourself, you 
will regret it either way. This, gentlemen, is the quintessence of all the wisdom of life” (I 38-39). 
The pedantic, metronomic repetition of “hang yourself” and “do not hang yourself” and “you 
will regret it either way” seems to empty these phrases of all meaning the way repetition of any 
phrase would—including “ridiculus sum” several times on the chalkboard.18 It is as if the 
meaninglessness and ridiculousness performed by the repetition itself becomes the “quintessence 
of all the wisdom of life.” “This ridiculous weakness for living is perhaps one of our most fatal 
tendencies,” says the Old Woman in Voltaire’s Candide who had been told to “cheer up” after 
she was enslaved and had one buttock sliced off. “For can anything be sillier than to insist on 
carrying a burden one would continually much rather throw to the ground? Sillier than to feel 
disgust at one’s own existence and yet cling to it?” (Voltaire 31). 
Other thinkers like Cioran offer this unexpectedly—and even uncomfortably—hilarious 
advice for not killing oneself: “It is not worth the bother of killing yourself, since you will 
 
18 Repetition, though, is one of the central principles of a meaningful existence to Kierkegaard, and regret “is the 
quintessence of all the wisdom of life” (Either/Or I.39).  
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always kill yourself too late,” echoed by Thacker, who writes, “One commits suicide not because 
one wants to die, but because one is already dead… in which case suicide is not worth the 
trouble” (The Trouble with Being Born 32; Infinite Resignation 49). Cioran also uses his 
characteristically aggressive sophistry when he argues that, “Only optimists commit suicide, 
optimists who no longer succeed at being optimists. The others, having no reason to live, why 
would they have any to die?” (All Gall is Divided 87).  
Maurice Blanchot reiterates this sentiment in The Space of Literature: “The weakness of 
suicide lies in the fact that whoever commits it is still too strong. […W]hoever kills himself is 
linked to hope, the hope of finishing it all” (103). For Blanchot, suicide is not an option because 
it is not pessimistic enough. It is still too affirmative: “He who kills himself is the great affirmer 
of the present. I want to kill myself in an ‘absolute’ instant, the only one which will not pass and 
will not be surpassed. […S]urely because of this, suicide retains the power of an exceptional 
affirmation” (103). 
In The Trouble with Being Born, Cioran writes, “The fact that life has no meaning is a 
reason to live—moreover, the only one” (188). And in On the Heights of Despair, he takes a 
more candid tone, echoing Schopenhauer and Freud: “If I were to be totally sincere, I would say 
that I do not know why I live and why I do not stop living. The answer probably lies in the 
irrational character of life which maintains itself without reason” (33). It is paradoxically the 
“irrational character of life,” the absurdity, the meaninglessness of it, that the pessimist embraces 
in order to live. The optimistic spirit of philosophy is what becomes suicidally depressing. There 
is a kind of consolation in avoiding the optimistic delusions that mask reality. Nietzsche takes 
this a step further, finding comfort in the thought of suicide itself: “The thought of suicide is a 
powerful comfort: it helps one through many a dreadful night” (Beyond Good and Evil §157, 
 63 
91). It’s not suicide per se that comforts Nietzsche, but the thought of it—and then the ability to 
contain it in words, in language, like Hamlet, who talks non-stop in order to talk himself through 
suicide so as to postpone the act, while Ophelia, who is hardly given any lines at all, who isn’t 
even given a chance to put a language to her own crisis, ends up being the one who kills herself.  
And maybe this is where pessimistic reflections on suicide converge with the novel—
coming out on the other side in the form of either writing or reading a book that engages the 
topic while staving it off. Maybe this is what Kafka is after when he writes in a letter, “…we 
need the books that affect us like a disaster, that grieve us deeply, like the death of someone we 
loved more than ourselves, like being banished into forests far from everyone, like a suicide” 
(Letters to Friends 16). Cioran says as much when he admits that, “A book is a postponed 
suicide,” and Virginia Woolf articulates this same experience in her diary: “…I am now writing 
to test my theory that there is consolation in expression” (The Trouble with Being Born 99; Diary 
III 81). As she was writing To the Lighthouse, she felt an “invigoration” that allowed her to 
“float everything off now; & ‘everything’ is rather a crowd & weight & confusion in the mind” 
(57; 60). Once she finished the novel, she fell into a suicidal despair (110). Unamuno, too, 
according to some accounts, began The Tragic Sense of Life as a diary, which “was the only 
thing that prevented [him] from suicide” (Thacker 383). 
Pessimists are undoubtedly enticed by the Siren song of suicide, and spend an inordinate 
amount of time—exhausted, spent, and still traveling on a journey without being sure that they’ll 
ever get back home, or that there is even a home to return to—thinking about it. They have the 
energy neither to stop up their ears with wax and strap themselves to the mast, nor to take the 
wax out and unstrap themselves. They feel that they are faced with an absurd, ridiculous choice. 
To be or not to be. Didn’t Gorgias prove that being was non-being anyway? (Gorgias 67-75). Or 
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was his mathematical proof more of a performance of logic itself committing suicide, 
demonstrating its inadequacy in grasping the world to begin with? Or was it all a joke? Maybe 
that’s what we’ll all end up as anyway—just  punchlines to bad jokes by the Gravediggers 
(Shakespeare originally called them “Clowns” instead), and the remains of Yorick will make its 
way from the tragedy of Hamlet to the comic novel of Tristram Shandy.  
Maybe the pessimist lies somewhere between suicide and non-suicide, like Nicolas 
Chamfort, who, to avoid arrest in 1793, fired a pistol to his temple, but misfired so that the bullet 
made its way through his right eye and blew off his nose instead (Arnaud 249). Disappointed at 
his own failed suicide, he took an ivory-handled razor to slit his throat, and when it slipped on 
the first try, he pressed it harder against his throat until his larynx was exposed. Still not enough. 
He then took another razor to make over twenty deep incisions in his chest, his thighs, and his 
calves. His housekeeper had to break into his locked room after seeing the blood pooling outside 
the door, and called for a doctor who was able to resuscitate him. In the days that followed, the 
new head librarian, Lefebvre de Villebrunne, paid him a visit to say, “But M. de Chamfort hasn’t 
read my article against suicide! It has had enormous success. In it, I prove primo… and secondo, 
I prove…” (qtd. in Arnaud 251). He left Chamfort as abruptly as he had entered, without asking 
how he was doing, or what the prognosis was. Sitting up in bed, Chamfort said about himself, 
“This is what it means to be clumsy—you don’t succeed at anything, not even killing yourself” 
(251). He died a year later. 
It is perhaps the subject of suicide itself that distinguishes the pessimist from the 
existentialist, or even the nihilist, even though these categories do overlap considerably:  
Above all, the pessimist is incapable of suicide, that solution of solutions that constitutes 
a horizon for even the most dyed-in-the-wool existentialist. Ironically, it is the pessimist’s 
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deep-seated misanthropy that keeps them alive. Weary of the all-too-human drama of life 
and the living, the pessimist is also aware that suicide solves nothing—that suicide is 
insoluble.” (Thacker 49) 
Maybe this is putting it a bit too strongly. Maybe, knowing that nothing is solved in life either, 
that suicide is just as “insoluble” as staying on this side of life, either choice becomes somewhat 
interchangeable and equally meaningless. Camus’s existentialism is a bit too gimmicky, forcing 
us to see in suicidal thought an opportunity for energetic action to embrace life instead. 
“Happiness and the absurd are two sons of the same earth. They are inseparable,” he wants to 
convince us (The Myth of Sisyphus 122). The pessimist wouldn’t go that far. “One must imagine 
Sisyphus happy”—? (123). No, thanks. As for the nihilist, maybe they’re not pessimistic enough 
either. Maybe it’s not so much a matter of identifying no meaning in the world, in life, in 
existence, but in identifying this meaning as a meaning of the worst, the pessimus. We are in the 
worst of all possible worlds, as Schopenhauer tells us (The World as Will and Representation II 
583).  
However unconvincing Camus can be, at least he acknowledges the role of the novel in 
existentialism to an extent that pessimists do not, perhaps because he was one, himself. But he 
recasts even the characters of philosophy as novelists, and novelists as philosophers: 
The philosopher, even if he is Kant, is a creator. He has his characters, his symbols, and 
his secret action. He has his plot endings. On the contrary, the lead taken by the novel 
over poetry and the essay merely represents, despite appearances, a greater 
intellectualization of the art. […] The novel has its logic, its reasonings, its intuition, and 
its postulate. […] The great novelists are philosophical novelists… (The Myth of Sisyphus 
100) 
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Here again the dream of Schlegel is rearticulated, but to say that the “great novelists are 
philosophical novelists” also seems to sidestep the point that the novel challenges philosophy, 
engaging it on one level only to reject it on another, in the way that Mann illustrates by the end 
of The Magic Mountain. It responds to the ridicule and laughter of the world with irony, with 
parody, and with ridicule and laughter of its own. The pessimistic laughter of the schoolboys 
taunting Charles Bovary at the beginning of Flaubert’s novel comes back at the end of the novel 
in the form of Emma Bovary’s death rattle as she commits suicide, but here the laugh is aimed 
back at the world: “…Emma burst into laughter, horrible, frantic, despairing laughter” as she 
confronts the “looming… terror itself in the darkness of eternity” (290). 
This is the sound of pessimistic laughter, the laughter at the realization of ridiculus sum, 
the hard truth Charles had to live with since he was a child, but which Emma is just now coming 
to terms with, in all its horror and ridiculousness. Maybe we should hear this laughter of 
pessimism in the way that Ivan instructs Alyosha to hear it when he tells him the story of the 
Grand Inquisitor: “Observe that I’m speaking seriously, though I may be laughing” (The 
Brothers Karamazov 229). This anxiety around laughter is echoed later by the young boy Kolya, 
who confides to Alyosha how “profoundly unhappy” he is: “Sometimes I imagine God knows 
what, that everyone is laughing at me, the whole world, and then I… then I’m quite ready to 
destroy the whole order of things” (557). Pessimism pivots around laughing disdainfully at the 
world and fearing that this act is reciprocated. Adorno and Horkheimer, as though recapitulating 
Bakhtin, but through the lens of Schopenhauer, write, “Even though laughter is still the sign of 
force, of the breaking out of blind and obdurate nature, it also contains the opposite element—the 
fact that only through laughter blind nature becomes aware of itself as it is, and thereby 
surrenders itself to the power of destruction” (Dialectic of Enlightenment 77). Laughter dissolves 
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the subject, propelling it toward annihilation, dissolved by blind Will and reclaimed by nature. “I 
choose one thing,” Kierkegaard writes, “—that I may always have the laughter on my side” 
(Either/Or I.43).  
The laughter of pessimism is the motor of chaos, of anarchy, and it has a history that 
stretches back to the ancients. It shouldn’t be forgotten that Aristophanes, in whose mouth Plato 
places the most beautiful poetry in Symposium, in actuality used his comedy to poke fun at 
Socrates, and was also one of his first accusers, ultimately leading to Socrates’ death. And the 
only reason, for instance, that Medea gives for killing her children is because she doesn’t want to 
be laughed at: “Why should I, just to cause their father pain,” she deliberates, “feel twice the pain 
myself by harming them? / I will not do it. Farewell to my plans. / But wait—what’s wrong with 
me? What do I want? / To allow my enemies to laugh at me?” (Euripides l.1068-1072).  
In The Brothers Karamazov, Doctor Herzenstube says that a “Russian laughs when he 
ought to weep” (675). No one exemplifies this better than Mitya, who often looks as though he 
has “something pensive and gloomy in his eyes,” but one “would suddenly be struck by his 
unexpected laughter, betraying gay and playful thoughts precisely at the moment when he looked 
so gloomy” (68). In Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov returns to the scene of his crime in a 
nightmare, but is unable to repeat the murder because Alëna Ivanovna is essentially castrating 
him with her laughter (266-67). This nightmare occurs only as an interruption in the agonizingly 
tense cat-and-mouse game he is playing with Porfiry Petrovich, the magistrate on his case, who 
rarely interacts with him without laughing.  
Bakhtin characterizes laughter as “ambivalent,” but also “at the same time cheerful and 
annihilating” (21). Laughter for him is the soil from which the novel springs, which is why the 
novel is fundamentally composed of irony. In “popular laughter, the authentic folkloric roots of 
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the novel are to be sought” (21). Laughter is the anarchic force that not only “destroys the epic,” 
but “in general destroys any hierarchical (distancing and valorized) distance. As a distanced 
image a subject cannot be comical; to be made comical, it must be brought close. Everything that 
makes us laugh is close at hand…” (23). Bakhtin here sounds like Heidegger, but with a sense of 
humor. He goes on to say that it “demolishes fear and piety before an object, before a world, 
making of it an object of familiar contact and thus clearing the ground for an absolutely free 
investigation of it” (23). The novel, for him, is that method of free investigation, liberated from 
any narrowly defined poetics that have restricted genres established before it.  
Whereas Lukács identifies the novel as a site of withdrawal, spoken of in abstract and 
transcendental terms, Bakhtin sees the novel as the opposite: as a close-up of the world and of 
ourselves in all its detail. Both theorists, however, agree that the novel is an expression of 
incongruity with the world, which is rooted in Schopenhauer’s theory of laughter: “…laughter 
itself is just the expression of this incongruity” (The World as Will and Representation I §13, 
59). Kundera, too, agrees on this point. Departing from Camus’ characterization of a good novel 
being a philosophical novel, Kundera insists that, “The novel’s wisdom is different from that of 
philosophy. The novel is born not of the theoretical spirit but of the spirit of humor” (The Art of 
the Novel 160). Quoting a conversation he had had with Octavio Paz, which itself sounds like an 
echo of Bakhtin, he writes that humor “renders ambiguous everything it touches” (6). 
As the pessimistic laugh in Madame Bovary, The Brothers Karamazov, and Medea show, 
however, there is a difference between laughter and humor. Bakhtin turns to laughter as such to 
illustrate the deepest concerns of the novel, writing: 
In this plane (the plane of laughter) one can disrespectfully walk around whole objects; 
therefore, the back and rear portion of an object (and also its innards, not normally 
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accessible for viewing) assume a special importance. The object is broken apart, laid bare 
(its hierarchical ornamentation is removed): the naked object is ridiculous; its ‘empty’ 
clothing, stripped and separated from its person, is also ridiculous. What takes place is a 
comical operation of dismemberment. (23-24)   
There is a physicality to laughter that the novel explores in greater detail than any theatrical 
comedy or other genre of literature. It functions in the same way that Heidegger’s concept of 
Ent-fernung does: it is a vehicle of de-distancing, of bringing objects close to us so that we can 
inspect them: “Laughter has the remarkable power of making an object come up close, of 
drawing it into a zone of crude contact…” (23). In this “zone of crude contact,” hardly anything 
is impressive.  
What Walter Benjamin would call the “aura” of an object—which he defines as “the 
unique manifestation of a distance”—is dispelled upon closer contact (Illuminations 188). “The 
essentially distant is the inapproachable,” he continues. “Inapproachability in fact is the primary 
quality of the ceremonial image” (188). The novel dissolves such ceremoniousness; the image of 
what may pass off as ceremonial in epic or tragedy becomes ridiculous and ordinary in the novel. 
Proust plays with the humor at work in images seen from afar and then brought suddenly up 
close throughout In Search of Lost Time, as in the aching desire Swann feels for Odette until he 
suddenly decides that she was no longer his type.  
Even earnest and sentimental novels can’t quite manage the ceremonial image, however 
hard they try. “One would have to have a heart of stone,” Oscar Wilde is reported to have said 
about Dickens’s The Old Curiosity Shop, “to read the death of Little Nell and not dissolve into 
tears… of laughter” (qtd. in McNamara, L.A. Times). And the trashy novels of Ayn Rand and 
E.L. James—with their dull, humorless, superhero Übermenschen—are unwittingly hilarious 
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precisely because they’re trying too hard to be ceremonious and imperious in their desperate 
pleas to be worshipped by undiscerning readers. There isn’t much humor in D.H. Lawrence 
either, but what he lacks in humor he makes up for in concentrating on sheer physicality, on new 
ways of experiencing and articulating the body in its tension between Lukácsian withdrawal and 
Bakhtinian engagement.  
The physical manifestation of laughter in the novel is what fascinates Bakhtin the most. 
Laughter is a physical eruption, a convulsion, a state of the body losing control of itself, and it 
ultimately becomes a metonym for the “comical operation of dismemberment” (24). This 
sparagmos, the dismemberment of the body, is a parody of Eucharist symbolism, as well as the 
more ancient myths of Orpheus and tragic stories of Hippolytus and Pentheus (Frye 192). 
Ultimately, though, Northrop Frye defines sparagmos as “the sense that heroism and effective 
action are absent, disorganized or foredoomed to defeat, and that confusion and anarchy reign 
over the world” (192). While this definition may seem pessimistic enough, he is emphatic in 
categorizing it under the “archetypal theme of irony and satire” (192). 
No one exemplifies this ironic, satiric sparagmos through laughter better than Rabelais. 
“But Rabelaisian laughter not only destroys traditional connections and abolishes idealized 
strata,” Bakhtin argues, “it also brings out the crude, unmediated connections between things that 
people otherwise seeks to keep separate, in pharisaical error” (170). In Gargantua and 
Pantagruel, Rabelais paints anatomically detailed and fantastically grotesque descriptions, such 
as the one of Friar John punishing his enemies who had broken into the monastery vineyard. In 
one sentence alone, we get a cascading catalogue of physical violence: 
He beat out the brains of some, broke the arms and legs of others, disjointed the neck-
bones, demolished the kidneys, slit the noses, blackened the eyes, smashed the jaws, 
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knocked the teeth down the throats, shattered the shoulder-blades, crushed the shins, 
dislocated the thigh-bones, and cracked the fore-arms of yet others. (Rabelais 99).   
Bakhtin is also particularly tickled by how Friar John slices a man’s head in two, providing 
details about the skull fractures and lobe incision (172). In another episode in the novel, which 
Bakhtin calls “a wicked parody on the conception of life and death as it was perceived by the 
medieval transcendental world view,” Panurge—after quarreling with a ship merchant—throws 
the merchant’s bellwether into the sea, leading the other sheep to run overboard to chase it, and 
the merchant and his herdsmen follow suit to save them (Bakhtin 196): 
Panurge stood beside the galley with an oar in his hand, not to help the drovers but to 
prevent them from clambering aboard and escaping their death… With rhetorical 
flourishes, he pointed out to them the miseries of this world, and the blessings and 
felicities of the other life, affirming that the dead were luckier than those who lived on in 
this vale of tears. (Rabelais 467)   
This is the same kind of humor that we see centuries later in Voltaire’s Candide, who, amidst 
graphic portrayals of mutilated bodies—from  brains that “lay scattered on the ground beside 
severed arms and legs” to the Old Woman’s story about how her buttock was sliced off (6; 30)—
lampoons Leibniz’s claim in Theodicy that this is the best of all possible worlds.19 
The full title of this work is Candide, or: Optimism. It is curious why Voltaire, a 
philosopher in his own right, would turn to the form of the novel to articulate his most scathing 
attack against Leibnizian optimism. “Deeply suspicious of metaphysical ‘systems,” like any 
other pessimist after him, Voltaire “was constantly appealing to the facts; fiction, paradoxically, 
allowed him to show the ways in which the muddle and miseries of life could not be reduced to 
 
19 Northrop Frye writes that the “literary ancestry” of “Candide runs through Rabelais” (308). 
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neat, abstract theories” (Pearson ix). It wasn’t just fiction that he turned to in this work, but that 
specific Rabelaisian literary tradition that Bakhtin associates with the rise of the modern novel. 
As much as contemporary pessimists may want to handle the novel at arm’s length—or, for 
whatever reason, refer to them as “non-novels,” it is important to note that Schopenhauer, 
himself an avid translator of Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy into German, has this to say 
about Voltaire’s novel: “…to return to Leibniz, I cannot assign to the Théodicée, that methodical 
and broad development of optimism, in such a capacity, any other merit than that it later gave 
rise to the immortal Candide of the great Voltaire” (The World as Will and Representation II 
582).  
In Voltaire’s companion piece to Candide, the interstellar adventurer Micromegas—
whose name draws our attention to absurdity as a game of scale—travels from his star Sirius to 
Saturn before stopping by Earth. In contrast to the inhabitants of Saturn, he expects humans, 
microscopic “animalcules” to him, “being apparently all mind and spirit… must spend your lives 
loving and thinking—the true life of the spirit. Nowhere have I seen real happiness, but no doubt 
it exists here” (117). He’s specifically addressing philosophers here who, in a rare moment of 
candidness, unanimously shake their heads in disagreement. One of them admits that, “except for 
a small number of inhabitants of little consequence, the rest were a collection of the mad, the 
malevolent, and the miserable” (117). Philosophers, these supposed experts of the mind and 
spirit, still cannot figure out how to alleviate misery. But at least pessimistic novelists have 
learned how to laugh, though.  
And this is how Micromegas ends. When one of the philosophers claims that “everything, 
their persons, their worlds, their suns, their stars, had been made uniquely for man,” Micromegas 
“fell about, choking with that irrepressible laughter which, according to Homer, is the portion of 
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the gods” (121). Voltaire describes how Micromegas’s shoulders and belly “heaved and sank” in 
“convulsions” of laughter, even as: 
…he was a trifle vexed to see that beings so infinitesimally small should have a degree of 
pride that was almost infinitely great. He promised to write them a nice book of 
philosophy, in very small script just for them, and that in this book they would discover 
what was what. Sure enough, he gave them this volume before he left. It was taken to 
Paris to the Academy of Sciences. But when the secretary opened it, he found nothing but 
blank pages. (121)     
A book of blank pages—the ultimate send-up of all those systematic tomes of philosophical 
scribbling. Eight years after the publication of Micromegas (and just one year after the 
publication of Candide), the genre of the novel itself takes a page out of this book, so to speak, 
when, toward the end of Tristram Shandy, Sterne includes two chapters consisting entirely of 
blank pages, perhaps to match the two fully blacked out pages in the beginning (Sterne 521-522; 
29-30). The novel provides a wisdom that philosophy, being “apparently all mind and spirit,” 
doesn’t have the guts for—especially the literal guts populating the pages of Rabelais, Voltaire, 
and Sterne. It is a Micromegian wisdom that coincides with the stance of pessimism, 
acknowledging that the cosmos, the stars, the world, are not “for us” (Thacker, In the Dust of this 
Planet 4). We then turn our attention away from the stars as ciphers of eternity to the finitude of 
our bodies, in all their ridiculousness and all their pain, even though they’re lined with chemical 





No Pity in the Stars 
The centrifugal act of laughter and its association with the dismemberment of the body in 
the novel moves away from the serious, concentrated, centripetal gaze of the cynosure in what 
Frye calls the “high mimetic” of Renaissance literature (58). The cynosure, the center of 
attention, is a sixteenth-century word that “originally denoted the constellation Ursa Minor, or 
the Pole Star which it contains, long used by navigators,” according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary. The novel distracts this attention, pulls it apart in different and often disorienting 
directions, so that by the time we get to Ulysses in the twentieth century, the hero of the novel is 
no longer the protagonist but the reader of the novel itself, as we navigate our own circuitous 
paths through the text, its impenetrable passages slowly revealing themselves as clearings in the 
dense, dark void. It is in this way that Joyce’s novel simulates the map not just of Dublin, but of 
the night sky, and the reader—named by the novel’s title—struggles to find one’s way back to an 
unstable home of unstable meaning by reading the work as a series of dizzying constellations in 
motion, seemingly re-patterning themselves with each reading. Joyce invites us to perform this 
Copernican turn, moving our attention away from the celestial spheres above us that had once 
given us transcendental meaning, to the immanence of our body, and of the bodies he populates 
in the novel, in their Rabelaisian humor. 
Sixty-five years before Ulysses, Flaubert used the novel form to thematize the constraints, 
the failure, of his own medium in these cosmic terms. Language for him can only ever be “like a 
cracked kettle on which we beat out tunes for bears to dance to, when we long to inspire pity in 
the stars” (Madame Bovary 167). The stars are what we had once relied on to understand our 
place in the cosmic order. Odysseus used them as a map to find his way back home to Ithaca. 
Dante navigates his own epic journey from hell to paradise, using the stars—the Ptolemaic 
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mediator between the light of God’s mind and the fallen humans on earth—as his lodestone. The 
Inferno ends as he “walked out once more beneath the Stars” (XXXIV.143). The Purgatorio 
ends with him “perfect, pure, and ready for the Stars” (XXXIII.146). And The Paradiso ends 
with the “Love that moves the Sun and the other stars” (XXXIII.146). This stellar canopy over 
our home was proof of divine protection, an organizing principle of meaning, structure, and 
comfort. Even melancholia, unlike pessimism, had the privilege of being explained away as a 
planetary affliction, reflecting the balance of stellar bodies in the universe. In Albrecht Dürer’s 
1514 engraving Melencolia I, we see the saturnine angel heavily, lethargically resting her head 
on her hand, deep in contemplation, in consideration, with the blazing star in the background. 
Consideration itself is etymologically rooted in the sidera, the stars—to consider, weigh the 
options (to be or not to be?) is to synchronize the orb of your mind with the orbs of the stars, 
following their movements.  
But as Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo dismantled the Ptolemaic system, they 
demolished with it the sense of cosmic order that undergirded our sense of who we are, where we 
came from, where we are going, and how we can arrive at meaning and values, ushering an 
ontological and epistemic crisis of the highest order. Shakespeare stages this contemporary 
cataclysm in King Lear, when Edgar, disguised as Poor Tom, characterizes the quasi-apocalyptic 
storm as “star-blasting” (3.4.58). No one, not even his own father, recognizes him after the 
storm, echoing the sentiment that governs Hamlet and sets that entire play in motion with its 
inaugural line: “Who’s there?” (1.1.1). Recognition fails; cognition needs to start anew. 
Shakespeare drags us through the stellar rubble of outmoded value systems, as when Edgar’s 
brother Edmund cynically observes, “the excellent foppery of the world, that, when we are sick 
in fortune, often the surfeits of our own behavior, we make guilty of our disasters the sun, the 
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moon, and stars; as if we were villains on necessity, fools by heavenly compulsion…” (1.2.112-
115). Macbeth implores the stars to hide their fires so as to conceal his murderous, “dark and 
deep desires” (1.4.57-58), but in Hamlet, stars are even doubted to be fire at all (2.2.124). They 
“start from their spheres,” falling out of their fixed orbits into a new, unknown, terrifying reality, 
calling the natural itself into question—not to mention the supernatural (1.5.22).  
Romeo, for his part, wants nothing to do with them, shouting, “Then I defy you stars!” 
after hearing the misinformation of Juliet’s death (5.1.24). Juliet for him had already replaced the 
stars; even the “brightness of her cheek would shame those stars / As daylight doth a lamp” 
(2.2.19-20). She herself “is” the sun, and their love constitutes a cosmic unity that emerges out of 
the chaos of their surroundings just as much as, on a purely linguistic level, their first encounter 
takes the shape of a formal sonnet that isolates them from the insults and vulgar language that 
opened the play (2.2.3). Instead of a big bang, they do not so much collide as coalesce into the 
covert and literal space of a “little sound” (the definition of a sonnet), while the loudness of the 
Capulets and Montagues feuding with each other roars on the other side of their silence. But this 
cosmic—or rather microcosmic—unity is also doomed to failure. Juliet Capulet, even in her 
initials, replaces Jesus Christ in this new scheme. But in her pessimistic resurrection, she wakes 
up to a world not even worth the bother of redeeming. She kills herself again instead, and in her 
suicide, maybe she takes the world with her. To Schopenhauer, the “terrors of death rest for the 
most part on the false illusion that then the I or ego vanishes, and the world remains. But rather is 
the opposite true, namely that the world vanishes…” (The World as Will and Representation II 
500).   
“Thus runs the world away,” Hamlet sings after staging his play within the play 
(3.2.300). Nothing, especially not the world we spin on, in the abyss of space, has any kind of 
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stability anymore. Maybe it doesn’t even deserve redemption. According to the New Testament, 
“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was God, and the Word was with God,” but now 
that that order had been sundered, all we are left with are “words, words, words” (2.2.210). A 
cracked kettle that solicits no pity from the stars—but a kettle we are condemned to use 
regardless. 
It is no wonder, then, why Schlegel sees Shakespeare as laying the ground for “the true 
foundation of the novel” (“Dialogue on Poetry” 108). Adapting to the present moment of his own 
time, Shakespeare takes a novel view into the dissolving order of the world and the 
precariousness of how we arrive at meaning and understanding of this world. Perhaps it is no 
coincidence, as well, that Lukács begins his Theory of the Novel with, “Happy are those ages 
when the starry sky is the map of all possible paths—ages whose paths are illuminated by the 
light of the stars” (29). Those ages—along with the possibility of happiness—are long past, 
relegated to an era dominated by the epic form. Lukács writes a pessimistic tract about the novel 
as a pessimistic genre, beginning his work with the word “Happy” and ending with undermined 
“hopes which are signs of a world to come, still so weak that it can easily be crushed by the 
sterile power of the merely existent” (153).  
In the time of Homer, by contrast, “[e]verything in such ages is new and yet familiar, full 
of adventure and yet their own. The world is wide and yet it is like a home, for the fire that burns 
in the soul is of the same essential nature as the stars…” (29) This was a time that, to Lukács, 
pre-dated philosophy—a time when we felt at home in the world, when there was no distinction 
yet between subject and object, when meaning could be gleaned from the stars. The “happy ages 
have no philosophy,” he insists (29). And now that we do have philosophy, as that structure of 
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meaning to replace the stars, it does little to guide our path the way the stars guided the paths of 
Odysseus and Dante: 
Kant’s starry firmament now shines only in the dark night of pure cognition, it no longer 
lights any solitary wanderer’s path (for to be a man in the new world is to be solitary). 
And the inner light affords evidence of security, or its illusion, only to the wanderer’s 
next step. No light radiates any longer from within into the world of events, into its vast 
complexity to which the soul is a stranger. (36) 
The novel for Lukács isn’t the first genre to articulate this solitary experience, this experience of 
loneliness. “Loneliness is the very essence of tragedy,” he notes, “for the soul that has attained 
itself through its destiny can have brothers among the stars, but never an earthly companion…” 
(45). The loneliness of the novel, however, cannot find any brotherhood among the stars 
whatsoever.  
Philosophy, culminating in “Kant’s starry firmament,” is born out of the alienation from 
what the other starry firmament had represented, but over the course of philosophy’s 
development, it becomes guilty of what Husserl and Heidegger would call the “forgetting of 
being” (Being and Time 2). Heidegger takes up this question in Being and Time, and Husserl 
locates the “roots of the crisis… at the beginning of the Modern Era, in Galileo and Descartes, in 
the one-sided nature of the European sciences, which reduced the world to a mere object of 
technical and mathematical investigation and put the concrete world of life, die Lebenswelt as he 
called it, beyond their horizon” (Art of the Novel 3).  
Both Lukács and Bakhtin think of the novel as a kind of Copernican turn, which we can 
see embedded even in Lukács’s metaphor of the “Kantian starry firmament.” Bakhtin, in 
emphasizing the concern with the body and its sparagmos, defines the novel as “the expression 
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of a Galilean perception of language, one that denies the absolutism of a single and unitary 
language—that is that refuses to acknowledge its own language as the sole verbal and semantic 
center of the ideological world” (367). The heteroglossia at work in the novel simulates, on the 
level of form, the multiplicity and division of bodies. Opposed to the novel is the “language of 
the poetic genre,” which is “a unitary and singular Ptolemaic world outside of which nothing else 
exists and nothing else is needed” (286). It is a dead, fixed “language,”; the novel is open-ended 
and polyvalent. 
If the novelist loses touch with the linguistic ground of prose style, if he is unable to 
attain the heights of a relativized, Galilean linguistic consciousness, if he is deaf to 
organic double-voicedness and the internal dialogization of living and evolving 
discourse, then he will never comprehend, or even realize, the actual possibilities and 
tasks of the novel as a genre. (327) 
From the opposite point of view, Northrop Frye articulates his discomfort with using the word 
“novel” for a “catchall term which can be applied to practically any prose book that is not ‘on’ 
something,” by saying that, “this novel-centered view on prose fiction is a Ptolemaic perspective 
which is now too complicated to be any longer workable, and some more relative and 
Copernican view must take its place” (304). But even as Bakhtin and Frye differ about where 
exactly the novel falls on the turn between the Ptolemaic and the Copernican, they both identify 
it as the pivot for that turn.  
 This consistent metaphor for the rise of the novel reflects the anxiety that the novel 
expresses about the tenuous state—or even loss—of any transcendental meaning we assign to 
ourselves. Opposed to melodrama, which transports “the anthropocentrism of tragedy and epic—
the idea that the struggles internal to a small group of individuals have a collective meaning—to 
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the world inhabited by average or middle-class characters,” the novel dissolves this meaning 
(Mazzoni 265). Kundera observes that, for Emma Bovary, whose private drama has little or no 
consequence to anyone outside her immediate relations, the “horizon shrinks to the point of 
seeming a barrier… The lost infinity of the outside world is replaced by the infinity of the soul” 
(Art of the Novel 8). But what is that? “The infinity of the soul—if it ever existed—has become a 
nearly useless appendage” (9). The novel traces the pessimistic trajectory of any life, in which 
the limitless horizon of the stars that had once inspired us gradually shrinks to something far 
more disappointing until, as a corpse, we are nothing but one useless appendage after another.  
This rift between our bodies and the unreachable stars that no longer constitute our home 
plays out that same drama told by Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium. We are descended from 
the stars, and now we are condemned to these fragile, insufficient bodies. Why else would we, 
like Rodolphe, seek to solicit pity from them if we didn’t identify in them some nebulous 
prehistory to our being, some prelapsarian home to which we can never return? And the means 
by which we seek this pity, language itself, can never be as articulate as we want it to be. It is, in 
fact, the opposite. Failing at articulation, it reflects our disarticulated body, the anatomy we are 
left with after that primordial cosmic incision.  
 
The Novelty of Anatomy and the Anatomy of the Novel 
Pessimism is an experience fundamentally rooted in the body, in the body’s anatomy. 
Unamuno thinks that, “It is not usually our ideas that make us optimists or pessimists, but it is 
our optimism or our pessimism, of physiological or perhaps pathological origin, as much the one 
as the other, that makes our ideas” (3). Any anatomy of pessimism would inevitably become a 
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pessimism of anatomy, of how our bodies fail us, in which “the philosopher and the physician 
trade places” (Thacker 44). 
It’s surprising that there aren’t more physical pessimists in philosophy. What is more 
inevitable than the breakdown of the body, than illness and aches and pains, than the 
crumbling, aleatory sigh of every joint and muscle and organ, of all matter? Is not the 
corpse the ultimate expression of this type of pessimism? A physicalism pushed to the 
point where it becomes aching and blissful nothingness. Is this physical optimism? (53-
54).  
Thacker reflects on the fusion of “corpus and corpse” in Nietzsche scholarship, on “the almost 
cultish curiosity over Pascal’s corpse in the autopsy that followed his death,” on the fact that the 
“logic of pessimism,” if one can even speak of such a logic, is, at its core, a “corporeal logic” 
(336; 347; 230). 
 Any anatomy of pessimism, then, must begin with anatomy itself. This brings us back to 
the Renaissance, when the “inner body had a more potent novelty than that conferred by its 
universally secretive quality” (Sugg 1). This is because anatomy up to that point had been 
outlawed as a morbid practice, performed only by criminal body-snatchers who would disinter 
corpses from the cemetery in the dead of night. Medicine relied on the medieval works of Galen, 
along with their commentaries through the centuries. But as people began to lose faith in the 
stars, they turned to the body for meaning: “Increasingly, a once cosmically meaningful 
organism is spiritually hollowed and neutralized into an entity which talks only about itself, in 
the most limited mechanical sense” (5). Through anatomy, Renaissance doctors hoped to “lay 
bare and explain that final, innermost mystery of all human life, the immortal Christian soul” 
(206). For this reason, Henry VIII in 1540 gave these doctors—or, rather, “Barber-Surgeons,” 
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whose tools allowed them to supplement their barbershop income with the occasional 
amputation—official permission for the first time to dissect the bodies of four criminals (2).  
But the more these anatomists tried to locate the organ of the soul, the more they were 
overcome with a particularly modern sense of anxiety: “Could the scalpel in fact pierce not only 
a living human body, but the ultimate, supposedly indestructible source of all human existence?” 
(207) Could dissection “indeed annihilate both body and soul”? (207) And, perhaps even more 
frightening: what if there is no such thing as a soul to begin with? Or what if it has nothing to do 
with the body? What if we are all just sacks of limbs sewn together, like puppets, only to be 
unsewn in order to expose the nothingness at the core of our existence?  
Just decades earlier—for the first time in 1516 and then, in its complete form in 1532—
Ariosto had written Orlando Furioso, the fantasy in which Orlando, mad with love for Angelica, 
destroys everything in his path from Europe to Africa in his lunacy. His wits had fled to the 
moon, and the English knight Astolfo rides his hippogriff there in order to bottle them up and 
return them to Orlando. With the advent of anatomy, and the turn away from the moon and the 
stars to locate our soul, maybe we’re just doomed to destroy everything in our own paths, like 
Orlando, but without a cure, without this transcendental idea of the soul. Sir Thomas Browne 
says as much a century later, in Urne-Buriall: “In vain do individuals hope for Immortality, or 
any patent from oblivion, in preservations below the Moon” (136). And a century after that, one 
of the philosophers tells Micromegas, “They’re doing enough to destroy themselves as it is,” 
about what it’s like to inhabit earth. “The fact is that after ten years there’s never a hundredth of 
the wretches left, and even if they never draw a sword, starvation or exhaustion or intemperance 
carry most of them off” (Voltaire 118). 
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The rise of the modern novel coincides with the rise of anatomy, both of which pivot 
around criminality and the profanation of the sacred. Schelling gives the term “Unheimlich” 
[uncanny] to “everything that ought to have remained… hidden and secret and has become 
visible,” a definition used by Freud in the beginning of his essay on “The Uncanny” (3-4). 
Anatomy is then the operation of the uncanny—literally, the “un-home-like.” Lukács, who 
defines the novel as the expression of transcendental homelessness, insists that “crime and 
madness are objectivations of transcendental homelessness—the homelessness of an action in the 
human order of social relations, the homelessness of a soul in the ideal order of a supra-personal 
system of values” (Theory of the Novel 61-62). Also consistent with anatomy is Bakhtin’s 
characterization of the novel, which brings what was once distant up close, in all of its ordinary, 
mundane, and vulgar detail.  
In showing what ought to have remained hidden and secret, there is something monstrous 
about anatomy—from the Latin monstrare, to show. It is in this context that we can read 
Frankenstein as a pessimistic novel about how anatomy can be exploited, in a quasi-criminal 
way, by Dr. Victor Frankenstein. In Ruins of Empires, one of the books that the Creature reads to 
educate himself about the people who so vehemently exclude him, Constantin François Volney 
writes, “Like the world of which he is part, man is governed by natural laws, regular in their 
course, uniform in their effects, immutable in their essence; and those laws, the common source 
of good and evil, are not written among the stars, nor hidden in codes of mystery…” (42-3). 
These laws are not written among the stars, but inscribed in the body. Volney was one of the first 
modern theorists to advocate for self-love and happiness; Mary Shelley demonstrates how this 
pursuit leads to a narcissism that excludes anyone who may not even physically match this 
narcissistic ideal. Shelley’s vision of society is, needless to say, a bleak one: it is a choice 
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between the Narcissus of Frankenstein or the anti-Narcissus of the Creature who flees from the 
sight of his own image in a pool of water (Engelstein 215). The narcissist in pursuit of happiness 
is eager to sniff out criminality as somehow legible in the body of someone else, like the 
anatomically constructed Creature, who is essentially criminalized and demonized for not being 
happy.   
The criminal activity of anatomy flips around to become a state-sanctioned dissection of 
the criminal to inspect if any traces of criminality can be located in one’s physiognomy. 
Influenced by the circulation of Lazarillo de Tormes in 1554, the criminal biography emerges as 
a popular genre, which is also an anatomy of sorts in its attempt to dissect the criminal’s 
behavioral traits. The novel, moreover, begins to be defined and attacked on the grounds of its 
“total or partial rejection of the rules that governed literary writing in Europe between the second 
half of the sixteenth century and the second half of the eighteenth,” essentially “defining itself as 
a locus for potentially transgressive writings” (Mazzoni 95). These transgressive writings include 
not just Lazarillo, but Gargantua and Pantagruel, which Rabelais wrote between 1532 and 1564, 
his sharp attention to physiological detail in this work reflecting the increasing cultural attention 
to anatomy.  
In 1543, the Flemish anatomist Andreas Vesalius published the De Humani Corporis 
Fabrica, which gave us “a newly vigorous, assertive, undeniably three-dimensional body,” 
marking a sharp break from all medieval medical texts that had preceded it, and the novel began 
to explore the body in the same way (Sugg 1). Judith Folkenberg writes that “the new vision of 
man and woman enshrined in Vesalius” is analogous to “the new vision of the place of the earth 
in the universe that was slowly gaining adherents…” (95). Two years later, Thomas Germinus 
issued pirated copies of Vesalius’ work, publishing it in English in 1553 and again in 1559 (Sugg 
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2). And in the decades to follow, the word “anatomy” emerged as a distinctly rhetorical, if not 
literary, genre: 
…the new intellectual and dramatic possibilities of anatomy swept England with a force 
and pervasiveness broadly similar to the later rhetoric of galvanism and electricity, or (in 
our own times) the vocabulary of computing and global communications. Around 1575 
the wider English public appeared barely to have heard of anatomy; by 1600 it seemed at 
times unable to talk about little else. (2) 
Between 1576 and 1650, over 120 literary texts are published with the word “anatomy” included 
in their titles, including the famous Anatomy of Wit by John Lyly in 1578 and Anatomy of 
Melancholy by Robert Burton in 1621 (3). The word “section,” too—from the Latin sectio: to cut 
off or cut up—appears for the first time in 1559 as “unequivocally dissective, deriving from 
Germinus’s Vesalian epitome: ‘neither in man only… but in the anatomy or section of any other 
beast’” (3). By 1576, it was being used as a metaphor for a “subdivision of a written or printed 
work,” according to the Oxford English Dictionary (3). 
The literary technique of the “section,” borrowed from anatomy, also has its precedents 
in strategies of suspense from the medieval and ancient Greek novel, such as Heliodorus’ 
Aethiopica from the third century. The opening scene of the remnants of a massacre leaves the 
reader hanging in suspense until four chapters later (Mazzoni 143). The “medieval technique of 
entrelacement,” in a similar manner, “alternately entwines and interrupts the characters’ stories, 
usually at the point when the reader’s curiosity is at its peak” (144). The fragmentation and 
sectioning off of narrative produces an “informational delay,” which Mazzoni traces from 
Aethiopica to Orlando Furioso, and this delay—longer than those found in epic, for instance in 
the flashback episode of Odysseus’ scar that Auerbach focuses on—“assumes a reader more than 
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a listener” (144). In short, it becomes an elastic organizing principle of the novel, and can be 
manipulated with great effect in works that vary in length and scope. Jacques Amyot published 
his French translation of Aethiopica in 1547, which in turn ushered “the age of the individual 
reader, the individual purchaser of discrete fictions,” and ultimately shaped the Baroque novel in 
the latter half of the sixteenth century (qtd. in Mazzoni 143). 
But this technique continues to shape the novel long after the latter half of the sixteenth 
century.  “I always find disruption interesting,” says Emma Bovary, that lover of novels, within a 
novel itself. “I like a change of scene” (Flaubert 70). And to Kundera, the “poetry” of Sterne’s 
innovative novels “lies not in the action but in the interruption of the action” (Art of the Novel 
161). This technique places Sterne “on the other side of Leibniz’s statement” of “Nihil est sine 
ratione—that there is nothing without its reason,” which prompts science to explore “the why of 
everything, such that whatever exists seems explainable, thus predictable, calculable” (161-62). 
The novel, in Sterne’s hands, resists predictability and calculability. It is the opposite of 
Leibniz’s optimistic faith in explaining away every phenomenon by reason.  
It is in this sense, too, that we can trace a genealogy from this cutting technique in 
narrative to the structural interruptions that organize Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, a work that 
opens with the young James Ramsay, “sitting on the floor, cutting out pictures” with his scissors 
(7). The “arid scimitar of his father,” who himself despises interruption, intrudes on the moment 
he is sharing with his mother, as an “interruption” (34; 24). At dinner that evening, William 
Bankes is annoyed at all the interruptions at the table, and Mrs. Ramsay feels “cut off from them 
all,” a feeling echoed by Lily Briscoe, who is “cut off from other people” (121). The middle 
section, “Time Passes,” is itself composed of sections, of interruptions in the decade-long 
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interval between “The Window” and “The Lighthouse,” with the incisive square brackets 
interrupting the already disjointed narrative with moments of loss.  
The entire novel is a series of interruptions that delay James from going to the lighthouse. 
Once he arrives as an adult, having lost his mother, that former childhood excitement gives way 
to an anti-climactic arrival: “…they ought to be so happy, but as a matter of fact James thought, 
looking at the Lighthouse stood there on its rock, it’s like that” (166). As he approaches it, 
something, “he remembered, stayed and darkened over him; would not move; something 
flourished up in the air, something arid and sharp descended even there, like a blade, a scimitar, 
smiting through the leaves and flowers even of that happy world and making them shrivel and 
fall” (152). The darkness eventually lifts somewhat, and he “rose and stood in the bow of the 
boat, very straight and tall, for all the world, James thought, as if he were saying, ‘There is no 
God’…” (169). 
It is anatomy itself that leads to this conclusion, secularizing the soul into something that 
no longer has any correspondence with God, operating in a body that obeys its own laws. The 
inquiry into these laws increasingly replaces faith, the acceptance of a whole narrative passed 
down from a distance, with the up-close examination of this narrative, its secular dissection into 
minutiae, into the fragment, the detail—trademarks of the novel itself. But the narrative 
organization of these fragments began to entail a distance of their own: “Little by little, a form of 
scientific distance emerged that would be called ‘anatomical’ and, at the end of the eighteenth 
century, ‘analytical’” (Mazzoni 195).  
It is no surprise, then, that the rise of anatomy, along with the circulation of Lazarillo de 
Tormes as a criminal biography, also coincides with the similar narrative of another rogue figure 
who likes to play pranks: Doctor Faustus, who appears first in an anonymous sixteenth-century 
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German chapbook that spread like wildfire throughout Europe. Like Lazarillo, it is a loosely 
structured, episodic narrative organized in chapters that apparently tell a “Historia” of this 
Doctor, “wherein is described specifically and veraciously” the course of his life and death, 
appealing to our sense of truth from the title page to the last page, which leaves us with a 
warning of his “quite veritable deeds” (Ch. XLIV). Faust is educated as a theological doctor of 
philosophy, but “[s]oon he refused to be called a Theologus, but waxed a worldly man, called 
himself a Doctor Medicinæ,” turning his attention away from the heavens to the body (Ch. I). 
The pact he signs with the forces of hell is written in his own blood, reflecting the belief in the 
body’s inherent legibility and serving as a parody of Christ’s material embodiment of the Word. 
It is through this somatic pact that he is able to access all the knowledge of the world—except, of 
course, the nature of the soul, which he has forsaken arguably through the act of anatomy itself.  
Anatomy runs through this chapbook as a thread of the grotesque, like when Faustus cuts 
off his leg knowing that he could magically make it reappear, or when he comes across four 
sorcerers who chop off each other’s heads to send them to the barber for a trimming before 
getting the heads reattached to their bodies (Ch. XXVI; Ch. XXI). We never end up seeing the 
damnation of his soul in hell, but what we do see is a graphic account of how he is punished on 
the level of the body: “The parlor was full of blood. Brain clave unto the walls where the Fiend 
had dashed him from one to the other. Here lay his eyes, here a few teeth” (Ch. XLIV). His 
students find his body parts “in many places,” and when “they came out to the dung heap, here 
they found his corpse. It was monstrous to behold, for head and limbs were still twitching” (Ch. 
XLIV). 
The more that the literal anatomy coincides with monstrosity, the more distance the 
narrator places between their own views and what is being narrated, playing the politically and 
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theologically dangerous game of admonishing Faustus’s actions while exploring, in great detail, 
just how much he undermined religious and secular authority. Anatomy is the genre that 
articulates as much as it disarticulates. To Mazzoni, the novelistic tradition that stretches back to 
anatomy gives us narrators who “could proudly lay claim to the act of detached observation” in 
the roman d’analyse (195). Frye explains that the “anatomy, of course, eventually begins to 
merge with the novel, producing various hybrids including the roman à thèse and novels in 
which the characters are symbols of social or other ideas…” (312). He traces the anatomy from 
Rabelais to Melville, from Apuleius and Cervantes to Proust and Joyce, and even to Kierkegaard, 
in his “strikingly original experiments in prose fiction form, including Either/Or” (313).    
To Frye, George Eliot also moves from romance in her early works to anatomy in her 
later novels (312-13). And in the anatomy of Middlemarch, we meet a literal anatomist, Dr. 
Lydgate, whose profession mirrors the operation of the narrator, as he “wanted to pierce the 
obscurity of those minute processes which prepare human misery and joy, those invisible 
thoroughfares which are the first lurking-places of anguish, mania, and crime, that delicate poise 
and transition which determine the growth of happy or unhappy consciousness” (Eliot 106). In 
this sense, his project is not much different from Casaubon’s in the Key to all Mythologies; both 
endeavors end in failure.  
As Lydgate’s ambitions begin to deflate under the oppressive provincialism of 
Middlemarch, he is increasingly and anxiously preoccupied with the thought of Vesalius, the 
famous doctor “who was about as old as I am three hundred years ago, and had already begun a 
new era in anatomy” (283). He tells his wife Rosamond about how Vesalius had to criminally 
“snatch bodies at night, from graveyards and places of execution,” and how he had faced fierce 
opposition from conservative doctors who still abided by Galen, like the “medical fogies in 
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Middlemarch” who object to Lydgate’s own pursuit of the latest advances in modern medicine 
(284). Nevertheless, “the facts of the human frame were on his side; and so he got the better of 
them” (284). Except he didn’t quite get the better of them, after all. Vesalius was forced “to burn 
a good deal of his work. Then he got shipwrecked just as he was coming from Jerusalem to take 
a great chair at Padua. He died rather miserably” (284). Lydgate’s own death is not as dramatic, 
but is just as pessimistic, after living a rather unremarkable life—significantly less remarkable 
than Vesalius’s. The narrator tells us, “We are on a perilous margin when we begin to look 
passively at our future selves, and see our own figures led with dull consent into insipid 
misdoing and shabby achievement. Poor Lydgate was inwardly groaning on that margin,” until 
he eventually dies at fifty, having “always regarded himself as a failure: he had not done what he 
once meant to do” (483; 512). And perhaps even more depressing is that, to all appearances, he 
“was what was called a successful man” (512).  
Eliot’s narrator ends Middlemarch with a direct appeal to the reader, writing, “…the 
growing good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric acts; and that things are not so ill 
with you and me as they might have been, is half owing to the number who lived faithfully a 
hidden life, and rest in unvisited tombs” (515). The role of the novel—not just of Middlemarch, 
but of the novel at large—is precisely to scope out this “hidden life” that belongs to the prosaic 
world of “unhistoric acts,” a life so hidden that it cannot possibly be staged in the theater or 
condensed in a poem, but can only come to light in the novel. And the novelist, by visiting these 
unvisited tombs and dissecting the vestiges of all that remains of this hidden life, is just as much 
of an anatomist as Lydgate wishes he could be.20  
 
20 Proust, who read George Eliot voraciously, came to the conclusion that, “a book is a huge cemetery in which on 
the majority of the tombs the names are effaced and can no longer be read” (Remembrance of Things Past III 940). 
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By linking the novel to anatomy, we see that the novel “attained its modern form 
precisely when the human sciences established themselves…” (Mazzoni 359). Descartes “sought 
to study the passions with a contemplative outlook borrowed from physics; Spinoza attacked 
those who disliked and derided the affects instead of trying to understand them as if they were 
lines, surfaces, and bodies” (194-95). But the novel’s relationship to the sciences, like 
pessimism’s relationship to philosophy, is one of simultaneous engagement and withdrawal. In 
the years that Galileo was defending his theory of heliocentrism against the vicious attacks of the 
Church, Francis Bacon was writing his New Organon, a “new” philosophy for a new era, 
outlining the sciences according to new anatomical divisions, new organs. This was a philosophy 
that he presented as “a very diligent dissection and anatomy of the world,” aimed at “the 
removing of despair and the raising of hope through the dismissal or rectification of the errors of 
past time” (Bacon CXXIV, 113; CVIII, 100). His optimistic method of “true induction” involved 
“reject[ing] all forms of fiction and imposture…” (CXXII, 112). The Ptolemaic system itself was 
a fiction that demanded a gullibility beyond what could be proven by empirical induction. Better 
to stay closer to our body than our imaginations—especially now that we are beginning to have a 
better anatomical understanding of the body—and trust the senses that are our only bonds to the 
world outside of us.  
“There remains but one course for the recovery of a sound and healthy condition,” Bacon 
writes, “namely, that the entire work of the understanding be commenced afresh, and the mind 
itself be from the very outset not left to take its own course, but guided at every step; and the 
business be done as if by machinery” (33). This “business” of viewing the “understanding” as 
operating by “machinery”—as part of the larger optimistic project of “the removing of despair 
and the raising of hope” lays the groundwork for Jeremy Bentham, a century and a half later, to 
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outline his mechanistic vision of modern happiness and optimism that has become the dominant 
ideology of Western discourse today. In following Bacon’s legacy, Bentham was so firmly on 
the side of science and machinery that he hoped it would obviate the need for language 
altogether. He therefore rejected the role of the novel in shaping our understanding.     
Taunting Bacon and his followers of “new” philosophers, however, Henry Stubbe of the 
Royal Society frequently called them “Novellists”:  
Most that the Novellists have done, is to find out new reasons for an antient practice… 
‘Tis their usual practice to vouch those things for new discoveries which we very well 
knew before… We are running on as fast as we can to this condition of ignorance, and 
shall be so inured to Historical untruths, magisterially imposed upon us, and disused 
from inquiring into them, as to beleeve any thing. (Qtd. in McKeon 71) 
The novel, for all its popularity, has never been widely accepted as laying an equal claim to truth 
as the sciences. As such, Stubbe dismisses Bacon’s aspirational philosophy as novelistic. 
Anatomy itself then splits into two directions. The first follows the direction of the sciences—
verifiable, replicable, and largely validated by our culture, at least until the tipping point of the 
2016 U.S. presidential election. The second follows the direction of the novel—a pejorative term 
used to question the veracity it claims to have. Maybe it is no coincidence that it took an 
American novelist, Edgar Saltus, to make his only forays into non-fiction with the 1885 work 
Philosophy of Disenchantment, followed a year later by The Anatomy of Negation, because 
anatomy is the natural genre of both the novel and pessimism (Ligotti 30).  
Frye attempts to bridge the two directions in his aptly titled Anatomy of Criticism. He 
takes Bacon’s inductive method to say that, “The first thing the literary critic has to do is to read 
literature, to make an inductive survey of his own field and let his critical principles shape 
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themselves solely out of his knowledge of that field” (6-7). He goes on to say that the “word 
‘inductive’ suggests some sort of scientific procedure. What if criticism is a science as well as an 
art? Not a ‘pure’ or ‘exact’ science, of course, but these phrases belong to a nineteenth-century 
cosmology which is no longer with us” (7). It is in this sense that Aristotle, who gave us our first 
work of literary criticism in Poetics, can be seen as just as much of a biologist as a literary critic 
in this work, approaching “a system of organisms, picking out its genera and species, 
formulating the broad laws of literary experience…” (14). 
Frye begins Anatomy of Criticism with the dubious category of the novel, noting that the 
“Greeks hardly needed to develop a classification of prose forms. We do, but have never done 
so. We have, as usual, no word for a work of prose fiction, so the word ‘novel’ does duty for 
everything, and thereby loses its only real meaning as the name of a genre” (13). His analysis of 
prose ultimately ends with a look at Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy, what has been singled out 
for centuries as the prime example of the anatomy genre, that genre of failure and 
impossibility—sprawling, intimidating, almost never-ending, an impossible project that cannot 
be finished, gesturing to the infinite, like a Borges nightmare of a book, or like Casaubon’s 
attempt at a Key to all Mythologies, or like the genre of the dissertation itself. But Frye calls this 
work “the greatest Menippean satire in English before Swift” for its “creative treatment of 
exhaustive erudition” (311). In Burton’s Anatomy, a “symposium of books replaces dialogue, 
and the result is the most comprehensive survey of human life in one book that English literature 
had seen since Chaucer, one of Burton’s favorite authors” (311).  
If we read the Anatomy of Melancholy as essentially melancholic, then we miss out on its 
fundamental irony, which it shares with the novel, itself rooted in the polyvocal symposium, full 
of laughter and delight. The definition Frye offers for an anatomy, one that would include both 
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Burton’s and his own, is a “form of prose fiction, traditionally known as the Menippean or 
Varronian satire and… characterized by a great variety of subject-matter and a strong interest in 
ideas. In shorter forms it often has a cena or symposium setting and verse interludes” (365). As if 
engaging Schlegel’s hope for a theory of the novel to itself be a novel, Frye’s archetypal 
criticism gives us an anatomy about an anatomy. He furthermore defines the symposium, that 
kernel of literary anatomy, as the: 
…extreme limit of social comedy… the structure of which is, as we should expect, 
clearest in Plato, whose Socrates is both teacher and lover, and whose vision moves 
toward an integration of society in a form like that of the symposium itself, the dialectic 
festivity which, as is explained in the opening of the Laws, is the controlling force that 
holds society together. (286) 
In the absence of God or the gods, the symposium, with its emphasis on nourishment in food, 
wine, and ideas, is “the controlling force that holds society together.”  
In this way we see Woolf sketching her own symposium in To the Lighthouse, especially 
in the dinner scene that begins in a state of disarray, of interruption and fragmentation, of 
characters feeling remote from each other, William Bankes pessimistically thinking to himself, 
“What does one live for? Why, one asked oneself, does one take all the pains for the human race 
to go on? Is it so very desirable? Are we attractive as a species? Not so very, he thought…” (73). 
But something happens over the course of the meal, as Mrs. Ramsay helps Bankes to another 
serving of meat, and this something rises up “like a flag [which] floated in an element of joy,” or 
“like a fume rising upwards, holding them safe together” (85). This feeling “partook… of 
eternity,” of a “coherence in things, a stability,” reflecting the “controlling force” that Frye reads 
in Plato as “hold[ing] society together (Woolf 85; Frye 286).  
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Kristeva, in response to Bakhtin, arrives at the same conclusion as Frye, seeing the 
“laughter of the carnival” as “no more comic than tragic,” but something that gives rise to a new 
form: “Situated within the carnivalesque tradition, and constituting the yeast of the European 
novel, these two genres are Socratic dialogue and Menippean discourse” (80). Kristeva also 
points out that the genre of Menippean satire “actually appeared much earlier” than Menippus of 
Gadara, a philosopher of the third century, B.C.E., whose “satires were lost, but we know of their 
existence through the writings of Diogenes Laertius” (82). The first representative of this genre 
“was perhaps Antisthenes, a student of Socrates and one of the writers of Socratic dialogue” 
(82). And, in a Lukácsian moment, Kristeva writes, “Only modernity—when freed of ‘God’—
releases the Menippean force of the novel” (85). So here we have a direct lineage from the 
Socratic dialogue to the Menippean satire, down through anatomy and the novel, linking Burton 
and Woolf to Socrates.     
There is a certain joy, maybe even levity, in reading Burton and Woolf in this context, 
just as much as there is a sense of joy that frames the original Symposium of Plato, even in its 
myth of our first experience of loss and grief, that same experience Woolf and Burton tap into. 
Only Proust comes close to Woolf’s capability of anatomizing the fleeting moment into its barely 
discernible elements, and Burton performs a similar technique of anatomy even in his 
pseudonym of “Democritus Junior,” the philosopher who first theorized the concept of the atom, 
and thought of all matter as being essentially composed of minute fragments. But Frye points to 
the fact that Erasmus had also called himself “Democritus Junior,” and both Burton and Erasmus 
did so because Democritus was the “philosopher who laughed at mankind…” (230).21  
 
21 Bacon also admires Democritus for his anatomical approach to knowledge: “But to resolve nature into 
abstractions is less to our purpose than to dissect her into parts; as did the school of Democritus, which went further 
than the rest” (LI 53).  
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Laughing at mankind, whether in joy or contempt, is where anatomy, the novel, and 
pessimism are born. Perhaps we can even trace this intertwined birth back to Rabelais, whose 
giant Gargantua gets so annoyed with the smaller humans living in the vicinity of Notre-Dame 
that: 
…with a smile, he undid his magnificent codpiece and, bringing out his john-thomas, 
pissed on them so fiercely that he drowned two hundred and sixty thousand, four hundred 
and eighteen persons, not counting the women and small children. 
 A number of them, however, were quick enough on their feet to escape this piss-
flood; and when they reached the top of the hill above the University, sweating, 
coughing, spitting, and out of breath, they began to swear and curse, some in a fury and 
others in sport (par ris). (74) 
The Paris of Rabelais, baptized in Gargantua’s piss, is literally the landscape of laughter, “par 
ris,” a landscape that encompasses both fury and fun, both spite and mirth, the disgusting and the 
beautiful, the physiological and the contemplative, all of which dissolve into the kind of laughter 
that belongs to the genre of the novel.  
               
The Sigh of Disappointment 
The first and last expressions of pessimism, before and after they crack up in novelistic 
laughter, are just as physical as laughter, but without the energy or the mirth. Maybe, as a result 
of trying to use the cracked kettle of language to seek pity in the stars, pessimism begins and 
ends in the sigh of disappointment. This is the only expression available to Andersen’s voiceless 
mermaid who, at the moment she realizes the prince will marry someone else, “sighed deeply, 
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for she did not know how to shed tears” (148). Disillusioned with her hopes in the world and in a 
future worth living for, she ends up killing herself, with this sigh as her only expression.  
In A Lover’s Discourse, Roland Barthes identifies the expression of absence with the 
sigh, citing Symposium: “…the two halves of the androgyne sigh for each other, as if each 
breath, being incomplete, sought to mingle with the other…” (15). We hear an even more 
pessimistic sigh in Thomas Hardy’s landscape, in “the occasional heave of the wind [which] 
became the sigh of some immense sad soul, coterminous with the universe in space, and with 
history in time” (Tess of the D’Urbervilles 21-22). The pessimist, recollecting what it was once 
like to be a free-wheeling celestial body as Plato describes it in Phaedrus and Symposium, is 
convinced, by comparison, that this is the worst of all possible worlds. But even this conviction 
fails us, as Edgar in King Lear reminds us that, “The worst is not / So long as I can say ‘This is 
the worst’ (4.1.31-32). “The worst,” then, lies beyond what can be said—in the nothingness that 
both defies and defines language, in the blank pages of Micromegas’ book of cosmic, and comic, 
wisdom. It is the asymptote that language can only gesture to, infinitely—perhaps even in 
infinite jest, occupying the space where language fails, where language frays, right before 
dissolving into silence. And here we enter the space of the sigh. This is the space that Lolita 
occupies in her confrontation with the worst, with the horror of horrors. Silenced by Humbert 
Humbert, she turns away from him in a “hopeless sigh” (Nabokov 128).  
Thacker defines pessimism as “the wavering, the hovering” between “the axiom and the 
sigh” (3). The definition of the human being: “the animal that sighs,” dreaming of sighs “that 
eclipse living entirely” (183; 177). Maybe the sigh is pessimism’s only axiom, revealing the 
abyss, the Abgrund, behind every Grund in systematic thinking. Unmetaphoring and reversing 
the process of inspiration, pessimism expires—it exhales, it goes sour. Like Ivan Karamazov, 
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who “would rather remain with my unrequited suffering and my unquenched indignation, even if 
I am wrong,” the pessimist refuses harmony and rejects God’s entrance ticket with the sigh 
(Dostoevsky 245). Cioran speculates, “Pursuing the antecedents of a sigh can lead us to the 
moment before—as to the sixth day of Creation” (All Gall is Divided 92). In this sigh, one hears 
the collapse of the absolute end with the absolute beginning, of the individual with the universal, 
of destruction with creation. “What is a poet?” Kierkegaard asks. “An unhappy person who 
conceals profound anguish in his heart but whose lips are so formed that as sighs and cries pass 
over them they sound like beautiful music” (Either/Or I.18). 
The sigh, though, was insufficient for the poet Coleridge, when he coined the English 
term “Pessimism” in his 1794 letter to Robert Southey. He opens the letter in a way that seems 
almost like a translation of anything Nietzsche would write nearly a century later: “When I am 
unhappy, a sigh or a groan does not feel sufficient to relieve the oppression of my Heart—I give 
a long whistle—/ This by way of a detached Truth.—” (138). The whistle, more insistent than the 
sigh, hovers somewhere between an alert and its very opposite: one whistles to pass over the 
dullness of idle time. It is, in any case, an alternative to speech, to language—especially the kind 
that Coleridge complains about in the rest of his letter, viciously attacking the pretentious dinner 
conversation he had had to endure the night before with self-fashioned intellectuals. “I 
pronounce this a very sensible, apostrophical, metaphorical Rant,” he continues (138). 
Like Schopenhauer a generation after him, Coleridge turns the pessimistic rant into an art 
form. But he reserves the use of the term as an insult aimed at Southey, complaining that one of 
his poems is “almost as bad as Lovell’s Farm house—and that would be at least a thousand 
Fathoms deep in the Dead Sea of Pessimism” (139). Kierkegaard, insulting himself, writes, “My 
soul is like the Dead Sea, over which no bird is able to fly; when it has come midway, it sinks 
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down, exhausted, to death and destruction” (Either/Or I.37). Pessimism is a “Dead Sea,” as 
though its inordinately high salt content exists solely to burn the wound of every insulting barb it 
inflicts. It is a sea of the worst, in which one finds oneself at least a thousand fathoms deep even 
when one expects to float. 
Pessimism then cuts both ways. It is a bad mood that, with its melodramatic sighs and 
whistles, hurls and attracts insults.  Despite its –ism, it is much less a form of organized thought 
than it is a “detached Truth,” a Truth that endeavors to “connect nothing with nothing,” as T.S. 
Eliot writes in The Waste Land.  But “Nothing will come of nothing,” Lear reminds us. “Speak 
again” (1.1.90). And here, with just one axiom, pessimism already dwells in the space of 
“paradox, [which] is (paradoxically) a foundation. Pessimism—the philosophy that demonstrates 
that all philosophy is destined to fail (its first and final proof)” (Thacker 45). Pessimism fails 
even at its own sigh, choosing instead to speak again and again, generating an insistent, repetitive 
quest for an authentic language to communicate our disappointments and disenchantment with 
this world, with each other, and with ourselves. This authentic discourse, according to 
Heidegger, resides in silence, opposed to the idle chatter that Coleridge ranted against, but even 
Heidegger cannot resist a baroque style to communicate this silence. 
Between the aphorism and the multivolume treatise, pessimism is not confined to a single 
genre, and even though Coleridge may have coined the term in English, its existence arguably 
coincides with the earliest modes of expression itself in the form of the sigh, drawing attention to 
our inevitable shortcomings. But its anatomy can reveal its role in the rise of the novel.  Even 
before the term was coined, we can look back to Leibniz, who 
…first used the term “optimum,” as a correlate to “maximum” and “minimum” in his 
Theodicée of 1710. French writers then began to refer to his doctrine as one of optimisme. 
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The international popularity of Voltaire’s Candide ou l’Optimisme of 1759 apparently 
propelled the term into English, but also provoked Voltaire’s Jesuit critics in the Revue de 
Trévoux to accuse him of “pessimisme”… The French Academy admitted the word 
“optimisme” in 1762 but “pessimisme” only in 1878… (Dienstag 9)  
It was also around this time, six years after the publication of Candide, that Diderot 
commissioned an entry in his Encyclopedia for “the novel.” This entry was written out of spite 
for a shared attitude among the French, that Richardson was not a good novelist (Mazzoni 167). 
The entry praises Richardson, and identifies him as a model novelist. In 1762, Diderot had 
already written that, “history is often a bad novel, and that the novel, as you [Richardson] have 
made it, is a good history” (qtd. in Mazzoni 209). Diderot here transvalues the values of “good” 
and “bad,” so that “good” is the designation of the art that best captures how “bad” people can be 
in history (that is, reality). The less optimistic this novelistic vision is, the more qualified it is as 
a “good” novel. And whatever it is he is doing, Richardson is conscious of creating a new 
“species” of writing just as much as Fielding claims to be creating a new “kind” or “province” 
(McKeon 410). It is this cultural moment in the eighteenth century that the word “novel” is 
beginning to crystallize. 
 McKeon notes that, after writing Pamela, “Richardson hated the idea of a happy ending 
in a novel, one in which vicious characters were suddenly reformed in a facile, lackluster way” 
(415). Richardson writes:  
It has been said in behalf of many modern fictitious pieces, in which authors have given 
success (and happiness, as it is called) to their heroes of vicious, if not of profligate, 
characters, that they have exhibited Human Nature as it is. Its corruption may, indeed, be 
exhibited in the faulty character; but need pictures of this be held out in books? Is not 
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vice crowned with success, triumphant, and rewarded, and perhaps set off with wit and 
spirit, a dangerous representation? And is it not made even more dangerous by the hasty 
reformation, introduced, in contradiction to all probability, for the sake of patching up 
what is called a happy ending? (Qtd. in McKeon 415-16) 
Here we get the ultimate refutation to Socrates’s anxiety with tragedy, which “shows us that just 
people may end up unhappy and unjust people happy” (Mazzoni 28; Republic X.612C). This is 
not to make the absurd claim that all novels must avoid the happy ending. Jane Austen is the 
perfect example of how a novelist could pull that off without patronizing her readers. But what 
the novel does provide is a possible space to explore, with the most heightened specificity, an 
encyclopedic, anatomical account of disappointment—to a degree that no other genre can.  
In Sense and Sensibility, we see Edward Ferrars wishing, “as well as everybody else, to 
be perfectly happy; but, like everybody else, it must be in my own way” (Austen 65). We can 
juxtapose this with the first sentence of Anna Karenina, which Tolstoy famously opens with, 
“All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way” (1). This 
statement refers not just to this particular novel, but to the nature of the novel as the genre of 
particularity. Unhappiness is particular in a way that happiness is not. Sense and Sensibility ends 
with Edward’s happiness; there is nothing more to say about it once the narrative has arrived at 
that point. We get a narrative that builds up to marriage, not a narrative about married life. Anna 
Karenina, on the contrary, begins with both marriage and a statement about happiness—or at 
least a single clause—and then recounts the journey into unhappiness for seven-hundred pages. 
Alain Badiou puts it bluntly: “We could even say married life has hardly produced a great work. 
It is a fact that it has rarely inspired artists” (82). To Mazzoni: 
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If death is the archetype of narrative endings, and if boredom projects death onto life 
(‘deadly boring,’ ‘mourir d’ennui,’ ‘tödliche Langeweile,’ ‘aburrimiento mortal,’ ‘noia 
mortale’), the experience of happiness is the most refractory to the story form [as an art 
of particularity], because every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way, but all happy 
families resemble each other. (352)   
In this sense, the novel and pessimism share a family resemblance. Only unhappiness can make 
its particular demands on such a versatile form as the novel, articulating pain and suffering in a 
way that can stretch from the compactness of The Sorrows of Young Werther to Anna Karenina 
and even the multivolume In Search of Lost Time and Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan Tetralogy. 
Unhappiness festers on details; the literature of happiness, however, perniciously ignores 
contingency and dwells in empty universal statements of advice, of truths that are supposedly 
universally acknowledged, but on closer inspection may not even be truths at all. Since the novel 
is that articulation of the “contingent world and the problematic individual… which mutually 
determine one another,” according to Lukács, the novel is, even on the level of its form, 
fundamentally opposed to the literature of happiness, which inevitably falls flat with its dull, 
cringeworthy clichés that are marketed as wisdom to undiscerning readers.22 This is why D.H. 
Lawrence writes the novel Lady Chatterley’s Lover as his own theory of the novel in his furious 
rejection of the budding nonfiction self-help genre, which I will explore further in Chapter 3.  
“It is not an accident,” writes Marcuse in Eros and Civilization, “that the great literature 
of Western civilization celebrates only the ‘unhappy love,’ that the Tristan myth has become its 
representative expression” (95). Eros “in a world of alienation… necessarily operate[s] as a 
destructive, fatal force—as the total negation of the principle which governs the repressive 
 
22 More recently, Brian Price has come up with a theory of regret through a kind of Lukácsian understanding of 
contingency, stating that, “Regret… brings us into attunement with the contingency of things” (60). 
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reality” (95). The contrast between the reality principle and the pleasure principle is the 
“fundamental antagonism between sex and social utility” (94). The modern novel, emerging out 
of capitalist forces as a commodity itself, is the expression that negotiates between these two 
incommensurable demands of modern life. Eros and civilization do not add up; they are at odds 
with each other. The narrative that takes this into account is a bleak one, one that undermines any 
notion of progress in civilization. 
 
The Entomology of Pessimism in the Novel 
In Pamela, the heroine writes to her parents about her treatment by Mr. B—: “This is a 
sad letter, my dear father and mother; and one may see how poor people are despised by the 
proud and rich! and yet we are all on a foot originally…” (258). We are all on a foot originally, 
until we inevitably lose our footing. Likewise, every footstep in Candide’s journey is a pas—
both a step and a negation—that Voltaire traces to eviscerate the world of its hopeful stupidity. 
But even this endeavor fails; evisceration is only the anatomical reality of the characters, and just 
a minor mishap. Every disaster, both political and natural, that Voltaire satirizes continues to 
punctuate history. It is as though Voltaire performs this failure on the level of the novel form, 
itself.  
Even in the absence of the word “pessimism,” it was clear from the moment of 
publication that Candide opened the space to think through an alternative to optimism, and that 
alternative begins with the pas, the step forward that always ends up being a step back, illustrated 
in Schopenhauer’s definition of life as “a ceaseless struggle for existence itself, while at every 
step it is threatened with destruction” (World as Will and Representation II 584, emphasis 
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added).23 To Kundera, if the novel “is to go on discovering the undiscovered, to go on 
‘progressing’ as a novel, it can do so only against the progress of the world” (Art of the Novel 
19). Progress as literal steps forward—and if the novel wants to make any steps forward, it 
paradoxically needs to step back from the world. A transgression in reverse. It’s not for nothing 
that, in The Brothers Karamazov, as Mitya is accused of murdering his father, his mind instead 
latches on to the fact that, “above all, he did not like his own feet; all his life for some reason he 
had found both his big toes ugly, especially the right one with its crude, flat toenail, somehow 
curved under, and now they would all see it. This unbearable shame suddenly made him, 
deliberately now, even more rude” (484). It’s his feet themselves that cause him “unbearable 
shame,” rather than anything he had thought or said about his father.   
One of the dominant refrains of The Brothers Karamazov is a quote that Ivan likes citing 
from Voltaire: “S’il n’existait pas Dieu, il faudrait l’inventer”—if God didn’t exist, we would 
have to invent him (234).24 The novel works through the implications of much of late eighteenth-
century philosophy, and its newly emerging pessimism as a backlash against Leibnizian 
optimism. The rise of pessimism also coincides with the new philosophical discipline of 
aesthetics, initiated by Baumgarten in 1750 before quickly developing into a mainstay of German 
Idealism. One of the first major aesthetic debates revolved around the image of feet (Engelstein 
135). It begins with a footnote in Lessing’s Laokoon (published only seven years after Voltaire 
published Candide) that refers to: 
 
23 Maurice Blanchot also sees in this etymology a fundamental pessimism: “Passivity, passion, past, pas (both 
negation and step—the trace or movement of an advance): this semantic play provides us with a slippage of 
meaning, but not with anything to which we could entrust ourselves, not with anything like an answer that would 
satisfy us” (The Writing of Disaster 16-17). 
24 This line is also repeated by Kolya (553). 
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…a euphemistic image of death among the ancients as a winged young boy rather than a 
gruesome skeleton as in later European art. Lessing relies for this claim on a second-
century CE description by Pausanias of an already ancient chest decorated with the 
brothers Sleep and Death, in the arms of their mother Night. The passage, unfortunately 
for him, includes the puzzling description of the children… ‘both with twisted feet.’ The 
premise that Death could be envisioned as a beautiful and eternal youth who thus 
presented no threat to the body was disrupted by this depiction. Lessing therefore twisted 
the passage itself into a more comforting form, substituting ‘crossed’ for the disturbing 
‘twisted,’ a translation that was much debated and widely rejected by other scholars. 
(135) 
Engelstein concludes from this aesthetic debate that, “This twisted or wounded foot is then a 
symbol of what classical aesthetics seeks to hide but can never escape,” or what Simon Richter 
calls the “pain [at] the origin of beauty” (Engelstein 135; Richter 32). “Pain at the origin of 
beauty” could work as a possible definition of pessimism—echoed by Kundera, who defines 
beauty as “the last triumph possible for man who can no longer hope” (Art of the Novel 123). 
And its emblem is this twisted foot, “what classical aesthetics seeks to hide but can never 
escape,” a foot we are told belongs to both Death and Sleep, and yet the “winged young boy” 
suggests that this figure could also be Eros himself. Like Tadzio in Death in Venice, who 
reminds Aschenbach of the Greek statue of the “Boy Picking a Thorn from his Foot,” death, 
eros, beauty, aesthetics, and pessimism all converge in this single image.  
The root of the word “pessimism,” pessum, means “downward, to the ground,” and is the 
same root for ped—“foot,” but also “to walk, stumble, impair” (Etymonline.com). Pessimism is 
thought drained down to the feet—unlike philosophy, which exists in the hands. But maybe we 
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can trace both pessimism and philosophy to Symposium—before they split apart for centuries 
until they find their way back to each other in the modern novel. It is in this work that the foot, or 
the leg, is the site of our most existential dread. As Zeus, in Aristophanes’ account of eros, orders 
the human race to be split in two, he issues the following threat: “But if they are thought to 
behave licentiously still, and are unwilling to keep quiet, then I shall cut them again in two… so 
that they will go hopping on one leg” (190D).  
Is this the kind of hubris that Melville sketches for us in the novel of all novels, Moby-
Dick, where Ishmael invites us to “see still stranger foot-prints—the foot-prints of [Captain 
Ahab’s] one unsleeping, ever-pacing thought”? (Melville 230). Ahab’s obsession is an “ever-
pacing” thought inscribed in the foot of his one remaining leg, even though “Ahab’s soul’s a 
centipede, that moves upon a hundred legs” (804). Maybe Melville’s portrait of Ahab and his 
amputated leg is what Zeus’ second punishment looks like—a vision of our humanity one step 
closer to annihilation. But even as Ahab lost his leg, his soul seems to acquire several more.  
There is a genealogy of bisections and dissections through the leg to the core of our being 
that traces the history of the novel from Symposium through Melville and leads us to the 
nightmares of Dostoevsky, Kafka, and Lispector, revealing our inner natures to be more insect-
like than human. In Notes from Underground, the Underground Man tries to explain why he 
“never managed to become an insect,” even though he “wanted many times to,” as a way to 
alleviate himself of the “sickness” of consciousness (6). In The Passion According to G.H., the 
narrator recounts her bizarre experience of mystically merging with a cockroach, whose 
“existence was existing me” (73). After she comes out of that experience, she “went back to 
having something I never had: just two legs. I know I can only walk with two legs. But I feel the 
useless absence of that third leg and it scares me, it was the leg that made me something findable 
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by myself, and without even having to look for myself” (4). The novel is a meditation on this 
loss, and on the self she discovers in the roach, a vision that “predated humanity” (83). When she 
sees that the roach is “split in two,” she thinks of love—of how “love is something before love” 
(91), addressing the dead roach by saying: 
I’m not going to do anything for you because I no longer know the meaning of love as I 
used to think I did. Also what I thought about love, that too I’m bidding farewell, I barely 
know what it is anymore, I don’t remember. 
Maybe I’ll find another name, much crueler initially, and much more it-self. Or 
maybe I won’t. Is love when you don’t give a name to the identity of things? […] I, who 
called love my hope for love. (85)   
The pessimistic act of writing itself is to put a language to something like love, which you would 
prefer not to, especially if love is “when you don’t give a name to the identity of things.” Love 
now becomes something “crueler,” something experienced in the absence of hope, something not 
quite human but that “predated humanity” and is the condition for its existence, something that 
belongs to the domain of insects.  
Ivan Karamazov, citing Schiller’s line of poetry, “To insects—sensuality!,” tells his 
brother Alyosha, “I am that very insect, brother, and those words are precisely about me” (108). 
His insect nature torments him as much as it torments Ahab, G.H., and Gregor Samsa, who 
crawls all over the framed picture of the erotic Venus in furs as the only possession he will not 
allow his mother and sister to take out of his room (“The Metamorphosis” 118). In Ivan’s fallen 
state, he says, “I loved depravity, I also loved the shame of depravity. I loved cruelty: am I not a 
bedbug, an evil insect—in short, a Karamazov?” (109). As for his father, Fyodor Pavlovich 
repeats twice in one conversation how he wants to “squash” his other son Mitya “like a 
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cockroach” (175). Mitya himself, like G.H. a century later, feels “the cruel insect… already 
growing, spreading out in my soul” (109). Smerdyakov, in turn, is worried that Mitya will kill 
him “like a fly” (270). And he has good reason to be scared of Mitya, who vows—expressing his 
wishes for parricide—to “exterminate one foul insect, so that it will not crawl around spoiling 
life for others” (406). Trying to defend his innocence in the act that he wished he could have 
committed, he is “sickened” to make the case for himself “in the face of these cold people, who 
‘bit at him like bedbugs’” (478). And yet he still comes to the conclusion that he is “the lowest 
vermin” and “accept[s] punishment not because I killed him, but because I wanted to kill him, 
and might well have killed him” (509). In his understanding of the crime, though, and of crime at 
large, “we are all cruel, we are all monsters”—in short, we are all the same kind of “vermin” that 
he identifies as (509). This is the same anxiety that Raskolnikov feels in Crime and Punishment, 
worried that the very act that would prove his greatness only demonstrates the fact that he is a 
“louse” or a “spider” who will spend the rest of his life “sucking the life-blood out of” anyone 
who gets entangled in his web (399; 402). 
There is an apocalyptic resonance to the image of the insect as a synonym for humanity 
emptied even of itself. Richard III is a “bottled spider” (1.3.256). Renfield, the insane asylum 
inmate in Dracula, unmetaphors the images both of Richard III and Raskolnikov sucking the 
life-blood of whatever gets caught in their web. He literally bottles and boxes up his spiders, 
studying their behavior so that he can act like them (69). He catches flies in order to eat some 
and feed the rest to his spiders, which he then devours, as well. Dr. Seward tries to identify “a 
method in his madness,” alluding to Hamlet perhaps as the foundation of modern English culture 
at the same time that Dracula poses an apocalyptic threat to it. In Lolita, Humbert refers to 
himself as “Humbert the Spider” as he vampirically preys on the young Dolores Haze, not 
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allowing her to metamorphose into anything with autonomy, using his prose instead to pin her 
down the way Nabokov would pin down and study his butterflies (67). And William Golding 
titled his 1954 novel The Lord of the Flies as an emblem of the cruelty and brutality that 
everyone, even seemingly innocent children, are capable of. The phrase is a translation of the 
biblical name Beelzebub, also known as the “prince of the devils”—it is a name that, in its 
onomatopoeia, buzzes with the activity of insects (New Testament, Matthew 12:24).  
The horror that Stoker, Nabokov, and Golding illustrate is not entirely different from the 
horror in Dostoevsky, Melville, Kafka, and Lispector. The bottom line is that there is a 
continuum between the human and the insect. This understanding has undergirded not only some 
of the most pessimistic novels, but also the most pessimistic moments of history, visions of our 
species at its worst, its cruelest. The insecticide Zyklon-B was the chemical that the Nazis used 
to murder millions of Jews in the gas chambers. In the Rwandan genocide, Hutus repeatedly 
referred to the Tutsi minority as “cockroaches” (Ndahiro, The Atlantic). Children right now are 
dying and being tortured in cages along our border because Trump speaks of “illegal 
immigrants” as “infest[ing] our Country [sic.]” (qtd. in Jones, The New Republic).   
Evolution, as an account of our origins, has given us a narrative of progress from ape to 
human. The pessimist, though, thinks through how this narrative will end, unwind, and 
ultimately terminate—or be exterminated. Is the next step in our evolution the Nietzschean Last 
Man, or the Übermensch, or the opposite—something like Dostoevksy’s Underground Man, who 
thinks of himself as “a foul, obscene fly—more intelligent, more developed, more noble than 
everyone else—that went without saying—but a fly, ceaselessly giving way to everyone, 
humiliated by everyone, insulted by everyone”? (52). Maybe the pessimist affirms this insect 
nature against the human. What is there to be so proud of in humanity when it is capable of 
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genocide, having by now engineered the technology for a world-extinction event several times 
over? At least roaches would survive a nuclear holocaust. But maybe the thought of anything 
surviving this is a source of more despair than of hope for the pessimist—someone who is both a 
would-be insect and a would-be self-exterminator who can’t be bothered to put an end to it all 
because it will arrive inevitably, adopting the position of Hamlet, stuck in a play of lapwings, 
beetles, glowworms, “maggots in a dead dog,” and a “convocation of politic worms”—all the 
living things that live off of rot (2.2.197; 4.3.23). “As flies to wanton boys,” Gloucester identifies 
us in King Lear, “are we to the gods. / They kill us for their sport” (4.1.36-37). The novel just 
takes this vision further, populating its pages with more insects than Shakespeare could have 
dreamed of populating his stage with.    
But maybe our souls have always been the souls of insects. Socrates the gadfly would 
know. We certainly looked like enlarged versions of them in our prelapsarian state, our eight 
limbs outstretched from globular bodies. And maybe this insect nature of ours is why 
Aristophanes in Symposium tells us that, before our split, we used to give “birth not in one 
another but in the earth, like cicadas” (191C). The “cicadas’ chorus,” of course, provides the 
soundtrack to Plato’s Phaedrus, that other dialogue in which eros is what allows us to remember 
our cosmic nature (230C). The cicadas, like our former selves, “used to be human beings who 
lived before the birth of the Muses,” but when the Muses were born and invented song, these 
creatures “were so overwhelmed with the pleasure of singing that they forgot to eat or drink; so 
they died without even realizing it” (259B-C). Their singing, therefore, is an obsession that 
destroys them, allowing them to enjoy nothing else. Ahab, too, split not once but twice, says, 
“This lovely light, it lights not me; all loveliness is anguish to me, since I can ne’er enjoy. Gifted 
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with the high perception, I lack the low, enjoying power; damned, most subtly and most 
malignantly!” (242).  
 
The Anatomy of Pessimism  
As for the rest of us, according to Symposium, we were molded after that first and only 
incision—so far, at least—by Apollo, who, like a plastic surgeon, rearranged some body parts 
and smoothed out the wrinkles “with somewhat the same kind of tool as shoemakers use in 
smoothing the wrinkles in leather…” (191A). The beings that we are today, pessimistic creatures 
who have inherited the trauma of being torn from ourselves without the option of ever finding 
our other halves—an option that was only ever available to that first generation sliced by Apollo 
on Zeus’ orders—are creatures shaped by a tool that is compared to one used by shoemakers. 
And some of us still feel the pain. “I am an amputee,” Barthes writes metaphorically of eros as 
absence, as waiting, as loss, “who still feels pain in his missing leg” (A Lover’s Discourse 39).   
To be torn in two: the space in between is where ambiguity, the detritus of experience 
ignored by rigid systematicity, resides. It is that mythic, unaccountable space where the 
“indefiniteness” of Moby Dick resides, between Ahab’s remaining foot and his missing one, this 
whale that “had actually been encountered in opposite latitudes at one and the same instant of 
time” (282; 263). Moby Dick, slipping beyond comprehension in all his slippery slippage, is a 
cipher of both pessimism and of the “indefiniteness” and irreducibility of ambiguity itself.25 
Maybe this is why the Germans call “ambiguity” Zweideutigkeit—literally “two-meaning-ness.” 
 
25 In describing the sublime, indefinite ambiguity of the White Whale, which amounts to a sketch of pessimism, 
Ishmael asks, “Is it that by its indefiniteness it shadows forth the heartless voids and immensities of the universe, 
and thus stabs us from behind with the thought of annihilation, when beholding the white depths of the milky way? 
Or is it, that as in essence whiteness is not so much a color as the visible absence of color, and at the same time the 
concrete of all colors; is it for these reasons that there is such a dumb blankness, full of meaning, in a wide 
landscape of snows—a colorless, all-color of atheism from which we shrink?” (282) 
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Philosophy aims to define, to specify, to pin down meaning to a single definition. But ambiguity 
by nature cannot be defined. It is what escapes the definite and gestures to the infinite, back to 
our cosmic origins, where we once roamed freely before Zeus’ punishment. Ambiguity, this two-
meaning-ness, is not on the side of philosophy, but of pessimism. And maybe this is why Hegel, 
in The Phenomenology of Spirit, tries to lead Spirit through and out of despair, or Verzweiflung, 
another term rooted in the zwei, or the “two” (Marasco 28). The “Unhappy Consciousness” is 
“the consciousness of self as a dual-natured, merely contradictory being” (Phenomenology of 
Spirit 126). Hegel moves out of this Verzweiflung, this dual-natured Unhappy Consciousness, but 
pessimists hold on to it—to their despair, to their phantom two-ness in the midst of their 
loneliness, cynically doubting (in German, bezweifeln) everything else as they cling to the 
festering wound in their feet like Philoctetes.  
Socrates, though, doesn’t care about his feet; this is why he walks around Athens 
barefoot. He performs thought with his hands, which is reflected in the most iconic image of him 
in Raphael’s painting The School of Athens. Philosophy attempts to grasp, to reach, to take hold 
of, emphasizing the greifen in begreifen, from which we get the noun Begriff, the concept. In The 
Republic, Socrates distinguishes philosophers from non-philosophers by saying that 
“philosophers are those who are able to grasp what is always the same in all respects, while those 
who are not able to do so but wander among what is many and varies in all ways…” (484B). It’s 
a differentiation between those who grasp and those who wander, those who use their hands and 
those who stray off by foot, those who seek philosophical universals and those who dwell in 
novelistic detail.  
Aristotle writes in the Metaphysics that, “All men by their very nature reach out to 
know,” and it is this reaching that he captures in his work (A1.980a21). Philosophy gestures, it 
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points, it indexes, from the marginal glosses of hand and finger icons in medieval manuscripts all 
the way to Heidegger’s Dasein, who is always handed and handy; being-in-the-world is the 
experience of approaching things that are either ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. In 
Parmenides, Heidegger writes, “Every motion of the hand in every one of its works carries itself 
through the element of thinking, every bearing of the hand bears itself in that element. All the 
work of the hand is rooted in thinking” (84). Byung-Chul Han, glossing this statement, says that, 
“Thinking is handi-craft” (In the Swarm 38). Maybe this is also why Socrates is so fond of 
metaphors from craftsmanship. Philosophy from Plato to Heidegger is as much an activity of the 
hands as it is of the mind. Philosophy is a rhetorical weighing of values (“on the one hand… on 
the other hand”) and of perspectives (firsthand account versus secondhand account). In liberal 
economic theory, the hand is invisible, but it manipulates everything like a puppet-master.  
Pessimism and the novel—or, rather, pessimism in the novel—parody the role of the 
hand in philosophy, exemplified most clearly in Thomas Mann’s novels. Thomas Buddenbrook 
feels a rare moment of intense consolation after haphazardly coming across a copy of 
Schopenhauer’s World and Will as Representation, a book that finally articulates his own bleak 
vision of life as “cruel, mocking, powerful” (631). He is so overcome with emotion that he 
weeps out of an “intoxicating joy” that “was incomparably sweeter than the world’s sweetest 
pain” (725). He finally feels understood, even vindicated in his pessimistic views by this book. 
But pessimism can be too frightening, too untenable, to sustain. The next day, he keeps this 
Schopenhauerian insight at arm’s length: “And so Thomas Buddenbrook, who had stretched his 
hands out imploringly for high and final truths, sank back now into the ideas, images, and 
customary beliefs in which he had been drilled as a child” (727, emphasis added).26  
 
26 Mazzoni argues persuasively that this episode in the novel illustrates Heidegger’s process of attaining a brief 
moment of Eigentlichkeit before slipping back into the world of das Man (372). In another part of the novel, 
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In Doctor Faustus, the narrator, Dr. Serenus Zeitblom, frequently apologizes for the 
messy handwriting of the manuscript, for his unsteady hand, because of the bombs that are 
dropping all around him in the midst of the Second World War. And in Death in Venice, the 
uptight snob Gustav von Aschenbach remembers the painful sting of overhearing someone say in 
public, “‘Here is how Aschenbach has always lived’—and he made a tight fist of his left hand—
‘not like this’—and he let his open hand dangle freely from the arm of his chair” (13). The irony, 
of course, is that, once in Venice, Aschenbach  
…raised his head and with both arms, which had been hanging limply over the back of 
his chair, made a slow, rising, circular motion that brought the hands forward in such a 
way as to indicate an opening and spreading of the arms. It was a gesture of willingness, 
welcome, of calm acceptance. (74) 
What he welcomes with these open arms, or what he wants to welcome, is the elusive noumenon 
of beauty and truth, of the highest philosophical endeavor, but these values are embodied in the 
image of the young boy Tadzio, that Narcissus who “stretched out his arms to the reflection of 
his own beauty,” which turns Aschenbach’s intellectual pursuit into one of a stalking predator 
bordering on criminality (95). Tadzio, the “charming psychagogue,” uses his own hand to lead 
Aschenbach to his death, “beckoning to him, as if, releasing his hand from his hip, he were 
pointing outward, floating onward into the promising immensity of it all” (141-42). That 
promising immensity is one that, the novel demonstrates, can never be grasped. 
 
Thomas, now speaking from the point of view of das Man, tells his brother Christian, “You do not belong just to 
yourself alone” (314). Their father also has a similar message for their sister Tony, writing to her in a letter: “We are 
not born, my dear daughter, to pursue our own small personal happiness, for we are not separate, independent, self-
subsisting individuals, but links in a chain; and it is inconceivable that we would be what we are without those who 
have preceded us and shown us the path that they themselves have scrupulously trod, looking neither to the left nor 
to the right, but, rather, following a venerable and trustworthy tradition” (144). While I fully agree with this analysis, 
it is important to note that Mann himself would have been furious with the comparison of his literature to 
Heidegger’s philosophy. 
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Pessimism, unlike philosophy, comes onto the scene late but already exhausted, too tired 
to reach, unable or unwilling to grasp. Philosophers make mis-takes; pessimists make missteps. 
The gesture of pessimism is one of withdrawal rather than of reaching. “In vain do I resist,” 
Kierkegaard writes in Either/Or. “My foot slips. My life nevertheless remains a poet-existence. 
Can anything worse be imagined?” (I.36). And in The Seducer’s Diary, his character Johannes 
reiterates the same sentiment: “I am almost unable to find a foothold; like a water bird, I am 
seeking in vain to alight on the turbulent sea of my mind” (33). Worn out and tired of looking 
ahead, the head itself hangs heavily, chin folding on neck, and the gaze rests on the waist down: 
the thighs, the legs, the feet—on the ground beneath one’s feet, where we’ll all inevitably end up. 
Standing like this, one strikes the physical image of despair itself. Lying down in this position, 
one looks like a corpse. “Human beings deep in thought look like corpses,” Thacker writes (236).  
Even in Shakespeare, the metric foot of his verse is what “struts and frets” along not only 
to the end of the work, but to an absolute end, an absolute silence, a silence “signifying 
nothing”—the last phrase in a line from Macbeth that breaks in the middle, where the metric feet 
collapse (5.5.31). And in the endgame of literature, Endgame itself, Beckett throws away not 
only metric feet, but actual feet, as well, since neither of Hamm’s parents, living in dustbins, has 
any legs. Cioran records a moment when he randomly ran into Beckett in Paris while, as a true 
pessimist, he refused to look “at the faces of passers-by,” and looked instead “at their feet, and 
they all became for me only their footsteps, which went in every direction, making a disorderly 
dance not worth lingering on. While thinking of this, I looked up and saw Beckett…” (qtd. in 
“E.M. Cioran on Beckett” 5).  
Philosophy aims to understand; pessimism provides a catalogue of irritating items that it 
can’t stand. Its feet fail. It has cold feet—that expression of non-commitment, but also a 
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description of a corpse’s feet. The ground falls beneath them, as it does for that most pessimistic 
articulation of what humans are capable of: Kurtz in Heart of Darkness, who “can’t walk—he is 
crawling on all fours…” (64). This is a man who “had kicked himself loose of the earth,” who 
“had kicked the very earth to pieces” (65). “He was alone,” Marlow tells us, “and I before him 
did not know whether I stood on the ground or floated in the air” (65).  
Instead of a Grund, that Kantian grounding of philosophy, pessimism dwells in the abyss: 
the Nietzschean Abgrund—or the Ungrund of the Renaissance German mystic of nothingness, 
Jakob Boehme. Nothing to hold on to and nothing to stand on. Maybe this is why, in Faulkner’s 
pessimistic vision in The Sound and the Fury, Benjy cries his inarticulate cry because “the 
ground wasn’t still” (13). And maybe this is also why Hardy organizes his novels according to a 
principle of antifoundationalism (Wright 1032). Heidegger breaks down the word “existence” 
into “ek-sistence” to draw attention to its etymology of literally meaning to “stand out” (“Letter 
on Humanism” 228). To him “Ek-sistence so understood is not only the ground of the possibility 
of reason, ratio, but is also that in which the essence of man preserves the source that determines 
him” (228). Existence may be outstanding to the philosopher, but to the pessimist it is 
disappointing. What’s the point in standing out, or standing at all, when we can’t even trust the 
ground beneath our feet. At the end of Heart of Darkness, Marlow sees how Kurtz “had stepped 
over the edge” while he himself “had been permitted to draw back my hesitating foot” as he 
comes to the following conclusion: 
Droll thing life is—that mysterious arrangement of merciless logic for a futile purpose. 
The most you can hope from it is some knowledge of yourself—that comes too late—a 
crop of unextinguishable regrets. I have wrestled with death. It is the most unexciting 
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contest you can imagine. It takes place in an impalpable greyness with nothing 
underfoot… (69) 
One can’t stand out, one can’t even stand, even exist, if there is nothing to stand on, if there is 
“nothing underfoot.” 
In his Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant recounts the biblical parable of 
finding one’s talents; in the original parable in the Gospel of Matthew, the servant who buries his 
one talent in the ground gets punished by his master. Pessimists bury their talents in the ground, 
and watch the ground give way into a sinkhole beneath their feet, the source of their pain, which 
is why they can’t think like philosophers. As Clov cries out in Endgame, “The pains in my legs! 
It’s unbelievable! Soon I won’t be able to think anymore” (46).27 And with this pain, we are still 
advised to pull ourselves up by our bootstraps—a cliché of optimism and a mainstay of 
conservative rhetoric that bullishly advises self-reliance. But this phrase was originally coined in 
1834 to denote something ludicrous, an absurdity, an impossibility (Bologna, Huffington Post). 
Pulling yourself up by your bootstraps was never supposed to get you anywhere—just the 
opposite. All it does is aggravate you as you reach down to your feet. A pessimistic saying 
robbed even of its pessimism.  
 The standard medieval and Renaissance topos of describing someone from head to foot 
would, in the pessimist imaginary, be reversed. In pessimism, as in autopsy tags, we are 
identified by our feet. This is our starting point for a physical anatomy of pessimism, which I 
imagine to be presided over by the most inadequate and disappointing medical doctors of 
literature. There is the inept Pangloss, who physically harms everyone around him while trying 
 
27 Kierkegaard also complains about his legs, and links a key abstract concept of his thought (the leap) in their 
physicality: “The disproportion of my body is that my forelegs are too short. Like the hare from New Holland, I 
have very short forelegs but extremely long hind legs. Ordinarily, I sit very still; if I make a move, it is a tremendous 
leap, to the horror of all those to whom I am bound by the tender ties of kinship and friendship” (Either/Or I.38). 
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to prove that this is the best of all possible worlds. Victor Frankenstein reduces the medical 
sciences to anatomy alone, stitching up detached limbs to create a Creature who resents being 
created, exclaiming in agony, “Hateful day when I received life!” (88). The promising young 
Lydgate tries contributing modern medicine to Middlemarch, but ends up being run out of town, 
living a life of disappointment. Doctor Sloper seems to inflict more harm than good on his 
daughter Catherine in Washington Square, and Doctor Herzenstube in The Brothers Karamazov 
is more or less inept. The original Doctor Faustus of the 1587 Faustbuch cures the plague, but 
can’t cure the sickness of his own soul, and Doctor Henry Jekyll similarly realizes that the 
sickness of criminality lies within himself, in the form of Mr. Hyde. We also have Kafka’s 
protagonist from “A Country Doctor,” who flees from a patient he cannot treat, a boy who tells 
him, “I have very little confidence in you” (224). Upon first seeing this patient, he “could not 
help a low whistle of surprise,” echoing the “long whistle” of Coleridge in the letter where he 
coined the term “pessimism” in English (223). This doctor runs away, “[n]aked, exposed to the 
frost of this most unhappy of ages,” unable to escape unhappiness itself (225).  
And then, of course, there’s Charles Bovary, who owns six shelves of Dictionary of 
Medical Science, but the pages are uncut (Flaubert 28). Flaubert organizes his novel around the 
foot and how it becomes the site of Emma’s disappointment. After the novel opens with the 
humiliating “Ridiculus sum” episode, we see Charles as an adult who receives an urgent letter 
begging him immediately to set a broken leg (11). Luckily for Charles, “not one who liked to get 
to the bottom of things,” the fracture “was simple, without complications of any kind. Charles 
could not have dared to hope for an easier one” (13).  
The man whose leg Charles sets is M. Rouault, and Charles ends up marrying his 
daughter Emma, who is never really in love with him, and just grows to resent him with every 
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passing day for not giving her the Parisian life she is desperate to have. When he reads an article 
about a new medical procedure to treat clubfeet, Emma pushes him to purchase the new 
apparatus so that he could perform the operation on their neighbor Hippolyte. At this prospect, 
Charles “saw his reputation growing, his prosperity increasing, his wife loving him forever; and 
she was happy to find herself reinvigorated by a new sentiment, a healthier, better one, a feeling 
of some affection for this poor man who cherished her so” (155). Charles performs the operation, 
and it seems to go well until a “black liquid” begins seeping from the leg. Another doctor, M. 
Canivet de Neufchatel, comes to fix Charles’s mistake, complaining that, “These are inventions 
originating in Paris!” (159). Hippolyte’s leg ends up getting amputated as a result of Charles’s 
botched operation, and Charles, distancing himself from any responsibility, claims that, “Fate 
had had a hand in it” (161). 
“Fate” becomes the empty and cruel signifier of stupidity and ridiculousness in Flaubert. 
No longer are we in the realm of tragedy, where fate is a monolithic force that could be appealed 
to. In the novel, the appeal to fate is a cop-out. This pessimistic novel is a parody of tragedy, 
reducing it in gravitas so that the false promise of happiness is inscribed in the name of 
Yonville’s sleazy merchant Lheureux, the space of the dramatic caesura is instead ironically 
filled with the empty prattling of Homais (Ô mais, “oh but”), Teiresias is reincarnated as “The 
Blind Man” who howls like a dog and fills Emma with disgust, and Hippolyte—who was 
mythically dismembered as a result of Phèdre’s ominous silence in Racine’s tragedy—now just 
has a leg amputated as a result of Emma goading Charles on in the medical procedure. And his 
operation haunts her even to the moment of her death, when “a stream of black liquid,” like the 
same black liquid from his gangrenous leg, “ran out of her mouth like a vomit” (293)  
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As Emma becomes increasingly irritated with her husband, even her affairs become 
sources of disappointment, Rodolphe flaking out on her by writing, “Is it my fault? Oh, Lord, no! 
Fate is to blame, only fate!” (177). This same phrase recurs after Emma’s death, when Charles 
actually runs into him—and, knowing about their affair, tells Rodolphe that he doesn’t blame 
him, even adding “a grand phrase, the only one he had ever spoken: ‘Fate is to blame!’ 
Rodolphe, who had determined the course of that fate, found him very good-natured for a man in 
his situation, comical even, and rather low” (310). Charles dies that same day, in the banal horror 
of ordinariness rather than in the grandeur of tragedy, judged by others as comical, as rather low, 
as ridiculous. 
The foot, the leg, the thigh—these central limbs in the anatomy of pessimism have 
traveled from a long literary tradition and other genres, but find their focal point as emblems of 
pessimism in the modern novel. The first hero of Western literature, whose epithet is “swift of 
foot,” dies because of an arrow to his heel (The Iliad IX.196). All the brawn, the might, the 
muscles, the battle skills, the semi-divine protection, and even the legendary rage cannot come to 
Achilles’ aid when the back of his foot succumbs to the fatal shot. Odysseus, on the other hand, 
survives the Trojan War. And twenty years later, he is back home, but in stealth mode until he 
kills all of his wife’s suitors and the housemaids who had entertained them this whole time. But 
the scar on his thigh reveals his identity through the disguise. His old nurse Eurykleia washes his 
feet as was the custom of greeting any stranger, until, dumbfounded by her recognition, she 
clumsily drops his foot into the basin with a loud thud and a mess of spilled water. In a rush of 
joy and excitement, she tries to get Penelope’s attention, but Odysseus warns her: “Be quiet; 
keep it from the others, else / I warn you, and I mean it, too, / if by my hand god brings the 
suitors down / I’ll kill you, nurse or not…” (XIX.565-68). This, to the woman who had suckled 
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him as a child, treated him as her own son. Obviously he is being strategic here, trying to keep 
his cover from the rest of the household, but nothing warrants this cold, cruel outburst. She 
quickly, even enthusiastically, agrees—and offers to report on all the maids to him, but his 
dismissive response is, “be quiet, hold your peace” (XIX.582). The scar reveals more than just 
Odysseus’ identity; it reveals his character at its worst.       
Oedipus is also a figure whose fate is inscribed in his feet. His name, transliterated as 
Oidipous, literally means “clubfoot” (it also means “tumorous” and “painful”), but embedded in 
his name is not just the first act of violence inflicted on him as an infant, but an echo of the riddle 
he had solved to lift the Sphinx’s curse from Thebes: What has tetrapous in the morning, dipous 
at noon, and tripous at night? Man—Oedipus himself, standing on two feet at the noon of his 
life. But the riddle is doubled, emphasizing the prefix rather than the suffix of di-pous. Oedipus, 
once the answer to the riddle, becomes the question. The man becomes the monster; the rescuer 
becomes the threat. He himself is the riddle to be solved—what Teiresias calls the “deadly 
footed, double-striking curse” (l.418). He begets two sons and two daughters from Jocasta, 
whose womb is described as a “field of double sowing” (l.1257). Realizing that Thebes for him 
is also doubled—“a haven no haven” (l.423)—he wrenches open two doors to find his “wife no 
wife” dead (l.1256) and gouges out both his eyes. The Chorus pities him: “In such misfortunes 
it’s no wonder / if double weighs the burden of your grief” (l.1320).  
In Greek, “oi da” means “I know” (and “I see,” colloquial synonyms even in English), so 
we see his name divided against itself. Sophocles opens the play with this tyrant (Oidipous 
Tyrannos is the original title) asking the Priest why everyone is suffering. Don’t you already 
know? the Priest, frustrated at this imbecilic question, wants to shout back, but settles on the 
more polite but still stringent, “King, you yourself / have seen our city reeling like a wreck / 
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already…” (l.21-23). Oedipus claims not to know what is going on, but then says, “…I have 
known the story before you told it” (l.59). He knows and he doesn’t know. He sees and he 
doesn’t see. The first part of his name suggests that he knows he is to blame all along, he knows 
the truth; but the feet in the last part of his name try to run away from this truth, and run away 
quickly. Oedipus is a man whose impatient temperament demands swift action: “When he that 
plots against me secretly / moves quickly, I must quickly counterplot” (l.618-619). But the limp 
from his clubfoot is the snag in his movement. Tragedy is what draws us back—to our past, to 
our wounds, to a slowness that inevitably approaches stillness, like Philoctetes stranded on the 
island and clinging to the festering sore on his feet. Captain Ahab mimics this obsession, having 
lost his leg to Moby-Dick—part of his body and his identity are identified with monstrosity 
itself, as Oedipus tragically learns about himself, as well. For Oedipus, Philoctetes, and Ahab, 
their undoing begins at their feet, and Oedipus ends up blind and tripous, exiled from Thebes as 
a poor beggar with a cane. No longer just doubled, he is now tripled. 
Oedipus’ limp makes its way into the novel, at least in comic form, in Diderot’s Jacques 
le fataliste, one of the “greatest novelistic works of the eighteenth century” for Kundera, who 
summarizes the plot in a single sentence: “…Jacques le Fataliste seduces his friend’s girl, he gets 
happily drunk, his father wallops him, a regiment marches by, out of spite he signs up, in his first 
battle he gets a bullet in the knee, and he limps till the day of his death” (The Art of the Novel 
24). There is also the limp of Ethan Frome, whose every step, even twenty-four years after the 
fact, is a painful reminder of his doomed love and failed suicide pact, crashing the sled into the 
tree with Mattie just hard enough to paralyze her and wound himself, but not enough to kill the 
two of them, which tethers him both to her and his wife in the same house for the rest of his 
agonizing life. And in Lady Chatterley’s Lover, Sir Clifford Chatterley is paralyzed from the 
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waist down, which, in part, propels his wife into a doomed affair with the gamekeeper in 
Lawrence’s modernization of the Tristan legend. And Tristan, the most iconic doomed lover of 
Romance, suffers from a thigh wound that in itself is an echo not just of Odysseus but of Adonis, 
as well. This wound brings him to Isolde, precipitating the events that would lead to his 
apocalyptic love, both a heaven and a hell on earth for him. Dante, for his part, makes it out of 
hell, but not without stopping to relish the torment of the Simoniacs, vertically buried upside 
down with their feet exposed to flames. 
The indulgence of pain in Dante and the triangulation between feet, identity, and 
blindness in Sophocles percolates into fairy tales, as well, such as the Grimm Brothers’ 
“Cinderella,” where the eponymous girl is properly identified by fitting into the golden slippers 
after her evil stepsisters, at the order of their mother, brutally mutilate their own feet—one cuts 
off a toe and the other hacks away at her heel—and all to no avail (126). As if this physical 
torture isn’t enough, they must endure Cinderella’s wedding, where the same two doves who 
magically gave Cinderella her golden slippers and ballgown proceed to pluck out the stepsisters’ 
eyes (127). Cinderella’s wedding can be seen, then, as a day not only of reckoning, but of 
wrath—and the bleak, violent, and apocalyptic vision sung by the Dies Irae Requiem is even 
inscribed in her own name: “Dies irae, dies illa / Solvet saeclum in favilla,” meaning, “Day of 
wrath, that day / will dissolve the world into cinders” (Faust 108 n.1, Arndt trans.). A happily 
ever after for a pessimist.  
In “Snow White,” the evil queen—whose blindness is of the sort that her mirror needs to 
speak to her instead of show her what she already knows—tries to gatecrash Snow White’s 
wedding, but ends up being forced into iron slippers that had been set over coal flames, and 
dances until she dies (255). Hans Christian Andersen mirrors this final scene in “The Red 
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Shoes,” but the girl with the shoes is no longer the villain. The villains are the shoes themselves, 
forcing the girl’s feet to carry out a will that is not her own, even if she set that will into motion 
by first wanting to put the shoes on. And in “The Little Mermaid,” the nameless girl trades her 
fishtail for a pair of legs, but unlike the prince in “Cinderella,” this prince is blind to who she is. 
Without a voice, all that’s left of her identity is in her feet, which she uses to dance, even though 
it feels as though every step is taken on sharp knives, ultimately leading nowhere except to her 
suicide. In Cruel Optimism, Lauren Berlant seems to invoke the mermaid’s story by defining 
“the activity of living,” which “demands both a wandering absorptive awareness and a 
hypervigilance that collects material that might help to clarify things, maintain one’s sea legs…” 
(4). But how does one “maintain one’s sea legs,” exactly? These are legs that inevitably fail. 
They bring her no closer to the object of her desire, which is where this relation of cruel 
optimism emerges: “A relation of cruel optimism exists when something you desire is actually an 
obstacle to your flourishing” (1). As such, the mermaid ends up killing herself. 
Pinocchio also commits a suicide of sorts when he kills the Talking Cricket, “a wise old 
philosopher” who voices his own conscience and advises him to learn a trade for moral 
responsibility (11). When the Talking Cricket ridicules Pinocchio for being a marionette and 
having a wooden head, Pinocchio, in a rage, takes a hammer and throws it at the hundred-year 
old insect, killing him in an instant. Pinocchio feels shame and remorse, and goes to bed hungry, 
lying his wet wooden feet on the stove to dry, but wakes up to see them burnt to ashes. In the 
original serialized version, he ends up getting a new pair of legs from his carpenter father 
Gepetto, but the book ends with two villains hanging him from a tree, these new wooden legs 
swinging in the air (Hooper and Kraczyna, The New York Times).  
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All of his existence, Pinocchio wanted to be a real human, and in the end he dies without 
having lived, realizing his worst nightmare: the death of a dehumanized entity—like Josef K. in 
The Trial, who also dies at the hands of two obscure villains, “Like a dog!” (Kafka 229). In this 
narrative arc is the story of pessimism itself, that newcomer to the ancient home of philosophy, 
not recognized as real, and throwing a tantrum in the face of philosophy even when recognizing 
that it shares more in common with philosophy than it would perhaps like to admit.  
Pinocchio also exemplifies another “hallmark of pessimism,” the thought that, “We do 
not live—we are lived” (Ligotti 81; Thacker 102). To Thomas Ligotti, a “puppet possessed of 
life would exemplify… a horror, because it would negate all conceptions of a natural 
physicalism and affirm a metaphysics of chaos and nightmare” (xxi). This is what Carlo 
Michelstaedter argued in his dissertation Persuasion and Rhetoric before shooting himself a day 
after finishing it, that everyone in this world is just a puppet, an idea perhaps influenced by 
Schopenhauer’s concept of the blind Will, the exact opposite of free will, propelling everything 
into motion. Or, in Ligotti’s words, “we are not what we are: unreality on legs” (25). 
Since Ligotti reminds us that the word “conscience” is archaic for “consciousness”—
what, to Hamlet, “makes cowards of us all”—then Pinocchio killing the Talking Cricket could be 
a suicide attempt, trying to kill not only his own conscience, but his consciousness (144). The 
Cricket could be the remnant of our former insect life that Plato describes. So what is it that 
persists in Pinocchio after the Cricket’s death? A doomed existence that is never recognized as 
real, an existence without legs until he is fitted with another pair of wooden prosthetics only to 
be hanged by criminals. Pinocchio, however, does not mean to kill the Talking Cricket, as one 
cannot have one’s own intention as a puppet. Maybe this anxiety of pessimism, that we live in a 
world like marionettes pulled by strings we are not conscious of, is what Heidegger responds to 
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with his concept of Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time, of imagining Dasein as existence in 
motion, propelled by a number of ontological currents, and occasionally we can twist ourselves 
away from the propulsion in brief moments of authenticity, when we are our own selves. 
In “On the Theater of Marionettes,” Heinrich von Kleist explores the tension between 
conscience and consciousness in the feet of marionettes, and suggests a pre-Heideggerian 
concept of authenticity within the context of “this art form intended for the masses,” drawing a 
parallel between puppetry and the novel (267). In dance, the “soul (vis motrix) finds itself twisted 
in a motion other than the one prescribed by its center of gravity” (268). Marionettes in this story 
have more grace, and paradoxically more soul, than human dancers because they are free from 
consciousness. Herr von C— even speaks about amputees who can dance with more grace 
because their prosthetic legs have no consciousness in them. And finally he tells a version of the 
Spinnario image, which makes its way into Death in Venice, as well: a boy spontaneously lifts up 
his foot to pick out a thorn and becomes struck with the recognition of how beautiful and 
graceful his body is at that very moment. He is so overwhelmed by this recognition that he tries 
repeating the same gesture, and yet he can never get it quite right after the first time. The 
moment is fleeting; the grace is gone.  
The absence of conscience in Pinocchio is just as much of a punishment as a full sense of 
consciousness is in “On the Theater of Marionettes.” In both cases, the pivot between grace and 
punishment lies in the feet. The novel at large seems to explore the nuances that lie in the 
spectrum between this fairy tale on the one hand and this “essay” (really more of a short story) 
on the other, and we can turn back to Flaubert to see how Emma herself feels caught in this 
tension. She is stuck in a novel called Madame Bovary, and is forced to play a part that is not 
hers, but is a type that she must end up fulfilling, pulled along by the marionette strings of the 
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novel. The first Madame Bovary we see is not her, but Charles Bovary’s mother, who was fond 
of stories and was “full of melancholy” and “beguiling chatter,” who puts into his head “all her 
sparse, shattered illusions” from “the isolation of her life” (7). The second Madame Bovary we 
are introduced to is Charles’s first wife, a jealous woman named Heloïse who runs up several 
debts and dies after spitting blood (17). Emma Rouault, our protagonist, now becomes the third 
Madame Bovary, but her story had already been played out before she could enter the scene. She 
is literally the Nouvelle Heloïse, and when she meets Rodolphe, he tells her, “Madame Bovary!... 
Oh, everyone calls you that… It’s not your name, anyway; it belongs to someone else” (136). 
Emma is just as much written by the narrator as she is by the stories of women she reads 
about in romances and histories. René Girard argues that she “desires through the romantic 
heroines who fill her imagination,” which “triangulates” the role of desire in the novel (5). When 
she attends a performance of Lucie de Lammermoor, “Lucie’s voice seemed the echo of Emma’s 
own consciousness, and the illusion that so charmed her, something from her own life” (Flaubert 
196). But what is, as Heidegger might say, her “own” life? It is a series of fictions that she uses 
against the fictions that have typecast her. Growing up, when “she went to confession, she would 
invent little sins in order to stay there longer… The metaphors of betrothed, spouse, heavenly 
lover, and marriage everlasting that recur in sermons stirred unexpectedly sweet sensations in the 
depths of her soul” (31). She would also write, herself, against the writing that inscribes her in 
this story of her life that she rejects:  
But as she wrote, she saw a different man, a phantom created out of her most ardent 
memories, the most beautiful things she had read, her strongest desires; and in the end he 
became so real, and so accessible, that she would tremble, marveling, and yet be unable 
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to imagine him clearly, so lost was he, like a god, under the abundance of his attributes. 
(258) 
Eventually, she succumbs to what Heidegger calls das Man, the world of others, determined by 
others. Even her death is not her own, as it is for Dasein; it is an imitation of the previous 
Madame Bovary’s death, with the same kind of black liquid from Hippolyte’s clubfoot, and 
maybe even from the ink of the novelist, himself. 
 What are the boundaries of one’s own life, one’s own death, and someone else’s? Elena 
Ferrante, whose novels are populated with uncanny, animated dolls, explores this question in 
what she calls “dissolving margins” (89). These are violent, explosive moments, as sudden as 
Heideggerian authenticity, but an expression of something that is its opposite without tracing a 
descent back to das Man. These are moments when “the outlines of people and things suddenly 
dissolved, disappeared,” and become the source of Lila’s anxiety throughout the Neapolitan 
tetralogy. This series begins with the question of constitutive identity, of Lila vanishing without a 
trace, and of Lenù recovering the existence of Lila through memory alone, beginning from the 
time when they were schoolchildren who exchanged their dolls—animated beings for them who 
were an extension of their own selves—and, in this exchange, performed a kind of dissolution of 
their own individual identity. When Lila throws Lenù’s doll down the grating into the cellar of 
Don Achille—“the ogre of fairy tales”—Lenù mirrors the act of violence with Lila’s doll (27). 
This mirrored moment, tying these two girls together through loss and cruelty, as they wonder 
about the afterlife of their dolls in the dark void beneath their feet, is Lenù’s first feeling of 
“despair” (54). 
Ferrante also uses the fairy-tale motif of feet as enchanted limbs that inevitably lead to 
pain and disappointment. Lenù is constantly worried that she will grow up to inherit the limp of 
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her mother as an adult. She makes a pact with Lila to work on a plan that would let them escape 
Naples and escape poverty, so they try working on a novel together that would make them 
famous like Louisa May Alcott, but after discouragement from their schoolteacher, Lila begins to 
draw sketches for shoes that seem “to have come from some world parallel to ours” (116). What 
begins as a dreamy pastime becomes the subject of much consternation and violence—of 
whether her father and brother would make these shoes, of who to sell them to, of her suitors 
who offer to buy these shoes and try to force her hand into marriage at sixteen. These seemingly 
magical shoes eventually lead to the first major betrayal of several betrayals in a life full of pain 
and struggle when Marcello, the one man whom she explicitly forbids to attend her wedding, the 
terror of Naples and the rapist of her friend Ada, storms into her wedding wearing the same 
shoes of her original design. 
This anatomy, according to the nature of the genre itself, could conceivably go on 
without end, tracing this pessimistic archetype of the foot from work to work, touching on epic, 
tragedy, romance, and the fairy tale in its trajectory toward the novel. (It’s almost tempting to 
even include in this discussion the amputation of Bakhtin’s leg in 1938). One thinks also of 
Werther, who reads too much meaning into his foot touching Lotte’s under the table, an incident 
that leads nowhere, to an emptying of all meaning altogether for Werther. What this anatomy 
lays bare, though is the etiology of a symptom, which is why we have medicine and anatomy to 
begin with, responding to pessimism’s complaint that something, everything, is wrong—
physically and metaphysically. To Dostoevsky’s Underground Man, “the best definition of man 
is: a being that goes on two legs and is ungrateful” (29). But a pessimistic anatomy, in its 
examination of the husk that’s left of an unfulfilled life, reveals no cure for the condition of 
existence, other than death, just as the original anatomy failed in its quest to locate the soul. As 
 130 
Hamm tells Nagg in Endgame, “…you’re on earth, there’s no cure for that!” (53). In pessimism, 
the body becomes inert, the world becomes just the earth, the human dissolves into the non-
human, ceremony dissolves into cerements, and the creations of civilization get reclaimed by the 
landscape—no longer that stable, passive background of idylls, but that dynamic, gloomy, 
encroaching force that leaves nothing in its wake but the rune and the ruin.  
 
The Landscape of the Novel 
 Already in the seventeenth century, the genre of anatomy bisected itself into scientific 
texts on one hand and what would contribute to the rise of the modern novel on the other, their 
first point of departure being in how they articulated our relation to landscape. To Browne, 
bodies are just entities waiting to inevitably become part of the landscape, subsumed and 
overpowered by it—a running theme through Schopenhauer and then Freud, who defined the 
“universal endeavor of all living substance” in Beyond the Pleasure Principle as “to return to the 
quiescence of the inorganic world” (76). To Bacon, the optimistic method of his “true induction” 
would “let the human race recover that right over nature which belongs to it by divine bequest, 
and let power be given it” (CXXIX, 119). Bacon’s anatomy introduces a new division of 
knowledge toward this goal; Browne’s anatomy understands nature itself to be the force that 
would divide, decompose, and disintegrate us. Bacon’s method recalls the image of Odysseus 
strapped to the mast of his ship, his ears stopped up with wax to avoid the fatal but alluring song 
of the Sirens. This becomes the central image for Adorno and Horkheimer in their Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, the pessimistic excoriation of what gets labelled as “progress” in a world that had 
just come out of the Holocaust (46). Odysseus’ innovation for them is the first example of 
technology used to conquer nature, as well as the “atomistic interest” that foreshadows the rise of 
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capitalism and, ultimately, totalitarianism (61). Freud, too, ends his Civilizations and its 
Discontents on a similar note, saying that, “Men have gained control over the forces of nature to 
such an extent that with their help they would have no difficulty in exterminating one another to 
the last man. They know this, and hence comes a large part of their current unrest, their 
unhappiness and their mood of anxiety” (112). The image of the Sirens being overpowered by 
Odysseus, then, is the image of our own unhappiness. 
Kafka, though, wonders whether we’ve got the whole story wrong, whether Homer 
himself got the story wrong. In his short story, “The Silence of the Sirens,” he points to the 
futility of the rope, of the wax, to protect Odysseus and his sailors from the Sirens:  
The song of the Sirens could pierce through everything, and the longing of those they 
seduced would have broken far stronger bonds than chains and masts. But Ulysses did 
not think of that… He trusted absolutely to his handful of wax and his fathom of chain, 
and in innocent elation over his little stratagem sailed out to meet the Sirens. (431) 
The Sirens “have a still more fatal weapon than their song, namely their silence” (431). Their 
whole interaction is a misunderstanding. They refrain from singing, and Odysseus succumbs to 
the pretentious self-satisfaction of having outwitted those who did not even feel like annihilating 
him at the moment: “Against the feeling of having triumphed over them by one’s own strength, 
and the consequent exaltation that bears down everything before it, no earthly powers can resist” 
(431).  
Kafka here both reads and writes Odysseus not as an accomplished epic hero, but as a 
small, ridiculous, unremarkable man who belongs in a novel, like Charles Bovary, similar to how 
Adorno and Horkheimer think of him as “a prototype of the bourgeois individual, a notion 
originating in… consistent self-affirmation” (43). In this same essay, “Odysseus, or Myth and 
 132 
Enlightenment,” they speak of the “translation of myths into the novel, as in the adventure 
story,” which “does not so much falsify the myths as sweep myth into time, concealing the abyss 
that separates it from homeland and expiation” (78). Time is what ultimately moves through us, 
performing its anatomy on our bodies, on our being, seducing us into reuniting with nature, with 
landscape. Here Novalis is explicitly invoked with his definition of philosophy as 
“homesickness,” which Lukács takes to articulate his own theory of the novel (78). And so too is 
Heidegger, whose Being and Time postulates a vision of Being as Time, of Dasein as defined by 
its finitude. 
The Sirens operate by seduction (“those they seduced” are die Verführten), by a sophistic 
psychagogia, a soul-conducting orchestrated by an enchantment without chant. Their silence 
doesn’t echo through the void of nature so much as it echoes the void itself, waiting to engulf 
Odysseus, but not just yet. Odysseus himself is like the angry Socrates in The Republic, who 
vows to “chant this argument we are making to ourselves as a countercharm, taking care against 
falling back again into this love…” (X.608a). He’s the one doing the chanting, trying to seduce 
himself into reason rather than the enticements of the imagination. As opposed to Bacon’s “true 
induction” and the formal logic of deduction, what emerges as an alternative to these modes of 
cognition is seduction itself—an embodied cognition, gesturing to the world while withdrawing 
from it in an erotic reacquaintance with and reimagining of ourselves as finite beings in the 
process of fading into our landscape, like Plato fading into the platonos, the shade of the broad 
plane tree that, on a hot summer’s day, seduces Socrates to philosophize about seduction itself. 
And maybe this is what Socrates has always been doing, in every dialogue. Maybe this is why 
Alcibiades, frustrated with Socrates not giving in to his erotic advances, says, “I stopped my ears 
and took off in flight, as if from the Sirens, in order that I might not sit here in idleness and grow 
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old beside him” (Symposium 216A). It’s not Socrates’ chanting or even pontificating that brings 
Alcibiades back, though—it is, like Kafka’s Sirens—Socrates’ silence, his restraint, his gesture 
of negation, that is what is most seductive about him. Seduction has always been at the heart of 
philosophy. 
Pessimism, in the form of the novel, which itself is rooted in anatomy—that transgressive 
genre—uncovers these traces, looking back through the millennia that document the history of 
this vicious lover’s quarrel to make the surprising discovery that maybe they were as close to two 
halves of a cosmic body as it gets, that they belong together, in erotic dialogue with each other. 
Socrates demands the apology of the mimetic arts before allowing them back into his utopian 
republic, including an explanation of how they serve the state in their utility—a humiliating 
demand that scholars, in the form of dissertations and academic books, have nevertheless bowed 
down to ever since the demand had been made (Republic X.607C-E; Mazzoni 353). It is not until 
Schlegel that we get the suggestion that maybe this demand can be reversed, and instead of 
accepting literature—and the novel, specifically—on philosophical grounds, we can read 
philosophy itself as a novel, with Plato being our first novelist, his seductive, Siren-like silence 
merging with the landscape. Is this seductive quality what every subsequent novelist aspires to, 
which is why Nabokov initially published under the pseudonym “V. Sirin,” which he says is “no 
doubt identical with the ‘siren,’ a Greek deity, transporter of souls and teaser of sailors”? (Strong 
Opinions 161).   
Maybe this is also why Kierkegaard chooses the form that he does when he writes The 
Seducer’s Diary, a genre that unites philosophy, pessimism, and the novel. And maybe this is 
why Schopenhauer has been such a consistent inspiration for novelists who have advanced the 
craft. We’ve already seen how Thomas Mann inserts Schopenhauer’s work into a pivotal 
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moment in his first novel with Thomas Buddenbrook’s intense, momentary revelation. And in 
Mann’s own personal opinion of Schopenhauer, he writes, “Never probably in the history of the 
mind has there been so wonderful an example of the artist, the dark and driven human being, 
finding spiritual support, self-justification, and enlightenment in another’s thought, as in this case 
of… Schopenhauer” (Essays of Three Decades 331). 
Mann wrote this over half a century after Tolstoy, in 1869, wrote the following letter to 
his friend A.A. Fet, in language that seems to prefigure the language Mann assigns to Thomas 
Buddenbrook: 
Do you know what this summer has meant for me? Constant raptures over Schopenhauer 
and a whole series of spiritual delights which I’ve never experienced before. I’ve sent for 
all his works and I’m reading them (I’ve also read Kant), and probably no student has 
ever studied so much on his course, and learned so much, as I have this summer. 
 I don’t know if I’ll ever change my opinion, but at present I’m certain that 
Schopenhauer is the most brilliant of men. 
 You said that he wrote something or other on philosophical subjects, not too 
badly. What do you mean, something or other? It’s the whole world in an incredibly clear 
and beautiful reflection. 
 I’ve begun to translate him. Won’t you also take it on? We could publish it 
jointly. As I read him, it’s inconceivable to me how his name can remain unknown. (Qtd. 
in Magee 331). 
Schopenhauer, in all his fragmentation, to Tolstoy represents “the whole world.” He makes 
whole to the novelist what had never been whole before. And Schopenhauer’s influence on him 
is clear. Having discovered him after finishing War and Peace, ending on a triumphant vision of 
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human history, Tolstoy began working on his next project, writing feverishly in his study with a 
newly purchased portrait of Schopenhauer hanging on his wall (Magee 404). He had already 
seduced Fet into co-translating The World as Will and Representation into Russian, but as soon 
as Fet began working on the translation, Tolstoy was preoccupied with his own pessimistic tome, 
Anna Karenina, that exploration of how all unhappy families are unhappy in different ways, 
publishing it in 1877. Fet, meanwhile, published his translation of The World as Will and 
Representation in 1881.  
Another novelist who sent letters to Fet, one of which even asked how his translation of 
Schopenhauer was going, was Turgenev, whose “‘Schopenhauerism’ was much more genuine 
than the ‘Schopenhauerism’ of Lev Tolstoy” (Walicki 15). Bryan Magee also traces 
Schopenhauer’s profound influence on Zola, Maupassant, and Proust (405-6, 415). And in 
English, after his work was translated in 1883, Schopenhauer’s most profound influence was 
found in the novels of Thomas Hardy and Joseph Conrad, novelists who focus just as much on 
landscape as on character, but landscape as a de-romanticized expression of a Schopenhauerian 
blind Will rather than an objective correlative for their characters. 
 
Profiles of the Pessimistic Landscape: Hardy and Conrad 
In Tess of the D’Urbervilles, characters vanish into the landscape, as though swallowed 
up by it. When Tess Durbeyfield first sees Angel Clare, the “rays of the sun had absorbed the 
young stranger’s retreating figure on the hill,” and as Tess marches deeper into her own tragedy, 
the narrator observes, “Thus Tess walks on; a figure which is part of the landscape…” (10; 220). 
Her face is “as white as the scene without” during the spell of dry frost, and just as much as 
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Hardy describes her face in terms of the landscape, he also describes the landscape in terms of a 
face (230):  
Every leaf of the vegetable having already been consumed the whole field was in colour a 
desolate drab; it was a complexion without features, as if a face from chin to brow should 
be only an expanse of skin. The sky wore, in another colour, the same likeness; a white 
vacuity of countenance with the lineaments gone. So these two upper and nether visages 
confronted each other, all day long the white face looking down on the brown face, and 
the brown face looking up at the white face… (224).  
This is how the landscape appears by day, characterized not only by absence of color, but by 
absence itself. The night deepens this absence, as though extending the landscape into infinity. 
The night “swallow[s]” characters “up” (15). After Angel discovers the truth about Tess’s past, 
we get a description of “the night which had already swallowed up his happiness, and was now 
digesting it listlessly; and was ready to swallow up the happiness of a thousand other people with 
as little disturbance or change of mien” (184-5).   
The night here function like Schopenhauer’s will, indiscriminately moving through, 
dismantling, swallowing, and digesting people’s happiness, like the Arctic winds that blast “with 
dumb impassivity” as they “dismissed experiences which they did not value… suggesting an 
achromatic chaos of things” (226-7). In this Schopenhauerian vision, Hardy’s characters aren’t 
even given the dignity of tragedy, but of a far bleaker pessimism. In tragedy, one is at least seen 
and recognized—even if only on the tragic stage. But Tess understands that “the thought of the 
world’s concern at her situation—was founded on an illusion. She was not an existence, an 
experience, a passion, a structure of sensations, to anybody but herself. To all humankind besides 
Tess was only a passing thought” (71). At least Richard III can shout at the top of his lungs about 
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how he had lost his “kingdom for a horse!” (5.4.7). Tess had no kingdom to lose, except for the 
quasi-mythical lineage that connected the destitute Durbeyfields to the aristocratic D’Urbervilles. 
And it was the death of the family horse that plunged the Durbeyfields into ruin, precipitating the 
events that would lead to her rape, followed by the stalking of her rapist, the abandonment by her 
husband, and every subsequent episode of misery that encircles her, like the landscape of 
Stonehenge, where she is eventually caught for Alec’s murder, and like the noose that eventually 
kills her. But she is no Richard III, and she knows it. Angel even calls her “Mistress Teresa 
d’Urberville,” as though nodding to George Eliot’s treatment of the unknown Saint Theresas in 
Middlemarch, “who had found for themselves no epic life wherein there was a constant 
unfolding of far-resonant action,” who “sank unwept into oblivion” (Hardy 149; Eliot 3).  
Upon its publication in 1891, the novel was received with charges of an unbearable 
pessimism. By the time Helen Garwood published her dissertation on Hardy in 1909, she wrote, 
“To couple his name with Schopenhauer even is no longer a new matter” (5). By 1912, Hardy 
penned the general preface to the Wessex edition of his novels, writing: 
That these impressions have been condemned as ‘pessimistic’—as if that were a very 
wicked adjective—shows a curious muddle-mindedness. It must be obvious that there is a 
higher characteristic of philosophy than pessimism, or than meliorism, or even than the 
optimism of these critics—which is truth (xv). 
There is a perfunctory gesture here of dismissing pessimism, perhaps to avoid alienating any 
more readers—but he pans optimism along with it, and even calls into question whether the term 
“pessimistic” were “a very wicked adjective” at all. He writes in service of the truth, which 
nevertheless remains a thoroughly pessimistic endeavor, and one that he pursues not through 
philosophy, as he writes in this preface, but through the novel. 
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And it is precisely in this novel that Hardy seems to condense the entire history of the 
novel itself, in its turn from finding meaning in the stars to meaning in the body, eventually 
coming to the conclusion that neither cosmos nor anatomy can provide any meaning for us that 
isn’t fundamentally disappointing, as when Tess instructs Angel to fix his attention on the stars 
to distract himself from the body: “…lie on the grass at night, and look straight up at some big 
bright star; and by fixing your mind upon it you will soon find that you are hundreds and 
hundreds o’ miles away from your body, which you don’t seem to want at all” (94).  
Hardy’s landscape takes on a cosmic scope, so that everyone around Tess “were at stellar 
distances from her present world” (167). These stellar distances are first explored by Tess’s 
younger brother Abraham, who “made observation the stars, whose cold pulses were beating 
amid the black hollows above, in serene dissociation from these two wisps of human life. He 
asked how far away those twinkles were, and whether God was on the other side of them” (21). 
In his mind, he associates the possibility of Tess being “made rich by marrying a gentleman” 
with the ability to “draw the stars as near to her as Nettlecombe-Tout” because she would then be 
rich enough to purchase a “spy-glass” (21). It is in the context of this association that Abraham 
marvels at the “beautiful diamond ring” Alec D’Urberville wears, as though it were a star itself: 
“And I seed it! And it did twinkle…” (33).  
But neither stars nor people ever broach the cosmic distance that separates Tess from 
everyone around her. Alec only trespasses this distance through violence and rape; Angel 
assumes a false intimacy, but withdraws as soon as he finds out about Tess’s past with Alec, as 
though she were at fault. When Abraham asks Tess if stars were worlds, she tells him, “I don’t 
know; but I think so. They sometimes seem to be like the apples on our stubbard-tree. Most of 
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them splendid and sound—a few blighted” (21). Abraham then asks whether we live on a 
splendid or a blighted one, and she responds, “A blighted one” (21). 
In Hardy’s vision, we live on a blighted star that only has moments of enchantment, when 
we are seduced, like Angel, into seeing the world “like a fairy place suddenly created by the 
stroke of a wand,” a place that seduces us even into happiness. But Tess reminds us, before she 
gets caught and eventually executed, that, “This happiness could not have lasted—it was too 
much…” (312). Ours is a world that is fundamentally incompatible with a happiness that can 
last, especially for people like Tess, victims of cruelty and circumstance beyond their control. 
Joseph Conrad takes up this same vision in his novels. Like Tess of the D’Urbervilles, 
Heart of Darkness also seems to walk us through the history of the novel, its opening paragraphs 
highly reminiscent of the way the Ancient Greek novelist Heliodorus begins his Aethiopica, with 
its image of a ship anchored in the river, an ominous stillness preceding Marlow’s story, which 
echoes what Heliodorus describes as a scene “strewn with fresh carnage; some of the victims 
were dead, of others the limbs were still quivering…” (1). Both Heliodorus and Conrad take us 
to the mouth of the river not just as the symbolic origin—and perhaps even apocalyptic end—of 
civilization, but of the novel itself.  
Three years after he first published Heart of Darkness in 1899, he re-released it in a 
collection published as Youth: A Narrative and Two Other Stories, with the title page bearing a 
quote from Grimms’ fairy tales: “…But the Dwarf answered: ‘No; something human is dearer to 
me than the wealth of all the world’” (2). Heart of Darkness invokes this fairy-tale notion, like 
Hardy, only to dismiss it. Even in its title, Heart of Darkness—like Heliodorus’ opening image 
of carnage—dissolves anatomy into landscape, a landscape that also takes on a cosmic scope and 
is charged with a sense of gloom that stretches across the globe. The novel begins with the 
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“dark” air in London, “above Gravesend, and farther back still seemed condensed into a 
mournful gloom brooding motionless over the biggest, and the greatest, town on earth” (7). The 
sun then sets, as if “stricken to death by the touch of that gloom brooding over a crowd of men” 
(8).  
Maybe the horror of the novel is that, for all the international distance covered by the 
ship’s journey—and by Marlow’s tale of another international journey—the landscape doesn’t 
actually seem to change at all. The gloom we find along the Congo River is the same gloom we 
find along the Thames. The horror appears in both places; maybe this is why it has to be repeated 
twice at the end. As in a nightmare, the vertiginous description of both places seems to blur them 
into one claustrophobic space, allowing for no escape, no matter how far one seems to move 
away from it. And the reader belongs to this darkness, aligned with the frame narrator who is one 
of Marlow’s listeners, interrupting Marlow’s hellish narrative by noting: “It had become so pitch 
dark that we listeners could hardly see one another. For a long time already he, sitting apart, had 
been no more to us than a voice” (30). This, of course, is exactly how Marlow first approaches 
Kurtz, who only “presented himself as a voice” (48). Just as the landscapes of two different 
countries dissolve into each other, so too do the characters in their disembodied voices. By the 
time we get to the end of the novel, when Marlow meets Kurtz’s fiancée, the “glitter of her eyes 
full of tears” does not distance us from the horrors we had witnessed in the Congo, but only 
returns us to the “glitter of the infernal stream, the stream of darkness” (74-5).28  
Despite the disembodied voices, the dominant voice of the novel is the voice of the 
landscape itself, in its harrowing silence, which, “driven away by the stamping of our feet flowed 
back again from the recesses of the land” (32). This is the Schopenhauerian “stillness of an 
 
28 Woolf notes how Conrad’s “characters are exposed far more to the forces of sea and forest, storm and shipwreck, 
than to the influence of other human beings” (Essays II 159). 
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implacable force brooding over an inscrutable intention” (35). Marlow describes how the “great 
wall of vegetation, an exuberant and entangled mass of trunks, branches, leaves, boughs, 
festoons motionless in the moonlight, was like a rioting invasion of soundless life…” (32). To 
him, this is the sound of “travelling back to the earliest beginnings of the world,” in the same 
way that Hardy takes us back to the origins of English civilization in the landscape of 
Stonehenge, where there “was no joy in the brilliance of sunshine. The long stretches of the 
waterway ran on, deserted, into the gloom of overshadowed distances” (35). And just as Tess 
feels like she is impossibly far away from anyone who could possibly reach her, separated by 
stellar distances on this blighted star, Marlow too observes that, “The earth seemed unearthly,” 
and that it “wore the aspect of an unknown planet” (37). “The rest of the world was nowhere as 
far as our eyes and ears were concerned,” he continues. “Gone, disappeared, swept off without 
leaving a whisper or a shadow behind” (41).  
Conrad here not only takes us to the “earliest beginnings of the world,” but to the earliest 
beginnings of the modern novel (after the ancient precursor in Heliodorus) in its move away 
from the stars to anatomy, at a time that coincided with the first wave of European imperialism 
and the age of exploration. The novel, in its novelty, rose alongside the exploration of the “New 
World,” raising philosophical questions of possible worlds, and whether this was the best or 
worst of possible worlds. In the following centuries, Leibniz uses philosophy to demonstrate that 
this is the best of all possible worlds; Voltaire uses the novel to demonstrate that this is the worst. 
And the novel, from Voltaire to Hardy and now Conrad, is the genre that explores, in the greatest 
detail, just how much of the worst of all possible worlds this “blighted star” is. The result of that 
optimistic exploration for the New World, for other possible worlds, is bound up in the violence 
and bloodshed waged in the name of empire. And even more violent than the slaughter at the 
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hands of imperialists is the silence that takes away the narrative of their victims. This is the 
palpable silence that roars through Conrad’s landscape. 
But the haunting silence is interrupted by “a cry, a very loud cry as of infinite 
desolation,” which “soared slowly in the opaque air,” and it is a cry that cannot even be 
described as human: “…to me it seemed as though the mist itself had screamed, so suddenly and 
apparently from all sides at once did this tumultuous and mournful uproar arise” (41). This is a 
cry that carries “such a tremulous and prolonged wail of mournful fear and utter despair as may 
be imagined to follow the flight of the last hope from the earth” (47). The landscape itself is the 
expression of pessimism, swallowing up the “last hope from the earth,” and belching out this 
horrific cry in response.  
This primal, pessimistic cry is the cry at the heart of the novel, and maybe even of all 
literature. As Hélène Cixous and Avital Ronell have argued in the “Re-Thinking Literature” 
Conference at New York University in 2013, there is no écrire without the cri, no schreiben 
without the Schrei, no writing without this primal cry, which the novelistic form had inherited 
from tragedy (the “ay” embedded in the Greek name of Ajax, “Aïas,” and in the opening lines of 
Medea and Hecuba in their respective tragedies, shouting “AÏAÏAÏ”). But both écrire and 
schreiben are mute modes of language; novelistic writing, as opposed to writing for the stage, is 
what relegates language to silence. And yet Conrad shows us that this silent writing is what most 
accurately accesses the primal cry. We hear echoes of it in the “first scream” that G.H. never 
gives in The Passion According to G.H.: 
Everything could be fiercely summed up in never emitting a first scream—a first scream 
unleashes all the others, the first scream at birth unleashes a life, if I screamed I would 
awaken thousands of screaming beings who would loose upon the rooftops a chorus of 
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screams and horror. If I screamed I would unleash the existence—the existence of what? 
the existence of the world. With reverence I feared the existence of the world for me. 
(58)29 
This is the “world,” organized by the “horror” of the “first scream” that Conrad creates in his 
novel. And we hear echoes of it too in Benjy’s inarticulate cries in The Sound and the Fury, 
which “might have been all time and injustice and sorrow become vocal for an instant by a 
conjunction of planets” (179).30 We also hear it in Oskar Mazerath’s “sing-shattering” in The Tin 
Drum, in Smerdyakov’s epileptic fits in The Brothers Karmazov, and in Adrian Leverkühn’s 
final gesture in Doctor Faustus, striking a dissonant chord on the piano as “he opened his mouth 
as if to sing, but from between his lips there emerged only a wail that still rings in my ears” 
(527). And, of course, behind Doctor Faustus is Goethe’s Faust, whose opening line includes the 
pessimistic “ach!” of despair (l.354). And behind that work is the play by Christopher Marlowe, 
whose last name is evoked in Conrad’s protagonist.  
Marlow’s narrative traces the modern pact with the darkness of imperialism, a narrative 
that puts a language to the litany of this cry and “the appalling and excessive silence” that 
follows it (41). This rhythm, this call and response, reaches its climax when the “bush began to 
howl,” as though people and the landscape were indistinguishable from each other, all just part 
of “the tangled gloom, naked breasts, arms, legs, glaring eyes—the bush was swarming with 
human limbs in movement glistening…” (46). The cry then menacingly takes the form of “a 
 
29 “Ah, but to reach muteness,” G.H. writes later, “what a great effort of voice. My voice is the way I go in search of 
reality; reality, before my language, exists like a thought that is not thought, but inescapably I was and am 
compelled to need to know what the thought thinks. Reality precedes the voice that seeks it, but as the earth 
precedes the tree, but as the world precedes the man, but as the sea precedes the vision of the sea, life precedes love, 
the matter of the body precedes the body, and in turn language one day will have preceded the possession of silence” 
(186). 
30 In his Introduction to The Sound and the Fury, Faulkner acknowledges his debt to Conrad, in addition to Balzac 
and James (227). 
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prodigious peal of laughter that would shake the fixed stars in their places” (49). Neither stars 
nor bodies have any fixed place in this novel, and the chaos seems to spring from Kurtz’s body 
himself, who is less of a person than a principle, a “shadow darker than the shadow of the 
night…” (72). Like Hardy’s depiction of night in Tess of the D’Urbervilles, Kurtz “open[s] his 
mouth wide—it gave him a weirdly voracious aspect as though he had wanted to swallow all the 
air, all the earth, all the men before him” (59). This image, both the gesture of a cry and of its 
silence, appears again when Marlow “had a vision of him on the stretcher opening his mouth 
voraciously as if to devour all the earth with all its mankind” (72). It is as though Marlow exists 
only in this space, like Jonah inside the mouth of the leviathan, on his way to warn the world 
about God’s impending doom. His memory itself is “like a passage through some inconceivable 
world that had no hope in it and no desire” (70). This is a world that is so bleak that there is no 
room even for any recantation, which Marlow never gives. Instead, he only speaks of Kurtz as a 
“remarkable man,” despite his genocidal brutality (69).    
Conrad nevertheless articulates this bleak vision, as does Hardy, with a fairy-tale-like 
register, which he already hints at by the quote from the Brothers Grimm in the 1902 edition of 
the novel. Kurtz is like an ogre who swallows everyone and everything in his path. But Marlow 
paints him as something like the victim: “The approach to this Kurtz grubbing for ivory in the 
wretched bush was beset by as many dangers as though he had been an enchanted princess 
sleeping in a fabulous castle” (44). He is both the hideous ogre guarding the castle and the 
sleeping beauty trapped inside. He wants to possess all the ivory he can hoard, but it is as though 
the ivory, like a fetish, magically possesses him instead. He looks “as though an animated image 
of death carved out of old ivory had been shaking its hand with menaces at a motionless crowd 
of men made of dark and glittering bronze” (59). From ivory to bronze, people in this novelistic 
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fairy tale are not so much human as they are just animated features of the landscape, and 
Marlow, sailing on the “fierce river-demon beating the water with its terrible tail and breathing 
black smoke into the air,” tries “to break the spell, the heavy mute spell of the wilderness that 
seemed to draw [Kurtz] to its pitiless breast by the awakening of forgotten and brutal instincts, 
by the memory of gratified and monstrous passions” (65-6). But this pessimistic fairy tale is one 
in which the spell is never broken, in which imperialism inexorably eats into the heart of 
darkness, swallowing everything in its path until there is nothing left in its wake but the ghostly 
silence that Conrad manages to put a language to, a silence that persists long after its last pages 
are closed, accompanying the violence of empire and conquest that continues to this day.  
 
The Novel and Pessimism in the Twentieth Century: Woolf, Lawrence, Nabokov 
“Great novels,” Nabokov said in his introductory remarks for his lectures on literature at 
Cornell University, “are above all great fairy tales” (Appel 160). Like Heart of Darkness, it is 
possible to read Lolita as a pessimistic fairy tale, as well—one that articulates not only the 
voracious violence of a monstrous predator who even calls himself a “pentapod monster,” 
preying on a girl whom he kidnaps and drugs with “capsules loaded with Beauty’s Sleep” so that 
she becomes Sleeping Beauty—but a fairy tale that is fundamentally rooted in silence and 
voicelessness (284; 122). It is no wonder that Humbert Humbert aims to silence the pain 
inscribed in the name of his victim, Dolores, calling her “Lolita” instead, and giving her a “de 
luxe volume of The Little Mermaid” as a corollary for her experience of voicelessness (174). Her 
voicelessness itself is the articulation of pessimism in the novel, as she silently turns away from 
him, after being raped for the first time, “with a hopeless sigh” (128). In this hopeless sigh and 
hopeless silence, Humbert kidnaps Dolores on a cross-country journey through the vapid, empty, 
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ominous landscape—a landscape as inhospitable to humanity as it is in Hardy and Conrad. 
Nabokov even once said that he was “born a landscape painter,” and which is how he approaches 
his novels (Strong Opinions 166).  
It is no surprise, then, that, in his exploration of the novel as fairy tale, in his treatment of 
landscape, and in his innovative contributions to the English-language novel as a foreigner, he is 
often compared with Conrad (56). But, as he was wont to do with writers who were too similar to 
him (Thomas Mann included), he went out of his way to disparage “the slightly bogus Conrad,” 
saying in his Playboy interview that he “cannot abide Conrad’s souvenir-shop style, and bottled 
ships, and shell necklaces of romanticist clichés” (Strong Opinions 127; 42).31 In another 
interview, he insisted that, “I differ from Joseph Conradically,” adding that, when it comes to 
fairy tales, he prefers “the first half of Proust’s fairy tale In Search of Lost Time” (57). As for 
Hardy, he only gets a passing reference in Pale Fire (79). 
Novelists like Virginia Woolf and D.H. Lawrence, however, were more open in 
acknowledging just how much Hardy and Conrad laid the foundations for the modernist novel, 
pulling it away from its Victorian roots at the turn of the century. The pessimism of Hardy and 
Conrad was a reaction to the saccharine sentimentality of Dickens, and was much bolder and 
relentless than the subdued strains of pessimism in George Eliot. It was precisely their 
pessimistic vision that the next generation of novelists inherited, turning to these writers to help 
them navigate their way through the trauma and the unprecedented bleakness and hopelessness 
that followed the First World War. “I think [Woolf] respected Hardy more than she respected 
any other living writer,” Quentin Bell wrote of his aunt (123). But in her imagination, both 
 
31 In his bizarre taste, he prefers the prose of H.G. Wells to Conrad (Strong Opinions 103; 139). But this is also 
someone who loved to dismiss Dostoevsky and Mann while saying that J.D. Salinger is “by far” one of “the finest 
artists” (57).  
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Hardy and Conrad come as a pair. “There are two novelists in England today,” Woolf writes of 
them in her 1917 review of Conrad’s Youth, “…whose work, we feel certain, is of such lasting 
importance that we are even serving a useful purpose when we try to value it…” (Essays II 158). 
She echoes this sentiment in her essay “Modern Fiction,” writing, “we reserve our unconditional 
gratitude for Mr. Hardy, for Mr. Conrad,” singling out these novelists as the standard-bearers for 
what the novel could achieve (Common Reader 147). Both of these novelists were especially 
instrumental for her, as she “was conscious of the fact that both Joseph Conrad and Thomas 
Hardy used the phrase ‘moment of vision,’” a phrase that served as a key principle of her own 
fiction (Bazin 22).  
In 1923, Woolf noted how she wanted to use Conrad’s technique of “light[ing] up a 
whole character in a flash” (qtd. in Bazin 25). Nancy Topping Bazin observes that, “just as Lord 
Jim is Marlowe’s [sic.] shadow-self, in Mrs. Dalloway (1925), Septimus Smith is Clarissa’s 
shadow-self” (27). And in Hardy, as in Emily Brontë as well, Woolf sees the “sense of country” 
and treatment of landscape itself as opening up new possibilities for the novel. In Hardy’s 
novels, she sees “great tracts of Wessex… inhabited by a race of people who seem to have the 
rough large outline of the land itself” (Essays II 163). This continuum of character and landscape 
“forecast[s] a time when character will take on a different aspect under the novelist’s hand, when 
he will be less fearful of the charge of unreality, less careful of the twitterings and chatterings 
which now make our puppets so animated and for the most part so ephemeral” (163). It is this 
precise technique that Woolf advances to a new level of innovation in To the Lighthouse, where 
the most moving section, “Time Passes,” is entirely devoid of character altogether, except for 
parenthetical statements that interrupt the description of the landscape and of the blind forces that 
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shape it, as though dramatizing Schopenhauer’s Will through the lens of Hardy and Conrad. This 
is her answer to putting a language to the horror of war without having to describe the war itself.   
Lawrence also turned to Thomas Hardy in his effort to put a language to the horror of the 
First World War. In a letter dated 5 September 1914, Lawerence wrote, “What a miserable 
world. What colossal idiocy, this war. Out of sheer rage I’ve begun my book about Thomas 
Hardy. It will be about anything but Thomas Hardy, I am afraid—queer stuff—but not bad” 
(Selected Literary Criticism 167). The extent to which his Study of Thomas Hardy is actually 
about Hardy at all is beside the point; Hardy provided the background for Lawrence to think 
through his own novelistic projects, seeing in “the Wessex novels, the first and chiefest factor is 
the struggle into love and the struggle with love…” (167). The tragedy he identifies in Hardy is 
not so much a tragedy of character, but one of landscape: “What is the real stuff of tragedy in the 
book? It is the Heath. It is the primitive, primal earth, where the instinctive life heaves up” (172). 
And despite the fact that he even calls Hardy “a bad artist,” he writes that his “feeling, his 
instinct, his sensuous understanding is, however, apart from his metaphysic, very great and deep, 
deeper than that, perhaps, of any other English novelist” (198; 189). This “sensuous 
understanding,” and this awareness of the “primitive, primal earth, where the instinctive life 
heaves up,” is what Lawrence would spend the rest of his career exploring in his own novels.  
After accounting for Hardy’s “pessimism” (179-83) in great detail, Lawrence comes to 
the following conclusion:  
It seems as if the history of humanity were divided into two epochs: the Epoch of the 
Law and the Epoch of Love. It seems as though humanity, during the time of its activity 
on earth, has made two great efforts: the effort to appreciate the Law and the effort to 
overcome the Law in Love… What remains is to reconcile the two. (222)   
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The history of humanity, seen by one novelist in light of another, is the history of the novel itself, 
born an outlaw, in exile from the same mind that gave birth to it. This is the tension between the 
Socrates of Republic and the Socrates of Symposium, the Socrates of Law and the Socrates of 
Love. The history of the novel is a history that can be traced back to Symposium, and it is a 
history that is aligned both with love and with pessimism.  
In the following chapters, I hope to place Woolf, Lawrence, and Nabokov in dialogue 
with each other to trace this history, using the novel as a way of reconciling eros and the law (of 
the state and of nature) before moving on to Kierkegaard and Heidegger as making key moves in 
this reconciliation from the standpoint of philosophy. These writers may not initially strike one 
as the most intuitive thinkers to gather into the same conversation. Woolf and Lawrence have 
radically different aesthetic styles, techniques, and registers. Nabokov, writing Lolita a 
generation after Woolf wrote To the Lighthouse and Lawrence wrote Lady Chatterley’s Lover, is 
even more distanced from them aesthetically as they are from each other, organizing his novel by 
a principle of aggressive irony and parody where Woolf’s irony is far gentler and Lawrence’s 
irony is virtually nonexistent. He hardly acknowledges Woolf, except for the passing reference in 
Lolita to “a lighthouse in Virginia” (151). Lawrence for him is a “second-rate” writer who elicits 
his disgust, and whose “execrable” prose belongs to “the easy platitudes of Balzac” (Strong 
Opinions 54; 139; 118).   
But despite their glaring differences, the works of these novelists come together to tell the 
story of the history of the novel itself as one that is deeply rooted in pessimism. Youngjoo Son 
notes how critics have hardly discussed Woolf and Lawrence together, “and when they have, 
their focus has fallen mainly on differences between them” (1). But Woolf herself notes in her 
diary that “he [Lawrence] and I have too much in common” (IV 126). Maybe what they have in 
 150 
common is precisely the pessimism that they work through in their novels. When Mrs. 
Ramsay—whom her husband thinks of as “pessimistic”—looks out through the window at the 
Lighthouse and catches its third stroke, like the “dactylic pulse of an elegiac meter,” it “seemed 
to her like her own eyes meeting her own eyes” (Goldman 35; Woolf 53). This discovery of the 
self, or a missing part of the self, recalls Plato’s pessimistic myth not only about love, but about 
the originary experience of loss, in his Symposium. In this myth, we are descendants of the stars, 
the moon, and the sun, but to Lawrence, even the “moon wouldn’t be far enough” for us to flee 
this hopeless world, “because even there you could look back and see the earth, dirty, beastly, 
unsavoury among all the stars: made foul by men” (Lady Chatterley’s Lover 220). As though 
returning to the Renaissance roots of the modern novel in its turn away from the stars to the body 
as the site of meaning, Lawrence identifies the body—in all its sensuousness, sensuality, and 
sexuality—as the only reminder of our humanity, a reminder that Lawrence articulates with 
religious fervor and passion. But the scope of pessimism in this novel, as in Woolf’s, is cosmic; 
there is no escaping the horrific world of our own creation, a creation that is at odds with our 
bodies. Lawrence’s lovers, like the medieval Tristan lovers before them, are caught in an 
apocalyptic cycle of “pain and doom” (119).  
Nabokov, too, charts this apocalyptic cycle in Humbert Humbert’s fantasy of longing “for 
some terrific disaster. Earthquake. Spectacular explosion… Lolita whimpers in my arms. A free 
man, I enjoy her among the ruins” (53). He writes of how his “world was split. […] One moment 
I was ashamed and frightened, another recklessly optimistic” (18). It is paradoxically his reckless 
optimism that leads him to commit the most terrifying acts of violence and violation. In “the 
possession and thralldom of a nymphet,” he condescendingly explains to the reader, “the 
enchanted traveler stands, as it were, beyond happiness” (166). He ostensibly intends this to 
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mean a joy beyond happiness to match his “love that is more than love,” since “there is no other 
bliss on earth comparable to that of fondling a nymphet” (166). However, he quickly qualifies 
this state beyond happiness as one of “horrible hopelessness” (166). It is a paradise for him, but 
one “whose skies were the color of hell-flames” (166). And in this hellish paradise, this 
pessimistic fairy tale modeled after Andersen’s “The Little Mermaid,” Lolita moves in the 
opposite direction of Lawrence’s protagonists—away from the traumatic experience of the body 
to instead reside among the stars, in Gray Star (128). 
In this triptych of novels, we see the genre evolving from the Platonic dialogue, the 
medieval romance, and the fairy tale. When writing about the novel in A Lover’s Discourse, 
Barthes says, “The amorous subject cannot write his love story himself. Only a very archaic form 
can accommodate the event which he declaims without being able to recount” (93). In this way, 
the novel can only be understood through the archaic forms that had preceded it, the forms which 
the novel incorporates to say something new. But what binds these modern novels to their 
historical predecessors is not just the formal structure, but precisely their articulation of 
pessimism. Plato’s myth is fundamentally a bleak account of how we had become human—what 
makes us human is an inherited experience of loss that had literally cut into the core of our being, 
and from which we can never recover. The Tristan legend is a story about an apocalyptic love, 
one that forsakes both this world and the next, and dooms its lovers to a life of  pain and grief. 
And “The Little Mermaid” is perhaps the darkest fairy tale ever written, one in which the 
protagonist commits suicide and the villain escapes unscathed. All of these works, and their 
corresponding modern novels, also share not just the cosmic scale of their pessimism, but an 
exploration of love and eros as ways of paradoxically reaffirming our ties to a world that is full 
of so much pain, disillusionment, and disappointment. 
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What Woolf illuminates is that pessimism lies at the core of both philosophy and the 
novel. Lawrence also struggles to reconcile Love and the Law in the novel, as he articulated it in 
his Study of Thomas Hardy. Nabokov, too, writes his novel not only as a palimpsest of a fairy 
tale, but of Kierkegaard’s pessimistic work that weds philosophy with the novel, The Seducer’s 
Diary. While Woolf and Lawrence show us the seduction of pessimism, Nabokov and 
Kierkegaard show us the pessimism of seduction, a seduction that, in Lolita, fails and becomes 
an act of abduction instead. Kierkegaard’s own novelistic work and novel reviews provided the 
inspiration for much of Heidegger’s work, especially Being and Time, which, in its portrait of 
average everydayness, is a project that by its very subject matter overlaps with the project of the 
novel. To Kundera, Heidegger’s seemingly groundbreaking work of philosophy had already been 
accomplished by four centuries of the European novel (Art of the Novel 5). So from Woolf, 
Lawrence, and Nabokov on one side, and Kierkegaard and Heidegger on the other, we see the 
novel and philosophy coming back together after being severed in two, since Plato, to tell the 
story of their parallel history, like long-separated lovers who find each other again just as much 




“A GLOBED COMPACTED THING”:  
WOOLF’S COSMOGONY OF LOVE AND THE PARADOX OF FAILURE IN TO THE 
LIGHTHOUSE 
 
“Consolation in Expression” 
Toward the end of To the Lighthouse, Lily Briscoe sits down in front of a blank canvas in 
order to recreate a painting she had left unfinished a decade earlier. She remembers the particular 
obstacle to finishing this painting: the question of “how to connect this mass on the right hand 
with that on the left” (Woolf 46). As though mirroring this painting split into two halves, Lily 
“felt curiously divided, as if one part of her were drawn out there—…the Lighthouse looked this 
morning at an immense distance; the other had fixed itself doggedly, solidly, here on the lawn” 
(129). And behind this divided painter—behind even the narrator—is Woolf, herself, reflecting 
on the origins of the work of art after its completion, writing to Vita Sackville-West in 1928, a 
year after the publication of To the Lighthouse: 
The main thing in beginning a novel is to feel, not that you can write it, but that it exists 
on the far side of a gulf, which words can’t cross… a novel, as I saw, to be good should 
seem, before one writes it, something unwriteable: but only visible; so that for nine 
months one lives in despair and only when one has forgotten what one meant, does the 
book seem tolerable. (Qtd. in Dalgarno 1, Virginia Woolf and the Visible World).  
Much has been made of Lily standing as a cipher for Woolf, and of the visual structure of Lily’s 
painting replicating the tripartite structure of the novel—“two blocks joined by a corridor,” as 
Woolf describes it in her working notes below a visual sketch of this plan (qtd. in Bradshaw xlii). 
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But Woolf here outlines a paradoxical pessimism that is necessary for any novelist to move 
through their “despair” and forgetfulness, writing something that is “unwriteable,” using words 
to gesture toward something “on the far side of a gulf, which words can’t cross.” The end result 
is not so much a triumph of having built a narrow bridge of art over this gulf, but of mapping out 
the attempts and inevitable failures to do so, molding them into something that seems, at best, 
only “tolerable.” 
 Scholars are quick to note how Woolf moved at an unusually rapid clip through the 
process of writing the novel, citing Moments of Being, where she says that she “wrote the book 
very quickly; and when it was written, I ceased to be obsessed by my mother” (92-3). She also 
writes in her diary that she “might become one of the interesting—I will not say great—but 
interesting novelists” (III 12). But over half a year after this diary entry, she writes of her 
frustration at not making any progress: “Reading & writing go on. Not my novel though. And I 
can only think of all my faults as a novelist & wonder why I do it…” (Diary III 47). A month 
later, after T.S. Eliot had sent her a tepid response to her recently published work, On Being Ill, 
she questioned her entire current project, writing that he “increases my distaste for my own 
writing, & dejection at the thought of beginning another novel. What theme have I? Shan’t I be 
held up for personal reasons? It will be too like father, or mother: &, oddly, I know so little of 
my own powers. Here is another rat run to earth” (Diary III 49). She wants to “weep away this 
life,” writing only to “test my theory that there is consolation in expression” (Diary III 46; 81).  
This consolation propelled her through another nervous breakdown in July 1926, and she 
became eventually “encouraged by my own abundance as I write” to the point that she was even 
“frightfully contented” as she approached the end of the novel (Diary III 90; 107). She quickly 
qualified the “relief” at finishing the novel with “the disappointment, I suppose” (Diary III 109). 
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And it only took two days for this disappointment to emerge as a “horror—physically like a 
painful wave swelling about the heart—tossing me up. I’m unhappy, unhappy! Down—God, I 
wish I were dead. […] Failure. Yes; I detect that. Failure failure. (The wave rises)” (Diary III 
110). Even after her husband Leonard praised the novel, her “mind dismisses the whole thing, as 
usual,” in her “intense depression” (Diary III 123).  
Although Woolf was plagued with self-doubt and a fear of failure, it is precisely failure 
itself that her aesthetic paradoxically masters. In response to a letter from Gerald Brenan, 
praising her beautiful prose in Jacob’s Room, she wrote: 
I think I mean that beauty, which you say I sometimes achieve, is only got by the failure 
to get it; by grinding all the flints together; by facing what must be humiliation—the 
things one can’t do—To aim at beauty deliberately, without this apparently insensate 
struggle, would result, I think, in little daisies and forget-me-nots—simpering 
sweetness—true love-knots. (Letters II 599) 
To scholars like Emily Dalgarno, this “planned failure” is central to her modernist innovations 
(Virginia Woolf and the Visible World 86). In The Common Reader, Woolf herself defines 
beauty, from the vantage point of “modern skepticism,” as “part ugliness”—its other missing 
half (qtd. in Dalgarno 87).  Like Baudelaire—and like Lily Briscoe—Woolf sees modernity as 
fundamentally fragmented, as essentially composed of two halves. “Modernity,” Baudelaire 
writes, “is the transitory, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art of which the other half is the 






Woolf’s modernism as one that disavows any pretense toward a deliberate completeness, 
identifying instead the recurrent motif of two halves separated by an impassable gulf, has roots 
that stretch farther back beyond Baudelaire. About half a decade before drafting what would 
become To the Lighthouse, Woolf wrote to the Greek scholar Janet Case, “I am reading the 
Symposium [Plato]—ah, if I could write like that! […] We are sitting in a brown vapour, hearing 
fog signals from time to time, while your moon, I suppose, is stuck among the apple trees…” 
(Letters II 446).32 This rearrangement of spatial relations among objects, with the Symposium 
clearly on her mind, later becomes an aesthetic technique in To the Lighthouse. The novel is full 
of characters like Lily Briscoe, “curiously divided” in half, and the frustrated Mr. Ramsay, who 
similarly imagines himself stuck just a little over halfway along the vast expanse of all 
knowledge—he thinks that if it were mapped out along the alphabet, his location would be at 
“Q,” without being able to quite reach “R”. Although Mr. Ramsay writes books about “subject 
and object and the nature of reality,” it is his wife, Mrs. Ramsay, who reconciles the two sides of 
the subject-object split, arranging halves into wholes not only through her social practices of 
matchmaking, but of exploring her own expansive self. When she looks out through the window 
at the Lighthouse and catches its third stroke, like the “dactylic pulse of elegiac meter,” it 
“seemed to her like her own eyes meeting her own eyes” (Goldman 35; Woolf 53).  
This discovery of the self, or a missing part of the self, as an object in the distance recalls 
the famous account of eros as told by Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium. It is a pessimistic 
myth not only about love, but about the first experience of loss, in which we were once globular 
 
32 There also seems to be an echo here of Thomas Hardy, when Tess uses the apple tree as a metaphor to describe 
the stars to Abraham: “They sometimes seem to be like the apples on our stubbard-tree. Most of them splendid and 
sound—a few blighted” (Tess of the D’Urbervilles 21). 
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cosmic beings who were split in two by Zeus’s thunderbolts as punishment for not obeying the 
Olympian gods. Falling down to earth after the split, Zeus introduced eros out of pity for our 
condition. Our consolation was to find our other halves and hold on to them as a way of 
remembering what it was like when we were whole. But, as Allan Bloom notes,  
…man’s condition soon worsened. In the beginning, their real half was right there, and 
they could hold on to each other. But soon some of the halves died while others lived on, 
and in succeeding generations, the offspring of mixed couples reproduced together 
without necessarily being the true other half. Eventually there are no true other halves. 
The result is that men continue the quest, but it is hopeless. (108) 
To Plato, wholeness is hopeless, and yet we still gesture to it in the act of love, even as we are 
doomed to fail. The pursuit of love coincides with the pursuit of truth—also a project doomed to 
fail. Socrates never arrives at any definition of Justice in The Republic. In Phaedrus, he offers an 
account of eros, but only to take it back and offer yet another account, ending the dialogue with a 
meditation on the limits of the written word and how this medium of language fails us. In the 
Symposium, rather than offering a definition of eros once and for all, Plato displays multiple and 
often contradictory explanations for it, ending with the distractions of a drunken mob. Truth 
stands always at a remove, as elusive as Woolf’s Lighthouse. The most we can do is approach it 
as an asymptote. What Plato leaves behind is the vehicle to approach it—the dialogue itself, 
literally two halves summoned together in intercourse, pursuing love and truth as 
interchangeable categories.   
The philosophical underpinnings of To the Lighthouse, as with Plato’s dialogues, are 
imbued with love and loss. In Woolf’s imagination, both love and loss are irrevocably linked, 
and love for Woolf encompasses more than just eros (Koulouris 100). Theodore Koulouris, while 
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not going into any depth about the specific links between To the Lighthouse and the Symposium, 
traces Woolf’s “tendency to link love with death and ‘loss’” back to her earliest rigorous study of 
the Symposium as a twenty-six year old in her unpublished Greek Notebook from 1908 (100).33 
Perhaps in the Greeks, and particularly in this dialogue, she identified a missing half of herself, 
as Lily and Mrs. Ramsay do when they look at the Lighthouse: “How I wish something would 
tear away the veil that still separates me from the Greeks—or is it inevitable?” she wrote in her 
notebook (qtd. in Koulouris 103).  
By documenting the experience of loss, Woolf recreates the Platonic cosmogony of love. 
Love for her is figured in cosmic terms, as a force that both simultaneously binds all things in the 
universe and bears the mark of their separation from each other. This explains the hesitation of 
Lily painting a mark down the middle of her canvas—while it could unify the two halves of the 
painting, it also carries the risk of the precise opposite effect: “…by doing that the unity of the 
whole might be broken” (46).  
At one point in the first section of the novel, “The Window,” Lily looks up at Mr. and 
Mrs. Ramsay, and “what she called ‘being in love’ flooded them. They became part of that 
unreal but penetrating and exciting universe which is the world seen through the eyes of love. 
The sky stuck to them; the birds sang through them” (40). The sky “stuck to them” just as much 
as the moon “stuck” to the apple trees in Woolf’s letter to Janet Case about reading and admiring 
the Symposium. But undermining how “stuck” these objects are to each other is the sense of their 
 
33 “Judging from her analysis in the Greek Notebook, there is a lot of material in the Symposium which appealed to 
her. From the intricate start, to the mythological framing of the narrative by Aristophanes, Plato’s Symposium 
contains multiple significances for Woolf” (Koulouris 102-103). Emily Dalgarno also mentions the influence of the 
Symposium on Woolf in To the Lighthouse, but only in terms of how the conception of beauty had evolved across 
time: “To the Lighthouse may be read in part as a study of the changes in the conception of beauty, from its 
valuation in the Symposium as the form that leads to the philosophical ascent of the mind, to its status in Victorian 
culture, where it is associated with Mrs. Ramsay” (Virginia Woolf and the Visible World 86). 
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mobility and their porousness, of being able to dislodge themselves from the empirical distances 
that keep them apart, fusing and rearranging themselves in endless combinations through love.  
 
The Mosaic Technique 
This cosmic vision of Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay in love makes Lily think “how life, from 
being made up of little separate incidents which one lived one by one, became curled and whole 
like a wave which bore one up with it and threw one down with it, there, with a dash on the 
beach” (41). The “little separate incidents” that compose the fragmentary nature of life become, 
for a moment, “curled and whole,” but only to be dashed and dispersed into debris once again on 
the shore—a process that imitates Woolf’s own account of attaining beauty through failure, of 
“grinding the flints together” into something that can only obliquely suggest wholeness before 
dissolving (Letters II 599). 
 This love that Lily notices in passing, as she “is pretending to move her canvas,” is not so 
much a private moment between two people as it is a vision of the world that she wants to 
capture in her own art (41). This is a “love that never attempted to clutch its object; but, like the 
love which mathematicians bear their symbols, or poets their phrases, was meant to spread over 
the world and become part of the human gain” (41). It is through this love “that barbarity was 
tamed, the reign of chaos subdued”—a dual reference not only to the impending First World War 
that occupies the middle section of the novel, “Time Passes,” but to the primordial chaos of 
Greek mythology, the original void, the non-existence from which all existence has come from 
and will return to (41). Perhaps this chaos is what’s denoted in the double exclamation of 
“Nothing! Nothing!” that occupies the space between Lily and Mrs. Ramsay, even as Lily rests 
on her knee, wondering, “Could loving, as people called it, make her and Mrs. Ramsay one? for 
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it was not knowledge but unity that she desired, not inscriptions on tablets, nothing that could be 
written in any language known to men, but intimacy itself, which is knowledge, she had 
thought…” (44). 
 This trail of thought begins by rejecting knowledge—presumably the kind of stuffy, 
academic knowledge that gives Mr. Ramsay and Charles Tansley a sense of self-importance—
and pursuing unity instead, but Lily arrives at the conclusion that this unity, this intimacy, is still 
knowledge, albeit a knowledge that precedes all language, that underlies all existence. To the 
first generation of cosmic beings split in half by Zeus’ thunderbolts in Plato’s myth, eros was the 
means by which they came to know and understand themselves, each other, and the world, prior 
to any mode of articulation. Its purpose is both ontological and epistemological; eros reveals not 
only who we are, but the memory of where we had come from, situating us in the cosmic order 
of things.   
 Hermione Lee identifies Lily’s affinity for Mrs. Ramsay as a lesbian desire (474). She 
does, after all, have to “control her impulse to fling herself (thank Heaven she had always 
resisted so far) at Mrs. Ramsay’s knee and say to her—but what could one say to her? ‘I’m in 
love with you’?” But Lily quickly qualifies the meaning and scope of this love, thinking, “No, 
that was not true. ‘I’m in love with this all,’ waving her hand at the hedge, at the house, at the 
children? It was absurd, it was impossible. One could not say what one meant” (19). Lily 
withdraws from language, as it inevitably fails her, and shifts her attention to her art, trying to 
forge a unity out of the two halves on her canvas. Even across a ten-year period, we return to this 
scene at the end of the novel, where the same thoughts are echoed: 
 It was some such feeling of completeness perhaps which, ten years ago, standing almost 
where [Lily] stood now, had made her say that she must be in love with the place. Love 
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had a thousand shapes. There might be lovers whose gift it was to choose out the 
elements of things and place them together and so, giving them a wholeness not theirs in 
life, make of some scene, or meeting of people (all now gone and separate), one of those 
globed compacted things over which thought lingers, and love plays. (157) 
There is a suggestion here that love falls under the domain of art, and that the artist supplements 
the fragmentary nature of life with a vision of something that approaches wholeness, making out 
of it a “globed compacted thing,” like the globular cosmic beings that we once were in our 
prelapsarian state, before we were divided in half.   
The lover-artists who “choose out the elements of things and place them together” 
assemble their material into something like a mosaic in motion, a technique that Woolf translates 
from the visual arts into literature. Her sister, the painter Vanessa Bell, referred to her own 
technique as a form of “mosaicing” (sic.), considering her paintings as “patches each of which 
has to be filled by the definite space of colours as one has to do with mosaic or woolwork, not 
allowing myself to brush the patches into each other” (qtd. in Goldman 36). In 1920, the 
Bloomsbury art critic Roger Fry wrote in his influential Vision and Design how “the artist does 
not distinguish individual objects as ‘separate unities’ but as ‘so many bits in the whole mosaic 
of vision’” (Goldman 36). He even echoes Bell’s articulation of her mosaic technique when he 
writes that, “Every solid object is subject to the play of light and shade, and becomes a mosaic of 
visual patches, each of which for the artist is related to other visual patches in the surroundings” 
(qtd. in Goldman 36). 
A mosaic is a kind of cutting up of fragments in order to bring them into new spatial 
relationships with each other. From the very beginning of the novel, we see James “sitting on the 
floor cutting out pictures from the illustrated catalogue of the Army and Navy Stores,” among 
 162 
them a “picture of a pocket knife with six blades,” and his act of cutting is at odds with his 
father, who, standing “lean as a knife, narrow as the blade of one, grinning sarcastically” (7), 
speaks to him “sharply” (26). The tension between them emerges from the humiliation of feeling 
cut down by the other. Mr. Ramsay is likened to an “arid scimitar, which smote mercilessly, 
again and again, demanding sympathy,” while James wishes he could kill him with “an axe…, a 
poker, or any weapon that would have gashed a hole in his father’s breast…” (34; 7). While this 
drama plays out, Lily walks along the beach with William Bankes, looking at “the swift cutting 
race of a sailing boat, which, having sliced a curve in the bay, stopped” (20). Perhaps this “sliced 
curve” is what she imagines transferring onto her painting, which she later remembers as a series 
of “relations of… lines cutting across, slicing down,” and which Mr. Bankes later taps with his 
penknife in order to ask her questions about it (130; 45).  
The cutting imagery at first distances all the characters from each other, setting them far 
apart. At one moment in the dinner party, Mrs. Ramsay feels “cut off from them all,” hearing the 
dislodged words of the conversation sounding “as if they were floating like flowers on water out 
there…” (90). Lily, returning back to the Ramsays’ summer home after Mrs. Ramsay’s death, 
mirrors Mrs. Ramsay’s sentiment by feeling like she  
had no attachment here, she felt, no relations with it… and whatever did happen, a step 
outside, a voice calling… was a question, as if the link that usually bound things together 
had been cut, and they floated up here, down there, off, anyhow. How aimless it was, 
how chaotic, how unreal it was, she thought, looking at her empty coffee cup. (122)  
The paradox, though, is that this identical imagery does end up binding Lily to Mrs. Ramsay, 
even in Mrs. Ramsay’s absence. The feeling of being cut off from relations becomes the 
precondition for bonds to be established and renewed. It opens the space for new patterns of the 
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imagination to emerge, as when Cam’s “hand cut a trail in the sea” on her way to the Lighthouse, 
“as her mind made the green swirls and streaks into patterns and, numbed and shrouded, 
wandered in imagination in that underworld of waters…” (150). Similarly, Lily struggles to 
“achieve that razor edge of balance between two opposite forces; Mrs. Ramsay and the 
picture…” (158). 
The entire novel abides by a principle of cutting and splitting. In her diary, Woolf wrote, 
“I think I might do something in To the Lighthouse, to split up emotions more completely. I 
think I’m working in that direction” (Diary III 38). Mrs. Ramsay practices this splitting after the 
dinner party: 
She felt rather inclined just for a moment to stand still after all that chatter, and pick out 
one particular thing; the thing that mattered; to detach it; to separate it off; clean it of all 
the emotions and odds and ends of things, and so hold it before her, and bring it to the 
tribunal where, ranged about in conclave, sat the judges she had set up to decide these 
things. Is it good, is it bad, is it right or wrong? Where are we going? and so on. So she 
righted herself after the shock of the event, and quite unconsciously and incongruously, 
used the branches of the elm trees outside to help her to stabilize her position. Her world 
was changing; they were still. (91) 
The technique of cutting becomes a technique of approaching a vision of permanence, so that, 
“Now one thought of it, cleared of chatter and emotion, it seemed always to have been, only was 
shown now, and so being shown struck everything into stability” (92). The stability itself is not 
as emphasized as the fact that it is “shown,” much like the permanent line down the middle of 
Lily’s painting is not as emphasized as much as her “vision” of it is. The elm tree that Mrs. 
Ramsay stabilizes herself with emerges in Lily’s painting—“Move the tree to the middle,” she 
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thinks to herself, aligning Mrs. Ramsay not just with the tree, but with the central line that holds 
her entire vision together (122). Out of these ephemeral moments, both Mrs. Ramsay and Lily 
gesture toward a vision of something not just as stable as a tree, but as the Platonic forms. Erich 
Auerbach himself uses the metaphor of cutting to explain how, in this novel, “an insignificant 
occurrence releases ideas and chains of ideas which cut loose from the present of the exterior 
occurrence and range freely through the depths of time,” coming as close to eternity as possible 
(Mimesis 477). Out of a dinner party in which “Nothing seemed to have merged” and “They all 
sat separate,” Mrs. Ramsay is able to arrange these separate guests the way Lily arranges her 
colors, into a cohesive whole that would transcend the fleeting moment, so that “They would, she 
thought, going on again, however long they loved, come back to this night; this moon; this wind; 
this house: and to her too” (92). 
 Undermining the sense of fragmentation, then, is the unity that holds the fragments 
together. While the “The Window” ends with Mr. Bankes taking Charles Tansley onto the 
terrace to finish a discussion about politics, “Time Passes” begins with Mr. Bankes “coming in 
from the terrace” at some point in the intervening decade, as though there are two competing 
experiences of time, one accelerated and one slowed down, both of which interrupt each other 
(91; 103). The entire section of “Time Passes” is an interruption in a novel composed of 
interruptions—James’s trip to the Lighthouse delayed by a decade, Mr. Ramsay having a “child-
like resentment of interruption,” William Bankes annoyed at all the interruptions at the dinner 
table, and Mrs. Ramsay interrupting even her own thoughts with reminders to pay the bill for the 
greenhouse (24; 73; 81). “Time Passes” abruptly inserts death into the narrative of life, and even 
the empty spaces between the numbered sections recreate the sense of loss on the level of the 
form. 
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 The use of square brackets, moreover, “the tool of textual editors for restoring or marking 
absent matter, takes on a poetry of its own here” (Goldman 40). They form a “set of connected or 
entombed utterances that form a narrative, or fragmented narrative, a central line, within the 
larger work” (41-42). These utterances are both central and peripheral, bracketed off from a 
cosmic narrative that shifts its attention from the human world to an uninhabited landscape. 
These brackets perform a kind of mutilation, which is perhaps why an entire section of “The 
Lighthouse” is composed of two sentences in square brackets: “[Macalister’s boy took one of the 
fish and cut a square out of its side to bait his hook with. The mutilated body (it was alive still) 
was thrown back into the sea.]” (148). This section intrudes as an interruption in the narrative of 
Lily finishing her painting, and Lily herself feels mutilated without Mrs. Ramsay. 
 In Lily’s question, “What does it mean, then, what can it all mean?,” we hear the echo of 
Mrs. Ramsay’s question to herself at the dinner table: “What did it all mean?” (121; 86). This 
same question, echoed across the lapse of ten years, illustrates the ontological mutilation at the 
core of Plato’s Symposium, in the quest of the self finding its missing half asking the same 
questions. Dalgarno argues that these “questions are like those of the Platonic dialogue in the 
sense that they ask for definitions as a means to engage the attention of the reader, and to prevent 
our taking for granted a vocabulary that includes not only truth but also knowledge and love” 
(“Reality and Perception” 70, italics in original). In “Time Passes,” the “mystic, the visionary, 
walked the beach, stirred a puddle, looked at a stone, and asked themselves, ‘What am I?’ ‘What 
is this?’ and suddenly an answer was vouchsafed them (what it was they could not say): so that 
they were warm in the frost and had comfort in the desert” (107). There is a sense in which these 
questions and their answers transform how one experiences one’s spatial surroundings, which is 
why Lily’s concern as a painter is predominantly one of organizing space. The answers lie 
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beyond the threshold of language, and Woolf’s aesthetic becomes one that approaches the silence 
beyond this threshold, the empty gaps in the mosaic that nevertheless hold all the pieces together. 
Even as far back as 1919, Woolf wrote a letter to Janet Case, with whom she spoke 
regularly about the Greeks, writing: 
There’s the whole question, which interested me… of the things one doesn’t say; what 
effect does that have? and how far do our feelings take their color from the dive 
underground? I mean, what is the reality of any feeling? …And then there’s the question 
of things happening, normally, all the time. (Letters II)  
Even though it would be years before she would embark on the project that would end up being 
To the Lighthouse, Woolf here is already beginning to think through her formulation of a 
language of silence, a language that undoes itself. On the day she ended up publishing the novel, 
she sent her sometime lover Vita Sackville-West a dummy copy of it, inscribing the book full of 
nothing but blank pages with the note, “In my opinion the best novel I have ever written” (qtd. in 
Lee 478). Without hearing a response from Sackville-West for a few days, she was worried that 
the joke had fallen flat, that her self-deprecating humor would be mistaken for arrogance.  
“Dearest donkey West,” she wrote in a follow-up message, “Did you understand that when I 
wrote it was my best book I merely meant because all the pages were empty?” (478).     
François Mauriac thinks of this dummy copy as “not the product of an author who had 
nothing more to say (those who have nothing to say, go on for ever [sic.] saying it) but of one 
who had too much, and when I say too much, I mean in terms of quality rather than quantity” 
(101). Woolf, for him, is one of the writers who “are moving towards silence” (101). It is this 
charged silence that Lily inhabits toward the end of the novel, struggling to put the finishing 
touches on her painting just as much as she struggles with language itself. She looks up to 
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address Augustus Carmichael, lying “on his chair with his hands clasped above his paunch not 
reading, or sleeping, but basking like a creature gorged with existence” (146). What does one say 
to such a “creature”?  What does it even mean to be “gorged with existence”?  She seems to be 
looking at him as though from another vantage point, if not vanishing point, of existence 
altogether, aligned as she is with the “Ghost, air, nothingness” of the dead Mrs. Ramsay (146).  
To Mr. Carmichael, Lily 
…wanted to say not one thing, but everything. Little words that broke up the thought and 
dismembered it said nothing. ‘About life, about death; about Mrs. Ramsay’—no, she 
thought, one could say nothing to nobody. The urgency of the moment always missed its 
mark. Words fluttered sideways and struck the object inches too low. Then one gave it 
up; then the idea sunk back again… For how could one express in words these emotions 
of the body? express the emptiness there? (She was looking at the drawing-room steps; 
they looked extraordinarily empty.) It was one’s body feeling, not one’s mind. (146) 
Like D.H. Lawrence in Lady Chatterley’s Lover, Woolf treats language as an inadequate but 
necessary medium of linking nothing with everything, of tracing a primordial and unspoken 
language of the body, of the “emptiness there”—in the subject—that discovers its unity with the 
“extraordinarily empty” nature of the object it confronts. This is an emptiness that is at once 
intensely physical but fundamentally abstract. Words inevitably “broke up” and “dismembered” 
this unity of emptiness, suggesting the kind of failure expressed earlier in the novel by Mr. 
Ramsay, who writes books about “[s]ubject and object and the nature of reality” (22).   
We see him pacing to and fro, “so ridiculous and so alarming” in his demeanor, reciting 
Tennyson’s “The Charge of the Light Brigade” out loud in his restless meanderings (18). The 
poem commemorates the failure of the cavalry, as a result of miscommunication, during the 
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Battle of Balaclava in the Crimean War. The line he settles on is “Someone had blundered,” 
repeating it incessantly, “as if he were trying over, tentatively seeking, some phrase for a new 
mood, and having only this at hand, used it, cracked though it was” (30). 
Words are “cracked” in the mouths of Woolf’s characters, like the “cracked kettle” of 
language in Flaubert (167). They are blunders. They miscommunicate more than they 
communicate. Words obscure meaning rather than reveal it:   
“What does it all mean? How do you explain it all?” [Lily] wanted to say, turning to Mr. 
Carmichael again. For the whole world seemed to have dissolved in this early morning 
hour into a pool of thought, a deep basin of reality, and one could almost fancy that had 
Mr. Carmichael spoken, a little tear would have rent the surface of the pool. And then?  
Something would emerge. A hand would be shoved up, a blade would be flashed. It was 
nonsense of course.  (147) 
The images of the hand and the blade here are also borrowed from Tennyson, who ends his Idylls 
of the King with the dying Arthur ordering Sir Bedivere to throw Excalibur into the lake 
(Tennyson 297). The Lady of the Lake emerges before the sword falls into the water, catching 
and brandishing it three times before descending with it back into the depths. The poetic allusion 
recalls Mrs. Ramsay (who identifies with the third stroke of the Lighthouse), pessimistically 
contemplating the future loss and grief her children will experience; “curled up from the floor of 
her mind, [she] rose from the lake of [her] being,” and tells herself, in silence, “brandishing her 
sword at life, nonsense” (51-54).  
By refraining from speech, dwelling in the kind of silence that is heavily evocative of 
Mrs. Ramsay, Mr. Carmichael avoids the “little tear [that] would have rent the surface of the 
pool,” keeping it whole. In this extended metaphor, language then functions as a kind of 
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Excalibur, a tool of violence, of divisiveness—something that one uses to strike at one’s enemy, 
even if it “struck the object inches too low” (146). It is, in the last resort, something that one 
discards in the “pool of thought, a deep basin of reality,” threatening to “rent the surface of the 
pool.” Perhaps it is thought and reality themselves that are the enemies. In her art, Lily moves 
away from the language of thought to the expression of the body, away from reality and 
verisimilitude to the space of created forms. The “whole world seemed to have dissolved,” as it 
does with D.H. Lawrence’s lovers, and in its place Lily wants to recover her vision of Mr. and 
Mrs. Ramsay a decade prior to this moment, when they belonged to “that unreal and penetrating 
and exciting universe which is the world seen through the eyes of love” (40).   
 An “unreal” universe emerges in the wake of the dissolved world. It is “penetrating,” not 
penetrated. It is a universe in which objects “stuck” and “sang through” subjects, eliminating 
their separation from each other. This new universe is comprised of solidity as opposed to the 
realm of reality, of the outer world, which dissolves into fluidity. During the dinner that Mrs. 
Ramsay hosts, she notices the  
…panes of glass, which, far from giving any accurate view of the outside world, rippled 
it so strangely that here, inside the room, seemed to be order and dry land; there, outside, 
a reflection in which things wavered and vanished, waterily.  
Some change at once went through them all, as if this had really happened, and 
they were all conscious of making a party together in a hollow, on an island; had their 
common cause against the fluidity out there. (79-80) 
The fluidity, the pool of reality, the world outside, a world “in which things wavered and 
vanished,” are what Woolf’s characters—but Mrs. Ramsay and Lily especially—battle against, 
trying to construct some kind of order, stability, and permanence out of the transient chaos. 
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 The result, then, is not just a static mosaic, but something that is more comparable to a 
shifting kaleidoscope that continuously reinvents itself and the relations among the fragments 
that compose the whole. Jean O. Love attributes this technique to Woolf’s “mythical 
consciousness,” in which spatial “relationships among objects, for example, are inconstant, a 
consequence to be expected from the lack of certain spatial dimensions and from the 
omnipotence of mythical consciousness. The distance of objects from one another changes 
without the objects being moved, an impossibility in an empirical world” (45). Lily’s memory of 
this same thought of love ten years prior is thus literally an act of recollection, of re-collecting 
and reassembling the impressions of her past into a postimpressionist vision of the fleeting 
moment in the present. Writing about the Symposium in her Greek Notebook, Woolf explores 
how “the body is always changing; a new birth; a new birth is no more than the change & 
continuation of the old body. Knowledge is recollection; re-birth” (qtd. in Koulouris 177). The 
Symposium itself is a shifting mosaic, one in which Aristophanes trades places with Erixymachus 
because of his hiccupping, another motif of interruption. By trading places in the order of 
speakers, Aristophanes’ story becomes the structural center of the work, the central line down the 
middle.  
T.E. Apter notes how the perceiver in To the Lighthouse, whether Mrs. Ramsay, Lily, or 
the disembodied narrator, “either fixes the external object, or releases its potential mobility from 
the mass of impressions available to her” (86). Lily, though, seems to want to achieve both at 
once, to use her painting as a means of fixing what she finds elusive, and at the same time to 
release its potential mobility, to incorporate the moving distances she perceives.34 Perhaps 
Woolf’s most striking use of this technique is when her narrator shifts from the interior of Lily’s 
 
34 “So much depends then, thought Lily Briscoe, looking at the sea… upon distance: whether people are near us or 
far from us; for her feeling for Mr. Ramsay changed as he sailed further and further across the bay” (156). 
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mind to the adjacent, external reality of Jasper shooting at a flock of starlings. Without causality, 
Woolf concatenates these two actions, drawing out a pattern that recurs throughout the novel: 
All of this danced up and down, like a company of gnats, each separate, but all 
marvelously controlled in an invisible elastic net—danced up and down in Lily’s mind… 
until her thought which had spun quicker and quicker exploded of its own intensity; she 
felt released; a shot went off close at hand, and there came, flying from its fragments, 
frightened, effusive, tumultuous, a flock of starlings. (24) 
Lily’s thoughts, likened to gnats, are all discrete and separate, but “marvelously controlled,” 
dancing according to a pattern she is trying to trace in the same way that starlings, too, fly 
according to rhythmic murmurations. Her role as an artist is “not inventing; she was only trying 
to smooth out something she had been given years ago folded up; something she had seen. 
[…O]ne had constantly a sense of repetition—of one thing falling where another had fallen, and 
so setting up an echo which chimed in the air and made it full of vibrations” (162). 
 
“Gigantic Chaos Streaked with Lightning” 
 The architecture of the novel enables these echoes to reverberate across the “two blocks 
joined by a corridor.” If Woolf doubles for Lily, then the “globed compacted thing” that the 
artist, out of love and commemoration, forges from a mosaic of fragments is the entire novel 
itself. The two blocks on either end of the novel are like the two missing halves of our original 
being from the Symposium, mirror images of each other as they reach across the empty corridor 
of the “Time Passes” section. It is this section where we are first told of Mrs. Ramsay’s death: 
“[Mr. Ramsay stumbling along a passage stretched his arms out one dark morning, but Mrs. 
Ramsay having died rather suddenly the night before he stretched his arms out. They remained 
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empty]” (105). The jarring news, encased in coffin-like square brackets, interrupts the 
disembodied narrative of the landscape, as though it were a lightning bolt accompanying the 
“nights full of wind and destruction” from the previous paragraph (105). The lightning emerges 
again, more explicitly, as an image that unites a Schopenhauerian pessimism with the pessimism 
of the Symposium:  
Listening (had there been anyone to listen) from the upper rooms of the empty house only 
gigantic chaos streaked with lightning could have been heard tumbling and tossing… 
until it seemed as if the universe were battling and tumbling, in brute confusion and 
wanton lust aimlessly by itself. (110) 
This lightning is the cosmic division, the expression of the universe in “brute confusion,” rending 
apart not just the chaos—the great void that the world is tumbling into—and not just the beings 
we once were, but the two adjacent halves of the novel as though this itself were a vision of that 
original separation. Commenting on the form of the Symposium from her Greek Notebook, 
Woolf writes, “This is a charming opening; in spite of the awkwardness of the form—a repetition 
after some years of what someone else had told the speaker. But it is very natural & easy” (53). 
What we get in To the Lighthouse is also “a repetition after some years”. “The Lighthouse” 
recollects details from “The Window,” reflecting and refracting these details across “Time 
Passes.” In the first part of the novel, Mrs. Ramsay endows the window with the properties of a 
mirror. As a transparent boundary that lets her look out to the lighthouse, what she ends up 
seeing is an extension of herself. The mirror gives us a vision of the wholeness we had lost when 
we had been broken apart into two fragments, but what Woolf explores is what happens when 
the mirror itself is broken: 
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Did Nature supplement what man advanced? Did she complete what he began? With 
equal complacence she saw his misery, condoned his meanness, and acquiesced in his 
torture. That dream, then, of sharing, completing, finding in solitude on the beach an 
answer, was but a reflection in a mirror, and the mirror itself was but the surface 
glassiness which forms in quiescence when the nobler powers sleep beneath? Impatient, 
despairing yet loth to go (for beauty offers her lures, her consolations), to pace the beach 
was impossible; contemplation was unendurable; the mirror was broken. (110) 
Across this threshold of the broken mirror, images such as the one of Mr. Ramsay looking at his 
wife and son in the window “the way one raises one’s eyes from a page in an express train and 
sees… a confirmation of something on the printed page to which one returns, fortified…” is 
refracted across the three sections (30). In “Time Passes,” the narrator describes solitude “like a 
pool at evening, far distant, seen from a train window, vanishing so quickly that the pool, pale in 
the evening, is scarcely robbed of its solitude, though once seen” (106). By the time we reach 
“The Lighthouse,” this analogy is transported to Lily’s mind, where she compares herself to “a 
traveler, even though he is half asleep, knows, looking out of the train window, that he must look 
now, for he will never see that town, or that mule-cart, or that woman at work in the fields again” 
(158).   
 In this triptych of the same image refracted across three fragmented sections, Woolf 
moves from a vision that can be captured and confirmed on the printed page to something that is 
more elusive and ephemeral. Implicit in this movement is a critique of Wordsworth’s Romantic 
optimism, according to Emily Dalgarno: “…Wordsworth fosters the ‘comfortable conclusion’ 
that outward vision serves to confirm inward. His image of the mind as mirror achieves its 
optimism by reducing the three-dimensional complexity of perception in the cave, where men 
 174 
see only shadows, to a two-dimensional model of reflection” (Virginia Woolf and the Visible 
World  91-92). Woolf shatters this image of the mirror, and its accompanying optimism. And yet, 
the artistry of both Woolf and her character Lily emerges from the paradoxical gesture of 
committing to the page and the canvas the very nature of reality that, as they acknowledge, 
cannot be grasped.  
 It is in this way that Woolf offers a vision of the wholeness that we once were, inscribing 
it into the form of the novel, writing about it not just as a “globed compacted thing,” but as a 
body itself: “What I feel is that it is a hard muscular book, which at this age proves that I have 
something in me. It has not run out & gone flabby…” (Diary III 123). But her tone was not as 
confident just days after she had finished it, feeling an “Intense depression,” something that was 
common to finishing her process of writing novels, which she referred to as a gestation over a 
period of “nine months…in despair” (Diary III 123; qtd. in Dalgarno 1). In the same diary entry, 
she asks herself, “But why am I feeling like this? …Children. Failure. Yes; I detect that. Failure 
failure. (The wave rises)” (Diary III 110). In the absence of having any children, she sees this 
finished novel as a failed surrogate, as a part of herself that is now separated from her, leaving 
behind something akin to postpartum depression. 
 
The Acoustics of Grief 
 As much as this novel can be seen as the progeny of a new generation, its other silent half 
is comprised of the generations that are no longer alive. As such, it is more of an elegy than a 
novel. Even in her working notes for To the Lighthouse, she writes, “I have an idea that I will 
invent a new name for my books to supplant ‘novel’.  A new ---  by  Virginia Woolf.  But what?  
Elegy? …?” (Diary III 34). An elegy, more than a novel, is heard, and Woolf had to listen in 
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mourning to the ghosts of her past in order to orchestrate this work that would supplant ‘novel’. 
When she articulates the language of loss in “Time Passes,” the lightning image is perceived not 
by anyone seeing it, but by “Listening (had there been anyone to listen)…” (110).         
In 1904, still traumatized by the death of her mother, Woolf suffered a mental breakdown 
when her father died. In this breakdown, she “heard birds singing Greek choruses” (Dalgarno, 
Virginia Woolf and the Visible World 33). Ancient Greek, to her, stood “for the most distant 
horizon of intelligibility, the point beyond which the sane mind does not reach” (33). The Greek 
chorus, accompanied by the flute, “constantly threatens to dissolve song into wailing, music into 
moaning, and the voice into a primordial, disarticulate anti-music,” as Eugene Thacker notes in 
Cosmic Pessimism (24). “The mourning voice delineates all the forms of suffering—tears, 
weeping, sobbing, wailing, moaning, and the convulsions of thought reduced to an elemental 
unintelligibility” (24).  
She would work through this elemental unintelligibility over the next two decades, 
writing To the Lighthouse as a way of putting the ghosts of her parents to rest, as she recounts in 
Moments of Being: “…when it was written, I ceased to be obsessed by my mother. I no longer 
hear her voice; I do not see her” (92-3). In her acoustics of grief, Woolf eventually came to mute 
both the birds singing in Greek and the sound of her mother’s voice while amplifying the sound 
of the waves crashing on the beach: “I am making up ‘To the Lighthouse’—the sea is to be heard 
all through it” (Diary III 34). In the same year, though, she wrote the essay “On Not Knowing 
Greek,” where she positions herself back in the aural space of Ancient Greece, in that linguistic 
“horizon of intelligibility,” imagining what the Greeks heard and how they interpreted the sounds 
of nature around them:  
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With the sound of the sea in their ears, vines, meadows, rivulets about them, they are 
even more aware than we are of a ruthless fate. There is a sadness at the back of life 
which they do not attempt to mitigate. Entirely aware of their own standing in the 
shadow, and yet alive to every tremor and gleam of existence, there they endure, and it is 
to the Greeks that we turn when we are sick of the vagueness, of the confusion, of the 
Christianity and its consolations, of our own age. (Common Reader I 58-59). 
It is in this way that we can see Woolf inheriting the legacy of Walter Pater, Oscar Wilde, and 
the Uranian poets, who turned particularly to Plato’s Symposium for a narrative of “spiritual 
procreancy” that would replace the Judeo-Christian creation myth (Koulouris 84).35 Like the 
biblical account of the Fall, the Symposium provides the myth of a literal fall from the farthest 
reaches of the cosmos to the earth; it is an account of how we come to know the world, 
ourselves, and the sense of loss that accompanies the awareness of our bodies, but without any 
hope for salvation.  
While composing the novel, Woolf wrote in her diary that she wanted to articulate the 
“mystical side of this solitude; how it is not oneself but something in the universe that one’s left 
with. It is this that is frightening & exciting in the midst of my profound gloom, depression, 
boredom, whatever it is” (Diary III 113). Solitude for Woolf, as for Aristophanes in the 
Symposium, is a cosmic feeling of “something in the universe that one’s left with,” a feeling that 
is rooted in a “profound gloom.” Woolf’s narrative, like her description of the landscape, 
“always seemed to be running away into some moon country, uninhabited by men,” a similar 
desire expressed by Mellors in Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover (14). The moon is that 
reminder in the universe of the shape we had once taken, and the freedom we once had from the 
 
35 Linda Dowling writes that Greek culture was promoted as a “ground of transcendent value alternative to Christian 
ideology” in Victorian Oxford (xiii).  
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earth.36 The Platonic myth, then, is the original story that narrates the “sadness at the back of 
life,” which she still hears in the sound of the sea—a sadness that paradoxically endows us with 
the capacity to be alive to “every tremor and gleam of existence.” 
 
Mrs. Ramsay’s Pessimism  
Such is the pessimism of Mrs. Ramsay, a pessimism that moves away from an 
anthropomorphic focus of the world, shifting its perspective away from the human and toward 
the inanimate landscape. Mrs. Ramsay feels her being merge with the gleam of the lighthouse, 
the gleam of her own existence, attuned to the sound of the sea, its  
waves on the beach, which, for the most part beat a measured and soothing tattoo to her 
thoughts and seemed consolingly to repeat over and over again as she sat with the 
children the words of some old cradle song, murmured by nature, ‘I am guarding you—I 
am your support’, but at other times suddenly and unexpectedly, especially when her 
mind raised itself slightly from the task actually in hand, had no such kindly meaning, but 
like a ghostly roll of drums remorselessly beat the measure of life, made one think of the 
destruction of the island and its engulfment in the sea, and warned her whose day had 
slipped past in one quick doing after another that it was all ephemeral as a rainbow—this 
sound which had been obscured and concealed under the other sounds suddenly 
thundered hollow in her ears and made her look up with an impulse of terror. (16-17) 
The sound of the sea to Mrs. Ramsay is, by turns, comforting and terrifying. It is both protective 
and threatening. There is a sense in which it underlies all other sounds, both intelligible and 
 
36 Woolf also uses the moon as a means to express her frustration in her diary: “How, at a certain moment, I see 
through what I’m saying; detest myself; & wish for the other side of the moon; reading alone, that is. How many 
phases one goes through between the soup & the sweet! I want, partly as a writer, to found my impressions on 
something firmer” (Diary III 63). 
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unintelligible. It is as though she actively listens away from intelligible speech to train her ear on 
sounds beyond thought, as when she looks out the window during the dinner party, in the 
direction of the sea that is now invisible behind the black panes, and  
the voices came to her very strangely, as if they were voices at a service in a cathedral, 
for she did not listen to the words. The sudden bursts of laughter and then one voice 
(Minta’s) speaking alone, reminded her of men and boys crying out the Latin words of a 
service in some Roman Catholic cathedral. (89)  
In “Sketch of the Past,” Woolf writes of the memory of her mother “in the very center of 
that great Cathedral space which was childhood; there she was from the very first” (Moments of 
Being 81). A vast space like a cathedral amplifies and echoes the sounds it contains. An echo 
itself is a repetition of a sound that had previously occurred—it is the acoustic lingering of a 
moment already past, and in Mrs. Ramsay, one hears the echo of Julia Stephen, herself. Mrs. 
Ramsay, at the dinner table, “did not know what they meant, but like music, the words seemed to 
be spoken by her own voice, outside her self, saying quite easily and naturally what had been in 
her mind the whole evening while she said different things,” an analogous passage in the overall 
auditory mosaic that resonates with the sound of Jasper’s gunshot dispersing the flock of 
starlings concomitantly with the dispersal of the “gnats” of Lily’s thoughts (90). Mrs. Ramsay 
understands the music behind the words, their musical shape, as though they belong to her, 
dissolving the boundary between her voice, her being, and the voices of the others at the dinner 
table. Sound seems to be what unites everyone at the dinner party “with a common cause against 
the fluidity out there,” in which “things wavered and vanished, waterily” (79-80). 
Both she and Lily try to mold out of the transient chaos some kind of order, stability, and 
permanence. The curious use of the adverb “waterily” recalls the function of the sea to Woolf, as 
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communicating the “sadness at the back of life” that the Greeks understood. And, like the waves 
themselves, the narrative by turns confronts this sadness and then protectively withdraws from it. 
Like Socrates joining his interlocutors at an indoor party in the Symposium, the inner space 
seems like a temporary protective shield, one in which the guests are invited to contemplate the 
permanence of forms while everything outside poses a threat of fickle change, of dissolution, of 
a war that would end up decimating their civilization.  
Still looking out the window, Mrs. Ramsay notes how the words “sounded as if they were 
floating like flowers on water out there, cut off from them all, as if no one had said them, but 
they had come into existence of themselves” (90). These words, reduced to meaningless sounds, 
registering as flowers floating on water, recall Ophelia in her descent into madness and eventual 
suicide by drowning, her final words also straining intelligibility and dissolving into pure sound. 
It is only appropriate, then, for Mrs. Ramsay to end her evening with Shakespeare, a “magnet” 
that gathers “[a]ll the odds and ends of the day” (98). She reads his Sonnet 98 as though it were a 
coda to the Symposium, a vision of the completeness that emerges out of the fragments of words 
and sounds flowing across the day, taking on a “rounded” shape like our original rounded selves, 
a shape she uses to denote every image of completeness in the novel: “And then there it was, 
suddenly entire shaped in her hands, beautiful and reasonable, clear and complete, the essence 
sucked out of life and held rounded here—the sonnet” (98). The sonnet itself is one of 
melancholic longing, in which the beauty of spring reminds the speaker of a lost lover. But the 
landscape is animated with language, including the “lays of birds” (l.5) that could not “make me 
any summer’s story tell” (l.7).  
The association of birds with words appears right before she settles on this sonnet, when 
“words, like little shaded lights, one red, one blue, one yellow, lit up in the dark of her mind, and 
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seemed leaving their perches up there to fly across and across, or to cry out and to be echoed; so 
she turned and felt on the table beside her for a book” (96). When she begins reading, “here and 
there at random… she felt that she was climbing backwards, upwards, shoving her way up under 
petals that curved over her, so that she only knew this is white, or this is red. She did not know at 
first what the words meant at all” (96). In this aural mosaic, the sounds occur to her first, and 
then the colors, and she continues to shove her way up under petals that curved over her so that 
she finally arrives at the surface meaning of the line, “Nor praise the deep vermilion in the rose” 
(98; l.10). The separation between the lover and the absent beloved for a moment seems to echo 
the gulf between her and her husband, even as he lies in bed right next to her, but she looks up 
from her book, “echoing his smile dreamily” instead (98).  
She hopes he will “say something… wishing only to hear his voice,” and as they come 
closer together in bed, “she could feel his mind like a raised hand shadowing her mind; and he 
was beginning now that her thoughts took a turn he disliked—towards this ‘pessimism’ as he 
called it—to fidget, though he said nothing…” (99) Despite this pessimism, however, “she began 
to smile, for though she had not said a word, he knew, of course he knew, that she loved him” 
(100). Looking out the window, as she did during dinner, she thinks to herself, “Nothing on earth 
can equal this happiness” (100). In the space of one brief, wordless, almost telepathic 
conversation, Mrs. Ramsay emerges as a pessimist who is happy, who articulates neither her 
pessimism nor her happiness, but sounds the depths of these experiences, following the 





Mr. Ramsay’s Pessimism 
Mr. Ramsay, for his part, sees in Shakespeare the anxiety of civilization, unwittingly 
adopting a pessimistic worldview of his own. “The very stone one kicks with one’s boots will 
outlast Shakespeare,” he thinks to himself on a walk earlier that day (32). He certainly appears to 
be the initial pessimist in the work, opening the novel by ruining James’s hopes of going to the 
lighthouse the next day, rigidly adhering to his belief that everyone “should be aware from 
childhood that life is difficult; facts uncompromising…” (8). In this sense, he seems like a 
parody of a Victorian father—like Thomas Gradgrind in Charles Dickens’s Hard Times—out of 
step with the Edwardian era when “The Window” takes place. Like Gradgrind, he imagines the 
totality of thought as something that could be quantified, something that could be divided up 
“like the alphabet is ranged in twenty-six letters all in order,” and his  
splendid mind had no sort of difficulty in running over those letters one by one, firmly 
and accurately, until it had reached, say, the letter Q. He reached Q. Very few people in 
the whole of England ever reach Q. Here, stopping for one moment by the stone urn 
which held the geraniums, he saw, but now far far away, like children picking up shells, 
divinely innocent and occupied with little trifles at their feet and somehow entirely 
defenceless against a doom which he perceived, his wife and son, together, in the 
window. They needed his protection; he gave it them. (30) 
What kind of protection exactly he has in mind is just as unclear as the kind of doom he 
perceives. If anything, it seems as though Mrs. Ramsay and James—or at least just James—are 
seeking to protect themselves from him rather than by him. However “splendid” he thinks his 
own mind is, the narrator, even in free indirect discourse, delineates a widening chasm between 
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Mr. Ramsay and his family, “far far away” from each other, a chasm that also traces the distance 
between the seriousness of his own thought and the satirical portrait he strikes.  
His pessimism takes on the metaphors of spatial dimensions; the distance that emerges 
between him and his family then translates to the daunting crevice between his intellectual 
achievement—his venerable “Q”—and the next letter, “R,” the next summit of knowledge to be 
attained. Pessimism here seems to realign his spatial relations so that when he sees “R” from this 
distance, a “flash of darkness” comes over him, and “he heard people saying—he was a failure—
that R was beyond him. He would never reach R” (31). The splendidness of his own mind is 
something that fails him; he is painfully aware of how his smugness is just a veneer that conceals 
a deeper anxiety that he has not achieved greatness, repeating to his wife “that he was a failure” 
(33). 
He is stuck at Q; he even “dug his heels in at Q. […] Here he knocked his pipe out, with 
two or three resonant taps on the ram’s horn which made the handle of the urn.” Since the root of 
the word “pessimism” is ped-, the foot—the lowest most part of the body, farthest away from the 
lofty reaches of the mind, we see Mr. Ramsay at his most pessimistic when he digs his heels, or 
when he contemplates the “stone one kicks with one’s boots” that “will outlast Shakespeare” 
(32). The stone urn he gravitates to will also outlast the funerary significance ascribed to it; in 
fact, it already has. It is just a vase of geraniums, reclaimed by the landscape, a constant 
reminder to all the characters of mortality. In a moment that lays bare the influence of Hardy and 
Conrad on Woolf’s treatment of landscape, we see William Bankes and Lily looking “at the 
dunes far away, …instead of merriment felt come over them some sadness—because the thing 
was completed partly, and partly because distant views seemed to outlast by a million years (Lily 
thought) the gazer and to be communing already with a sky which beholds an earth entirely at 
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rest” (20). Mr. Ramsay is obsessed with “how we know nothing and the sea eats away the 
ground we stand on—that was his fate, his gift” (38). 
The landscape Mr. Ramsay imagines himself inhabiting in his “desolate expedition” is 
one of “icy solitudes of the Polar region,” and he sees himself as “the leader of a forlorn hope,” 
whose “temper, neither sanguine nor despondent, surveys with equanimity what is to be and 
faces it…” (31-32). But the problem is that he cannot help his melodramatic despondency: 
Feelings that would not have disgraced a leader who, now that the snow has begun to fall 
and the mountain-top is covered in mist, knows that he must lay himself down and die 
before morning comes, stole upon him, paling the colour of his eyes, giving him, even in 
the two minutes of his turn on the terrace, the bleached look of withered old age. Yet he 
would not die lying down; he would find some crag of rock, and there, his eyes fixed on 
the storm, trying to the end to pierce the darkness, he would die standing. He would never 
reach R. 
He stood stock still, by the urn, with the geranium flowing over it. (31) 
Mr. Ramsay is a kind of self-proclaimed, would-be Zarathustra, looking “from a mountain-top 
down the long wastes of the ages” into the inevitable dissolution of civilization, seen from the 
perspective of deep time (32). This, perhaps, is why he is drawn to stone, why he “stood very 
upright by the urn,” why he finds “some crag of rock” to hold onto, why he “dwells upon fame, 
upon search parties, upon cairns raised by grateful followers over his bones,” so that he can hold 
on to whatever it is in this world that lasts (32). But even in this fantasy of martyrdom into the 
doomed expedition of the intellect, he imagines a kind of rebirth, one in which life itself stems 
from the same feet that marked his morbid pessimism:  
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Finally, who shall blame the leader of the doomed expedition, if, having adventured to 
the uttermost, and used his strength wholly to the last ounce and fallen asleep not much 
caring if he wakes or not, he now perceives by some pricking in his toes that he lives, and 
does not on the whole object to live, but requires sympathy, and whisky, and someone to 
tell the story of his suffering to at once? Who shall blame him? Who will not secretly 
rejoice when the hero puts his armour off, and halts by the window and gazes at his wife 
and son, who very distant at first, gradually come closer and closer, till lips and book and 
head are clearly before him, though still lovely and unfamiliar from the intensity of his 
isolation and the waste of ages and the perishing of the stars, and finally putting his pipe 
in his pocket and bending his magnificent head before her—who will blame him if he 
does homage to the beauty of the world? (32). 
The distance opened up by his pessimism narrows—if not between Q and R, then at least 
between him and his family. But this proximity is still undermined by the first sentence of the 
next chapter: “But his son hated him” (33). The distance doesn’t simply vanish because he is 
now ready to return from his polar expedition. Nevertheless, this pessimism of the “forlorn hope” 
is one he cannot maintain. At his core, he is quite happy, but this happiness catches him off-
guard; it is something he is even ashamed of, “as if to be caught happy in a world of misery was 
for an honest man the most despicable of crimes. It was true; he was for the most part happy…” 
(39). From his wife’s perspective, he has nothing of the cheerlessness or the “bleached look of 
withered old age” (31). On the contrary, his  
arm was almost like a young man’s arm, Mrs. Ramsay thought, thin and hard, and she 
thought with delight how strong he was, though he was over sixty, and how untamed and 
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optimistic, and how strange it was that being convinced, as he was, of all sorts of horrors, 
seemed not to depress him, but to cheer him. (58)  
Ultimately, then, Mr. Ramsay’s own pessimism fails him, leaving him “untamed and optimistic.”    
Mrs. Ramsay experiences and revels in moments of “intense, exquisite happiness,” while 
happiness makes Mr. Ramsay uncomfortable.37 He resorts to cheer instead. She withdraws into a 
sphere of reticence, of a language behind language, while he, like Bernard in The Waves, is 
known for his “phrase-making.” She picks up on minute details of daily existence while he is 
“dumb, to the ordinary things, but to extraordinary things, with an eye like an eagle’s” (59). 
Their perceptions, their outlooks, even their pessimistic attitudes seem at times diametrically 
opposed—so much so, that she even thinks of him as an optimist, and he bristles at her sense of 
doom even though she accommodates his: “And so she went down and said to her husband, Why 
must they grow up and lose it all? Never will they be so happy again. And he was angry. Why 
take such a gloomy view of life? he said. It is not sensible” (50). She herself does not consider 
herself a pessimist, but when she thinks about life, her thought either trails off, or she imagines 
brandishing her sword against it (50). 
 
A Lovely Pessimism 
What Woolf traces in To the Lighthouse are different models of pessimism, different 
inflections and even rejections—but, ultimately, engagements with—a pessimistic worldview. It 
is in this sense that we can hear William Bankes echoing both Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay: “What does 
 
37 In her diary, though, Woolf makes the distinction between “natural happiness” and “intense happiness,” aligning 
“intense happiness” with an overall bleaker view of life: “Only I am exiled from this profound natural happiness. 
That is what I always feel; or often feel now—natural happiness is what I lack, in profusion. I have intense 
happiness—not that. It is therefore what I most envy; geniality & family love & being on the rails of human life. 
Indeed, exaggeration apart, this is a very satisfactory form of existence. And it exists for thousands of people all the 
time. Why have we none of us got it, in that measure?” (Diary III 73). 
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one live for? Why, one asked oneself, does one take all these pains for the human race to go on? 
Is it so very desirable? Are we attractive as a species? Not so very, he thought…” (73). At the 
dinner table, he “felt rigid and barren,” words that recall the barren landscape of Mr. Ramsay’s 
polar expedition, but the simile Woolf pairs this with is “like a pair of boots that has been soaked 
and gone dry so that you can hardly force your feet into them. Yet he must force his feet into 
them” (73-74). The only other time we see boots is when they kick the stone that will outlast 
Shakespeare, and we do hear Bankes echoing this precise thought later on, when he asks, “Who 
could tell what was going to last—in literature or indeed in anything else?” (87). In the 
knowledge that all traces of humanity will vanish before stones do, the one recourse available to 
us is to force our feet into the boots and keep on kicking away these stones. “Let us enjoy what 
we do enjoy,” he concludes (87). 
To the Lighthouse seems to have sprung just as much from this sense of joy as from 
Woolf’s own grief. Just over a week after her letter to Janet Case about how she wished she 
could write like Plato in the Symposium, she turned to her diary with a fresh burst of energy after 
not having written during her study of Plato. She was now ready to write again, and in the same 
entry, she recorded the dinner conversation from the previous evening, in which “Sydney 
boomed out in the background that he was too unhappy ‘of course I’m unhappy—aren’t we all 
unhappy?—isn’t it inevitable, seeing that no one of us has any satisfactory things?’…I laughed a 
good deal, & cheered myself at their discontent” (Diary II). 
Like Lily contemplating the dependence of all things on distance, Woolf’s relationship to 
pessimism is one that, up close, reveals a vision of unbearable doom—but can also just as well 
generate humor, laughter, and cheer, reflecting the intersecting genres on display in the 
Symposium. One would expect Aristophanes, the most famous comedian of his time, to give a 
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humorous account of eros, even in the context of celebrating Agathon’s victory for writing his 
tragedy. Instead, Plato uses Aristophanes as the mouthpiece for his own melancholic poetry. In 
the shifting mosaic of the novel, and especially in the tension between Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay, 
Woolf’s pessimism adapts to and dispenses with different patterns at every turn of thought. What 
holds these patterns together, though, is her treatment of love—a love that encompasses more 
than just the eros of Plato’s Symposium. Auerbach, ending his chapter on Woolf—and the whole 
of Mimesis—by writing that, “There is in all these works a certain atmosphere of universal 
doom,” still points out that To the Lighthouse “is one of those books of this type which are filled 
with good and genuine love,” even with its “irony, amorphous sadness, and doubt of life” (551).  
Even though love is not sufficient to withstand the sense of loss that pervades the novel, 
love here nevertheless accompanies every articulation of pessimism to assemble the debris left in 
its wake into a new arrangement that preserves the traces of what had been lost. Mrs. Ramsay’s 
pessimism is followed by a warm, unarticulated expression of love to her husband. The coda to 
James’s childhood hatred of his father is his sister Cam’s adolescent realization that their father 
is actually “most lovable”—an opinion that James gradually warms up to (155). Charles Tansley, 
introduced as a “miserable specimen” who is perpetually “not satisfied,” finding fault with 
everyone around him—“You all of you are wrong,” he thinks to himself at the dinner party—
ends up “preaching brotherly love” (10; 75; 160). Lily chases the “demons” who “often brought 
her to the verge of tears and made this passage from conception to work as dreadful as any down 
a dark passage for a child” with the “love” she feels “with this all” (19). 
In the dark passage of “Time Passes,” love takes the form of loveliness, standing as a 
bulwark against the cosmic destruction wrought on the landscape and on civilization in the 
intervening decade that spans the First World War. Balancing the violent imagery of lightning,  
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loveliness reigned and stillness, and…clasped hands in the bedroom… and the soft nose 
of the clammy sea airs, rubbing, snuffling, iterating, and reiterating their questions—
‘Will you fade? Will you perish?’—scarcely disturbed the peace, the indifference, the air 
of pure integrity, as if the question they asked scarcely needed that they should answer: 
we remain. (106)  
These are the forces that anchor what remains in the chaotic wreckage, functioning as both 
consolation and as a painful cipher of loss in the same way that Zeus employs eros in the 
Symposium. Lily translates this double gesture of loveliness—and love—into her painting just as 
much as Woolf translates it into her own writing, referring to writing itself as “the great solace, 
& scourge” while working on the novel (Diary III 40). Love in this novel, like pessimism, “had a 
thousand shapes,” offering art as a means for the characters to confront life at its most painful 
and horrific, “giving them a wholeness not theirs in life, making of some scene, or meeting of 
people (all now gone and separate), one of those globed compacted things…” (157).38 
Woolf rounds out the wholeness of this novel, her own “globed compacted thing,” with 
affirmation. The first sentence of “The Window” begins with “Yes,” the word that also begins 
the last sentence of “The Lighthouse” (7; 170). Jane Goldman argues that, “These two bracketing 
yeses, two blocks joined by the intervening text’s corridor, constitute another form of 
parenthesis, framing its matter” (43). Even within “The Window,” the last paragraph begins with 
“Yes,” as well: “‘Yes, you were right. It’s going to be wet tomorrow.’ She had not said it, but he 
knew it. And she looked at him smiling. For she had triumphed again” (100). This whole section 
is framed by the word “Yes,” but it comes around full circle to have opposite meanings. At first, 
 
38 The way Woolf treats art as the consolation for bearing life’s miseries is analogous to the function of art in 
Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy, which is his response to the irrevocable subject-object split in Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason. 
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Mrs. Ramsay tells James, “Yes, of course” he will be able to go to the Lighthouse (7), but then 
uses this “Yes” to acknowledge that her husband was right in saying that he would not be able to 
go. This word becomes a kind of self-effacing affirmation that dissolves into nothingness without 
being negative—it bears the trace of the shifting alliances in character, at first binding Mrs. 
Ramsay closer to her son than her husband, and then gradually shifting so that she finds a 
“triumphant” way of bridging the emotional distance with Mr. Ramsay. But this word  
may also function as a… unifying, structuring line or corridor, yet simultaneously a 
destabilizing and fragmentary force, right through the text; it can no longer be read off as 
signifying anything permanent, affirmative or otherwise, merely pegging a central line 
through the narrative patchwork, like the lighthouse, the butterfly’s wing, the round and 
square brackets: “Yes, with all its green and blues, its lines running up and across, its 
attempt at something” (Woolf 170). (Goldman 44)    
Just as James, finally reaching the Lighthouse, says that, “Nothing was simply one thing,” this 
“yes” also cannot be reduced to simply one thing. It is both a framing device and a central line 
down the middle, like the line that finally ends up running down the middle of Lily’s canvas. It is 
what holds the characters and the structure of both the novel and the painting together while 
illuminating the gaps in the underlying mosaic that keep this structure fragmented. It is a word 
that, in its movement from hope to disappointment—and finally to a quiet triumph—manages 
only to be an “attempt at something,” tracing out this attempt as a process that recedes from sight 
as soon as it appears. It achieves perfection only in the verb tense with which Lily, painting the 
central line down the middle of her canvas, says to herself, “I have had my vision,” in the present 
perfect.  
 190 
Lily’s triumph is not so much the line itself as having had her vision in the tension 
between the ephemeral moment that is now fading into the past and the permanent mark of that 
moment on the painting. The “governing form” of the painting, like the novel itself, “is not the 
static noun image of the title but its transitive syntax suggesting the elusiveness of the object of 
knowledge, celebrating open process over finite arrival” (Goldman 32). Her vision mirrors Mrs. 
Ramsay’s vision in “The Window,” after having arranged her guests at the dinner party the way 
Lily arranges her colors:  
With her foot on the threshold she waited a moment longer in a scene which was 
vanishing even as she looked, and then, as she moved and took Minta’s arm and left the 
room, it changed, it shaped itself differently; it had become, she knew, giving one last 
look at it over her shoulder, already the past. (90)  
In her diary, Woolf wrote, “…I can only note that the past is beautiful because one never realizes 
an emotion at the time. It expands later, & thus we don’t have complete emotions about the 
present, only about the past” (Diary III 5). The purpose of the present, then, is to gesture toward 
the past with the purpose of completing it, even if this completion does not reach any 
permanence. Lily herself is reconciled to the thought that her painting “would be hung in the 
servants’ bedrooms. It would be rolled up and stuffed under a sofa. What was the good of doing 
it then…” (131). The “good” becomes the process itself, of having the vision and seeing it fade 
into the past. This is precisely where love and pessimism coincide; as with the Symposium, love 




COSMIC PESSIMISM IN LADY CHATTERLEY’S LOVER: D.H. LAWRENCE’S 
TRISTAN LEGEND FOR THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
  
Against Self-Help 
When Jessie Chambers—D.H. Lawrence’s “most important female companion and 
friend” in late adolescence and early adulthood, as well as the model for Miriam Leivers in Sons 
and Lovers—was turning nineteen in 1906, her brother Alan turned to Lawrence for advice on 
what birthday gift to get her (Ellis 2). He recommended a slim volume of Schopenhauer’s essays, 
newly translated into English less than a decade before, and he even ended up reading aloud 
from the book to them at the birthday party. The essay he chose to read was “The Metaphysics of 
Love,” and it was one of the earliest occasions that Lawrence used to identify the philosophical 
position that he would spend the rest of his writing career fleshing out. “Every kind of love,” 
Schopenhauer writes in the essay, according to the translation Lawrence read out loud, “however 
ethereal it may seem to be, springs entirely from the instinct of sex” (171). Schopenhauer 
continues: 
Love is of such high import because it has nothing to do with the weal or woe of the 
present individual, as every other matter has; it has to secure the existence and special 
nature of the human race in future times; hence the will of the individual appears in a 
higher aspect as the will of the species. (172) 
To David Ellis, the “advantage of this view is that it allows Schopenhauer to explain the feeling 
lovers often have of being in the grip of powers quite beyond their control” (3). The “old stable 
ego” that Lawrence was intent on challenging in his works is obliterated through love, exposing 
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the passivity behind passion, the blind Will behind scopophilic desire, and raw sexuality behind 
sentimental affection (Kinkead-Weekes 379). In sex is a vision of the future, a dissolution of the 
conscious self by the instinct of the species. Just twenty-one at the time of his initial enthusiasm 
for Schopenhauer’s pessimism, Lawrence’s own vision of the future grew bleaker over time, 
ultimately culminating in Lady Chatterley’s Lover over two decades later. 
 Beth Blum situates Lawrence’s bleak vision as a response to the self-help industry that 
took over Europe and the United States in the nineteenth century, only continuing to boom ever 
since.39 Even though modernism “has long been defined by its rejection of Victorian moral 
imperatives,” she sees “the concomitant rise of the self-help industry” as highlighting “the stakes 
and objectives of modernism’s own genre of anti-advice” (118). In “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. 
Brown,” for example, Woolf identifies the modernist novel as a space that, to Blum, “exceeds 
instrumentalism, surpassing the needs of ‘happiness, comfort, or income’ (precisely the province 
of self-help)” (131). Lawrence himself traces this self-help genre back to Benjamin Franklin, and 
ended up rewriting and reversing Franklin’s maxims, “confessing that they inspired him to 
develop his moral philosophy,” which “forms the backdrop to the sexual reform advocated in 
Lady Chatterley’s Lover” (120).  
Lawrence belongs to a tradition that includes Baudelaire, who complained of the 
“stupidity” of “those volumes which treat of the art of making people happy, wise, and rich, in 
twenty-four hours” (102-04). Flaubert was an early detractor, too—in his 1842 novella 
November, the narrator sounds almost identical to Schopenhauer, wondering if “happiness too is 
 
39 The term itself first emerged in its modern usage in 1859, but the industry had already been primed by decades of 
moralizing writers who found an eager audience raised on the Enlightenment values of progress, improvement, and 
individualism (Blum 118). 
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a metaphor invented on a day of boredom?” (92).40 Lawrence didn’t think much of Flaubert, but 
he did admire G.K. Chesterton, who noted how, in 1909, “On every bookstall, in every 
magazine, you may find works telling people how to succeed… they are written by men who 
cannot even succeed in writing books” (Chesterton 21; Worthen 64). Nevertheless, bestsellers 
like Samuel Smiles’s 1859 book Self-Help and Wallace Wattle’s The Science of Getting Rich 
from 1910 ensured that this genre was here to stay (Blum 118).  
As this industry took a stronghold of European and American culture, Schopenhauer’s 
writings—balancing a curmudgeonly impatience and disgust with an eloquent lyricism—
emerged as an antidote, inspiring artists from music to literature to reject the cheap optimism of 
these hack self-help writers. After a period of writer’s block, Wagner wrote in his autobiography 
that in 1854, his “poetic impulses” were finally “stimulated. It was no doubt in part the earnest 
frame of mind produced by Schopenhauer, now demanding some rapturous expression of its 
fundamental traits, which gave me the idea for a Tristan und Isolde” (510).41 With the opening 
bars of the unstable Tristan leitmotif, Wagner ushered in a new era of music in 1865. Swinburne, 
spearheading the British decadent movement less than two decades later, also turned to this 
medieval love story in his poem Tristram of Lyonesse (1882), and Thomas Mann, influenced by 
both Schopenhauer and Wagner, reinvented the Tristan story at the turn of the century in his 
novellas Tristan (1903) and Death in Venice (1912). Even in Swann’s Way (1913), Proust echoes 
Schopenhauer’s concept of sexuality from “The Metaphysics of Love” when he writes,  
Vinteuil’s phrase, like some theme, say, in Tristan, which represents to us also a certain 
emotional accretion, had espoused our moral state, had ended a vesture of humanity that 
 
40 In the first volume of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer writes, “…life swings like a 
pendulum to and fro between pain and boredom” (312). 
41 The enthusiasm Wagner had for Schopenhauer was, hilariously, not reciprocated. “He is a poet but no musician,” 
Schopenhauer quipped (qtd. in Wagner, 776 fn.510/1). 
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was peculiarly affecting. Its destiny was linked to the future, to the reality of the human 
soul, of which it was one of the most special and distinctive ornaments. (381)     
Proust here uses the Tristan reference to signal a historical shift in consciousness and morality, 
disrobing the “vesture of humanity that was peculiarly affecting,” a vesture of the past, in order 
to uncover—literally, to discover—the “reality of the human soul” in some future revelation.   
As avant-garde artists flocked to the pessimism of Schopenhauer (and later, Nietzsche, another 
one of the “subterranean intellectual influences” on Lawrence), they each seemed to rediscover 
the medieval Tristan legend as a way to think through the most modernist innovations (Worthen 
59). Nothing could be further from self-help than a bizarre story about lovers who do nothing but 
inflict pain on each other and themselves, thinking of their love in terms of apocalyptic 
destruction.  
Despite its variations across the centuries, the rough outline of the legend goes something 
like this: Tristan and Isolde are enemies, but because Tristan killed a dragon that had threatened 
Ireland, he is able to bring back Isolde as the bride of his king, Mark of Cornwall. Isolde’s 
mother prepares a love-potion for Isolde to drink so that she will fall in love with Mark on their 
wedding night, but on the ship both Tristan and Isolde get thirsty, and Isolde’s nurse mistakenly 
administers the potion to them. The two enemy lovers cannot resist the potion’s work on their 
bodies, even as they continue to hate each other. This triggers a series of events in which they 
continually risk their lives for pure lust, committing adultery and fleeing into the woods, where 
they feed on nothing but their passion for each other. They are miserable when they are together 
and miserable when they are not. Doomed to this intense love, they eventually die because of it. 
Tristan and Isolde see themselves not as excited lovers acting on their desire, but as 
lethargic, passive slaves to a blind, destructive, violent, and incomprehensible Will. This 
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understanding of love fits Schopenhauer’s definition in the essay that had left such a deep 
impression on Lawrence from a young age. It also provides a template to think through human 
relations in light of global, even apocalyptic, disaster. After World War I, this pessimistic vision 
of love became more resonant to artists like James Joyce, who uses the structure of this story in 
his 1918 play Exiles, and Virginia Woolf, who inserts an episode of seeing Wagner’s Tristan und 
Isolde in her war novel Jacob’s Room (Martin 55). T.S. Eliot cites Jessie L. Weston, who had 
translated Gottfried von Strassburg’s Tristan into English in 1899, as the inspiration for “not 
only the title, but the plan and a good deal of the incidental symbolism” of The Waste Land, 
which itself has allusions to Wagner’s version of the story (Eliot 140). 
Denis de Rougemont, who researched his landmark study Love in the Western World in 
the aftermath of the First World War and published it on the eve of the Second, in 1939, sees in 
the Tristan legend the bedrock of modern history. “Happy love has no history,” he writes in his 
introduction. “Romance only comes into existence where love is fatal, frowned upon and 
doomed by life itself” (1). He systematically works from Dante and Shakespeare to Stendhal and 
Wagner, viewing their love stories as variants of this legend. Rather than hiding in the delusional 
comforts of self-help optimism, de Rougemont turns to this story as a trajectory of Western 
culture in decline even as it inspired some of the greatest artistic achievements. 
This chapter will show how Lady Chatterley’s Lover is also modeled on the Tristan 
legend, and how it is this particular legend that allows Lawrence to make sense of modernity 
after the cataclysm of the First World War while informing his pessimistic vision of the future as 
one in which civilization will “have lovingly wiped each other out” (LCL 218). This pessimism 
is one that mediates between love and apocalypse, between self-help and anti-self-help. Using 
Blum’s recent insights into modernism as a response to the self-help genre, and responding to 
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critics like Stefania Michelucci about Lawrence’s treatment of physical and metaphorical space, 
I want to shed new light on how Lawrence uses the novel to challenge novelistic constraints.  
 
Cosmic Scale, Ancient Melancholy 
In the years after World War I, Lawrence wrote several essays as he began drafting what 
would eventually become Lady Chatterley’s Lover, a number of which also read as excoriating 
tracts against the self-help genre. “The ‘sweet’ novel is more falsified, and therefore more 
immoral, than the blood-and-thunder novel,” he insists in “Morality and the Novel” (1925) (173). 
“A new relation, a new relatedness hurts somewhat in the attaining; and will always hurt. So life 
will always hurt,” he continues (174). In his essay “The Future of the Novel” (1923), he writes 
that, “Some convulsion or cataclysm will have to get this serious novel out of its self-
consciousness. The last great war made it worse” (152). He imagines himself to be the bomb that 
would explode this genre into something new, so that we can find “a new world outside” (118). 
Lady Chatterley’s Lover maps out this new world. Lawrence’s lovers, like the Tristan 
lovers, return to the language of cosmic doom even when they are together, as when Mellors 
launches into the following post-coital monologue after their first tryst: 
…when I feel the human world is doomed, has doomed itself by its own mingy 
beastliness—then I feel the colonies aren’t far enough. The moon wouldn’t be far 
enough, because even there you could look back and see the earth, dirty, beastly, 
unsavoury among all the stars: made foul by men. Then I feel I’ve swallowed gall, and 
it’s eating my inside out, and nowhere’s far enough to get away. (220) 
Lawrence uses similar language, even as early as 1915, to articulate the effect of the First World 
War on him in a letter to Ottoline Morell:  
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So it seems our cosmos is burst, burst at last, the stars and moon blown away, the 
envelope of the sky burst out, and a new cosmos appeared, with a long-ovate, gleaming 
central luminary, calm and drifting in a glow of light, like a new moon, with its light 
bursting in flashes on the earth, to burst away the earth also. So it is the end—our world 
is gone, and we are like dust in the air. (Letters 2: 390) 
In this letter, Lawrence seems almost to exult in the destruction of “our cosmos” even as he 
laments it, illustrating the template for a new cosmos organized around something “like a new 
moon” that would wipe away even the traces of destruction. There is something generative and 
creative in this “long-ovate, gleaming central luminary.” Mellors, however, still sees the old 
moon in the wake of this destruction—and from the vantage point of that moon, imagines the 
dismal sight of earth in its rubble. Mellors’s pessimism is more intense than Lawrence’s from his 
1915 letter; Mellors is less willing to adopt a narrative of cosmic redemption. But Mellors’s 
pessimistic language is still a language of love—a language of engagement and connection even 
in its withdrawal and disavowal.  
 In the spirit of disavowal, perhaps it is possible to read Lady Chatterley’s Lover along the 
same lines as his previous essays. Just like his reversal of Franklin’s optimistic maxims, we can 
see him rejecting and reversing the standard modes of coping with loss in the post-WWI era, 
including even the methods of psychoanalysis, which he particularly reviled (Burack 20).42 Blum 
notes how, despite their differences, “self-help and psychoanalysis both stem from a new interest 
in the power of the invisible dimension of thought to shape one’s present and future actions” 
(Blum 122). Lawrence is not so much interested in this dimension of thought as he is in the 
 
42 For an opposite reading, in which “D.H. Lawrence was a virtual textbook embodiment of Freud’s theories about 
the pleasure principle and the death instinct” (207), see Alan W. Friedman, “D.H. Lawrence: Pleasure and Death.” 
Studies in the Novel 32.2 (Summer 2000). 207-228.  
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grounding of experience in the body. So when Freud distinguishes mourning from melancholia 
by writing, “In mourning, it is the world which has become poor and empty[; in] melancholia, it 
is the ego itself,” Lawrence’s novel seems to trace a melancholia beyond melancholia—
something that approaches an act of mourning both for the ego and the world, and whatever lies 
beyond the world. It is a cosmic pessimism that cannot be pathologized, treated, and cured 
(246).43  
This pessimistic vision is one in which Connie and Mellors carry on a litany of how the 
world, not the ego, has become apocalyptically poor and empty after the War. No grief-work will 
enrich it again. Connie wonders in her melancholy, “Couldn’t one go right away, to the far ends 
of the earth, and be free from it all?” (281). When she begins to acknowledge the attraction she 
feels for Mellors, she “felt herself released, in another world” (84). This world of ecstasy, in 
which “she walked away from herself,” becomes the only world she can inhabit with him (66). 
The pessimistic withdrawal from this world, then, paradoxically grounds the affirmative love that 
emerges between Connie and Mellors. It is a love that initiates what Mellors calls “a new cycle 
of pain and doom” (119). 
Right before consummating their affair, Connie experiences an inner expansion of self, in 
which her interiority merges with the interiority of the forest. Lawrence writes, “from the old 
wood came an ancient melancholy, somehow soothing to her, better than the harsh insentience of 
the outer world” (65). This “ancient melancholy” stretches back to the earliest iterations of the 
Tristan legend, where the most intense love intersects with the deepest sadness, the most sublime 
tristesse. The melancholy is just as “soothing” as it is destructive, just as stimulating as it is 
paralyzing, like the love-potion—a kind of pharmakon—that the Tristan lovers accidentally 
 
43 For more on cosmic pessimism, see Thacker, Eugene. Cosmic Pessimism, Univocal, 2015.  
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drink on the ship back to Cornwall. To the Tristan lovers, neither this world nor the next can 
provide the necessary space to accommodate the intensity of their passion for each other, so they 
have to create their own universe, their own world, their own enclosed space, renouncing and 
replacing all secular and religious law with the law of their love. Like Gottfried von Strassburg’s 
poem and Wagner’s opera, Lawrence’s novel treats love as its own religion.44 His aesthetic 
“[proposes] a Newer Testament to replace the extant one” (Schwartz 111). Mark Kinkead-
Weekes writes that this novel is, “at its deepest… a religious book. Since 1913 Lawrence had 
been maintaining in various ways that sex was a religious mystery…” (392). Lawrence’s 
religious reverence for erotic passion necessarily demands an iconoclastic view of the world.     
 The Tristan legend still risks repelling readers on the basis of its preachiness as it once 
offended its earliest readers on the basis of its sacrilege. Its language of self-indulgence and 
passionate excess aims to alienate the majority of its readership, picking out the select few who 
can appreciate this cultivated form of love.45 It is so exclusive that Gottfried, in his thirteenth-
century rendering of the tale, begins his epic poem by choosing only the most finely selected 
audience worthy enough of listening to it—an audience that constitutes a world in itself: 
Thus I have undertaken a labour to please the polite world and solace noble hearts—those 
hearts which I hold in affection, that world which lies open to my heart. I do not mean the 
world of the many who (as I hear) are unable to endure sorrow and wish only to revel in 
bliss. […] What I have to say does not concern that world and such a way of life; their 
way and mine diverge sharply. I have another world in mind which together in one heart 
 
44 “It is widely known that Wagner wrote a religious drama, but not so widely realised which of his works that is. 
Tristan und Isolde, often described as a paean to sensuality, a hymn to romantic love, even an exposé of its 
impossibility, is the work in question” (Tanner 140).  
45 In The Seducer’s Diary, Kierkegaard’s seducer Johannes writes, “A neutral third party does not always find the 
lovers to be most beautiful at this moment. I have witnessed trysts in which, although the girl was lovely and the 
man handsome, the total impression was almost revolting and the meeting itself far from beautiful, although it 
undoubtedly seemed so to the lovers” (28). 
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bears its bitter-sweet, its dear sorrow, its heart’s joy, its love’s pain, its dear life, its 
sorrowful death, its dear death, its sorrowful life. (42) 
Before the story even begins, Gottfried performs its inner actions, revealing the paradoxes and 
palindromes that govern every nuance of this most unusual love about to be spelled out. Only the 
reader sophisticated enough to follow the sinuous paths of these paradoxes is invited to continue 
reading. Lawrence, too, begins Lady Chatterley’s Lover in a similarly paradoxical fashion: “Ours 
is essentially a tragic age, so we refuse to take it tragically” (5). The love that both authors 
proceed to delineate exists in “another world,” but bears drastic consequences on the familiar 
one. It is a love that is as tender as it is violent, destroying as much as it unites, and upsetting 




 This paradox of an apocalyptic harmony is mapped out in the setting of every Tristan 
story, which conflates lush gardens and dense forests with barren wastelands and inhospitable 
climates. In the eleventh-century Persian epic Vis and Ramin, one of the earliest versions of this 
legend, Fakhraddin Gorgani writes, “…to the lovers, all this barren waste, / The fierce simoom, 
the countless trials they faced, / Seemed like a garden filled with sweet delight / So dear to them 
was one another’s sight” (166).  The enemy lovers, having renounced any allegiance to their 
King and faith, indulge in saccharine exclamations of how each other’s bodies provide the space 
for their own idealization of heaven. Like Connie and Mellors, “clinging to each other with 
uncanny force,” a force neither one can resist, Vis and Ramin are unable to let go of each other 
(LCL 173). They even drink while locked in their mutual embrace, a rather awkward image of 
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obsession, “[s]ucking the sugar of each other’s lips” in “greedy sips” (Gorgani 192). These are 
not just any sips—these are “greedy” sips. This is not just any love—this is the love of addicts. 
Every time they unite, there is a sense of euphoric relief, but also a sense of pain and dread. After 
making love with each other, they think “of the dawn when all the pain / Of separation would be 
theirs again” (193). It is, however, precisely this separation—this physical distance—that they 
need in order to feel the same rush, the same high, when they reunite again. Ramin, the male 
lover, tries to break this cycle of pain and doom by escaping to a nearby kingdom, where he finds 
another bride. But he comes back to Vis, telling her, “Why should I seek the world? If you’re not 
there / My soul knows only sickness and despair” (419). If he does not seek the world, and he 
returns to Vis, then the question arises as to what kind of space she occupies, being at odds with 
the world. 
 What is striking about the scope of this love—a scope that takes the expanse of the 
universe without being universal—is how the narrator inscribes himself into it. In one of the rare 
moments when Gorgani’s narrator shifts the attention away from the lovers to himself, he 
exclaims: 
O world, I will not hear your voice repeat / Its everlasting message of deceit. / And since 
I’ve witnessed everything you do / To other men, I’ll turn aside from you; / I’ve scoured 
my heart now of the scraps of trust / And love I felt for you, like so much rust… The 
world’s not worth our knowing, and its name / Should be unspoken and a source of 
shame. (485-86)   
If the name of the world should be unspoken, then what kind of utterance is available to the 
telling of the Tristan story? There is a Wagnerian caterwaul to its exclamatory presence, but 
there is simultaneously a stark reticence to it, as when Connie contemplates the “unspeakable 
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beauty to the touch” of Mellors’s naked body, feeling that she herself is “ocean rolling its dark, 
dumb mass” when she is with him, a “voiceless song of adoration moving through her” (174-75, 
136). It is the “unspeaking reticence of the old trees” that draws Connie to the woods, where she 
has sex with Mellors, whose “recoil away from the world was complete. His last refuge was this 
wood” (88). By speaking of the world as a source of unspeakable shame, and contrasting it with 
ebullient praise for the lovers, both Gorgani and Lawrence solicit us to imagine this particular 
experience of love as occupying a parallel space that emerges at the expense of this world, a 
space they invent through art. Gorgani even invites us to think of his own name as a space to 
protect these lovers from the rest of the world. Gorgan is a territory where the lovers frequently 
escape to, and when Vis’s husband King Mobad finds out, he shouts, “Damn Vis, and damn 
Ramin, and damn Gorgan” (482). Both Gorgan and Gorgani provide the space for the love of Vis 
and Ramin, damned both from this world and the next. Gorgan, then, is not so much a place that 
exists in this world as it is the fictional space in Gorgani’s imagination that opens up in its wake. 
 In Gottfried’s Tristan, the narrator similarly draws attention to himself only on the rare 
occasion when he calls on us to reconsider our notions of space. In the episode when Tristan and 
Isolde flee from King Mark and run off into the woods, they ultimately come across the Cave of 
Lovers. Gottfried abruptly interrupts the poem to say, without further elaboration, “I have known 
that cave since I was eleven, yet I never set foot in Cornwall” (266). It is a cave accessed only 
through this obsessive, addictive, all-consuming kind of love. He writes that, “No paths or tracks 
had been laid towards [this cave] of which one might avail oneself,” and that it lies in the midst 
of “wilderness and wasteland” (262). But the Cave here is not so much a feature of the natural 
landscape as it is a work of art, a hidden cathedral constructed by former giants for the worship 
of Love. The fugitive lovers lie together on “the bed of crystalline Love,” which we are 
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somehow supposed to accept as being comfortable (264). And, like Vis and Ramin, who subsist 
on the “greedy sips” of each other’s lips, Gottfried’s Tristan and Isolde “fed in their grotto on 
nothing but love and desire” (262). 
 In this space where this kind of love occurs, the most stylized form of art emerges from 
the depths of the wasteland and the wilderness. Crystalline beds are more desirable than anything 
softer. The lovers nourish their bodies on nothing but their bodies alone. A life of crime and 
addiction are glorified as states of divine ecstasy. And, in this space, the lovers violate not only 
the laws of the state and of religion, but even the laws of the natural world, especially if Gottfried 
could set foot here without ever having set foot in Cornwall. The Nurse who facilitates the love 
between Vis and Ramin tells them that rivers will flow into deserts before their love can ever be 
realized. The fact that their love is realized then suggests that the natural world order has already 
been disrupted. Ramin, when he is separated from Vis, sighs with longing, which Gorgani 
compares to a “wind that blows / In April, bringing cold December’s snows” (76). 
 
A Utopia of Failure 
 It would seem, by contrast, that Lawrence aligns the love between Connie and Mellors 
with the natural order against the artificial behemoth of industrialization, but in the hut where 
Connie and Mellors end up having sex, we see Connie “crying blindly, in all the anguish of her 
generation’s forlornness. His heart melted suddenly, like a drop of fire…” (115).46 In the outside 
world, tears drop and fires rise, but here fire drops like tears, and the melancholic tears instead 
rouse and elevate the lovers’ desire for each other. In every version of the story, the Tristan love 
arises only out of paradoxes. It is a love that equates tears with fire, melancholy with happiness, 
 
46 It is no coincidence, then, that even Swinburne, in his Tristram of Lyonesse, begins by describing desire as leading 
“these twain to the life of tears and fire…” (6). 
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pessimism with affirmation, apocalypse with genesis, poetry of the highest order with reticence 
and silence. This love erupts in a world without world, in a space that somehow defies spatial 
dimensions. They literally inhabit a utopia, but it is a utopia of failure, a utopia that cannot be 
sustained.  
It seems like the narrators get too carried away with their sentimentality when they say 
that the lovers can subsist only on their love. Of course this cannot be true; they eventually 
abandon their self-imposed exile in the Cave of Lovers, or the hut, or the wasteland, where 
everything supposedly is so perfect. De Rougemont argues that these lovers deliberately create 
obstacles for themselves, where none may exist otherwise (33). This is a melancholy not of loss, 
but of its opposite. Perhaps the only thing worse than the melancholy of unrequited love is the 
terror of a love fulfilled, a love that is reciprocated with an intensity that is aimed at obliterating 
the world. It is in this space where we see the lovers profess their love not through direct speech, 
but through a withdrawal from speech altogether. Language itself seems necessarily to fail in 
describing this love, just as much as speech necessarily fails in the act of kissing. 
 And yet, this failure also paradoxically indicates a remarkable achievement of language.  
Amidst constant wordplay and word-reversals, The Cave of Lovers is where “the name was well 
suited to the thing” (261). In “À Propos of Lady Chatterley’s Lover,” Lawrence explains that he 
also wrote the novel as a way to reconcile the Word with the Deed (329). Connie finds refuge in 
Mellors’s hut, not just as a way to fulfill her sexual desire, but to escape the world in which 
words no longer hold any value. The mystical space that the lovers inhabit is a space that 
dissolves the “hypocrisy” of language, a space that allows them to name themselves and their 
own world anew (50; 227).  
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 Language and space are mutually constitutive in the Tristan legend. The writers of the 
Tristan legend use language toward carving out a privileged space, one in which language itself 
is actively reevaluated by both the narrator and the lovers. Even on a formal level, the way 
language is organized across the page often corresponds to the space that these lovers occupy. 
Both Gottfried and August Graf von Platen structure their verses in quatrains, and within each 
one, the final rhyme is always a repetition of a word that had been introduced in the first line. In 
Platen’s “Tristan,” the entire last line repeats the first line, sectioning off each stanza from the 
rest of the poem. If the end and the beginning mirror each other, the enclosed space of the 
quatrain creates its own cyclical universe, paradoxically opening up this space to infinity and 
thereby effacing all notions of a beginning or an end. In this structural arrangement, Platen’s 
poem displays a total unity composed of isolated units, each one of these units just as complete 
in their own symmetries. Wagner similarly orchestrates the doom at the end of the opera in the 
opening bars of the prelude. But the delay of the tonic key in the Tristan chord, and the onerously 
repetitive and cyclical structure of the opera that fills the gap of this delay, create a musical space 
that allows the lovers to escape into the infinity of their own making.     
 
The Space of the Novel: Suiting the Name to the Thing 
Instead of poetry or any other art form, Lawrence chooses the novel to create this unique 
space for his lovers. And within the novel, itself, the narrator reflects on the novelistic form in 
spatial terms: “…the novel, properly handled, can reveal the most secret places of life: for it is in 
the passional secret places of life, above all, that the tide of sensitive awareness needs to ebb and 
flow…” (101, italics in original). In every Tristan story, the lovers escape to the forest or the 
garden to explore their “sensitive awareness,” and it is an exploration not just on the level of the 
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body, but of language, as well. Only the vernacular, for Lawrence, can reveal this “passional 
secret” place, and the novel can exploit the vernacular to an extent that no other genre can. In 
Gottfried’s Tristan, the secret place is The Cave of Lovers, a place just as literal as it is 
figurative. For Lawrence, this secret place is not just the hut in the woods, but the novel itself.  
In yet another paradoxical reversal, Lawrence’s meditations on the novel—which he 
places within a novel, as if fulfilling Schlegel’s injunction for a theory of the novel—bring him 
full circle back to the genre of self-help, the genre he adamantly rejected. Looking closely at 
Woolf’s essays, Blum examines how both the genres of self-help and anti-self-help overlap, 
demonstrating how modernist aesthetics end up replicating some of the rhetoric it attacks (129-
134). The same can also be said of Lawrence, who never felt quite comfortable with the other 
modernists because he believed, as Laura Frost writes, “the pursuit of novelty in and of itself 
produces overly self-conscious, too-deliberate art. The true artist, then, struggles between 
novelty and cliché” (106). It is as though he enters the self-help genre through the back door, 
unwilling to relinquish his pessimistic understanding of the world, which to him is a place 
overwhelmed by death and destruction. In Cosmic Pessimism, where Eugene Thacker 
paradoxically defines the titular term as, among other things, “the last refuge of hope,” he writes 
that he “like[s] to imagine the idea of pessimist self-help” (47; 4). The novel, for Lawrence, weds 
this idea of pessimism to self-help. It is precisely this last refuge of hope, this space we retreat to, 
in order to learn how to live. It is “not life” itself, as Lawrence writes in “Why the Novel 
Matters,” but only “tremulations on the ether” that stimulate us into life (195). In the same essay, 
he writes, “at its best, the novel, and the novel supremely, can help you. It can help you not to be 
dead man in life” (197).  
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Perhaps it is not just the novel as a genre he has in mind, but this specific one, aimed at 
instructing us in life the way Mellors instructs Connie in sex and the way Tristan tutors Isolde 
under the disguise of his name in reverse, Tantris. It is this awkwardly didactic—not to mention 
condescending—quality that Lawrence finds most admirable in the genre of the novel, even 
though any work that entertains such a pedagogic tone seems to be less of a novel than an 
instructional manual or a self-help book at such moments of authorial intrusion.47 Petar Penda 
argues that Lawrence “follows the same rule in the fictitious world of Lady Chatterley’s Lover” 
as he does in his essay “Morality and the Novel,” where he “convincingly argues that any 
imposition of morality on art is immoral” (39). This hardly seems to be the case, since Lawrence 
is imposing, quite heavy-handedly, his own moral code on this novel. 
Like Gottfried’s Cave of Lovers, where “the name was well suited to the thing,” the 
novel is the space for Lawrence the pedagogue to instruct us on how to use language after all 
“the great words, it seemed to Connie, were cancelled for her generation: love, joy, happiness, 
home, mother, father, husband, all these great dynamic words were half-dead now, and dying 
from day to day” (62). Lawrence demonstrates that the “King’s English” is incompatible with the 
love he sets out to describe (298). This English is a language associated with the mechanized, 
industrial England and its ruling classes, all of whom speak, act, and think in equally mechanical, 
inhuman ways.   
Gottfried comes to a similar conclusion when he writes about the first word that Connie 
feels is cancelled for her generation, ‘Love’: “All that we have is the bare word, only the name 
remains to us: and this we have so hackneyed, so abused, and so debased, that the poor, tired 
 
47 Laura Frost cites Michael Squires, Ian Gregor, John Worthen, and other critics who “concur that Lady 
Chatterley’s Lover became more didactic and polemical as Lawrence revised it” (118). Andrew Harrison writes that 
the novel “proved to be his most polemical work of fiction on the relations between the sexes” (354). 
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thing is ashamed of her own name and is disgusted at the word” (203). Lawrence’s project, like 
Gottfried’s, is to wrest this word away from the shame that had become attached to it in its 
worldly, vulgar usage. In the wake of the First World War, the rupture between the Word and the 
Deed had never been greater. To Connie’s generation, “the only reality was nothingness, and 
over it, a hypocrisy of words” (50).   
Her husband, Sir Clifford, participates in this hypocrisy. Paralyzed below the waist from 
the War, he is Connie’s husband in name alone. He turns his physical disability into contempt for 
all things bodily, withdrawing into the world of the cerebral and insisting on a language that has 
been deprived of its meaning. Chatterley is reduced to idle chatter, stubbornly perpetuating this 
empty language in his mediocre novels: “It was as if the whole of his being were in his stories” 
(16). If there is any obscenity48 in this novel, it is the misappropriation of language in instances 
when Clifford pronounces false banalities of love to Connie (112). She resorts to a silent but 
growing resentment, as if using her silence as resistance to the empty noise of his words. “She 
was angry with him, turning everything into words. […] How she hated words, always coming 
between her and life! They did the ravishing, if anything did: ready-made words and phrases 
sucking all the life-sap out of living things” (93). By retreating from language, both Connie and 
Mellors create a clearing for a new kind of utterance to take shape—a discourse eloquent in its 
mystical silence. And yet neither the characters nor the narrator can ever get outside language; all 
they can do is gesture to its limits and reimagine its possibilities. “In life and in art,” writes 
Daniel R. Schwartz, Lawrence “believed the best we can do is open up infinite possibilities” 
(111).  
 
48 Aldous Huxley, defending Lawrence, explains this reversal of obscenity: “It is against this unnatural vice and the 
life-hating perverts who practise it that Mr. D.H. Lawrence appears to be fighting. A militant, crusading author, he 
hurls himself on what he calls ‘the evil thing, the wicked people.’ But the evil thing is sacred in our modern world 
and the wicked people are precisely those Good Citizens who wield the powers of the State” (169). 
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Unlike his modernist contemporaries, Lawrence addresses this twentieth-century 
catastrophe in language by resisting standard usage without resorting to abstract language 
experiments. It is not abstraction he is after, but quite the opposite. To Andrew Harrison,  
…the full, conscious realisation of sex in the relationship between Connie and Mellors 
assumes an urgent role in counteracting wider cultural trends towards prurience and 
hypocrisy, so that language of sex is employed to stem the flow of linguistic abstraction 
and (if possible) to cleanse the Anglo-Saxon words of their dirty associations. (355) 
Lawrence uses language to mine a physical reality largely abandoned after World War I. He uses 
the term “stream of consciousness” not as a Joycean49 literary technique, but as an organic, 
phenomenal substance: “The quiver was going through the man’s body, as the stream of 
consciousness again changed its direction, turning downwards” (211). He even takes the 
opportunity to ridicule Proust in a conversation between Clifford and Connie, when she tells him, 
“But he bores me: all that sophistication! He doesn’t have feelings, he only has streams of words 
about feelings. I’m tired of self-important mentalities” (194). To Lawrence, Joyce and Proust use 
these “streams” as ways to signal how clever they are, concatenating ideas and impressions in 
ways that are largely abstract and cerebral, even if the technique is used to capture the experience 
of something intensely physical like Molly Bloom’s orgasm.   
Instead of re-creating the ubiquitous sense of alienation in the inter-war period through 
the language of “self-important” sophistication, Lawrence resorts to the vernacular Derbyshire 
dialect to recuperate the only possible connections available to humans in this seemingly 
apocalyptic world. If Standard English is the language of civilization, it is also the language of 
 
49 Writing to the novelist Compton Mackenzie in 1920, Lawrence complains of Joyce’s Ulysses, particularly Molly 
Bloom’s final speech: “This Ulysses muck is more disgusting than Casanova… I must show it can be done without 
muck” (qtd. in Britton, 8). Mackenzie “later came to wonder whether Lady Chatterley might have been conceived in 
that moment” (8).   
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the death, destruction, and alienation wrought by this same civilization during and after the War.  
The language of life, then—of sex, of establishing bonds instead of breaking them—is the 
language of the colliers, among the only people left after the War who have a physical and 
intimate contact with the earth, with the land, and with each other. Humanity’s last hope of 
endurance depends on this contact, this intercourse both linguistic and physical. To Charlie May, 
with whom Connie agrees, “sex is just another form of talk, where you act the words instead of 
saying them” (34). As Candis Bond notes, Lawrence’s treatment of sex, “when viewed as a 
language of the body, becomes generative in a new way” (23, italics in original). Sex as language 
and language as sex resist the hierarchy of English culture, threatening the sense of civilization it 
purports to uphold. To Penda, Mellors’s “use of dialect is a purposeful way of opposing 
civilization, which is often seen in the proper use of language” (33).   
Critics such as George Levine, however, have criticized Lawrence for not neatly 
resolving this impasse in language, and for resorting to the outdated mode of realism when he 
purports to be dispensing with it. “In his rejection of the conventions of realism, Lawrence 
belongs nevertheless to that great struggle of the realists both to use and to reject literature and 
language, for the sake of a reality beyond language. He is trapped like those before him in 
language…” (Levine 236). This failure of advocating for a new language without inscribing it 
into his novel places Lawrence not among his contemporary modernists, but among “the last of 
the great Victorians” (236).   
Julian Moynahan similarly questions “the inadequacy of words—any words—to set forth 
the meaning and drama of intimate physical and emotional experiences in which consciousness, 
on the narrator’s own admission, surges in a dimension of reality inaccessible to language” 
(162). He compares the efforts of Lady Chatterley’s Lover to the accomplishments of “Wagner’s 
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Liebestod sequence in Tristan und Isolde, which might be interpreted as orgasmic, [where] such 
questions do not arise” (163). Wagner is able to dissolve language into music; in his 
Gesamtkunstwerk, all of the arts merge to create a new mode of art. As a novel, Lady 
Chatterley’s Lover relies only on language—but it is a language that, despite its controversial 
diction, is not adventurous enough in dislodging itself from traditional narrative practices to 
reveal the inner sacred bonds that Lawrence is so intent on portraying.  
Lawrence seems to recognize this problem, however. His attempts at distancing himself 
from self-help, Victorianism, realism, and even modernism all end up in failure. In light of this 
failure, he ends up nudging language toward a silence that is rich in meaning, an absence that is 
not empty. “Well, so many words,” Mellors writes to Connie at the end of the novel, “because I 
can’t touch you. If I could sleep with my arm around you, the ink could stay in the bottle” (301). 
Language is not the word made flesh; the flesh will always be holier. While characters like 
Charles May and Tommy Dukes may view sex as a form of communication, Mellors views it as 
a form of communion, transcending any linguistic parallels.  
 
Reconfiguration of Space 
Lawrence’s merging of the linguistic and the physical creates a space that dissolves the 
boundary between interior and exterior. Before her affair with Mellors, the void of Connie’s 
interior world echoes the weariness of the world around her. “The world looked worn out,” she 
thinks to herself (47). But then this exterior world becomes synonymous with her own: “To 
Connie, everything in her world and life seemed worn out, and her dissatisfaction was older than 
the hills” (48). Among the many reversals in the novel is that the characters do not quite inhabit 
their spaces as much as the spaces inhabit the characters. Connie is drawn to the “inwardness of 
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the remnant of forest,” because it allows her to escape from Clifford and his exterior world of 
empty formalities and hollow language (65, italics in original). The inwardness of the forest 
becomes her own, so that when she has sex with Mellors, “[she] was like a forest, like the dark 
interlacing of the oakwood, humming inaudibly with myriad unfolding buds” (138). In a later 
episode, during anal intercourse, the metaphorical space of Connie’s interiority opens up a 
foreign territory with a foreign climate: “…she came to the very heart of the jungle of herself. 
She felt, now, she had come to the real bed-rock of her nature, and was essentially shameless. 
She was her sensual self, naked and unashamed” (247). 
In the same way that Gottfried could enter the Cave of Lovers without traveling to 
Cornwall, Connie’s space transports and transforms her from a forest to a jungle. She essentially 
merges with the alternative space that opens up in the course of consummating her love. By 
affirming her self against the world, a world that cannot be spoken of without shame, she 
discovers another space worth inhabiting, a space for shamelessness. The passage from the forest 
to the jungle is itself the passus, the passion, that these lovers endure. It is a passion that denotes 
as much erotic desire as suffering, and it becomes a religious rite that replaces Christ’s passio (de 
Rougemont 41). From the very beginning, they are haunted by a premonition of inevitable doom 
and destruction, and yet they precipitate this doom by loving each other all the more fiercely. 
When Connie first sees Mellors, “she [sees] in his blue, impersonal eyes a look of suffering and 
detachment, yet a certain warmth” (47). The entire course of their relationship is a struggle to 
affirm both this suffering and this warmth, which are the only values that Mellors believes in 
(206). But even with this belief, he “dreaded with a repulsion almost of death, any further close 
human contact” (89). When Connie asks him, “And were you sorry when I came along?” he 
replies, “I was sorry—and I was glad” (203-4).    
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Mellors’s face before copulation is “pale and without expression, like that of a man 
submitting to fate” (116). Like Tristan, his unbridled passion is tinged with a fatalist resignation 
and dread. “The desire rose again, his penis began to stir like a bird. At the same time an 
oppression, a dread of exposing himself and her to that outside Thing that sparkled viciously in 
the electric lights, weighted down his shoulders” (120). Connie, for her part, also dreads sex with 
him as much as she desires it. She “watched his face, and the passion for him moved in her 
bowels. She resisted it as far as she could, for it was the loss of herself to herself” (135).  
Returning repeatedly to her lover, who makes her “half afraid,” she “quivered again at the potent 
inexorable entry inside her, so strange and terrible. It might come with the thrust of a sword in 
her softly-opened body, and that would be death” (125; 173). Whether she is fearful of the pain 
or of his anger, sex for her—as for the Tristan lovers—carries with it the dread of death. 
In Space and Place in the Works of D.H. Lawrence (2002 [1998]),50 Stefania Michelucci 
leaves her only comments on Lady Chatterley’s Lover at the end, dismissing the novel as a return 
to “less ambitious objectives, abandoning every hope of rebirth for the entire community and 
limiting the range of the quest to individual existence” (107-108). By focusing on individual 
existence, though, Lawrence illustrates what is at stake not just for any community, but the 
global community, the scope of his novel panning out not just onto the world but the entire space 
of the cosmos. Michelucci nevertheless goes on to identify Lawrence’s treatment of space here 
as an opposition between 
…the line and the circle, or between the open and the closed, that is between movement 
onward towards new, always more distant places versus staying within the circularity of a 
world with fixed, but controllable limits, which is in the end the only effectively habitable 
 
50 Originally published in Italian as L’orrizonte mobile: spazio e luoghi nella narrative di D.H. Lawrence (1998). 
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space. Whereas the ‘line’ is oriented in the direction of large open spaces (which are 
never actually fully reached)… the ‘circle’ is formed by the circumscribed horizons of 
places culturally marked by human beings (albeit foreign)… [In] Lady Chatterley’s 
Lover, the circle is a familiar, circumscribed environment, the woods near her husband’s 
ancestral home, which makes it possible for… Connie to find a haven for her existential 
quest through her rediscovery of her own instincts. (108, Italics in original)  
While Michelucci’s readings of Lawrence’s works are deeply insightful, this particular reading 
does not address how Lawrence’s circular imagery also fulfills the function that Michelucci 
ascribes to the line. It is precisely in the “familiar, circumscribed environment, the woods,” that 
Connie is able to move “onward towards new, always more distant places” even as they are 
located inside herself. But if the border between inside and outside blur, then the distinction 
between movement and staying is no longer an entirely accurate one.  
I would argue that Lawrence is at his most sophisticated in his mystical reconfiguration 
of space in this novel. Linearity for Lawrence, moreover, paradoxically ends in a cul-de-sac: “I 
don’t want to grow in one direction any more,” he writes in “Why the Novel Matters.” “A 
particular direction ends in a cul-de-sac” (196). And circularity for him is anything but fixed or 
limited. He begins “Morality and the Novel” by writing, “The business of art is to reveal the 
relation between man and his circumambient universe, at the living moment” (171). This 
circumambience is predicated on change and flux, not stasis or familiarity. Lawrence illustrates 
this world in flux with a recurrent image of fluidity, heavily evocative of the fateful episode at 
sea when the Tristan lovers drink the love-potion and become aware of their mutual love and 
doom. Unmoored from this world, Connie feels as though she “had been fastened by a rope, and 
jagging and snaring like a boat at its moorings,” but now drifts to the new world she creates with 
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Mellors (86). With him, “she was like the sea” itself, and “her womb was open and soft and 
softly clamouring like a sea-anemone under the tides” (174; 133).51 She dissolves into “one 
perfect concentric fluid of feeling” rippling across the space they inhabit so that their 
surroundings reflect themselves: “In the dimness of it all trees glistened naked and dark, as if 
they had unclothed themselves…” (134; 122). Everything around her seems enchanted, buoyed 
by the tidal currents of her consciousness: “As she ran home in the twilight, the world seemed a 
dream; the trees in the park seemed bulging and surging at anchor on a tide, and the heave of the 
slope to the house was alive” (178). Even this prose sentence is propelled by a poetic tide of 
anapests, mirroring the structure of Swinburne’s Tristram of Lyonesse.    
Sex itself is figured as a kind of baptism, in which Connie would “sink in the new bath of 
life, in the depths of her womb” (136). The holiness of Mellors’s touch replaces any lingering 
traces of religion, and even this metaphorical bath replaces any literal bath she would have 
expected to take: “Connie would not take her bath this evening. The sense of his flesh touching 
her, the very stickiness upon her, was dear to her, and in a sense, holy” (137). As with 
Gottfried’s Tristan, the only character seen taking a bath is Tristan, and the observer—more of a 
voyeur—is Isolde, “who stole glance after glance at his hands and face [and] studied his arms 
and legs, which so openly proclaimed what he tried to keep secret. She looked him up and down; 
and whatever a maid may survey in a man all pleased her very well…” (173). When Connie 
chances upon Mellors taking a bath, “it was a visionary experience: it had hit her in the middle of 
her body. […] Perfect, white solitary nudity of a creature that lives alone, and inwardly alone” 
(66).  
 
51 At the same time that Lawrence published Lady Chatterley’s Lover, Freud was working on Civilization and its 
Discontents, in which he describes the sensation of eternity as “a feeling of something limitless, unbounded—as it 
were, ‘oceanic’” (11).  
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The Art of Courtless Love 
Perhaps it is not so much love-sickness as sea-sickness that Connie suffers from when she 
first sees Mellors, dissolved as she is into “one perfect concentric fluid of feeling” and seeing the 
trees as though they were “surging at anchor on tide”. “I’m not well lately, and I don’t know 
what’s the matter with me,” she writes to her sister Hilda (76). Hilda arrives from the Midlands 
at once, and is astonished at Connie’s unnamed illness. She takes her to a doctor, who “examined 
Connie carefully” and yet cannot diagnose her because “there’s nothing organically wrong” (78). 
In the Tristan legend, the presence of some kind of medical figure only serves to indicate that 
whatever illness is plaguing the lovers is beyond remedy and even beyond proper diagnosis. The 
illness, like the love itself, is otherworldly and therefore unaffected by any earthly treatment. The 
only intoxicating pharmakon that both relieves and intensifies the illness is the love she must 
repeatedly consummate with Mellors.       
Hilda takes Connie back with her to the Midlands so that she can regain her health, and 
Clifford hires Ivy Bolton to look after his own disability in Connie’s absence. Even though she is 
Clifford’s nurse, Mrs. Bolton “felt more at home with Lady Chatterley” upon Connie’s return 
(82-83). Like Brangaene to Isolde and the Nurse to Juliet, Mrs. Bolton serves as Connie’s 
confidante and private messenger, keeping “a cherishing eye on Connie, feeling she must extend 
to her female and professional protection” (85). She encourages the affair with Mellors, 
suggesting the path that Connie would eventually take to see him on the first occasion that they 
have sex (85). When Connie vacations in Italy, it is Mrs. Bolton she writes to in order to redirect 
her private missives to Mellors. Mrs. Bolton also underscores Lawrence’s scathing treatment of 
social class in the novel. She panders to Clifford’s self-importance and feels drawn to the luxury 
of Wragby Hall, even though she is simultaneously repelled by his lifestyle: “She liked the 
 217 
colliers, whom she had nursed for so long: but she felt very superior to them. She felt almost 
upper class. At the same time, a resentment against the owning class smouldered in her” (81). 
She is fundamentally “a nihilist, and really anarchic,” implicating herself in the destructive 
repercussions of Connie’s affair with Mellors (140). Clifford, for his part, feels that he is a potent 
ruler of the masses, even though all evidence points to the contrary. “…I believe there is a gulf 
and an absolute one,” he says, “between the ruling and the serving classes. The two functions are 
opposed. And the function determines the individual” (183). When he considers the practical 
ramifications of bearing an heir, he consents to the idea that Connie would have sex with any 
other man for the sole purpose of conception, as long as he is of noble prestige. The thought that 
she would be carrying a passionate affair with his gamekeeper is inconceivable.       
The Tristan romance is fundamentally a tale of courtly love—the lovers must be of noble 
rank; all appearances to the contrary are disguises to protect them from punishment. Both 
Gottfried and Béroul narrate episodes in which Tristan disguises himself as a member of the 
lower class, but it is always made clear to the reader that Tristan is a noble knight. Yet in an age 
when courtly love is an anachronism, Lawrence treats class itself as anachronistic, as well. Love 
for him outranks rank itself, instituting its own hierarchy in place of the enfeebled aristocracy.  
The Tristan lovers are necessarily foreign enemies to each other; now that the First World War is 
over, there is no greater enemy to British civilization than the lower classes who no longer 
believe in it.   
But Mellors belongs to no class. He had a modest upbringing, although he was well-
educated, having attended Sheffield Grammar School on scholarship. As much as he tutors 
Connie in the vernacular language of sex, he had also tutored Mrs. Bolton, decades earlier, in 
anatomy (145). Like Tristan, he distinguished himself as a valiant soldier in the War. Also like 
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Tristan, he faced combat in foreign lands, earning the respect of anyone who had seen him in 
battle. He “had been an officer, a lieutenant with a very fair chance of being a captain,” but 
returned to England after “his own narrow escape from death: his damaged health: his deep 
restlessness…” (141). When Connie thinks to herself, early in the novel, of the man who would 
inseminate her to give her husband an heir, she “had an idea that he would have to be a 
foreigner” (64). In a certain light, Mellors is precisely this foreigner, having returned from 
foreign countries to find himself even more estranged in his own. All he wanted after the War 
was “to be alone, and apart from life” (141). The only way to be as alone as possible was to 
return to the working classes and find work as Clifford’s gamekeeper. He is unimpressed with 
the “toughness, a curious rubber-necked toughness and unlivingness about the middle and upper 
classes,” but he is just as out of place in his own class: “So, he had come back to his own class. 
To find there, what he had forgotten during his absence of years, a pettiness and a vulgarity of 
manner extremely distasteful” (141-2). 
To Mrs. Bolton, though, Mellors is “quite the gentleman, really, quite the gentleman!”  
(145). Even Connie’s sister Hilda, who despises and condescends to him as an underling, “could 
not help realising that he was instinctively much more delicate and well-bred than herself” (244). 
He knows how to speak the English of the upper classes, but would prefer not to. Like Connie, 
he recognizes the pretensions of the “King’s English,” so he decides to speak the Derbyshire 
dialect instead, but he “spoke the vernacular with a curious calm assurance, as if he were the 
landlord of the inn” (243). The more that Clifford insists on the rigidity of the class system, 
though, the less he notices that he uses “turns of speech that oddly had a twang of Mrs. Bolton” 
(180).52 
 
52 “…Clifford, while he was better-bred than Connie, and more ‘society,’ was in his own way more provincial and 
more timid. He was at his ease in the narrow ‘great world’—that is, landed-aristocracy society—but he was shy and 
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If class is revealed through language, then Mellors’s disguises are not so simple to 
unravel.53 By speaking in dialect, Mellors disguises his gentlemanly awareness, but by speaking 
in Standard English, he disguises his working-class life. His nobility, though, is a nobility that 
cannot be communicated through language. It is much stronger, much more immediate and 
impressive than any nobility of class, or even of spirit. His nobility is in his physical prowess, in 
his virility, his accomplishments of the body. Admiring his penis, Connie exclaims that it is “so 
lordly!” (210).54 She then proceeds to knight him as the “Knight of the Burning Pestle,” to which 
he responds that she is “the Lady of the Red-hot Mortar” (227). It is in this way that Lawrence 
“represents sexual intercourse as the annulment of class segregation” (Penda 37). 
 
The Last Refuge of the Human 
Untethered from the world, Connie and Mellors exist in another realm where their free-
floating bodies and their surroundings need to be named and honored as though for the first time. 
With strongly biblical overtones, their love is as much genesis as it is apocalypse. With the 
thunder and rain crashing down outside of their hut, “it was like being in a little ark in the Flood” 
(216). For all they know, civilization has been wiped out—and the thought provides some relief 
for Mellors, who exclaims: 
 
nervous of all that other big world which consists of the vast hordes of the middle and lower classes, and foreigners. 
If the truth must be told, he was just a bit frightened of the vast hordes of middle and lower-class humanity, and of 
foreigners not of his own class. He was, in some paralysing way, conscious of his own defencelessness: though he 
had all the defences of privilege. Which is curious, but a phenomenon of our day” (10). 
53 “That Lawrence felt compelled, in writing each successive version of the novel, to reduce the social distance 
between the lady and the gamekeeper is a measure of how seriously he regarded divisions of class as impediments to 
love” (Sanders 12). 
54 “Though it is impossible to take him seriously when he has Connie rhapsodize about phallic worship, Lawrence 
here creates a couple who know and articulate as well as feel: their becoming open to multiple ways of 
communicating suggests that Lawrence means them to serve as fully realized exemplars of heterosexual love” 
(Friedman 224). 
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Quite nice! To contemplate the extermination of the human species, and the long pause 
that follows before some other species crops up, it calms you more than anything else.—
And if we go on in this way, with everybody, intellectuals, artists, government, 
industrialists and workers all frantically killing off the last human feeling, the last bit of 
their intuition, the last healthy instinct—if it goes on in algebraical progression, as it is 
going now: than ta-tah! to the human species! Good-bye! (218)  
Mellors’s pessimism here takes on a tone of exuberance. “Is that warning, or is that yearning?” 
Scott R. Sanders wonders (1). “The gamekeeper seems half to dread the prospect of 
extermination, half to relish it,” as the Tristan lovers do (1). It is as though, like the sorcery of 
Isolde, their affair magically conjures up the elements to celebrate their passion at the world’s 
expense. It also provides them a clearing so that they can re-name the new world of their own 
creation, beginning with the re-naming of their genitals and the flowers they use to decorate each 
other’s pubic hair (221-224).    
In this vertigo of genesis and apocalypse, their love transcends the finite end of 
procreation to include all creation, itself: “And as his seed sprang in her, his soul sprang towards 
her too, in the creative act that is far more than procreative” (279). Connie tells Hilda that, “love 
can be wonderful; when you feel you live, and are in the very middle of creation” (241). By 
renouncing their faith in the outer world, they affirm a higher faith in the world of their poiesis. 
In this transvaluation of values, the lovers postulate a new set of beliefs. After Mellors proclaims 
his only set of beliefs—that of “fucking with a warm heart” (206)—Connie later reaffirms this 
belief by telling him what distinguishes him from other men: “It’s the courage of your own 
tenderness, that’s what it is…” (277). Mellors responds, “Ay! it’s tenderness, really; it’s cunt-
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awareness. Sex is really only touch, the closest of all touch. And it’s touch we’re afraid of. We’re 
only half-conscious, and half alive. We’ve got to come alive and aware” (277). 
Lawrence’s working title for Lady Chatterley’s Lover was Tenderness—but, as Mark 
Spilka points out:  
Tenderness implies personal feelings, affections, soft sentiments from the conscious 
heart; and Lawrence usually speaks for dark impersonal passions from unconscious 
depths. Tenderness is, moreover, a conventionally romantic feeling, an aspect of romantic 
love; and Lawrence usually speaks against conventional romance. (171)   
Lawrence’s tenderness is precisely a departure from convention and a wholehearted disavowal of 
it. This kind of tenderness is a singular achievement of humanity, not a clichéd experience shared 
by the masses. It is primordial, not derivative; it destroys convention in order to create a new 
world in its wake. Connie feels it when Mellors “came with a strange slow thrust of peace, the 
dark thrust of peace and a ponderous, primordial tenderness, such as made the world in the 
beginning” (174).  
The word “tender” does not just correspond to the way that Mellors treats Connie’s body, 
but to the way that he lives on earth, tending to the land as a gamekeeper, protecting it from the 
threatening world of civilization and industrialization (Spilka 179). He exists “to fight that 
sparkling-electric Thing outside there, to preserve the tenderness of life, the tenderness of 
women, and the natural riches of desire” (120). In this word are also resonances of Isolde tending 
to Tristan’s wounds long before drinking from the fated love-potion, already establishing their 
relationship as intensely physical from the very beginning, on the verge of death—but also on the 
verge of a new kind of living. The only meaning of ‘tender’ that Lawrence actively renounces is 
the sense of a contractual offer. “So in the world as it is, what have I to offer a woman?” Mellors 
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asks Connie (275). She responds, “But why offer anything? It’s not a bargain. It’s just that we 
love one another” (275). Their tenderness is beyond tendering.          
The pursuit of this tenderness is a battle against the world. “I stand for the touch of bodily 
awareness between human beings,” Mellors says to himself, “and the touch of tenderness. And 
she is my mate. And it is a battle against the money, and the machine, and the insentient ideal 
monkeyishness of the world” (279). Both tenderness and the external world are mutually 
exclusive—as, for instance, when Connie “saw the forgetfulness of the world coming over him 
again, his face taking the soft, pure look of tender passion” (278). Like Tristan, Mellors is among 
the few sensual men in the world who are courageous enough in their own tenderness. “What a 
pity that fine, sensual men are so rare!” Connie thinks to herself, before contemplating the extent 
of this rarity: “Ah God, how rare a thing a man is!” (247-8).   
In her newly charted lexicon of love, a man by definition is a sensual being—and as such, 
is exceedingly rare. Most of the people who populate the earth, to Connie and Mellors, are 
neither men nor women, but humanoid automatons, slaves to an industrial annihilation of their 
own making. They delude themselves into the myths of productivity, substituting happiness for 
profit while pillaging the earth for their own gain. These are the same sterile people whom 
Clifford entertains in his parlor room, postulating hopes for a post-sexual world in which “all the 
love business, for example… might as well go. I suppose it would, if we could breed babies in 
bottles” (74). Tenderness, by contrast, is the last refuge of the human. Connie and Mellors are 
figured as the last humans, the last ones capable of this tenderness—but they are also the first 
ones, too. They are the first humans of a future world that will be inherited by their unborn child.   
Even so, this future world will be a miserable one. The sense of foreboding at the 
beginning of the affair persists until the end, wrecking the domestic order that Clifford stands 
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for. Appropriately, Clifford tries reducing his devastation to the level of language, to the level of 
the word, asking Connie, “I suppose you don’t at all mind having gone back on your word?” 
(294). The affair also makes Mellors endure public humiliation when his legally married wife, 
Bertha Coutts, attempts to move back in with him.55 But the prophetic gloom reaches far beyond 
the domestic spaces of the lovers’ legal partnerships, encompassing the entire world. Mellors 
writes to Connie at the end, “There’s a bad time coming. […] If things go on as they are, there’s 
nothing lies in the future but death and destruction, for these industrial masses” (300).  
Even with the extended passages prophesying universal doom and the destruction of 
civilization, Mellors ends by writing, “John Thomas says good-night to lady Jane, a little 
droopingly, but with a hopeful heart—” (302). The dash, though, replaces the more conventional 
period not just to end the letter, but the entire novel, providing an end that resists ending. 
Friedman notes how much “of Lawrence’s major fiction… concludes irresolutely, as if impelled 
by desire toward unreachable solutions, ones impossible of fulfillment or completion this side of 
death. Lawrence, it seems, lacked faith in the future he craved, one predicated upon affirmation 
of human relations and mortality” (207). It is as though Lawrence’s final punctuation mark 
empties out the penultimate word of any optimism, tenuously opening up the expressed hope to 
the abyss of the future.  
  
 
55 Their daughter is also named Connie, hinting at a parallel with the Tristan legend. Like Tristan’s relationships 
with the two Isoldes, Isolde the Fair and Isolde of the White Hands, the two Connies serve as indicators of vastly 






“A LAST MIRAGE OF WONDER AND HOPELESSNESS”:  
ANDERSEN’S “THE LITTLE MERMAID” AS A SHADOW TEXT OF NABOKOV’S 
LOLITA 
 
The Most Pessimistic Fairy Tale 
Long after the simultaneous explosion of Lily’s thoughts and Jasper’s gunshot, which 
both seem to set flight to a flock of starlings in To the Lighthouse, Lily sees the children playing 
a game of catch, and there is still  
a sense of things having been blown apart, of space, of irresponsibility as the ball soared 
high, and they followed it and lost it and saw the one star and the draped benches. In the 
failing light they all looked sharp-edged and ethereal and divided by great distances. 
Then, darting backwards over the vast space (for it seemed as if solidity had vanished 
altogether), Prue ran full tilt into them and caught the ball brilliantly high up in her left 
hand, and her mother said, ‘Haven’t they come back yet?’ whereupon the spell was 
broken. (61)  
The game, with the ball in midair, casts a spell that reorganizes the spatial relations of the 
characters, inserting “great distances” between them, and yet aligns the “one star” appearing in 
the twilight with the “draped benches.” The trajectory of the ball illuminates the “vast space” of 
the cosmos against the foreground of the yard. 
 This magical play of an animated unity, linking proximity with cosmic distance, is what 
Lily ultimately aims to fix in her art, painting the loving memory of that day ten years later. In 
Lolita, Humbert Humbert does something similar, finding in “the refuge of art” a way to fix his 
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elusive love, to transmit his fleeting memory into a permanent immortality (309). Among the 
final memories of his muse and victim is of her serving, rather than catching, a ball: 
My Lolita had a way of raising her bent left knee at the ample and springy start of the 
service cycle when there would develop and hang in the sun for a second a vital web of 
balance between toed foot, pristine armpit, burnished arm and far back-flung racket, as 
she smiled up with gleaming teeth at the small globe suspended so high in the zenith of 
the powerful and graceful cosmos she had created for the express purpose of falling upon 
it with a clean resounding crack of her golden whip. (231-32)    
Here, too, the ball in motion seems to cast a spell that reaches the “zenith of the powerful and 
graceful cosmos,” and the trajectory of Humbert’s thoughts, rather than an explosion that startles 
a flock of starlings, obsessively returns to the image of the single caged starling: “Where are you 
hiding, Dolores Haze? / Why are you hiding, darling? / (I talk in a daze, I walk in a maze, / I 
cannot get out, said the starling)” (255).  
Alfred Appel, Jr. notes how the starling’s refrain is a quotation from Laurence Sterne’s A 
Sentimental Journey, but also “partakes of Lolita’s origin, and its lament is at the book’s center” 
(Lolita 432, n.255/4). As Nabokov himself explains, he was “prompted” to write this novel in 
1939 “by a newspaper story about an ape in the Jardin des Plantes, who, after months of coaxing 
by a scientist, produced the first drawing ever charcoaled by an animal: this sketch showed the 
bars of the poor creature’s cage” (“On a Book Entitled Lolita” 311). Humbert sees himself as a 
dehumanized creature—trapped by a cage, trapped by Lolita, trapped by Trapp. He’s a starling, 
an “ape” (258), a “pentapod monster” (284). To him, Lolita has command of the entire cosmos. 
She is a figure of mythic qualities. Playing with the ball, she is like Nausicaa on the shore, 
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awakening to her sexuality with the sight of a stranded Odysseus. “Gray-eyed,” she also seems to 
fulfill the role of Athena accompanying Odysseus on his journey (278). 
If we are seduced into such comparisons, we must acknowledge the extent to which we, 
the readers, also fall into the many traps of this text—because the opposite holds true, as well. 
Lolita is hardly a Nausicaa; Odysseus never has sex with her, and she is left only with an 
adolescent fantasy of this foreigner. She is no Athena, either; instead of guiding him with divine 
power, she finds herself kidnapped and raped, strapped to the passenger seat of her rapist’s car 
across a nightmarish odyssey from coast to coast and back. It is not even so much The Odyssey 
that serves as a template for Nabokov’s aesthetic as Ulysses, either.56  
Humbert narrates more than just the bars of his prison cell; he tells a story that spans 
continents, going from Europe to North America, even with a stint in the North Pole, as well. Far 
from a beast, he sees himself as the apotheosis of civilized culture, condescending to the 
stupidity of American commodified life. It is precisely Lolita whom he dehumanizes in order to 
satisfy his predatory appetite for prepubescent girls. And, having raped and beaten her, using her 
not just as a sexual object but as a pawn in a clever literary game, one we are ostensibly meant to 
be impressed with in its erudition, he somehow wants to solicit our empathy—and has 
succeeded, for generations of readers—in rare moments of seeming authenticity, when he insists 
that “the world know how much I loved my Lolita, this Lolita, pale and polluted, and big with 
another’s child…” (278). In moments of dubious self-deprecation, he identifies Lolita as the 
 
56 In a 1965 interview, Nabokov called Ulysses “a divine work of art,” which “will live on despite the academic 
nonentities who turn it into a collection of symbols or Greek myths. I once gave a student a C-minus, or perhaps a 
D-plus, just for applying to its chapters the titles borrowed from Homer while not even noticing the comings and 
goings of the man in the brown mackintosh” (Strong Opinions 55). For comparisons between Lolita and Ulysses, see 
Appel’s Introduction to The Annotated Lolita (1991). Nabokov also said, “Oh, yes, let people compare me to Joyce 
by all means, but my English is patball to Joyce’s champion game” (Strong Opinions 56). However, he insists that, 
“James Joyce has not influenced me in any manner whatsoever”—perhaps a case of protesting too much under the 
anxiety of influence (102). 
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unmoved mover of an ecstatically confining cosmos, and yet at the end, he vows to “create a 
brand new God and thank him with piercing cries,” if only she would give him the hope of one 
day moving back in with him (280). He takes pride in having “woven throughout this memoir 
with the express purpose of having the ripe fruit fall at the right moment,” orchestrating 
coincidences that no mortal could take responsibility for (272). This postlapsarian fruit recalls 
the episode when Lolita repeatedly tosses an “Eden-red apple… up into the sun-dusted air” the 
way she later tosses the tennis ball, until Humbert intercepts it (58). In his characteristic 
manipulative semblance of generosity, he gives it back to her, but by the time she is done eating 
it, “her shameless innocent shanks and round bottom shifted in my tense, tortured, surreptitiously 
laboring lap” until he ejaculates in his pants, setting “paradise loose” (59-60).   
In perhaps the most horrifying act of violence, he takes it upon himself to give Lolita 
immortality—“the only immortality you and I may share” (309). She is granted immortality only 
so long as it is tethered to his own, only so long as it belongs to his narrative and serves his 
artistry, only so long as he gets to write her, create her, impose on the surface of her identity 
anything he wishes to, imagining her as his own “Lolita—perhaps, more real than Lolita; 
overlapping, encasing her; floating between me and her, and having no will, no consciousness—
indeed, no life of her own” (62). He claims to write this work “to save not my head, of course, 
but my soul” (308). Much has been made of his grandiose, operatic opening sentence—“Lolita, 
light of my life, fire of my loins”—but the next sentence perhaps sheds more light on how he 
sees her: “My sin, my soul” (9). It is never her soul that is Humbert’s concern, even in retrospect, 
but only his. She exists even after her death only as his soul (9).57 She is nothing but an extension 
of him, “safely solipsized”—trapped as a mirror of his desires (60).  
 
57 Julia Bader observes that “Lolita is described in minute detail: her smell, her mannerisms, her thigh, and arm 
measurements are given with meticulous precision. But only too late does Humbert realize that he has given her no 
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When she first pleads for him to return the apple she had been tossing in the air, she 
shows “the marbled flush of her palms,” and he, for his part, takes stock of the fact that the 
hollow of his hand “was still ivory-full of Lolita,” whose skin is “ivory-smooth” (58; 67). In 
moments that Humbert would later refer to as “icebergs in paradise,” he recalls that after having 
his way with her, he  
would gather her in my arms with, at last, a mute moan of human tenderness (her skin 
glistening in the neon lights coming from the paved court through the slits in the blind, 
her soot-black lashes matted, her grave gray eyes more vacant than ever—for all the 
world a little patient still in the confusion of a drug after a major operation)—and the 
tenderness would deepen to shame and despair, and I would lull and rock my lone light 
Lolita in my marble arms, and moan in her warm hair, and caress her at random and 
mutely ask her blessing… (285)  
This is a far cry from the tenderness that we see in D.H. Lawrence. This is a tenderness that 
denies the subjectivity of the Other. It is not even clear from this passage whether the tenderness, 
as well as the shame and despair, belong to him or to her. From Humbert’s perspective, he would 
like us to think that it is shared. But both he and Lolita are marble statues to each other, mutely 
asking for the other’s blessing, mutely soliciting the other, in despair, in a bid for their own 
immortality. 
 Lolita is a palimpsest that explicitly draws on a vast number of shadow texts, but the one 
that highlights this marmoreal dynamic and this plea for immortality is the most pessimistic fairy 
tale ever written, Hans Christian Andersen’s “The Little Mermaid.” It is the story of a young 
 
soul, that in spite of his painstaking artistry he has failed to appreciate her wonder and mystery, and it shocks him to 
the border of unconsciousness to think that ‘I simply did not know a thing about my darling’s mind, and that quite 
possibly, behind the awful juvenile clichés, there was in her a garden and a twilight, and a palace gate’ (p.259)” (77). 
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mermaid who falls in love with a prince by first seeing a marble statue of him, and gives up her 
voice to the sea-witch in order to trade her fishtail for a pair of human legs so that she can secure 
the prince’s love. Only through holy matrimony can she be granted an immortal soul, but after 
rescuing the prince from shipwreck and unable to explain herself without a voice, the prince 
mistakenly chooses another bride whom he thinks had rescued him instead. The nameless girl 
who had once been a mermaid then commits suicide as a result, throwing herself into the sea on 
their wedding night. It is the only fairy tale where the protagonist commits suicide and the witch 
goes unpunished.58  
Nabokov himself writes about how he had cried over this story as a child with his English 
governess (Speak, Memory 87).59 The story is indelibly bound up with his own childhood as it is 
with his relationship to the English language. Jane Grayson identifies his preoccupation with the 
figure of the mermaid in his transition from writing in Russian to English, seeing in the mermaid 
a representation of “continuity through change, a way through from one world to the next” (170). 
Mermaids, like the butterflies that Nabokov was obsessed with, are emblems of metamorphosis. 
And we can actually trace the metamorphosis of Lolita’s mermaid-like story to the last work of 
fiction he had written in Russian before moving over to English, a posthumously published work 
translated as The Enchanter.  
The story is roughly the same, though its prose is often just as cringeworthy as its subject 
matter, like when the nameless Humbert figure, as the “Enchanter” of the title, euphemistically 
 
58 Bruno Bettelheim is so insistent in his claim that, “The myth is pessimistic, while the fairy story is optimistic, no 
matter how terrifyingly serious some features of the story may be,” that, in his comprehensive study of the fairy tale, 
The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales, he never mentions Andersen’s “The Little 
Mermaid” once (37). It is too problematic to fit into his reductive view of the optimism that is supposedly inherent 
in the genre. He begrudgingly brings up Andersen only to say that stories like “The Little Match Girl” and “The 
Steadfast Tin Soldier” are too sad to properly be called fairy tales, even though he notes that they are some of the 
most popular stories of this genre, and are widely anthologized in fairy tale collections (37).  
59 Emily Collins notes Nabokov’s association of this governess, Miss Norcott, with the sea, since her two other 
appearances in Speak, Memory are on beaches (79).  
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passes his “magic wand over her body” (73). Enchantment, of course, invokes a particular use of 
language, summoning its supernatural power to cast a spell. Enchantment is the chant that, in its 
enunciation, overwhelms the power of any other kind of language to resist its force, which is 
why its victim, like the mermaid, is rendered voiceless.   
This kind of enchantment is part of the Ur-Humbert’s “pact with happiness” (56). It is a 
pact that dissolves past, present, and future so that his victim is trapped into an enclosed eternity 
that is entirely governed by him:  
As he imagined the coming years, he continued to envision her as an adolescent—such 
was the carnal postulate. However, catching himself on this premise, he realized without 
difficulty that, even if the putative passage of time contradicted, for the moment, a 
permanent foundation for his feelings, the gradual progression of successive delights 
would assure natural renewals of his pact with happiness, which took into account, as 
well, the adaptability of living love. Against the light of that happiness, no matter what 
age she attained—seventeen, twenty—her present image would always transpire through 
her metamorphoses… And this very process would allow him, with no loss or 
diminishment, to savor each unblemished stage of her transformations. Besides, she 
herself, delineated and elongated into womanhood, would never be free to dissociate, in 
her consciousness and her memory, her own development from that of their love, her 
childhood recollections from her recollections of male tenderness. Consequently, past, 
present, and future would appear to her as a single radiance whose source had emanated, 
as she had herself, from him, from her viviparous lover. (56-57) 
By the time Nabokov scraps this project for Lolita, Humbert ends by insisting that he loves “this 
Lolita, pale and polluted, and big with another’s child,” but it’s difficult not to read this 
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solicitation for the reader’s sympathy as yet another trap (278). Through the “pollution” of 
Dolores’s seventeen years, Humbert still sees the nymphet Lolita of his own imagination and his 
own control, just as his literary predecessor would see the same image “transpire through her 
metamorphoses” (56). Pregnant and “elongated into womanhood,” she still “would never be free 
to dissociate” from him (57).   
“Happiness,” then, becomes a cipher of horror, of violence, of pessimism. Through this 
“enchantment,” the girl is forever trapped in an eternity of the worst. By the time we get to 
Lolita, the word “happy” is issued as a threat, as an act of violence that hides all the other acts of 
violence in the novel. We see this in Humbert’s threat to her, instructing her not to contact the 
police:  
Let us suppose they believe you. […] Okay. I go to jail. But what happens to you, my 
orphan? […] While I stand gripping the bars, you, happy neglected child, will be given a 
choice of various dwelling places, all more or less the same, the correctional school, the 
reformatory, the juvenile detention center… You will go there, Lolita—my Lolita, this 
Lolita will leave her Catullus and go there, as the wayward girl you are. (150-51) 
This is the trap set up for the “happy, neglected child.” It’s chilling to read this passage side by 
side one of the most famous passages, toward the end, when Humbert says, “I insist the world 
know how much I loved my Lolita, this Lolita, pale and polluted, and big with another’s child, 
but still gray-eyed… still mine… Come just as you are. And we shall live happily ever after” 
(278). This is the passage readers and critics point to, perhaps with too much exaggeration, 
claiming that Humbert has changed, that this moment is one of true love rather than exploitation. 
But the language of possession is the same (“my Lolita, this Lolita… still mine…”). And the 
disturbing language of happiness is just reinforced. Humbert breaks down Dolores into the 
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“happy, neglected child” precisely in order to envision his complete control over her, 
ensorcelling her into the fairy tale ending of, “And we shall live happily ever after.” The rhetoric 
of happiness here insidiously hides and ignores the pain and violence that are inflicted in its 
name.   
And this bleak vision of happiness is what binds Lolita not only to The Enchanter, but to 
an even earlier novel that Nabokov had written in Russian, translated as The Gift, where Boris 
Ivanovich tells Fyodor: 
Ah, if only I had a tick or two, what a novel I’d whip off! […] Imagine this kind of thing: 
an old dog—but still in his prime, fiery, thirsting for happiness—gets to know a widow, 
and she has a daughter, still quite a little girl—you know what I mean—when nothing is 
formed yet but already she has a way of walking that drives you out of your mind—A 
slip of a girl, very fair, pale, with blue under the eyes—and of course she doesn’t even 
look at the old goat. What to do? Well, not long thinking, he ups and marries the widow. 
Okay. They settle down the three of them. Here you can go on indefinitely—the 
temptation, the eternal torment, the itch, the mad hopes. […] Eh? D’you feel here a kind 
of Dostoevskian tragedy? (186) 
Narratologists point out that behind Humbert’s narrative is the narrative of John Ray, Jr., and 
behind that one is the narrative of Nabokov, himself. But maybe there’s one more narrator even 
behind Nabokov, who happens to be this minor character from one of his other novels, giving us 
here the summary of the entire plot of Lolita in its earliest iteration, a summary framed by 
“thirsting for happiness” and “mad hopes” (186).60 And when Humbert tells us that he “felt a 
 
60 Nabokov, of course, would disagree with such a reading, rejecting the notion “of how a character takes hold of [a 
writer] and in a sense dictates the course of the action” (Strong Opinions 69). “My characters are galley slaves,” he 
insists (95). 
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Dostoevskian grin dawning (through the very grimace that twisted my lips),” maybe this is Boris 
Ivanovich twisting those lips from behind Humbert’s mask (Lolita 70). Since The Gift was 
written between 1934 and 1937, and Humbert first meets Dolores Haze when she is twelve years 
old in 1947, then both Lolita and Lolita can be said to have been born in The Gift, and not, as 
Nabokov said it, when he saw the caged ape at the Jardin des Plantes in 1939. 
The gift that Humbert ends up giving Lolita, a year after he first intrudes into her life, is a 
“de luxe volume with commercially ‘beautiful’ illustrations, of Andersen’s The Little Mermaid” 
for her thirteenth birthday (174). The gift is meant as one from a father figure to his daughter 
instead of a rapist to his victim, but he acknowledges that “as father to Lolita… I was a 
ridiculous failure” (174). As Emily Collins notes, even though Humbert evokes an eclectic array 
of fairy tales, this is the only one we know of that he buys her as a gift; all of his other presents 
are non-fiction (77). It could be that, within the universe of this dark fairy tale that traps Lolita to 
Humbert, “The Little Mermaid” is meant to be taken as non-fiction, accurately reflecting the 
story of the eponymous but voiceless child.  
There is never any indication of what Lolita herself thinks of the gift, or whether she had 
even read it. She receives it in the exhaustion of their mad itinerary across the country, and it 
serves more as an emblem of how they “had been everywhere. We had really seen nothing” 
(175). This “long journey had only defiled with a sinuous trail of slime the lovely, trustful, 
dreamy, enormous country that by then, in retrospect, was no more to us than a collection of dog-
eared maps, ruined tour books, old tires, and her sobs in the night—every night—the moment I 
feigned sleep” (175-76). Two years later, on her fifteenth birthday—the same birthday that 
Andersen’s mermaid gets to experience the land of humans on the surface—Humbert gets rid of 
all her belongings while shedding “merman tears” (255). He even has to appropriate her sobs 
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from years of sexual abuse and make them his own, as if he himself were the victim, seduced by 
the “nymphean evil breathing through every pore of the fey child…” (125).  
Nabokov’s use of mermaids has been well-documented.61 However, so far only Collins 
has focused on the role of Andersen’s particular mermaid in Lolita. But where Collins concludes 
her perceptive close reading of the novel in light of the fairy tale with the claim that “Lolita’s 
outlook is not as pessimistic… as Humbert would like it to be,” I think it would be a mistake to 
downplay the pessimism not just in Lolita’s outlook, but in the entire work (95). Other scholars 
like Jane Grayson are also just as uncomfortable with settling on a pessimistic reading of Lolita, 
arguing that Nabokov’s gradual transition from the use of the mermaid as the vengeful rusalka 
figure from Eastern European lore to Andersen’s gentle creature moves “from the negative to the 
positive variants of the legend—from the loss, despair, guilt, revenge aspects of the tale, to those 
versions which highlight motifs of intercession, reconciliation and immortality” (175). But 
Nabokov demonstrates in this novel that any notion of immortality is predicated on loss, despair, 
and guilt. And as the pessimistic blueprint of these associations, he turns to Andersen’s fairy tale.  
 
A Failed Fairy Tale 
In his first lecture of the Great Novels course at Cornell, Nabokov issued this opening 
statement:  
Great novels are above all great fairy tales. […] Literature does not tell the truth but 
makes it up. It is said that literature was born with the fable of the boy crying, ‘Wolf! 
 
61 See especially Grayson, Jane. “Rusalka and the Person from Porlock.” Symbolism and After: Essays on Russian 
Poetry in Honour of Georgette Donchin. Ed. Arnold McMillan. London: Bristol Classical Press, 1992. 162-85; 
Johnson, D. Barton. “‘L’inconnue de la Seine’ and Nabokov’s Naiads.” Comparative Literature 44.3 (1992): 224-
48; Meyer, Priscilla. Find What the Sailor Has Hidden: Vladimir Nabokov’s Pale Fire. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan 
UP, 1988; Meyer, Priscilla and Jeff Hoffman. “Infinite Reflections in Nabokov’s Pale Fire: The Danish Connection 
(Hans Christian Andersen and Isak Dinesen).” Russian Literature 41 (1997): 197-22. 
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Wolf!’ as he was being chased by the animal. This was not the birth of literature; it 
happened instead the day the lad cried ‘Wolf!’ and the tricked hunters saw no wolf… the 
magic of art is manifested in the dream about the wolf, in the shadow of the invented 
wolf. (Lolita 347) 
If Lolita is a “great novel,” then it is because it aspires to the pre-novelistic genre of the fairy 
tale.62 Humbert is at once the boy crying ‘Wolf!’ as well as the animal itself. He plays every part 
in the story, even the “tricked hunter”—or, rather, the enchanted hunter—who dreams about the 
wolf, and whose name (its root is from the Latin umbra) suggests its shadow. This is a novel that 
lays bare its genealogy of genre, tracing back to the origins of storytelling.  
But both Lolita and “The Little Mermaid” only touch on the fairy tale genre while 
refusing categorization. In addition to Bettelheim, folklorists like Sheldon Cashdan refuse to call 
“The Little Mermaid” a fairy tale precisely because of how bleak it is (163). If anything, this 
work subverts the Romantic genre by moving from enchantment to disenchantment and 
disappointment. The magical creature ends up being disappointed both in her sea realm and in 
the world of humans. She gives up her mermaid tail and her voice so that she can live in a reality 
that is far removed from any fantasy land, but finds that this reality is just as unforgiving. The 
story draws on a composite of genres, from Romance to anti-Romance and Bildungsroman. The 
original manuscript even ends on the note of a personal confession. Lolita, too, is also framed as 
a confession and a fictional autobiography. In the Foreword, John Ray, Jr. calls this a “memoir” 
(3), but then says that it can be viewed “simply as a novel” (4). He then proceeds to call it a 
“case history” and then “a work of art” (5).  
 
62 Douglas Fowler, whose work has otherwise not dated well, also refers to Lolita as a “great fairytale” (175). 
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The genre changes, seemingly, based on who is reading it. And Humbert loves to dismiss 
his readers by naming them. At first it is “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury” (9), but then he even 
mocks any reader: “…my patient reader, whose temper Lo ought to have copied” (139). 
“Imagine me,” he taunts us. “I shall not exist if you do not imagine me” (129). This is the boy 
crying wolf, trying to trick the hunter into imagining his story. But once we take the bait, we 
engage in a dizzying reassignment of roles. We are not the hunter, but rather the hunted, falling 
into his traps. He has a special disdain for readers who read with the hubris of hunters, sniffing 
out clues to explain away his story in a reductive manner: “Why does the way she walks—a 
child, mind you, a mere child!—excite me so abominably? Analyze it” (41). 
This is a disdain that Humbert actually shares with Nabokov, himself. “In addition to 
conventional moralists,” Thomas R. Frosch writes, “Nabokov detests psychiatrists and literary 
critics, and it is against these types of readers—or these metaphors for the Reader—that Humbert 
wages constant war” (43). In short, this is a novel written for someone who either isn’t a reader 
(like Lolita), or for someone who reads too well. The novel becomes a substitute for an 
impossible love (if it can even be called that)—a “love that is more than love”—narrated by 
someone like Othello, who thinks of himself as loving not wisely, but too well. The novel reads 
like echoes of Othello’s lyrical lament, proclaiming his love for Desdemona after strangling her 
to death. Both the Little Mermaid and Desdemona—and even Ophelia, who dies a 
“mermaidlike” death—endure fatal violence inflicted specifically on their throats, at the site of 
language.63 
 
63 Carl Proffer maintains that the “most important literary echo of her real name, Dolores Haze, is from Algernon 
Swinburne’s ‘Dolores’…” (28). In the poem, Swinburne also draws attention to Dolores’s throat as the intersection 
between desire, pain, youth, and violence: “Wert thou pure a maiden, Dolores, / When desire took thee first by the 
throat?” (qtd. in Proffer 29).  
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 Humbert needs to silence Lolita so that only he can be heard—but by whom? Brian 
Boyd writes that the “careful reader is precisely Nabokov’s ideal audience” (“Even Homais 
Nods” 58), but maybe the careful reader is not exactly Humbert’s ideal audience. For someone 
who despises allegory and symbolism, Nabokov’s “hero-villains are often allegorists like 
Humbert, who imposes his fantasy of Annabel Leigh on Lolita and turns her into a symbol of 
monomania,” not to mention the original transposition of Edgar Allan Poe’s Annabel Lee onto 
Annabel Leigh (Frosch 44). Humbert draws on literature as an allegory for his own experiences 
in much the same way as Dante’s Paolo and Francesca fall in love with each other through the 
act of reading itself, learning about love by reading the Arthurian romances of Lancelot and 
Guinevere. The story, of course, is told in the Inferno, and Humbert takes on the roles of not only 
these lovers, but of Dante and Virgil, guiding us through his own allegorical hell. 
The intimidation tactics of not only Humbert, but also Nabokov, in aggressively 
dismissing allegorical interpretations of their narratives, are symptomatic of their proprietary 
claim to allegory and literary criticism in the first place.64 “Allegory, as Angus Fletcher has 
shown, is demonic and compulsive; it is a spell, enchanted discourse. Nabokov, on the contrary, 
tries to create structures that defy interpretation and transcend the reader’s allegorism…” (Frosch 
44). The hubris, then, is not in the reader’s “allegorism,” but in Nabokov’s—and Humbert’s—
attempt at creating “structures that defy interpretation.” Such a utopian attempt is bound to fail. 
 
64 Nabokov’s own literary criticism leaves much to be desired, claiming that “many accepted authors simply do not 
exist for me” (Gold 202). Among these “complete nonentities” are Brecht, Faulkner, and Camus, as well as “the 
pretentious nonsense of Mr. Pound, that total fake” (203). Balzac, Dostoevsky, Stendhal, Conrad, and Henry James 
are also not worth his attention. He is too eager to dismiss Death in Venice as “asinine” (Strong Opinions 57) as well 
as any influence from James Joyce (102). Don Quixote is a “cruel and crude old book,” and Kafka’s “The 
Metamorphosis” interests him only insofar as he mistakenly reads in the text an invitation to identify the specific 
kind of bug that Gregor Samsa turns into, demonstrating only that Nabokov could not even begin to understand 
Kafka (203). Nabokov is certainly entertaining, if not entirely persuasive, in his idiosyncratic readings and heavy-
handed opinions presented as incontrovertible truths. He relishes in the practice of literary criticism insofar as he can 
condescend to any other critic as a mediocrity. But for all his “instinct to digs at great reputations,” as Edmund 
Wilson observed, his own reputation should not be exempt from similar treatment (qtd. in Strong Opinions 266).   
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There is no art and no language that defies interpretation, and any sneer at the literary critic is an 
expression of contempt that criticism and interpretation are necessary at all. 
Maybe it is for this reason that critics are not likely to read Nabokov as a pessimistic 
writer, bullied by his dismissive attitude to pessimists. In an early short story, he wrote that a 
minor character “was a pessimist and, like all pessimists, a ridiculously unobservant man” (“An 
Affair of Honor” 218). At the risk of being “ridiculously unobservant,” I think the evidence of 
pessimism in his work warrants re-evaluation. He almost seems to plagiarize Schopenhauer, for 
example, when he writes in Speak, Memory: “The cradle rocks above an abyss, and common 
sense tells us that our existence is but a brief crack of light between two eternities of darkness. 
Although the two are identical twins, man, as a rule, views the prenatal abyss with more calm 
than the one he is heading for…” (19). Schopenhauer writes that “our existence is but an 
infinitesimal moment between two eternities,” which is his justification for not being afraid of 
death (The Wisdom of Life 14).65 Nabokov captures the concept of two eternities on either end of 
an infinitesimal moment in the image of the hourglass, the name of the lake that separates him 
from Lolita. Anyone who gets in the way is treated with scorn and ridicule.   
To Humbert, especially, the ridiculed “Reader” is just the haze that stands in the way of 
his ideal and impossible reader: Lolita, who is dead by the time that Humbert’s manuscript 
would have been read by anyone, and who was never much of a reader to begin with. It is she 
whom he directly addresses both at the beginning of the work (“Lolita, light of my life, fire of 
my loins”) and the end (“And this is the only immortality you and I may share, my Lolita”) (9; 
309). Her name frames the entire narrative, and is even echoed in the first word of John Ray, 
Jr.’s Foreword, which itself is framed by the title on the cover of the book, so that her name 
 
65 Pascal, however, found this concept terrifying: “The eternal silence of these infinite spaces fills me with dread” 
(Pensées 66). 
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reverberates through the circles of hell that imprison Humbert in its frozen center. As much as he 
wanted to fix her like a pinned butterfly, he ends up being the one frozen in place, tormenting 
both himself and the memory of those who had suffered because of him.  
Any reader who is not Lolita is then positioned as an intruder in the text—an invader, an 
enchanted hunter who responded to the wrong cry. It is as though the reader interrupts Humbert 
calling out to her just as much as his first sexual experience with Annabel Leigh was interrupted 
in his “princedom by the sea”—not so much a place as a time that remains forever unfulfilled 
(9).66 He writes this as a letter with an impossible addressee, a book for no living reader, a 
modern equivalent to a medieval verse lapidary, the beginning and ending coming full circle 
with the same word, the same name, uttered in futility.67 This is the only immortality he can hope 
to share with her.68 
Andersen also ended the original manuscript of “The Little Mermaid” with a plea for 
immortality, one which he hoped to share with the man he loved: “I myself shall strive to win an 
immortal soul… that in the world beyond I may be reunited with him to whom I gave my whole 
heart” (155). He transforms the dark fairy tale into a private confession, into a letter that would 
never be read by the man he was deeply in love with, Edvard Collin, who had married a woman 
 
66 Time and space are interchangeable in this novel, as Humbert notes: “It will be marked that I substitute time terms 
for spatial ones. In fact, I would have the reader see [the ages of] ‘nine’ and ‘fourteen’ as the boundaries—the mirror 
beaches and rosy rocks—of an enchanted island haunted by those nymphets of mine and surrounded by a vast, misty 
sea” (16). 
67 It is worth noting that the sketch for Humbert in The Enchanter was a jeweler, so we can read Lolita as a kind of 
jewel in his possession. The crystalline effect of his prose was apparent even to its earliest readers. Walter Minton, 
the president and publisher of G.P. Putnam’s Sons, found an excerpt of the novel in the apartment of his mistress 
Rosemary Ridgewell, a nightclub showgirl who said, in 1958, “I thought Nabokov had a very interesting way of 
writing, very, you know—crystalline?” (qtd. in Weinman 212). As a result of Ridgewell introducing Lolita to 
Minton, G.P. Putnam published the novel in the United States after its bowdlerized version was first published in 
France. 
68 The hopelessness suggested by the spherical architecture of the novel is also reiterated in Nabokov’s memoir 
Speak, Memory: “I have journeyed back in thought—with thought hopelessly tapering off as I went—to remote 
regions where I groped for some secret outlet only to discover that the prison of time is spherical and without exits” 
(20). 
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the day before Andersen started writing this story (123). Like the mermaid herself, Andersen 
ended up removing his own personal voice articulating his own desire, and deleted these lines 
before publication. Instead, he ends with a sinister warning to the children reading the tale of this 
girl who had just committed suicide and has now become a “daughter of the air,” equipped with 
absolute surveillance of children’s behavior. Her “time of trial” before entering heaven and 
attaining an immortal soul is set at 300 years, but if she or any other daughter of the air comes 
across a child who is “mean or naughty,” they would “shed tears of sorrow and each of those 
tears adds another day to our time of trial” (155). P.M. Pickard calls Andersen’s ending 
“unsuitable for children,” and P.L. Travers, the author of Mary Poppins, says, “Andersen, this is 
blackmail. And the children know it, and say nothing” (qtd. in ibid. 88; 92-93).   
 
Rewriting Andersen  
The reader in both works, then, is singled out as delaying or interrupting both the 
mermaid and Humbert from attaining immortality with those they love. But while Andersen’s 
vision of immortality is a Christian one, Nabokov empties his articulation of immortality from 
any religious notions whatsoever. Lolita herself dies on Christmas Day in 1952, giving birth to a 
stillborn child instead of a figure of hope and salvation who would have shared the same 
birthdate as Jesus (4).69 The Via Dolorosa is hinted at in Lolita’s given name, Dolores, but is 
removed in the diminutive nickname that Humbert prefers.70 He actively chooses to ignore the 
pain explicitly spelled out in her name.71 When he marries her mother, the platitudinous 
 
69 The last time Humbert sees her, she is already pregnant, and letting him pass through the doorway, she “flattened 
herself as best as she could… and was crucified for a moment” (270). 
70 Nabokov chose this name for the “roses and tears” embedded in it: “My little girl’s heartrending fate had to be 
taken into account together with the cuteness and limpidity” (Strong Opinions 25).  
71 Brian Boyd points out that Lolita “is not the name she, her mother, her friends, or her teachers ever use” (229). 
This name, and the fantasy identity of a magical nymphet that Humbert tethers to it, is entirely Humbert’s own 
creation.  
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Charlotte Haze, she tells him that, “if she ever found I did not believe in Our Christian God, she 
would commit suicide,” a prospect not entirely unwelcome for the man who plots to get rid of 
her in order to have sex with her prepubescent daughter (75).    
If there is any Second Coming in the novel, it is Annabel Leigh coming back in the form 
of Dolores. Humbert is “convinced… that in a certain magic and fateful way Lolita began with 
Annabel,” his childhood seaside crush, whose “seaside limbs and ardent tongue” have haunted 
his imagination ever since they had to interrupt their copulation. When Annabel would kiss him, 
her mouth was “distorted by the acridity of some mysterious potion,” and her “seaside limbs” 
became “lovely live legs… not too close together…” (14-15). It is as though Annabel, who never 
says a word in Humbert’s narrative, is not just the Annabel of his childhood or even of the Edgar 
Allan Poe poem, but the voiceless mermaid of Andersen’s story, especially with the emphasis on 
the “mysterious potion” and her “seaside limbs.” Humbert casts himself as the mermaid’s prince, 
which is why he changes Poe’s “kingdom by the sea” to “princedom by the sea” (9). But the 
roles are not quite as static as they appear. The magical forking of the mermaid tail into two legs 
also seems to serve as a metaphor for his own memory: “…I surrender to a sort of retrospective 
imagination which feeds the analytic faculty with boundless alternatives and which causes each 
visualized route to fork and re-fork without end the maddeningly complex prospect of my past” 
(13).  
Since Andersen’s mermaid dies while her prince is still alive, so too must Annabel. But 
Humbert “broke her spell by incarnating her in another,” and when he first sees Dolores, 
“without the least warning, a blue sea-wave swelled under my heart and, from a mat in the pool 
of sun, half-naked, kneeling, turning about on her knees, there was my Riviera love peering at 
me over dark glasses” (15; 39). This is a girl whom Humbert imagines to have been, in her fetal 
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state, “a little curved fish,” but who has now grown up to engage in “backfisch foolery,” a term 
Nabokov borrows from German to signify “an immature, adolescent girl” with the “seaside of 
her schoolgirl thighs” (76; 113; 376; 42). Humbert thinks of her as a “gaspingly adorable 
pubescent pet,” and the prince in Andersen’s story also treats the mermaid as a pet, insisting 
“that she must never leave him, and she was allowed to sleep outside his door on a velvet 
cushion” (Nabokov 172; Andersen 147).72 
Lolita is a talented swimmer, being one of only two girls at camp who “could make 
Willow Island (some swimming test, I imagine),” perhaps a nod to Andersen’s mermaid, who 
retreats to her underwater garden with a weeping willow (137; 125). She idolizes a man in a 
magazine advertisement that she pastes to her wall (above an image of Clare Quilty) in the same 
way that the mermaid idolizes the statue of the prince that falls to her garden from a shipwreck 
(69). The “conquering hero” in this ad, dressed in a robe over pajamas, bears a “striking” 
resemblance to Humbert, which also parallels the attraction the mermaid has both for the artistic 
representation of the prince and for the prince, himself. Humbert, for his part, is careful to wear 
his own “white pajamas with the cornflower blue (not the lilac) design on the back” around her, 
echoing the opening of Andersen’s fairy tale: “Far out at sea, the water is as blue as the petals of 
the prettiest cornflowers and as clear as the purest glass” (57; 120).73 Nabokov also refigures the 
second simile in this opening sentence, comparing water to glass as “Hourglass Lake” / “Our 
Glass Lake,” where Lolita’s mother Charlotte disappoints Humbert as “a very mediocre 
mermaid” (81; 43; 86). Humbert fantasizes about drowning her, leaving her body “in the inky 
 
72 Humbert later calls her a “precocious pet!” and in The Enchanted Hunters hotel, he thinks to himself, “Oh, what a 
dreamy pet!” (49; 120). In the other hotels they frequent, there “was sometimes a special line in the write-up, such as 
‘Children welcome, pets allowed (You are welcome, you are allowed)’” (146). In between hotels, Humbert “petted 
her in the parked car in the silence of a dusk-mellowed, mysterious side road…” (146). 
73 Frosch interprets the cornflower blue insignia as a reference to Spenser and Novalis: “Like Spenser’s Red Cross 
Knight, [Humbert] rides forth on his quest adorned by the image of his guiding principle, in his case a blue 
cornflower on the back of his pajamas—the blue cornflower being Novalis’s symbol of infinite desire” (40).  
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ooze, some thirty feet below the smiling surface of Hourglass Lake” (87). This “inky ooze” 
could also refer to the ink of his printed words, as well—in the doom that hides in the depths 
“below the smiling surface” of his “gloomy good looks” (104). 
After Nabokov’s puppet-mastery removes the hindrance of Charlotte by having her die in 
a car accident, Humbert dives headlong into his fantasy of sharing the rest of his life with 
Dolores. When he goes to buy clothes for her, he “moved about fish-like, in a glaucous 
aquarium. I sensed strange thoughts form in the minds of the languid ladies that escorted me 
from counter to counter, from rock ledge to seaweed, and the belts and the bracelets I chose 
seemed to fall from siren hands into transparent water” (108). He ends up kidnapping Lolita, 
who holds the clothes he bought her “between her silent hands” and walks “through dilating 
space with the lentor of one walking under water” (120). In The Enchanted Hunters hotel, 
paneled in “seasick murals,” he plies her with sleeping pills, which he likens to a “magic potion” 
so that he can rape her (122). Violating her, he effectively takes her voice away: “Loquacious Lo 
was silent” (140).  
 
“The Horrible Hopelessness of it all” 
It is at this point in the narrative that Humbert acknowledges the discrepancy between 
reality and fantasy: “I should have understood that Lolita had already proved to be something 
quite different from innocent Annabel… I should have known (by the signs made to me by 
something in Lolita—the real child Lolita or some haggard angel behind her back) that nothing 
but pain and horror would result from the expected rapture” (124-25). Like Andersen’s prince, 
who mistakenly asserts that the girl he is marrying is the same one who had saved him at sea in 
the past, Humbert conflates the identities of Lolita with Annabel. But even after he disentangles 
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them in his mind, he continues to think of them as contiguous figments of his imagination that he 
gets to mold along the way.  
Just as much as Humbert is addressing this work to Lolita, he is writing Lolita herself 
(and Lolita itself). He is crying her name and inventing her at the same time. And yet that name 
belongs to a human girl, not the “fey child” of his imagination (125). She is someone who 
refuses to be written or created, someone whose interiority will forever be unknown to her rapist. 
It is precisely the conceit of inventing and writing her as a fantastical creature that is one of 
Humbert’s many violations against her, the fact that what he “had madly possessed was not she, 
but my own creation, another, fanciful Lolita—perhaps more real than Lolita; overlapping, 
encasing her; floating between me and her, and having no will, no consciousness—indeed, no 
life of her own” (62). He functions with the delusion that this is a “love that is more than love,” 
and she is a Lolita “more real than Lolita” (62). By dwelling in this fantasy of his creation, he 
inflicts unbearable harm on the real child, and in his mind, the fact that he cannot ever get this 
real Lolita to love him constitutes his greatest failure.  
Perhaps as a taunt to the reader, Humbert complains that, in attempting to fix the one 
point where the “beastly and beautiful merged… I fail to do so utterly. Why?” (136). Modesty 
only comes to him in moments of irony, except for the ending—if one is to be persuaded by the 
authenticity of his feeling. But Frosch thinks of Humbert as exemplifying the failed Romantic, a 
“nineteenth-century hero out of his age” (46). He “was a failed artist early in his career, who 
tried to translate art into life and again failed, and… then turned a third time to art, now as a 
refuge, a sad compensation, and a ‘very local palliative’ (285)” (48). “Having in effect destroyed 
her,” Frosch continues, “he now wants to make her ‘live in the minds of later generations’ (311)” 
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(48). The ‘you’ that replaces Lolita with the reader then amounts to an attempt to seduce us into 
feeling pity for his failure, and generations of readers have fallen into this cynical trap. 
Lolita, for her part, perhaps with some premonition about what is to happen to her on the 
first night of their hotel stay, “softly…turned away” from him “with a hopeless sigh” (128). 
Denis de Rougemont sees this novel the way I see Lady Chatterley’s Lover, as a modern 
reincarnation of the Tristan legend, with two doomed lovers whose hopelessness and pessimism 
outscale the world itself.74 As in Tristan, de Rougemont reads this novel as a story of “lovers 
[who] flee the world, and the world with them” (The Myths of Love 53).75 Humbert writes, 
almost like an echo of Mellors wanting to leave the world, that his “only regret” after checking in 
to The Enchanted Hunters was that he “did not quietly deposit key ‘342’ at the office, and leave 
the town, the country, the continent, the hemisphere,—indeed, the globe—that very same night” 
(123).  
Humbert’s entire project in this work is to make sense of another world, after having left 
his trail of destruction76 in this one: “I am trying to describe these things not to relive them in my 
present boundless misery, but to sort out the portion of hell and the portion of heaven in that 
strange, awful, maddening world—nymphet love” (135). This is a world of his own creation, and 
despite “the horrible hopelessness of it all, I still dwelled deep in my elected paradise—a 
 
74 Of course, Nabokov reserved choice words for his opinion about Lady Chatterley’s Lover: “…I must fight a 
suspicion of conspiracy against my brain when I see blandly accepted as ‘great literature’ by critics and fellow 
authors Lady Chatterley’s copulations…” (Strong Opinions 102). It is common for scholars to compare both Lady 
Chatterley’s Lover and Lolita solely for their publication history and the similar legal battles that had ensued in the 
1950s and early 1960s, but they are rarely compared for their treatment of pessimistic love (Bowlby 156).  
75 De Rougemont also places too much emphasis on the reciprocity of these “lovers,” writing about a “mutual 
attraction” between Humbert and Lolita without ever highlighting the crimes that Humbert has perpetrated against 
her (49). 
76 Humbert writes, “And I catch myself thinking today that our long journey had only defiled with a sinuous trail of 
slime the lovely, trustful, dreamy, enormous country that by then, in retrospect, was no more to us than a collection 
of dog-eared maps, ruined tour books, old tires, and her sobs in the night—every night, every night—the moment I 
feigned sleep” (175-76). 
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paradise whose skies were the color of hell-flames—but still a paradise” (166). No earthly space 
can accommodate Humbert’s apocalyptic desire for Lolita, a desire that makes him “long for 
some terrific disaster. Earthquake. Spectacular explosion… Lolita whimpers in my arms. A free 
man, I enjoy her among the ruins” (53). 
What frustratingly eludes readers like de Rougemont and Lionel Trilling is the painfully 
obvious way in which Humbert and Lolita do not resemble the Tristan lovers (or Lawrence’s 
lovers). Tristan never rapes Isolde, and while neither of them can be said to have any agency or 
control over their desires or actions, there is never such a disproportionate imbalance of power 
and violence in the relationship. Humbert, of course, knows this, which is why he goes to great 
lengths—as any predator would—to make himself out to be the victim, arguing that he is falling 
under Lolita’s spell rather than the other way around.  
At stake here is the issue of freedom at work in Humbert’s conception of love. The 
Tristan lovers can only imagine freedom as a postapocalyptic fantasy, as Humbert imagines 
himself as a “free man” to “enjoy her among the ruins.” He may be free, but she never is. It’s not 
entirely necessary to resort to Sartre to make the case that someone in her state is not in a 
position to reciprocate what passes as “love” for Humbert, but Sartre articulates the concepts of 
love and freedom, as does Nabokov, with the image of metamorphosis: “Just as wisdom is 
proposed as a state to be attained by an absolute metamorphosis, so the Other’s freedom must be 
absolutely metamorphosed in order to allow me to attain the state of being loved” (Being and 
Nothingness 370). Humbert does everything he can to prevent Lolita’s metamorphosis, her 
freedom, so that he can keep her as a child for as long as possible.   
Ellen Pifer traces Nabokov’s idea of freedom back to the Romantic role of the child in 
Wordsworth, Blake, and Dickens, where “the child’s wonder, innocence, and spontaneity 
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constitute the image and embodiment of human freedom and creativity. In striving to attain his 
perfect world or paradise, Humbert deprives Lolita of her rightful childhood—and betrays the 
principles of romantic faith and freedom” (103). Lolita only ever speaks about freedom in 
clichés: “This is a free country,” she fires back at her mother after being told that there will be no 
picnic the next day (46). She is denied even the language to speak specifically about her own 
freedom, which amounts to another form of silencing. Lolita’s liberation from Humbert 
symbolically occurs on the Fourth of July, a holiday to celebrate both American independence 
and optimism, but this liberation becomes only another kidnapping, another instance of sex 
trafficking and imprisonment, this time from Quilty. 
A closer analogue to this expression of freedom and love than the Tristan legend is “The 
Little Mermaid” itself, which still bears heavy traces of this legend with its potion, prominent sea 
imagery, the doubling of Isolde figures—and the prince eventually abandoning his first love-
interest for the second—and the overwhelming, fatal passion. But this particular story centers on 
the one-sided experience of a child’s desire; Lolita mirrors this story, narrating the one-sided 
desire for the child. “The Little Mermaid” traces a determined girl’s struggle for freedom and 
recognition, traveling across the seascape and the landscape, traveling across genre from the 
Romance to the Bildungsroman, and even across gender when she dons a page’s costume to 
explore the world of humans on horseback through forests and mountains (147). The tragedy of 
Lolita is that her own determination and struggle to escape her captor is hardly narrated, and she 





Between Humbert and Beardsley: Against Optimism 
 Early on in the novel, Humbert writes that, in becoming an adult with his appetite for 
nymphets, his “world was split. […] One moment I was ashamed and frightened, another 
recklessly optimistic” (18). It is paradoxically his reckless optimism that leads him to commit the 
most horrific acts of violence and violation. In “the possession and thralldom of a nymphet,” he 
condescendingly explains to the reader, “the enchanted traveler stands, as it were, beyond 
happiness” (166, italics in original). He ostensibly intends this to mean a joy beyond happiness 
to match his love that is more than love, since “there is no other bliss on earth comparable to that 
of fondling a nymphet” (166). However, he quickly qualifies this state beyond happiness as one 
of “horrible hopelessness” (166). It is a paradise for him, but one “whose skies were the color of 
hell-flames” (166). He is so beyond happiness that he stands on the other side of it, residing in a 
space of deep gloom, like the “inky ooze” beneath the “smiling surface of Hourglass Lake” (87). 
Dolores, most probably out of self-preservation, can only withdraw from this hopelessness by 
going to the movies, which provide her a “grief-proof sphere of existence wherefrom death and 
truth were banned…” (170). But her idolization of celebrities leads her to the lair of Clare Quilty, 
where she is treated just as terribly as she is by Humbert.  
The mask of optimism in this novel slips to reveal either a nightmarish world of sadistic 
torture, which is then aggressively defended as “love,” or just a world of empty, sentimental 
stupidity. When Humbert enrolls Lolita at Beardsley, headmistress Pratt explains the school’s 
philosophy to him: “…we do try to turn our backs to the fog and squarely face the sunshine” 
(177). This is a school that stresses “the four D’s: Dramatics, Dance, Debating and Dating,” all 
of which Dolores is, by now, sufficiently skilled at (177). Perhaps contemporary and future 
readers of the novel will soon miss the humor in Humbert’s account of this school’s philosophy, 
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since its utilitarian curriculum does not include “irrelevant topics”—like Shakespeare—in a 
frightening parallel to today’s data-driven and STEM-heavy evisceration of humanities curricula 
across the nation’s high schools and colleges, and for the same reason as Beardsley: for a 
“financially remunerative modern touch” (178). Humbert tries to make up for this gap in the 
humanities by purchasing books for her—among them “The Little Mermaid”—but both Humbert 
and the Beardsley school attempt to reduce Lolita to their image of what she ought to be, 
insidiously passing off this confinement as an education. “Jean-Jacques Humbert,” as he calls 
himself at one point, is hardly a Rousseau, and Dolores is hardly his Émile. 
It may appear at first glance that Dolores would take well to Beardsley’s curriculum. Not 
much of a reader, she, “even at our very best moments, when we sat reading on a rainy day,” 
would impatiently look “from the window to her wrist watch and back again” (174). Collins 
notes that there is no actual evidence that Dolores even ends up reading “The Little Mermaid” 
(95). And why would she? Humbert purchases that copy for her birthday at the same bookstore 
where he purchases “a book with the unintentionally biblical title Know Your Own Daughter” 
(174). Dolores “knows better than to read the book Humbert offers her as the companion volume 
to the modern guide for manipulative men that he is studying” (Collins 95). The very opposite of 
the story of a girl who loses her voice is the teaching philosophy at Beardsley, where 
headmistress Pratt says that she wants “our girls to communicate freely with the live world 
around them rather than plunge into musty old books” (177).  
But maybe there is a different possibility. Maybe Dolores does not fully align with either 
Beardsley’s or with Humbert’s models of education, but casts her own critical eye on them both, 
studying just enough to withdraw into a space beyond their reach. Dolores, like the mermaid, has 
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an uncanny power of perception—enough so that she can eventually make her escape.77 She 
picks up on details that even Humbert does not notice until she is gone. Under Humbert’s 
surveillance, it is impossible to truly “communicate freely with the live world.” One of the many 
dangers of being enslaved to him is that she does end up being plunged into a musty old book, 
into Lolita itself. But the “sunshine” that Beardsley promises does not impress her, either. 
Whereas Beardsley encourages its girls to “turn our backs on the fog,” the older that Dolores 
gets, the more she actually does withdraw into the fog spelled out in her last name, until she is 
cosmically unreachable, a distant cloud of pain, Dolores Haze—a gray star residing in Gray Star, 
past hope and past help.78 
According to one of her school reports, Dolores, like the mermaid while she still resides 
in the sea, “[e]njoys singing with group in class though mind seems to wander” (194). The report 
continues to hint at an opaque interiority, out of reach from anyone else: “A little dreamy. Has 
private jokes of her own, transposing for instance the first letters of some of her teacher’s names” 
 
77 When the mermaid has human legs, she looks down from the railing of the prince’s ship, from where “she thought 
she could see her father’s palace, and there at the top of it was her old grandmother, a silver crown on her head as 
she stared through the turbulent currents at the keel of the vessel” (149). With her bare eyes, she plumbs a distance 
that the narrator has established in the beginning as “so deep that even the longest anchor can’t touch bottom” (120). 
Earlier, when she first sees the prince, the narrator adopts her perspective when describing the ship, which “was so 
brightly illuminated that you could see even the smallest piece of rope” (133). When she rescues the prince from 
shipwreck, there is a moment in which “it was so dark that she couldn’t see a thing, but then a flash of lightning lit 
everything up so that she could make out everyone on board” (133).  
78 In Sarah Weinman’s The Real Lolita, a devastating biography of Sally Horner, the eleven-year old girl who was 
kidnapped, raped, and taken across the country from 1948-1950 by a man named Frank La Salle as Nabokov was 
drafting Lolita (Nabokov only makes a parenthetical reference to her in the novel), Weinman notes how one of La 
Salle’s “most notorious aliases was that of Frank Fogg” (58). The crime made national headlines, and Nabokov 
documented its details in his index cards that he had used to draft Lolita (177-8). In a draft of the screenplay that 
Nabokov had written for Lolita, he introduces a character named “Dr. Fogg,” who turns out to be a disguise for 
Quilty (246). Since La Salle presented Sally to the public as his own daughter, sometimes even while he was going 
by his own name, this would make Sally’s name coincidentally sound Nabokovian: “Sally La Salle” (with the same 
ring to it as another Lolita character, Vanessa Van Ness). Another alias La Salle gave Sally was “Madeline 
LaPlante” (89). Nabokov plays on the “madeleine” motif from Proust, and Humbert has sex with a child prostitute 
“on a gray spring afternoon somewhere near the Madeleine” (21). The actual name of La Salle’s ex-wife, Dorothy 
Dare, also sounds as though she were a Nabokov character. One of the most depressing aspects about this case was 
that, “The consensus about Sally and her ‘father’ was that they ‘seemed happy and entirely devoted to each other”—
the same kind of terrifying vision of “happiness” that is portrayed in Lolita (114). 
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(195). Of course, these spoonerisms are indicative of Humbert’s own rhetorical patterns, 
especially from the night when he first rapes her, saying things like, “What’s the katter with 
misses?” and “Show, wight ray” (120). The fact that she seems to ventriloquize Humbert in her 
own private jokes with herself suggests the degree of control that Humbert wields over her. In 
the absence of her own voice, all she has is his to control her narrative.  
But the use of spoonerisms in this novel identifies moments in which this power is 
reversed. Humbert even admits that his “word-control [is] gone” when he says, “What’s the 
katter with misses?” (120). He is no longer the pursued prince in his own narrative, but the 
mermaid who has lost control of her voice, and who can only hope, in his own words, to “moan 
and die” in the presence of his beloved (120). And when he tells her, “Show, wight ray,” it is as 
though John Ray, Jr.—who introduces this narrative—demonstrates his own editorial control 
over the text. Ray’s ray beams through the holes in the mask that Humbert takes great pains to 
avoid from slipping. Ray warns the reader in his Foreword that this text is a “mask—through 
which two hypnotic eyes seem to glow” (3). His metaphorical light aims to outshine the hypnotic 
effect of Humbert’s eyes, cutting through the entire narrative.  
Dolores, in turn, does not participate in this game of narrative control by shining an even 
brighter light through the text. She moves in the opposite direction, withdrawing into a dark 
space that cannot be seen by either of these men and refusing to play by their rules. Through 
insults, she distinguishes herself from the book that traps her, leaving Humbert behind in that 
book: “You talk like a book, Dad” (114). Ray notes how “not a single obscene term is to be 
found in the whole work,” so Dolores carries out her own narrative rebellion, writing “a most 
obscene four-letter word” on pamphlets distributed at school before saying “unprintable things” 
to Humbert in a fight (4; 197; 205). From all sides, she is forced into being nothing more than a 
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sex object—even her Beardsley report card expresses disappointment in how “morbidly 
uninterested” she is “in sexual matters” (195). And on top of this objectification, she is punished 
for naming the sexuality that is expected of her in terms that her abusers find offensive, if only 
for the fact that it puts an accurate language to their offense. Her linguistic transgressions, 
through spoonerisms and curse words, afford her the little agency she is able to hold onto in a 
world of predatory forces.     
Dolores performs this reversal of power in the play The Enchanted Hunters, where she 
plays the role of “a farmer’s daughter who imagines herself to be a woodland witch, or a Diana, 
or something, and… plunges a number of lost hunters into various entertaining trances before 
falling in her turn under the spell of a vagabond poet…” (200). In this role, she breaks free from 
the roles of either adoring mermaid or adored statue that Humbert assigns to her in his 
imagination. She is now a witch who hunts the hunter, but the tragedy is that this power is short-
lived. She succumbs to the “spell of a vagabond poet,” namely Humbert, himself—even though 
the poet is performed by Mona Dahl in the play—in a work written by Clare Quilty, her other 
abuser.        
Both Dolores and the mermaid move from figures of erotic longing to figures of 
withdrawal and resignation. In this sense, “The Little Mermaid” does not have to be seen as a 
companion piece to Know Your Own Daughter. It is a story of severing ties with her father, the 
Sea King, of withholding a deeply intimate knowledge about herself from him and ultimately 
from everyone except the Sea Witch, in pursuit of her own soul. Humbert may not even realize 
that he is inadvertently giving her a story that could spark her own rebellion, and that it stands as 
an emblem of everything he will never be able to know about her. It is a pessimistic consolation, 
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though. Both the mermaid and Dolores, in their rebellious quest for independence, tread through 
both the realms of fantasy and reality in pain, harmed and disappointed in this impassive world.  
 
Role Reversal 
 As Dolores begins to show signs of a fierce and desperate independence, wresting as 
much power for herself as she can, Humbert manipulates the narrative so that this role reversal 
works to his advantage. No longer the enchanted hunter, he fashions himself as Andersen’s 
mermaid—the innocent victim of a passionate love. Collins points out that, “Humbert’s reading 
of Andersen justifies his claim that he is a victim as well as an artist, and adds weight to his 
contention that Lolita herself is merely fictional” (23).  
When Dolores is hospitalized for a throat infection, again drawing emphasis to the site of 
lost speech, Humbert aggressively seeks out the same kind of permission that Andersen’s prince 
grants the mermaid to sleep outside his room on a velvet cushion: “In vain I insisted I be allowed 
to spend the night on a ‘welcome’ mat in a corner of their damned hospital” (240). His “despair 
and weariness” reach their own fever pitch as he comes to the conclusion that his “love was as 
hopeless as ever” (241-43). But even his pessimism is no match for Dolores’s. When he tells her 
that, “there is no point in staying here,” she responds, “There is no point in staying anywhere” 
(244). She ultimately ends up escaping, but to a life full of more pain and misery. Frustrated with 
her escape, Humbert gets rid of all her belongings on her fifteenth birthday, the same birthday 
that Andersen’s mermaid escapes to the world of humans. In this analogy, he is neither the 
mermaid nor the prince, but the mermaid’s father. And as such, Humbert finds himself alone 
with his “merman tears” (255). Humbert is not the one who had broken her heart, as he comes to 
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realize. The man responsible for that was Quilty. “You merely broke my life,” he imagines her 
telling him instead (279). 
 But Humbert insists on playing the mermaid, on adoring his Lolita as the mermaid adored 
her statue. When he tracks her down in Alaska, the first thing he notices about her is that her 
“head looked smaller (only two seconds had passed really, but let me give them as much wooden 
duration as life can stand)…” (269). Throughout the entire course of the novel, he has tried in 
vain to fix her and render her immobile. Even shortly after he first meets her in the beginning, he 
sees “her lips… apparently still forming the words of the Carmen-barmen ditty that no longer 
reached my consciousness,” and his own singing and the “steaming water roaring into the tub” 
drown out her voice (60).  
 Nabokov subverts the traditional use of the water image, using it more as an image of 
fixed rigidity rather than fluidity. Camp Q, where Dolores has her first sexual experience (with 
the boy Charlie Holmes) and where she makes her first contact with Clare Quilty, is located next 
to three lakes: Onyx, Eryx, and Climax. Onyx is a kind of stone, and Eryx—according to Greek 
mythology—was turned to stone by Perseus. The association of water with stone again brings to 
mind the role of the marble statue in “The Little Mermaid.” And the explosion of “more than a 
hundred rockets” on the prince’s birthday at sea, when the mermaid first recognizes him as the 
model of this statue, simulates her own climactic excitement at seeing him. All three names seem 
interchangeable in their trochaic meter, and they each end with the same letter that suggests the 
cliché of X marking the spot—the degree zero of a fixed, immoveable point on which Humbert 
aims at pinning Dolores.79  
 
79 James Tweedle sees this novel as occupying “a place on the literary map akin to those cartographic idiosyncrasies 
where several states converge at a single spot; within the limits of a single page [Nabokov] can wander into different 
forms, using their often vastly different conventions” (154). 
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 Meghan Vicks notes that it is no coincidence that the Russian word for “lake” is ozero, 
and that this wordplay “establishes the possibility that all of Nabokov’s lakes are signifiers of 
nothing, in addition to markers of otherworldly realms” (78). The nothingness that these lakes 
suggest marks the “limits of human perception” on the one hand, as well as a “transcendent 
realm,” one that is “‘more real’ than our world” (79). It is this watery, transcendent, and 
fantastical realm that both Nabokov and Humbert place Dolores in. There is something about her 
that will always elude the perception of her predator, her novelist, and even her reader, as she 
constantly slips out of reach. Humbert is flailing in this realm, his murderous plans foiled at 
Hourglass Lake while Dolores is away at camp near the other three lakes. Altogether, these four 
lakes seem to mark the four corners of Humbert’s prison cell, the nothingness that traps him to 
his mortality. Hourglass Lake is the only one of these four lakes he swims in, and its name, 
rather than the longevity of Onyx or Eryx, reduces stone to sand as a measure of time running 
out, of finitude trapped between two globes.80 
 Humbert situates Dolores in a world beyond time while he is caught in the hourglass of 
time itself. Comparing Humbert to Andersen’s mermaid, Melanie McKay writes that, “Humbert 
can dimly perceive another level of existence beyond the walls of time just as the mermaid can 
perceive another existence beyond the sea, and both try desperately to escape their mortal 
prison” (76). If Humbert is also to be compared to the ape that Nabokov saw in the Jardin des 
Plantes, drawing the prison bars of his cage, then he “has drawn not the world but what separates 
him from the world…” (Wood 108). In Speak, Memory, Nabokov writes of “captivity in the zoo 
of words,” and it is precisely this captivity that Humbert is stuck in: “Oh, my Lolita, I have only 
 
80 In Speak, Memory, Nabokov refuses to accept the “utter degradation, ridicule and horror of having developed an 
infinity of sensation and thought within a finite existence” (297). This refusal is at the core of Humbert’s artistic 
struggle, as well. 
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words to play with!” (233; 32). The difference between the realm of the word and the realm of 
the world—the world beyond the literal prison and the metaphorical prison of language—is a 
single letter, Lolita’s initial. He wants to move through language to go beyond it and reside 
wherever it is that Lolita resides, in the voiceless, watery, but magical void. Her name is central 
to the narrative, and yet she only skirts its periphery, belonging to another world instead. Michael 
Wood writes how Nabokov would take issue with Plato and Derrida with their claims that “there 
is nothing outside the text… There is plenty outside the text, Nabokov would say, but the text is 
usually what we’ve got, and pretty much all we’ve got. Outside the text is silence” (106). 
Humbert feels like he lives in a “lighted house of glass,” perhaps of the hourglass itself, and yet 
he wants to transcend this space, away from the light, into the darkness and the void (182). In the 
same way that he does not just want to be an ape in a cage—ape meaning, as Frosch reminds us, 
not just an animal, but an imitator (46)—Humbert wants to create rather than imitate, and use his 
artistic creativity to approach the point of the mermaid’s silence and of Dolores’s silence, 
sketching an ellipsis in the world he is stuck in81—a lake, a zero, a space of nothingness he can 
dive into and share with Lolita, turning Hourglass Lake into Our Glass Lake, the finitude of the 
hour metamorphosing into an eternal “immortality that you and I may share, my Lolita” (309). 
 The significance of the Hourglass Lake episode is also that this is the first time Humbert 
receives a clue about the identity of Dolores’s future abductor. Jean Farlow almost mentions 
Clare Quilty’s name, but she is interrupted. Right before she almost says it, she notices that 
Humbert had swum with his watch, and Charlotte, the “very mediocre mermaid,” responds 
“softly, making a fish mouth,” that it is “Waterproof” (86-89). Nearly two-hundred pages later, 
when Dolores says Quilty’s name “in a kind of muted whistle,” Humbert begins the next 
 
81 Even in The Enchanted Hunters Hotel, Humbert imagines redecorating the mural to accommodate his fantasy: 
“There would have been a lake” (134). 
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paragraph of his narrative with: “Waterpoof. Why did a flash from Hourglass Lake cross my 
consciousness? I, too, had known it, without knowing it, all along” (272). While critics like 
Alfred Appel, Jr. marvel at the clever way in which the word “waterproof” points to Clare 
Quilty, the logic of Quilty being Humbert’s double suggests that this word actually points at 
Humbert, himself. He, of course, is also Dolores’s predator. He is both the hunter and the hunted, 
the detective and the fugitive. Like Oedipus—the first two syllables of whose name literally 
mean “I know,” despite all his protestations at saying he does not know what is plaguing 
Thebes—Humbert admits, “I, too, had known it, without knowing it, all along.” What exactly 
does he know, beyond Quilty’s identity, and what is it that is waterproof? Quite literally, the first 
time the word is mentioned, it refers to his watch. Time itself is waterproof; it does not blur and 
dissolve under Humbert’s spell, despite all his artistic attempts at overpowering it.  
The mermaid in folklore is also a figure that is waterproof, moving between sea and land, 
between human and superhuman, in a way that Humbert wishes he could emulate. To Elena 
Sommers, the mermaid “carries the most otherworldly characteristics, being the only 
mythological heroine that is truly situated between this and [the] other world” (34). Water brings 
Humbert as close as he can possibly be to the world of Dolores, which he suggests even in 
seemingly throwaway lines such as, “J’ai toujours admire l’œuvre ormonde du sublime 
Dublinois. And in the meantime the rain had become a voluptuous shower” (207). The reference 
is to Joyce, the “sublime Dubliner” who sets his “Sirens” chapter of Ulysses in the Hotel 





An Ethical Pessimism: How to Read Dolores Haze in Lolita?  
However much Humbert glorifies Dolores and the magical realm out of this world that he 
identifies her with, both he and Nabokov place an ethical burden of how to interpret Dolores as a 
cipher of nothingness, as someone whose voice has been subsumed by her predator. Critics like 
Eric Naiman articulate the dilemma in terms of necessarily having to adopt Humbert’s 
perspective:  
Since readers have no way of knowing what sort of person Humbert prevents from 
speaking her mind, those who want to imagine Lolita as a real-world girl (or, at least, as a 
real girl’s representation), have to construct the character themselves or attack the 
construction of others. In the process, they are required to emulate Humbert, creating 
Lolita in a way that inevitably makes her reflect their own anxieties and desires. (149) 
But David Packman frames the dilemma in terms that would align the reader closer to Lolita’s 
perspective, identifying how the  
…breach between the representation and that which is represented, between the language 
that makes up the novel and the fictive world that it unfolds… mirrors the reader’s desire 
for the text; this doubling calls the reader’s attention to his own activity, resulting in a 
subversion of the fictive world (1).  
Dolores tries to subvert the fictional fantasy of the text imposed on her, slipping away from the 
role of a nymphet into a human, just as much as Andersen’s mermaid subverts the magical, 
fictional realm of supernatural creatures in order to inhabit the world of humans, as well. 
Packman’s reading strategy of subverting the fictive world within the text itself then functions as 
a gesture of empathy for Dolores’s struggle. Julia Bader sees this “tantalizing part of Lolita 
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which is resistant to the process of artistic abstraction” as something that “transcends and resists 
even their creator, the author himself” (69). 
 Dolores refuses to be an artistic abstraction, and vies to be an artist in her own right. 
Maybe this is rooted in her own pessimism, her own sense of negativity. Even her mother, filling 
out questionnaires in A Guide to Your Child’s Development, “underlined the following epithets, 
ten out of forty, under ‘Your Child’s Personality’: aggressive, boisterous, critical, distrustful, 
impatient, irritable, inquisitive, listless, negativistic (underlined twice) and obstinate” (81). She 
has all the characteristics of an anti-authority pessimist, with “negativistic” underlined twice. Her 
pessimism and her artistry win her the little autonomy that she has, just as much as the 
mermaid’s artistry does, as well. The mermaid’s talent for singing is praised at such a high cost 
that it is worth the transaction with the Sea-Witch for human legs, allowing her to escape. 
Dolores, tired of being stuck with the role of playing Humbert’s mermaid, “preferred acting to 
swimming,” and uses her talent at acting—which she learned from Quilty—to escape from 
Humbert’s control through dissimulation (232).  
She is clearly more sharp and intelligent than the vulgar veneer with which Humbert 
presents her to us, outsmarting him and even reproducing, mocking, and outwitting his own 
verbal acrobatics. She is the opposite of a passive figure; she literally acts both in the sense that 
she takes to the stage and she takes action against her circumstances. Maybe it is for this reason 
that Nabokov personally ranked her second, after Pnin, “of all the characters he ever created that 
he admired as a person” (Weinman 182). His wife Véra noted in her diary, after reading all the 
reviews upon its initial publication, “I wish, though, somebody would notice the tender 
description of the child’s helplessness, her pathetic dependence on monstrous HH, and her 
heartrending courage all along” (qtd. in Weinman 182).  
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 The tragedy is that this is hardly any consolation. Even the most sensitive and well-
intentioned critics, after generations of outlandishly misogynistic scholarship on the novel,82 feel 
the need to reclaim Dolores’s unsung narrative through the lens of optimism. Kirsten Rutsala, for 
example, celebrates her “bravery and optimism” (208), ignoring her when she writes, in her own 
words, “I have gone through much sadness and hardship” (266). Nomi Tamir-Ghez writes, 
“While all the efforts of the narrator to win over the reader fail, the author finally wins us over, 
using as his strongest weapon the protagonist’s own realization of his guilt” (18). H. Grabes 
emphasizes this point, insisting that Lolita is  
…less pessimistic than the story that suggested it: at the end of the novel Humbert 
Humbert succeeds in finding another more selfless relationship to Lolita, that is, in 
escaping from his cage to some extent. He is successful because he had managed to find a 
different approach to other people, no longer characterized by selfishness, namely in his 
encounter with Rita whose actions were determined by ‘compassion’ and 
‘comprehension’. Quilty’s murder… appears in this context as the destruction of the 
personification of the ‘selfish vice’ whose mastery the narrator had just overcome 
himself. (42) 
For too long, critics have insisted that the ending of the novel is some kind of transformative 
moment, that Humbert—by falling in love with “this Lolita, pale and polluted, and big with 
another’s child…” (278)—is now “selfless,” as Grabes puts it. Just because Humbert is still 
 
82 “So convincing is Humbert as a narrator that he has managed to persuade numerous critics to take him at his 
word. Robertson Davies states that the theme of Lolita ‘is not the corruption of an innocent child by a cunning adult, 
but the exploitation of a weak adult by a corrupt child’ (30); Lionel Trilling claims that Lolita ‘seems to have very 
few emotions to be violated’ (11); Douglas Fowler calls Lolita ‘meretricious and far less vulnerable than Humbert’ 
(164) and asserts that ‘she is quite as indifferent to his love of her’ (165)” (Rutsala 203). Elizabeth Patnoe “argues 
that the novel has been misinterpreted because it has been co-opted by a hegemonic paradigm that insists on both the 
invisibility of child abuse and the evil of female sexuality” (Naiman 154). 
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obsessed with the girl he had raped long after the age he had otherwise been attracted to hardly 
counts as “selfless,” and characterizing her as “polluted” is also deeply misogynistic and 
objectifying. Rita is such a minor character that she is hardly given any attention, and Quilty’s 
murder redeems nothing. The end result is that a girl named Dolores Haze, now Mrs. Richard F. 
Schiller, had her life destroyed by this man, and will never recover from it. And maybe even 
Nabokov himself rejects such a transformative reading, saying that, “Humbert Humbert is a vain 
and cruel wretch who manages to appear ‘touching’” (Strong Opinions 94). Any critic who falls 
for his ruse—like Douglas Fowler, who insists that Humbert’s refusal to kill Charlotte “is a 
moral achievement,” setting a pretty low bar for moral achievements in general—is just fooled 
by this appearance (148) 
Moreover, other scholars take a radically different approach to the ending, arguing that 
Dolores never became pregnant, and that there never actually was a Richard F. Schiller. Because 
of our unreliable narrator, maybe we can justify the position that “she actually died at the age of 
fourteen and a half. Her short, tragic adult life is in fact Humbert Humbert’s delusion, a projected 
fantasy in order to create some sort of romanticized ending for the girl he defiled” (Weinman 
180). Weinman argues that, “In this version, rather than bearing responsibility for her death, 
Humbert can indulge in the illusion that—at least for a short time—Dolores found her way to a 
kind of happiness. By extension, he can mold their rapist-victim power dynamic into real life,” 
duping generations of readers in the process (180).  
This is the “pact with happiness” that his earliest avatar, in The Enchanter, had made, and 
that stuck with this character, crossing from one novel to the other just as much as Humbert 
kidnapped Lolita and crossed state lines (56). Happiness, in this story, is precisely what is 
transgressive, criminal, monstrous. For Dolores, there is no happy ending, no matter what 
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interpretation we take. “And by killing Clare Quilty for taking Dolores away from him—in his 
mind, taking away what was rightfully his—Humbert Humbert loses his last vestige of 
morality,” even though countless readers have seen this act as some kind of brave heroism or an 
overcoming of his own monstrous impulses, when in fact it only confirms them (181). The final 
declaration of hope that Humbert may share an immortality with her in death is chilling in its 
horror rather than moving in any kind of semblance of authenticity or sensitivity—this is the last 
domain of control that Humbert wishes to exert on her, the last act of violence he could inflict. It 
is the last one and the everlasting one. 
 Michael Bell also insists that it “is not simply the warm humanity of the person, then, that 
subverts his inhuman view of her,” but it is her acting itself that temporarily gives Lolita a 
reprieve from his abuse (78). Through acting, she “learns what her unfortunate mother never 
knew: the difference between an actual and a romanticized or fictitious self” (78). If the reader 
were to adopt Grabes’s interpretation, and fall for that last trap of letting Humbert manipulate us 
into sympathy for him, then we also need to recognize that this so-called “realization of her 
humanity… occurs within the context of a more radically impersonal contemplation of her, 
himself and the whole relationship than he has ever been capable of before” as the novel closes 
and we are invited to regard the novel now in its entirety as “being consciously reified into an 
aesthetic object” (79).  
 The novel ends with Dolores positioned back in the place where she tried to escape from, 
in a magical world of immortality, which she shares with Humbert. Any optimistic interpretation 
of her story just serves to silence her even more. Her immortality, of course, is contingent on the 
extent to which she continues to live in the imagination of generations of readers, just as much as 
Andersen’s mermaid does. Where Andersen comes right out and tells his readers that the time 
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before the mermaid can enter heaven and finally acquire a human soul depends on how “good” 
or how “mean or naughty” they are, the implied injunction in Nabokov’s ending seems to be 
similar. In the muted cry of Dolores is an ethical call to recognize and articulate horror and 
violence, even with the knowledge that however we may respond to such acts will do little to 
prevent them from being perpetrated on a scale that has always been overwhelmingly 
unfathomable. The cry emerges from this aesthetic, highly stylized, fairy-tale world, attempting 
to be heard by the world of reality outside it. But the reader is located in the world outside 
Humbert’s prison, which—to him—is the world of nothingness, a world that swallows up these 
cries and lets them die off in the void.  
 Before Humbert ends up in prison, he stands still on a high slope overlooking a children’s 
playground, which “evoked a last mirage of wonder and hopelessness” (307). The “hopelessly 
poignant thing was not Lolita’s absence from my side, but the absence of her voice from that 
concord” (308). If anything, this novel teaches us to listen to—and listen for—absence in 
concord, if not with wonder, then at least with a poignant hopelessness. “At this or that twist of it 
I feel my slippery self eluding me, gliding into deeper and darker waters than I care to probe,” he 
continues (308). Perhaps this “self,” this part of him, is the soul he imagines to have created for 









A CONTRIBUTION TO A THEORY OF THE NOVEL 
 
Merman Tears 
In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard summarizes the legend of Agnete and the Merman 
in a way that allegorically prefigures the plot of Lolita: “The merman is a seducer who rises up 
from concealment in the depths, and in wild desire grasps and breaks the innocent flower 
standing in all its charm by the shore, pensively bending its head to the ocean’s roar” (120). 
Kierkegaard then proposes two changes to the legend. In the first, Agnete’s innocence and 
“absolute faith” in the merman overpowers and disarms him so that he is unable to take 
advantage of her. He eventually “turns back alone, and the ocean rages, but more wildly still 
rages the merman’s despair” (121). In the second, which Kierkegaard provides in a footnote, the 
merman “does not want to seduce Agnete, even though he has seduced many previously” (121). 
He is no longer even a merman, but just a “pitiable” figure who “sorrowfully” waits to “be saved 
by an innocent girl’s love” (121). He sees her from a distance, and it is only when he blends his 
pessimistic “sigh with the whispering of the reeds” that “she turns her ear towards it,” and he 
takes her down into the ocean with him in a “wild” fulfillment of his love until “he became tired 
of Agnete,” and “her body was never found; for she became a mermaid, who tempted men with 
her songs” (121). 
 In the working notes for Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard writes about how he had 
thought of adapting this legend “from an angle that has not occurred to any poet,” emphasizing 
that, in order to “belong to her entirely,” the merman “must initiate her into his whole tragic 
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existence” (“Supplement” 242). The merman is “a monster at certain times,” and because “the 
Church cannot give its blessing” to them, he “despairs and in his despair plunges to the bottom of 
the sea and remains there, but leads Agnes to believe that he only wanted to deceive her” (242). 
Just as in Andersen’s “The Little Mermaid,” the “complication can be resolved only by the 
religious… [If] the merman could believe, his faith perhaps could transform him into a human 
being” (243).  
Kierkegaard insists that this unwritten version of the legend “is poetry, not that wretched, 
miserable trash in which everything revolves around ridiculousness and nonsense” (242). 
Perhaps this is a barbed comment aimed at Andersen himself, who had staged an adaptation of 
Agnete and the Merman for the Royal Danish Theater in 1843 (he had also written another 
version of it as a short story a decade earlier), the same year Kierkegaard wrote and published 
Fear and Trembling. The play was a disastrous failure, both at the box office and among critics. 
If Kierkegaard was thinking through alternative versions of this fairy tale as “poetry,” in 
contradistinction to the “wretched, miserable trash” of Andersen’s play, then his poetic vision 
also ended in a kind of failure, never materializing beyond the drafted outlines he had inserted in 
Fear and Trembling. He was uncomfortable in the field of aesthetics, which, he writes in a 
footnote, “is the most faithless of all sciences. Anyone who has truly loved it will in a way 
become unhappy; while anyone who has never done so is and will remain a pecus [ox, or 
blockhead]” (Fear and Trembling 121). By gesturing toward a withdrawal from aesthetics, from 
this pessimistic choice between unhappiness and idiocy, he ends up retracting his own 
suggestions for revising the fairy tale, reaching the conclusion that “it is nonsense and sheer 
coquetry as well as an insult to the female sex to imagine a seduction where the girl is in no way, 
in no way at all, to blame” (121). 
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This disturbing characterization of seduction, as well as his literary techniques of 
withdrawal, had already been worked out in his other major work published the same year, 
Either/Or. In the second edition of this two-volume tome that spans a number of different genres, 
Kierkegaard drafted a postscript that he would later decide against publishing: “I hereby retract 
this book. It was a necessary deception in order, if possible, to deceive men into the religious, 
which has continually been my task all along. Maieutically it certainly has had its influence. Yet 
I do not need to retract it, for I have never claimed to be its author” (The Seducer’s Diary viii). 
In classic Kierkegaardian fashion, he ends up retracting this retraction (one that claims 
there is no need for a retraction in the first place). And the method is not just one of literary 
posturing, but of autobiographical seduction itself—a seduction that ultimately ends up in failure. 
In 1837, when Kierkegaard was a twenty-five-year old graduate student, he met the fourteen-
year old Regine Olsen at a “party of schoolgirls in the home of the widowed mother of another 
girl, Bolette Rørdam, whom Kierkegaard was pursuing” (ix). He only mentions her in his journal 
two years after that party, and in 1840 “proposed with such abrupt passion” to the teenager that 
“she said nothing and showed him the door” (ix). With her father’s consent, two days later, she 
accepted the proposal, and yet Kierkegaard wrote in his journal, “But inwardly—The next day I 
saw that I had made a blunder,” and was paralyzed by his “melancholy” (ix). They kept the 
engagement going for a year until Kierkegaard sent her back her ring with the following note: 
“Forget him who writes this, forgive a man who, though he may be capable of something, is not 
capable of making a girl happy” (x). Regine rejected the rejection, and tried working on mending 
their relationship for two months, but Kierkegaard eventually ran off to Berlin, where he began 
Either/Or, in which Regine “was the muse and object of much of his production” (xi). He was 
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shocked when she had accepted an earlier suitor two years later, and then married that suitor in 
1847. Until the end of his life, Kierkegaard constantly wrote about her in his journals. 
It is no wonder that the first volume of Either/Or ends in a section called “The Seducer’s 
Diary,” which Kierkegaard later admitted was “part of his campaign to portray himself as a 
scoundrel and thus make their break easier for her” (xii). He claims to have written it “for her 
sake, to clarify her out of the relationship” (xii). This section marks the middle of an unwieldy, 
two-volume work of multiple genres framed by the literary conceit of a found text, edited by a 
fictional Victor Eremita into Volume A, written by a “nameless young man who styles himself 
an aesthete,” and Volume B, written by Wilhelm, a former judge (vii). The fact that “The 
Seducer’s Diary” is written by a character named Johannes, a young man who also styles himself 
as an aesthete, and this diary ends Volume A, suggests on first glance that Johannes had written 
everything that had preceded this section.83 Or it opens up the proto-Nabokovian space of 
competing authorship in a single work.  
The extent of Nabokov’s familiarity with Kierkegaard is unclear—he never cites him as 
an influence the way he cites Andersen. In fact, none of his works reference Kierkegaard by 
name, and surprisingly no scholarship has demonstrated any kind of influence, even though 
Nabokov was living in Berlin in the 1920s, when Lukács said that Kierkegaard “was present 
 
83 This, in fact, is what Victor Eremita suspects: “The last of A’s papers is a narrative titled ‘The Seducer’s Diary.’ 
Here we meet new difficulties, inasmuch as A does not declare himself the author but only the editor. This is an old 
literary device to which I would not have much to object if it did not further complicate my own position, since one 
author becomes enclosed within the other like the boxes in a Chinese puzzle. This is not the place to explain in 
greater detail what confirms me in my view; I shall only point out that the prevailing mood in A’s preface somehow 
manifests the poet (Either/Or I.8-9). Enticingly, A also writes in “Diapsalmata,” that, “If anyone should keep a 
diary, I am the one, in order to refresh my memory…” (32). Another possibility is that Victor Eremita penned The 
Seducer’s Diary himself, trying too hard to distance himself from the text while referring to Johannes as a shadow 
that stalks him: “…I, too, who have nothing at all to do with the narrative—indeed, am twice removed from the 
original author—I, too, sometimes have felt quite strangely uneasy when I have been occupied with these papers in 
the stillness of the night. It seemed to me as if the seducer himself paced my floor like a shadow, as if he glanced at 
the papers, as if he fixed his demonic eyes on me and said, ‘Well, well, so you want to publish my papers! You 
know that is irresponsible of you; you will indeed arouse anxiety in the darling girls” (9). 
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everywhere” (Theory of the Novel 19).84 Even by 1918, Kafka was writing to Max Brod how 
“Kierkegaard is always in my mind these days,” a sentiment that was also shared by Thomas 
Mann around the same time (“Letters to Friends” 199). Lukács was not exaggerating this point. 
But Nabokov scholars find themselves in particularly contentious territory when it comes to the 
question of influence at all, especially because of the “single-minded Nabokovian belief that art 
supersedes influence, and so influence must be brushed off” (Weinman 224).85 The Russian 
émigré writer Nina Berberova, who documented the lives of Russians in Parisian exile, noted 
how she “gradually got used to [Nabokov’s] manner of… taking something from a great author 
and then saying he’d never read him” (qtd. in Meyer and Trousdale 490).86  
Even so, Priscilla Meyer and Jeff Hoffman trace motifs of the “Agnete and the Merman” 
story in Pale Fire, but Kierkegaard’s reimagining of the fairy tale suggests a much closer 
connection with Lolita (Meyer and Hoffman 206). Herner Sæverot links Kierkegaard’s form of 
deception with Nabokov’s, following up a chapter on The Seducer’s Diary in his book Indirect 
Pedagogy: Some Lessons in Existential Education with a chapter on Lolita, but without engaging 
the question of influence (33). Nabokov’s itinerant life in exile, moreover, has made the 
scholarly task of tracking down his library a notorious nightmare (Parker 283-290). The 
Nabokovs also “were not book collectors, and as a rule Vladimir Nabokov did not buy books” 
(285). Of the books that were purchased in the household, mainly by his wife Véra and his son 
 
84 Hullot-Kentor also refers to the 1920s in Germany as a time that could be referred to as a “Kierkegaard 
renaissance” (Adorno, Kierkegaard xii). Nabokov likes to insist on the fact that in Berlin he “lived in a closed 
émigré circle of Russian friends and read exclusively Russian newspapers, magazines, and books,” but this still does 
not square with his erudite knowledge of even the most obscure writers when Kierkegaard was virtually inescapable 
at the time (Strong Opinions 189). 
85 With his trademark hubris, Nabokov says, “As for influence, well, I’ve never been influenced by anyone in 
particular, dead or quick…” (Strong Opinions 116). In another interview, he says, “Alas, I am not one to provide 
much sport for influence hunters” (152). 
86 To this point, Priscilla Meyer and Rachel Trousdale have researched the extensive ways in which Nabokov mined 
material from Woolf’s novels (“Vladimir Nabokov and Virginia Woolf” 490-522). 
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Dmitry, “no special effort was made to retain them” once they had been read (285). The 
catalogue of his father’s library, published in 1904 and then in 1911, also do not include any 
works by Kierkegaard, either (“1904/1911 Library Catalogue”).  
This is not to say that Kierkegaard did not shape, to any extent, Nabokov’s writing—nor 
is this an attempt to force a Kierkegaardian interpretation of Nabokov, either, but a close look at 
Kierkegaard’s experimentation with the novel form, in addition to his treatment of the “Agnete 
and the Merman” fairy tale, seems to open the space for the literary strategies that Nabokov uses 
in Lolita. It is odd to think of Kierkegaard as a novelist; The Seducer’s Diary, if anything, seems 
to be a proto-Nabokovian parody of a novel. Its seemingly random insertion in a kaleidoscopic 
text that could also just be labeled as a parody of philosophy, occasionally lapsing into 
philosophical jargon in order to undermine the systematicity of philosophy itself, also draws 
attention to its generic instability. 
The Seducer’s Diary seduces us into reading it as a separate work. In its English 
translation, it even appears as a separate publication, with a foreword by a novelist. In this 
foreword, John Updike situates it in the context of Either/Or not as a work of philosophy, but as 
a work written by a “fiction writer” (vii). Kierkegaard “engages in multiple impersonations, 
assuming various poses and voices with an impartial vivacity. The method is, in one of his 
favorite words, maieutic—from the Greek term for midwifery—like that of his beloved model 
Socrates, who in his questioning style sought to elicit his auditors’ ideas rather than to impose his 
own” (vii).    
While Updike reads The Seducer’s Diary as part of a tradition of nineteenth-century 
novelists “from Jane Austen to Henry James, [who] embraced as a patently major theme the 
sentimental education of the heroines,” it is Kierkegaard’s maieutic method that is strikingly 
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modern, that comes into full force with Nabokov’s Lolita a century later (xiv). Using the same 
technique of “multiple impersonations” and “assuming various poses and voices” in order to 
“elicit his auditors’ ideas rather than to impose his own,” Nabokov’s narrative strategies achieve 
the same effect. And both Kierkegaard and Nabokov employ these narrative strategies in the 
context of treating a young girl as an aesthetic object of erotic fascination and predatory 
attention. Johannes writes in The Seducer’s Diary, “An artist paints his beloved; that is now his 
joy; a sculptor shapes her. This I, too, am doing, but in an intellectual sense. She does not know 
that I possess this image and therein really lies my falsification. I obtained it secretively, and in 
that sense I have stolen her heart…” (122). Johannes and Humbert aim at immortalizing the 
young girl in a work of art designed “to confuse poetry and actuality, truth and fiction, to frolic 
in infinity” (127). Just as much as Humbert wants to take Lolita and “leave the town, the country, 
the continent, the hemisphere,—indeed, the globe,” Johannes writes, “I am carrying you away, 
not from some people to others, but out of the world” (Lolita 123; The Seducer’s Diary 132). 
Like John Ray, Jr. introducing Humbert Humbert’s narrative, the anonymous writer ‘A’ 
warns us that this diary is “not historically accurate,” so we need to read this text with what 
would later be called a hermeneutics of suspicion (5). The novelist Nathalie Sarraute famously 
used the phrase “age of suspicion” in her 1950s essay on the genre of the novel, which she took 
from Stendhal’s 1832 remark that the “spirit of suspicion has entered the world” (qtd. in 
Josipovici, On Trust 7). Paul Ricoeur, in turn, labeled Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud as the 
“masters of suspicion,” prefiguring the hermeneutics laid down by Foucault and Barthes, but 
behind these masters is, to Gabriel Josipovici, a glaring omission: Kierkegaard, himself (10). 
Barthes maintains that, “to read with suspicion is… to retain our freedom,” and Foucault insists 
that, “Writing unfolds like a game,” creating “a space into which the writing subject constantly 
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disappears” (qtd. in Josipovici 15-16). Both of these positions on reading and writing echo the 
fictional worlds created by Nabokov and Kierkegaard, but in these worlds we see a suspicion 
even of suspicion itself: “Kierkegaard’s ‘genuine’ negative thinker always recognizes how easy 
it is for suspicion itself to harden into a new conviction, the conviction of the unquestioning 
value of suspicion. Kierkegaard never does this. In that regard his first major work, Either/Or, is 
exemplary” (17). 
In both Kierkegaard and Nabokov, the reader becomes this “‘genuine’ negative thinker,” 
shifting in between positions of suspicion and persuasion. Eros, to Anne Carson, resides in this 
liminal, in-between space (109). “Something moves in the space between. That is the most erotic 
thing about Eros” (167). It is out of this erotic space that a new sense of self emerges: “The self 
forms at the edge of desire, and a science of self arises in the effort to leave that self behind” 
(39). Carson here refers to her reading of Neville in Woolf’s The Waves, who is “contracted” 
with Bernard into “a single being” out of love for him (38). Similarly, Humbert wishes to “safely 
solipsize” Lolita, and Johannes wants to seduce Cordelia just as much to himself as he wants to 
seduce her to her own self, her newly expanded sense of self that emerges out of their 
interaction. 
 
What’s in a Name? 
A informs us, before Johannes gets a chance to speak in his own voice, that this young 
girl “was very correctly named Cordelia but not, however, Wahl” (6). The Germanic last name 
Wahl, as opposed to the Danish Valg, means “choice.” Cordelia ostensibly has no choice in this 
narrative that, to A, is not even “strictly narrative” (5). If we read this with suspicion, we should 
be alerted to the possibility that Cordelia does in fact make a choice, the most existential of 
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choices: what she chooses is her self, a self that she discovers in what Heidegger would call 
authenticity:  
And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very 
Being, ‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 
‘seem’ to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic—
that is, something of its own—can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. (Being and 
Time 68) 
It could very well be that Heidegger took this concept straight from Kierkegaard, and from the 
same work, Either/Or, that includes The Seducer’s Diary. In the second volume, Judge Wilhelm 
writes,  
The ethical individual knows himself, but this knowing is not simply contemplation, for 
then the individual comes to be defined according to his necessity. It is a collecting of 
oneself, which itself is an action, and this is why I have with aforethought used the 
expression ‘to choose oneself’ instead of ‘to know oneself.’ (258) 
This is the either/or situation that seems to confront Cordelia. But to what extent is her self a 
discrete entity if it is manipulated and modulated by a seducer? Is A right, after all? Or is there 
an erotically charged space of in between?  
In choosing this last name for Cordelia, Kierkegaard also seems to be writing this work as 
a parody of the popular novel of unrequited love—as though this is The Sorrows of Young 
Werther in reverse. Goethe’s novel takes place in the idyllic town of Wahlheim—literally a 
“home of choice,” where Werther, whose name suggests a cheapening of value (which coincides 
with the homonym Wörter: words, words, words), chooses, or at least discovers, a new sense of 
self when he falls in love with Lotte. Or, to go back to Heidegger, “only ‘seems’ to do so” (68). 
 273 
The thinly illustrated basis of this intense infatuation is the source of the novel’s sentimental and 
melodramatic quality. Goethe seems to stage the literal loss of a self in inauthenticity with 
Werther’s suicide. Kierkegaard turns the tables so that he retains the story of unrequited love, but 
instead of this inauthentic experience of self, we get an authentic gaining of a self—and not of 
the lover, but of the beloved. Goethe’s epistolary novel is written as letters to an unresponsive 
Wilhelm, but the letters feel more like diary entries, addressed to a self in dissolution rather than 
a self in formation (that of a Wilhelm Meister, for instance).87 Kierkegaard gives us the opposite: 
The Seducer’s Diary is, by its title, a diary, and yet it is written as letters both sent and unsent, 
ostensibly to Cordelia. Or, on further reading, maybe these are also letters to Wilhelm, too—
Judge Wilhelm, that is, the author of Volume B who responds to the author of Volume A in 
Either/Or.  
Nabokov, too, parodies The Sorrows of Young Werther, alluding to Lotte both in the 
names of Charlotte and her daughter Lo.88 Charlotte wants to play the part of the beloved until 
she is killed off by the narrator, and Lolita’s emerging sense of self rebels against this role that 
had been forced on her. Cordelia, too, ends up severing ties with Johannes—in his words, “she 
herself breaks it in order to soar into a higher sphere,” reminiscent of Andersen’s mermaid (190). 
But even after this break, as though crying with Humbert’s “merman tears,” Johannes writes: 
To what can I compare your pure, deep soul, which has no connection with the world, 
except to a spring? And have I not told you that I am like a river that has fallen in love? 
And now when we are separated, do I not plunge under the sea in order to be united with 
 
87 Louis Mackey reads all of Either/Or as modeled on Wilhelm Meister, even though it is essentially “a 
Bildungsroman, but without Bildung” (273-74).  
88 There is also a brief moment in The Seducer’s Diary when Johannes is drawn to a woman named “Charlotte 
Hahn” (117). 
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you? There under the sea we shall meet again, for only in the deeps of the sea shall we 
really belong together. (193-94)89 
This is precisely the image of seduction that Kierkegaard sketches in his version of “Agnete and 
the Mermaid,” and which we see also in Lolita. The sea he is referring to here is the sea of his 
mind, as when he says, “My mind roars like a turbulent sea in the storms of passion” (33). And 
in this storm of passion, he is “almost unable to find a foothold; like a water bird, I am seeking in 
vain to alight on the turbulent sea of my mind” (33). After admitting, like Humbert, that he 
“continually seek[s his] prey among young girls, not among young women,” he claims to “have 
gone under in love-rapture” for Cordelia, whose nymphet-like “glance is so childlike and yet so 
saucy” (33; 40). “I have been given what swimmers call a ducking,” he writes (33).  
So who is the one seduced here? A suggests that Johannes’s “affair with Cordelia was so 
intricate that it was possible for him to appear as the one seduced…” (9-10). And, in the end, 
Johannes maintains that Cordelia “will herself become the temptress who seduces me into going 
beyond the boundary of the universal; in this way she will become conscious of it herself, and for 
me that is primary” (172). In this vertigo of seduction, we are taken from the depths of the sea to 
cosmic heights. Nabokov associates Lolita with Jupiter in her final destination of “Gray Star” in 
Juneau (the homonym of Juno). Her last name, Haze, alludes both to the gray appearance of this 
planet and to the elusive self that lies behind this haze, something that can never be captured. In 
The Seducer’s Diary, it is Johannes who is characterized both as Jupiter and as a hazy cloud, 
saying in a tone that Humbert would later take, “It is not only Minerva who springs full-grown 
out of Jupiter’s forehead, it is not only Venus who rises up out of the sea in her full beauty—
every young girl is like this if her femininity has not been spoiled by what is called developing” 
 
89 Like Humbert, who also compares Lolita to a fish in several predatory episodes, Johannes says of seduction that, 
“the fishing is always best in troubled waters” (29).  
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(43). He imagines Cordelia as springing from his own head, fully formed, without developing 
any further, the way Humbert fantasizes about controlling Lolita. And maybe it is the planet 
Jupiter that Johannes has in mind when he notices that Cordelia “does perceive that on her 
horizon a new planet has loomed, which in its course has encroached disturbingly upon hers in a 
curiously undisturbing way, but she has no inkling of the law underlying this movement” (57).  
Johannes imagines himself as belonging to an otherworldly realm, in the same way that 
Humbert imagines himself residing in “an enchanted island haunted by those nymphets of mine 
and surrounded by a vast, misty sea” (16). Out of this misty sea, he envisions the hazy Dolores 
Haze, just as Johannes says, “I see everything as a sea of fog, where feminine creatures 
resembling you appear and disappear everywhere” (136). To Humbert, this enchanted island is 
surrounded by “mirror beaches,” an image later mirrored itself in Hourglass Lake (16). When 
Johannes happens to see Cordelia alone outside, he notices how the “lake was still, smooth as a 
mirror” (42). In this mirrored universe, Johannes mirrors the characterization of Cordelia as a 
cloud, so that when she throws her arms around him, she writes that, “everything changed, and I 
embraced a cloud” (12). Johannes then in turn calls on Cordelia to “dispel your fog,” using the 
same epithets for her that Humbert uses for Lolita: “Enchanting troll woman, fairy, or witch” 
(27). He falls short of calling her a mermaid, even though he sees her as belonging “to the deeps 
of the sea” (194). 
And this may be where Nabokov’s explicit reference to The Seducer’s Diary is hiding in 
plain sight. In the earlier iteration of Lolita, published as The Enchanter, the narrator writes, 
“Thus they would live on—laughing, reading books, marveling at gilded fireflies, talking of the 
flowering walled prison of the world, and he would tell her tales and she would listen, his little 
Cordelia, and nearby the sea would breathe beneath the moon…” (57). In a flight of imagination, 
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the previous version of Humbert names the previous version of Lolita “Cordelia,” a reference 
that has been lost on critics for decades since its posthumous publication in 1986, especially with 
Dmitri Nabokov insisting that this must be referring to Shakespeare’s Cordelia in the book’s 
Afterword, “On a Book Entitled The Enchanter,” where he explores how his father had written 
this is as a draft for Lolita. But his explanation of this passage is hardly convincing: “The 
Enchanter… [is] a kind of lecherous Lear living in a fairy-tale seclusion by the sea with his ‘little 
Cordelia,’ whom, for a flicker of an instant, he imagines as an innocently loved daughter” (98). 
Lear wasn’t lecherous, though, and is more associated with the heath than the sea. It is not an 
avatar of Lear that we are reading here, but of Johannes, Kierkegaard’s Seducer, who imagines 
living in a fairy-tale seclusion—in his own kingdom by the sea—with Cordelia.90 
 Given her fairy-tale, mermaid-like characteristics, Cordelia’s frustration at Johannes’s 
fickle games of seduction and control, and the fact that she hardly speaks in her own voice (the 
only time she does is, like Lolita, through letters), maybe A is wrong about her name. It’s not her 
last name that seems to be a problem, but her first. Out of all Shakespearean names to exemplify 
her situation, she seems to be closer to her fellow Dane, Ophelia, than to Cordelia. But in King 
Lear, Cordelia chooses her reticence, acting rather than speaking, challenging not only the 
assumptions of Lear and her sisters, but of the audience as well. The young girl at the beginning 
who quietly challenges her father but then respectfully obliges his flights of rage hardly seems to 
be the same character who leads an army at the end. After two asides—“Love, and be silent” 
(1.1.61)—she first announces herself with the word “Nothing” (1.1.86). As Nothing, she is pure 
possibility, and she chooses her self in authenticity as opposed to the Heideggerian ‘they’ 
exemplified by the obsequiously scheming Regan and Goneril. She loves and is silent, as is 
 
90 The working title for Lolita was The Kingdom by the Sea, clearly a reference to Poe’s “Annabel Lee,” but also an 
illustration of Johannes’ fantasies in The Seducer’s Diary (Weinman 54). 
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Kierkegaard’s Cordelia. But what Shakespeare shows is that the resolute self that Cordelia 
attains is tragically insufficient; neither her love nor her silence achieve anything.  
At the root of Cordelia’s name is the core, the coeur, the heart (in her name is also 
inscribed the cord, the rope by which she is hanged). “Unhappy that I am,” Cordelia reluctantly 
responds to her father, “I cannot heave / My heart into my mouth” (1.1.90-91). As Lear slowly 
begins to realize his mistake, he cries, “I have full cause of weeping; but this heart / Shall break 
into a hundred thousand flaws” (2.4.281-82). It is as though Lear and Cordelia share the same 
heart that prevents them from speaking and weeping. Cordelia is the structural heart of the play, 
the absent center on which the entire chaotic structure collapses into a thousand flaws. 
For Kierkegaard, the heart at the core of Cordelia’s name may have a different but 
equally central significance. Johannes establishes this connection between his Cordelia and 
Shakespeare’s precisely with the heart: “Cordelia! That is really a splendid name—indeed, the 
same name as that of King Lear’s third daughter, that remarkable girl whose heart did not dwell 
on her lips, whose lips were mute when her heart was full” (49-50). She, like Lolita and the little 
mermaid, is praised for her silence: “She is silent; nothing breaks in upon the stillness. […] In a 
state such as this, a girl is adored and worshipped, just as some deities are, by silence” (109). 
Claire Carlisle also identifies the heart as the organizing metaphor in Fear and Trembling, 
gathering “together the text’s key themes: love, suffering, and courage” (436). Could Johannes 
de Silentio, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym in Fear and Trembling, be the same Johannes who pens 
The Seducer’s Diary? Perhaps. But more “generally, throughout Kierkegaard’s work the central 
concept of appropriation—that process through which the existing individual relates herself to 
the truth, at once making it her own and becoming herself—is understood as a ‘taking to heart’ 
(Inderliggjørelse), a passionate ‘making-inward’” (436). Heidegger, too, translates the Greek 
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term for thinking as “taking to heart” (437). Thinking with the heart, for both Kierkegaard and 
Heidegger, involve an “active trait of undertaking something” (437). The fact that Heidegger, in 
the same lecture, goes out of his way to say that Kierkegaard “has nothing whatever to say” 
about the question of being is perhaps a symptom of his own anxiety of influence (437). 
Cordelia Wahl’s name, then, suggests an allegory of actively, authentically choosing 
one’s self with the most philosophically rigorous form of thinking, which is thinking with the 
heart. While Heidegger awkwardly eschews any eroticism in this process—a process that may 
nevertheless be latently present in his work, despite himself—Kierkegaard views this mode of 
accessing the truth as purely erotic. But it is an eros tinged with pessimism and hopelessness for 
both the lover and the beloved. In her third letter to Johannes, Cordelia writes, “Is there no hope 
at all, then?” (16). Johannes, for his part, aligns himself with the “unhappy mirror” which 
“assuredly can grasp her image but not her; unhappy mirror, which cannot secretly hide her 
image in itself, hide it from the whole world, but can only disclose it to others as it now does to 
me” (20). He is drawn to her precisely because of her pain, the same pain inscribed in Lolita’s 
name: “Her bearing is a harmonious blend of sadness and pain. She is really attractive” (30). And 
yet it comes as a surprise to him, later on, that “she does have a conception of the pains in life, of 
its dark side. Who would have said this of her[?]” (51).  
 
Eros and Irony 
Cordelia is the daughter of an officer in the Royal Navy, establishing a lineage that is 
strongly associated with the sea, but both he and her mother are dead (51). Even though she lives 
with her aunt, who “almost worships” Johannes as much as Lolita’s mother worships Humbert, 
Cordelia’s status as an orphan, like Lolita’s, makes her more vulnerable and more alluring for the 
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older man. The absence of her parents and the devotion of her guardian to him allows Johannes 
access to the girl in a way that is ideal for him, a way in which he can freely imagine her as a 
work of his own aesthetic creation. “If I were to imagine an ideal girl,” Johannes writes, “she 
would always stand alone in the world and thereby be assigned to herself…” (55). He thinks of 
himself both as a lover and as her surrogate father, in the same way that Humbert thinks of 
Lolita: 
I am intoxicated with the thought that she is in my power. Pure, innocent womanliness, as 
transparent as the sea, and yet just as deep, with no idea of love [Kjoerlighed]! But now 
she is going to learn what a powerful force erotic love [Elskov] is. Just like a king’s 
daughter who has been elevated from the dust to the throne of her forefathers, so she will 
be enthroned in the kingdom to which she belongs. And this will take place through me; 
and in learning to love, she will learn to love me; as she develops the rule, the paradigm 
will sequentially unfold, and this I am. (105-6) 
Johannes here equates love with ontology. He continues this thought when he writes, “The 
eternal in erotic love is that in its moment individuals first come into existence for each other” 
(111). Johannes fashions himself as the pedagogue who educates Cordelia, seduces her into her 
own existence “in the kingdom to which she belongs” through love. Seduction here is just 
another philosophical strategy as is deduction and induction. 
In this kingdom by the sea that foreshadows both Poe and Nabokov, Johannes sees 
himself as both a lover and a father figure who bestows existence onto Cordelia. Like T.S. 
Eliot’s “paternal care / That will not leave us, but prevents us everywhere,” Johannes assumes a 
God-like omniscience: “It always seems as if I were the one who paid attention to her; the 
advantage I have is that I am placed in her thoughts everywhere, that I surprise her everywhere” 
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(Four Quartets 30; The Seducer’s Diary 152). Both Johannes and Humbert are self-conscious 
narrators in this sense, vying for absolute narrative control—Johannes fashions himself as “[t]he 
humble narrator who follows your triumphs” (146), while Humbert ironically refers to himself as 
“Humbert the Humble” while engaging in the same kind of narrative manipulation. The drama 
emerges from whether—and how—Cordelia and Lolita escape this control. The irony is that both 
Johannes and Humbert can only imagine Cordelia and Lolita existing in the ontological 
boundaries that they themselves provide. “In me she is seeking her freedom,” Johannes writes, 
“and the more firmly I encircle her, the better she will find it” (154). 
Encircling her and prefiguring Humbert’s own name, Johannes lurks in the shadows, 
where she “will be unable to see me” (18): 
My relationship to her is like a dance that is supposed to be danced by two people but is 
danced by only one. That is, I am the other dancer, but invisible. She moves as in a 
dream, and yet she is dancing with another, and I am that other one who, insofar as I am 
visibly present, is invisible, and insofar as I am invisible, is visible. (110) 
This invisible visibility is how Carson imagines Eros: “He never looks at you from the place 
from which you see him. Something moves in the space between. This is Eros” (Carson 167). 
Johannes oversteps his boundary as a potential lover in pursuit of his beloved, and tries to play 
the role of Eros himself, tensing his bow as he takes aim. “I am pulling the bow of love tighter in 
order to wound all the deeper,” he writes (67-68). He describes himself as “almost like a mood” 
that seizes her, completing “her thought, which nevertheless is completed within itself. She 
moves to the melody in her own soul; I am merely the occasion for her moving” (111). And from 
this voyeuristic vantage point of seeing her without being seen, Johannes chillingly observes, 
“she is selected, she will be overtaken” (22). The selection—the choice, the Wahl—now resides 
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with him rather than her, and yet the passive voice of his grammar seems to undermine this 
choice. Or at least this is what he is trying to seduce us into believing. Just as Humbert fashions 
himself as “Humbert the Spider,” Johannes keeps with the passive voice in writing that, “she 
must be spun into my web” (67).  
Also like Humbert, Johannes contemplates how this young girl regards him, from a 
distance, as “a nice man from quite another world” (25). He schemes how to “begin my attack,” 
resolving to “first become acquainted with her and her whole mental state” (57). Seduction for 
him, as it is for Humbert, is a game. Johannes is someone who not only “always join[s] in 
games,” but who devises them (39). Freedom for him is a “game” played out “between us two” 
(83). If “one just knows how to surprise, one always wins the game” (90).  
This game of seduction, however, carries with it the threat of abduction: “The first war is 
a war of liberation; it is a game. The second is a war of conquest; it is a life-and-death struggle” 
(116). Unlike Lolita, this only remains a threat, and is never actualized. “I shall very covertly 
lead her to this point,” Johannes writes, “and let her fall down through this trapdoor” (60). This 
trap in the game may be like Nabokov’s Lieutenant Trapp, or Clare Quilty, the man Lolita 
escapes with to run away from Humbert. Because Cordelia eventually breaks off the engagement 
with Johannes, whichever man she will end up with instead lies on the other end of this trapdoor, 
outside of the boundaries of the game he had played on her. According to the rules of this game, 
once he has won, “she must, as the philosophers say with a play on words: zu Grunde gehn [sic.] 
[fall to the ground]” (72). But Cordelia is the one who wins this game, so she doesn’t so much 
fall down as float up. Johannes imagines her soaring above him in an atmosphere that “must not 
narcotically entrap her soul”—as Humbert uses narcotics to entrap Lolita91—“but continually 
 
91 Johannes does, however, say that he has “known too well how to anestheticize her esthetically” [sic.] (194). 
 282 
allow it to soar aloft as she views it all as a game that means nothing compared with what is to 
come” (192). 
Cordelia wins this game by “perceive[ing] the irony, which is precisely what I want” 
(74). The question is whether the reader wins the game, too, by identifying the irony in that 
statement. Does Johannes really think we buy the conceit that he only seduced Cordelia in order 
to have her reject him and walk away from the engagement more edified as a result? “To poetize 
oneself into a girl is an art,” he brags. But “to poetize oneself out of her is a masterstroke” (93). 
And he finally concludes, “But now it is finished, and I never want to see her again” (199). The 
barely concealed bitterness in this irony is something Proust would later master when, after 
obsessively chasing Odette, Charles Swann tries to convince himself that she “was not my type!” 
(Swann’s Way 396). At times, though, Johannes’s mask slips:92  
She must owe me nothing, for she must be free. Only in freedom is there love; only in 
freedom are there diversion and everlasting amusement. Although I am making 
arrangements so that she will sink into my arms as if by a necessity of nature and am 
striving to make her gravitate toward me, the point nevertheless is that she should not fall 
like a heavy body but as mind should gravitate toward mind. (83) 
Cordelia does not fall, but neither does she gravitate to him in her intellectual ascent. His traps 
do not promote freedom, and his game does not establish a meaningful connection with her, no 
matter how many layers of irony he wants to hide behind. He wishes he could “raise an erotic 
storm capable of tearing up trees by the roots. By means of it, I could see if it is possible to lift 
her off the ground, to lift her out of the historical context, and through secret meetings to 
generate her passion in this unsettled state” (91). But it is all for naught. She operates by 
 
92 Like Humbert, Johannes is explicit in his use of masks: “To make it hearty, low comedy would not be in harmony 
with the mask I have used up to now or with the new one I intend to put on and wear” (98-99). 
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different laws of gravity that ultimately resist his orbit, his cosmic influence over her. And yet he 
still deludes himself into thinking he is operating from a position of power over her mind and 
soul, as does Humbert with Lolita: “I am the one who gains the most,” Johannes reasons, “for I 
determine the choice of books and continually stay in the background” (88). He specifies that 
these books are “the best nourishment: mythology and fairy tales” (154). Humbert also tries to 
educate Lolita through books, among them “The Little Mermaid,” and her frustrated response is, 
“You talk like a book, Dad” (114). As though Johannes takes Humbert’s place, he seems to 
respond to this objection over a century before its fictional utterance, pedantically explaining: 
A person who talks like a book is extremely boring to listen to, but sometimes it is rather 
expedient to talk that way. That is, a book has the remarkable characteristic that it can be 
interpreted as one pleases. If a person talks like a book, his talking also has the same 
characteristic. (102) 
The invitation to a freedom of interpretation is central to Johannes’s irony: “My art is to use 
amphibolies so that the listeners understand one thing from what is said and then suddenly 
perceive that the words can be interpreted another way” (96). Socratic irony, being the subject of 
Kierkegaard’s dissertation, is central to his thought and his literary method. The awkwardness of 
talking like a book, in the context of Socratic irony, brings to mind Plato’s Phaedrus, in which 
the differences between oral speech and written text are hashed out in a discussion of love as a 
discovery of one’s self in the tension between memory and forgetfulness. “I have forgotten 
myself in order to recollect you,” Johannes writes before asserting, “I am in love with myself. 
And why? Because I am in love with you…” (142-43). The irony here is that Johannes tries 
leading Cordelia to an understanding of herself as he forgets and abandons his own self, thinking 
of his own love as “an expression of most inspired self-annihilation” (144). As Cordelia pulls 
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away from him in this erotic tension, discovering her own authenticity, he falls deeper and 
deeper into a state of inauthenticity: “‘My’—what does that word designate? Not what belongs to 
me, but what I belong to, what contains my whole being, which is mine insofar as I belong to it” 
(146). 
 
“A Contribution to a Theory of the Kiss” 
 Johannes even cites Phaedrus when he writes that he has been “preparing myself by 
reading the well-known passage in the Phaedrus about erotic love. It electrifies my whole being 
and is an excellent prelude. Plato really had knowledge of the erotic” (162). He ostensibly 
reiterates Socrates’ observations in the dialogue, viewing his relationship with Cordelia at one 
point as “only that of two good minds… in the purely Greek sense” (87). Maybe it is for this 
reason that Lukács calls Kierkegaard “the sentimental Socrates” (Soul and Form 50). Johannes 
also flatters himself with an implicit comparison with the gadfly philosopher: “As you know, I 
have a weakness for asking questions; I may almost be censured for it” (161). But when he 
arrives at the subject of speaking like a book, and of the written word at large, he turns Socrates 
on his head, insisting that, “the dead letter of writing often has much more influence than the 
living word” (158). While this may carry some truth, the irony arguably is that Cordelia ends up 
liberated from his influence, both in written and in spoken form. But Johannes’s preference for 
writing draws attention to the erotic text itself as a written artifact.  
 Carson, in tracing the literature of eros, asks, “Is it a matter of coincidence that the poets 
who invented Eros, making of him a divinity and a literary obsession, were also the first authors 
in our tradition to leave us their poems in written form?” (41). Writing about love rather than 
speaking about it “cues us to certain radically new conditions of life and mind within which 
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[these erotic poets] were operating” (42). Just as Plato’s Phaedrus “electrifies” Johannes’s 
“whole being,” Carson observes that there “is something like an electrification” in “the 
resemblance between the way Eros acts in the mind of a lover and the way knowing acts in the 
mind of a thinker” (70). This resemblance, to Carson, is worked out most richly in the genre of 
the novel: 
 Novels institutionalize the ruse of eros. It becomes a narrative texture of sustained 
incongruence, emotional and cognitive. It permits the reader to stand in triangular relation 
to the characters in the story and reach into the text after the objects of their desire, 
sharing their longing but also detached from it, seeing their view of reality but also its 
mistakenness. It is almost like being in love. (85) 
The novel that Johannes—and Kierkegaard—end up writing emerges out of a failed attempt at a 
work of systematic philosophy. Johannes thinks about writing a book called, “A Contribution to 
a Theory of the Kiss,” and wonders how odd it is “that there is no book on this topic. If I manage 
to finish it, I shall also fill a long-felt need. Can the reason for this deficiency in the literature be 
that philosophers do not think about such things or that they do not understand them?” (159-60). 
It is clear that, from Plato, philosophers do think about such things, but maybe the form of 
philosophical discourse is inadequately matched with the subject matter.  
What would A Contribution to a Theory of the Kiss look like, and why must it fail? It is 
certainly more of a modest proposal than Casaubon’s Key to All Mythologies. A kiss is 
something narrower, more specific, more physical, more immediate than the elusive, abstract 
concept of love—and maybe it is for this reason that philosophers have a hard time with it. Its 
embodied particularity resists any kind of theoretical framework. Johannes imagines a highly 
systematic taxonomy of kisses, classified according to duration, to touch (“the tangential kiss, the 
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kiss en passant, and the clinging kiss”), and to sound (“[s]ometimes is a smacking sound, 
sometimes whistling, sometimes slushy, sometimes explosive, sometimes booming, sometimes 
full, sometimes hollow, sometimes like calico, etc. etc.”) (161).  
This comical and clumsy understanding of how one can understand the phenomenon of 
the kiss seems to foreshadow the definition later provided by Freud (who cleverly avoids the trap 
of ever defining sexuality, the subject of his entire career)93:  
One of these contacts in particular, the mutual contact of the mucous membrane of the 
lips, has also achieved high sexual value as a kiss among many peoples (including the 
highly civilized), although the parts of the body in question are not part of the sexual 
apparatus, but in fact form the entrance to the alimentary canal. (The Psychology of Love 
128).  
No definition of a kiss could be more accurate—that is, more tongue-in-cheek. This sounds like 
Plato mocking Erixymachus, the doctor in Symposium, by putting in his speech the most de-
eroticized account of eros, reducing it to an absurd narrative of mechanics. It is too bad that 
Nabokov was so biliously anti-Freudian that he couldn’t even pick up on his humor 
(“…including the highly civilized…!”).94 When Humbert wishes he could “apply voracious lips” 
to Lolita’s “nacreous liver,” Nabokov seems to be setting a trap for readers on the hunt for a 
Freudian analysis of his text without realizing that he himself fell into the trap of taking Freud 
 
93 In the introduction to Sartre’s Nausea, Hayden Carruth writes, “Long before Freud, Kierkegaard was aware of the 
hidden forces within the self, forces that, simply by existing, destroyed all rational, positivistic, and optimistic 
delusions” (viii). There is more fascinating research to be done in connecting Freud with Kierkegaard vis-à-vis their 
pessimism. 
94 “Freudism and all it has tainted with its grotesque implications and methods appears to me to be one of the vilest 
deceits practiced by people on themselves and on others,” Nabokov told Playboy. “I reject it utterly, along with a 
few other medieval items still adored by the ignorant, the conventional, or the very sick” (Strong Opinions 23-4). In 
another interview, he calls Freud “the Viennese quack” (47). “I think he’s crude. I think he’s medieval, and I don’t 
want an elderly gentleman from Vienna with an umbrella inflicting his dreams upon me,” Nabokov said in a 1965 
interview (qtd. in Weinman 249). 
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too seriously when even Freud himself possibly wrote this definition as a joke (165). Any 
philosophical, physiological, or psychological definition of a kiss inevitably falls flat, leaving the 
task for literary writers to imbue this phenomenon with meaning. 
What Johannes is most interested in is exploring, outside of the classification of kisses he 
had outlined, is how the “first kiss is qualitatively different from all the others. Very few people 
think about this. It would be a shame if there were not even one who thinks about it” (161). One 
person who did think about not just any first kiss, but the first kiss to have ever taken place, was 
Plato, whose Symposium is a philosophical text that slips into literary narrative. John Vignaux 
Smyth, in thinking of Kierkegaard’s “ironist as eroticist,” says that, “the most venerable or well-
known precedent might perhaps be found in… Plato’s Symposium” (Smyth 6-7). In 
Aristophanes’ myth of our severed cosmic ancestors, after one of these beings are split in half, 
they find each other again and cling to one another with such steadfastness that Hephaistos offers 
to weld them together so that they would live one life and die one death, never to be apart ever 
again after that traumatic incision by the Olympian gods (192d-e). It is significant that the lovers’ 
response to this offer is never heard, but Aristophanes suggests that, “No lover could want 
anything else” (192e).  
Maybe the lovers’ response is not heard because their lips are locked into each other the 
way the rest of their bodies are, in this erotic ritual, this reminder of what they once were. The 
movement of language, like the movement of desire, reaches across a gap, a void, in its attempt 
to apprehend, to comprehend. In the moment that desire is reached, fulfilled, grasped and pulled 
toward me, the need for language dissolves. It has already been apprehended, arrested; it 
surrenders to the object in the awe of silent communion rather than chatty communication. The 
kiss is the emblem, the symbol, of this arrest of language. Symbollein is the process of bringing 
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two different things together to share one meaning. When two people share one kiss, the mouth, 
as the site of language, is now incapable of it; language becomes instead a physical grammar that 
operates by rules that mute speech. Johannes understands this either/or choice between language 
and the kiss when he says that Cordelia’s “heart does dwell on her lips, not in the form of words 
but in a more heartfelt way in the form of a kiss” (50).  
But a kiss, as any lover knows, can only last so long, and in the desperate clinging to each 
other of these severed beings in Plato’s image, there is a sense that this bodily proximity is not 
close enough. As with the Tristan lovers, they feel apart even when they are together, which is 
why Hephaistos offers his services. Carson, though, has her suspicions: 
Now, how credible a witness is Aristophanes, or his spokesman Hephaistos, in the 
question of what a lover really wants? Two reservations strike us: Hephaistos, impotent 
cuckold of the Olympian pantheon, can be viewed as at best a qualified authority on 
matters erotic; and Aristophanes’ judgment (“no lover could want anything else”) is 
belied by the anthropology of his own myth. Was it the case that the round beings of his 
fantasy remained perfectly content rolling about the world in prelapsarian oneness? No. 
They got big ideas and started rolling toward Olympus to make an attempt on the gods 
(190b-c). They began reaching for something else. So much for oneness. (68) 
These beings—that is to say, ourselves—claim to value oneness, but again, like the Tristan 
lovers, cling as much to their separation as they do to each other. The kiss is an act of locking 
lips not just to come together, to symbollein, but precisely to do its opposite: to disengage, to 
withdraw. Eros resides in that gap, that in-between space, that dialectic between the systole and 
diastole of desire. Eros exists between engaging and withdrawing, in the rhythmic tension 
between thrusting and pulling away. It is for this reason that these lovers locked in entropy could 
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strike one as ridiculous, and even rather comic (we shouldn’t forget that it is Aristophanes telling 
us this story, after all).  
The build-up to the kiss and the withdrawal from it—even if only to repeat the kiss 
again—demands narrative sequence. And, as Carson reminds us, the mouth is not the only site of 
language. The noun symbolon “means, in the ancient world, one half of a knucklebone carried as 
a token of identity to someone who has the other half” (74). The symbol as that token of our 
identities resides not in our mouths, but in our hands—symbols in themselves of comprehension, 
of reaching across the void to the outer world and erotically pulling it toward us only to push it 
back again in understanding our selves as separate beings, albeit beings that have an involvement 
with the world, or what Heidegger would call “being-in-the-world.” This is what Shakespeare 
stages for us when Romeo and Juliet, withdrawing from the ‘they’ of the Capulet’s party, 
gravitate to each other and use their lips to mutely pray: “Let lips do what hands do,” Romeo 
pleads, “purg[ing]” his “sin” through a kiss. When Juliet playfully asks whether he had just given 
her his sin by kissing her, he kisses her again to take it back. Inscribed in a kiss is the hope of its 
repetition; we kiss for the moment when we are no longer kissing, so that we may kiss again, 
summoning Eros in this push and pull. Juliet’s response to Romeo is, “You kiss by the book” 
(1.5.111). In line with the rest of the biblical imagery in the sonnet that contains their dialogue 
which builds up to their kiss, “the book” in question is most likely the Bible, but it could also 
refer to any number of the seduction manuals in vogue at the time, from Capellanus’ The Art of 
Courtly Love to Castiglione’s The Book of the Courtier. Whatever book it is, it is a text that is 
just as mute as their kiss that imitates hands in prayer. 
The language of hands then imitates the muteness of the mouth when occupied by a kiss. 
Sign language is a language without verbal speech, as is written language. The novel departs 
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from drama and poetry in that it fundamentally inheres in the muteness of written language 
which, for Carson, imitates eros itself, siding with the muteness of the kiss. The ancient Greek 
novels that Bakhtin refers to went by the name of “erotica pathēmata, or ‘erotic sufferings’: 
these are love stories in which it is generically required that love be painful. The stories are told 
in prose and their apparent aim is to entertain readers” rather than auditors (Carson 78). These 
novels flesh out the contradictory movement of the kiss, the engagement and disengagement: 
“The novelists play out as dilemmas of plot and character all those facets of erotic contradiction 
and difficulty that were first brought to light in lyric poetry” (79). To contradict is, literally, to 
use one’s tongue against another. It engages in order to reject; it both denies and affirms, attacks 
and defends, resists and yields. The history of the novel is a history of returning to this kiss, this 
mute contradiction, from the pessimistic image of the clinging lovers in Symposium to the 
greatest happiness that can exist in Kafka’s universe, when Frieda tells K.: 
I know of no greater happiness than to be with you, constantly, without interruption, 
without end, but in the dreams I dream there’s no tranquil place on earth for our love in 
the village or anywhere else, so I picture a deep and narrow grave where we embrace 
each other as if with clamps, I hide my face in you, you hide yours in me, and nobody 
will ever see us again. (The Castle 138) 
In Frieda’s vision of love, we see a genealogy of lovers traced back to what they always have 
been, and what they have always wanted—these archetypal lovers from the Symposium, whose 
answer to Hephaistos cannot be heard because they hide their faces in each other as if with 
clamps, holding on to each other constantly, without interruption, without end. When she says 
that “there’s no tranquil place on earth for our love,” she says this with the recollected conviction 
of her cosmic ancestors, who knew this to be true because they could compare the dismal life on 
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this earth with the happier existence they had held in the far reaches of the universe. And this 
pessimistic conviction echoed through the ages, through the Tristan lovers who also experienced 
their love in life as if they were already in the grave, down to the modern lovers, Frieda and K. 
Frieda’s love for K. is triangulated by this ancient memory.95 
 
The Novel as Seducer, The Seducer as Novel 
“Tactics of triangulation are the main business of the novel,” Carson writes (79). The 
written text is an artifact that not only triangulates between lovers as a passive medium, but as 
the agent of seduction, itself. Carson here cites Paolo and Francesca in Dante’s Inferno, who fell 
in love with each other by reading Arthurian legends together and ended up in hell for their act of 
adultery (79). But we also see the erotic tension between Lotte and Werther heighten when they 
both read Ossian together, leading to nothing but Werther’s eventual suicide. Emma Bovary also 
engages in love affairs with Rodolphe and Léon not so much because she is ever actually 
seduced by them, but because she is seduced by the image she projects onto them from the 
romantic novels she had read, which also only leads to disappointment and suicide.  
In the case of Anna Karenina, after meeting Vronsky for the first time, Anna reads an 
English novel on the train back home, “but it was unpleasant for her to read, that is, to follow the 
reflection of other people’s lives,” because she wanted to inhabit the roles of the characters, 
themselves (Tolstoy 99-100). She, in a sense, wants to abandon her own actuality so that she can 
exist only as a novelistic creation. Tolstoy tells us that the “hero of the novel” she is reading 
“was already beginning to achieve his English happiness, a baronetcy and an estate, and Anna 
 
95 In the critical reception that links Kierkegaard with Kafka, Judith Butler notes how, “the very notion of the gesture 
that Lukács begins to elaborate in the context of reading Kierkegaard is later taken up by Benjamin and Adorno to 
retrieve the social and historic significance of Kafka…” (Soul and Form, “Introduction” 9).  
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wished to go with him…” (100). While riding on the train, she is seduced into a false promise of 
happiness, wanting to follow this hero’s path while the train takes her down a different path, and 
this fictional happiness inevitably sets her up for failure. In a moment of distraction from 
reading, though, she comes to ask herself, “And what am I? Myself or someone else?” (101). It is 
as though she gets caught up in what Heidegger would call the Wirbel, the turbulence, of the 
novel—matched in velocity by the speed of the train—so that, in her loss of self, she later dies 
just as much from the impact of the train as from the impact of the novel. Nabokov himself, in 
his Cornell lectures, diagrammed the space of Anna’s sleeping car on the train when she reads 
this novel, indicating also the outside blizzard that seems to encompass the train as a threat, and 
advised his students to copy down the diagram. “This, he seems to be saying, is the reality of the 
novel” (Ong 1). 
This also simulates the reality of reading the novel. As Yi-Ping Ong notes, “The 
experience of novel reading requires prolonged solitude and stillness,” citing also Isabel Archer 
in Henry James’s The Portrait of a Lady, who takes her novels to an office with a door “fastened 
by bolts which a particularly slender little girl found it impossible to slide” (Ong 8; James 214). 
And in Nabokov’s translation of Pushkin’s novel in verse, Eugene Onegin we see Tatiana just as 
absorbed in the novelistic universe: 
With what attention she now 
reads a delicious novel, 
with what vivid enchantment 
drinks the seductive fiction! […] 
She sighs, and having made her own 
another’s ecstasy, another’s melancholy, 
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she whispers in a trance, by heart, 
a letter to the amiable hero. (153-54) 
Tatiana learns love through a novel, and later projects this love onto Onegin. Here she “whispers 
in a trance, by heart, / a letter to the amiable hero,” but she ends up writing this letter to Onegin, 
who, in response, writes her off. Once he flees after accidentally killing Lensky in the duel, 
Tatiana visits his abandoned mansion, riffling through the books he had annotated in his library 
and wondering whether there was no “real Onegin,” but a “parody” of the literary heroes he 
modeled himself after (262). The next time they meet, years later, she is married, and now that 
he falls in love with her, she rejects him. 
Nabokov uses this outline in Lolita, of a young girl who has a crush on an older, 
handsome man who seems like a collage of celebrity looks, but then begins to see through his 
character as someone who talks like a book instead of a real person, and as someone who wants 
to teach her how to love him through giving her books. Once he starts pursuing her, her fantasy 
dissolves, and she ends up fleeing from him. This movement between attraction and repulsion is 
the same movement we also see in The Seducer’s Diary, beginning with Johannes’s seduction of 
Cordelia, followed by the books he gives to instruct her as part of this seduction, which is then 
followed by Cordelia’s rejection of him. 
“Novel reading,” Ong explains, “demands the singular concentration of the seated 
meditator, in whose silent awareness an encounter with consciousness itself unfolds” (8). But 
unlike Anna Karenina, Isabel Archer, and the adolescent Tatiana before she gets married, all of 
whom want to dissolve in the novels they read and lose their sense of self, both Cordelia and 
Lolita encounter Johannes and Humbert respectively as though these men themselves were 
books, were novels—and their encounter with them allows their own consciousness, their own 
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sense of self, to unfold in contradistinction from these walking books. They both seek an 
autonomy outside of the novels they are trapped in.  
 Just as Humbert’s gift to Lolita is a copy of “The Little Mermaid,” thematizing the 
muteness that he prizes in her, Johannes thinks that: 
Erotic love is much too substantial to be satisfied with chatter, the erotic situations much 
too significant to be filled with chatter. They are silent, still, definitely outlined, and yet 
eloquent, like the music of Memnon’s statue. Eros gesticulates, does not speak… The 
erotic situations are always either sculptural or pictorial, but two people speaking 
together about their love is neither sculptural nor pictorial. (163) 
The element of muteness that Johannes values in pictures and sculpture is what Carson identifies 
as the novel’s most salient feature. Simone de Beauvoir, too, defines the novel as a “silent 
whole” that “says nothing but rather shows a whole set of difficulties, ambiguities and 
contradictions which constitute the lived meaning of an existence” (“My Experience as a Writer” 
287). Just as much as Cordelia and Lolita seem to read Johannes and Humbert as novels, 
Johannes and Humbert attempt to write them into their own novels—that is, to write them into 
silence. “Usually Cordelia keeps silent,” Johannes reiterates. “But at times a single brief remark 
betrays how much dwells within her. Then I assist her. It is as if behind a person, who with an 
unsure hand hastily made a few strokes in a drawing, there stood another person who every time 
made something vivid and firsthand out of it” (164). This is an artist who believes not only that 
he is creating a work of art, but that he is training this work of art to, in turn, become an artist, as 
well, which is why he imagines her as a future “temptress who seduces me” (172). She will 
become trained in seeing right through him the way Tatiana sees through Onegin and Lolita sees 
through Humbert, identifying this man as not so much of an artist as an artificer—an inauthentic, 
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dissembling manipulator who hides behind layers of irony and lets other books speak for 
himself. 
 When Cordelia breaks off the engagement, Johannes asks in his Diary, “What does erotic 
love love?” (195). Carson asks this question in reverse, and traces the history of its answer in a 
passage worth quoting at length: 
‘What does the lover want from love?’ is the question to which the [ancient Greek] lyric 
evidence led us. But now we should consider the matter from another side, for the nature 
of the lyric evidence cannot be separated from the fact of its transcription, and that fact 
remains mysterious. I mean by this that the lyric poets present a borderline case, living as 
they did in the first outburst of literary activity that followed the alphabet, commissioned 
as they were to compose lyrics for oral and public performance but somehow involved 
also in making written record of these poems. They are poets exploring the edge between 
oral and literate procedure, probing forward to see what kind of thing writing is, reading 
is, poetry can be. […] New genres of expression developed to meet its demands. Let us 
look at the most influential of those genres, evolved expressly for the delectation of 
writers and readers. Let us superimpose on the question ‘What does the lover want from 
love’ the questions ‘What does the reader want from reading? What is the writer’s 
desire?’ Novels are the answer. (77-78)  
It is a novel that Johannes—and behind him, Kierkegaard—ends up writing with The Seducer’s 
Diary. And it is Eros that seemingly draws its fictional reader, Victor Eremita, who comes across 
the manuscript locked inside the antique desk: “For a time, I again walked by every day and 
gazed at the desk with enamored eyes,” Eremita tells us (Either/Or I.5). He eventually takes a 
hatchet to the desk, where a secret compartment opens to reveal the mass of papers that he would 
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later edit under the title of Either/Or, including The Seducer’s Diary. “In the greatest haste,” he 
tells us, “a mahogany box that usually contained a pair of pistols was emptied and the papers 
deposited into it” (I.6). Eros’ arrows are replaced with images of a hatchet and pistols—the 
pistols being interchangeable with the manuscript—and the violence works hand in hand with 
the seduction.  
Eremita, as a reader, is ultimately seduced by the novel inside, by The Seducer’s Diary, 
however much its novelistic narrator may disparage novels themselves. “To see her was to love 
her, as the novels say,” Johannes tells us, “…but what, indeed does one come to know about love 
from novels? Sheer lies—which helps to shorten the task” (61). He insists that, “the ideal 
hovering before her is certainly not a shepherdess or a heroine in a novel,” and even pokes fun at 
the way blushing women are described in novels (61; 87). However, this could just be part of 
Johannes’s ironic posturing. He writes, “The point, then, is to find another aspect that at first 
glance may not seem so to her but that precisely because of this impediment becomes interesting 
to her. To that end, I choose not the poetic but the prosaic” (63). And again, he reiterates that the 
“infinite prosiness of an engagement is precisely the sounding board for the interesting” (95). If 
the book he wanted to write was called A Contribution to a Theory of the Kiss, then this novel 
could itself be an attempt at that theory, especially if we recall Schlegel’s formulation of a theory 
of the novel that would itself have to be a novel (“Letter About the Novel” 109).  
 
Kierkegaard Contra Schlegel 
Kierkegaard himself would probably object to this point, siding with Hegel when he 
writes in his dissertation that “Schlegelian irony was… on a very dubious wrong road” (The 
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Concept of Irony 265). He then proceeds to criticize Lucinde, Schlegel’s own novel that could 
very well stand in for a theory of the novel, because it “is an attempt to suspend all ethics” (289): 
…[By] starting from the freedom and the constitutive authority of the I, one does not 
arrive at a still higher spirituality but comes only to sensuousness and consequently to its 
opposite. In ethics, the relation to spirit is implied, but because the I wants a higher 
freedom, it negates the ethical spirit and thereby falls under the laws of the flesh and of 
drives. (301)  
And it is not so much that the characters in Lucinde have questionable ethics, but the fact that the 
entire work feels too “doctrinaire” that offends Kierkegaard the most (290). “If it were possible 
to imagine Lucinde as a whole to be merely… a hilarious playfulness that took joy in setting 
everything on its head, in turning everything upside down; if it were merely witty irony over all 
the ethics that is identical with custom and habit,” then anyone, to Kierkegaard, would “have the 
time of his life relishing it” (290). 
It is possible, then, to read The Seducer’s Diary, which he was writing in parallel to his 
dissertation, when Schlegel was very much on his mind, as a response to Lucinde. Sylvia Walsh 
interprets Johannes as “modeled after the hero of Lucinde, only he is far more calculating and 
intellectually sensuous than Julius, Schlegel’s romantic hero” (Walsh 64). She even goes so far 
as to see all of Either/Or as a work “that corresponds to what Friedrich Schlegel has dubbed an 
‘arabesque novel’” with its “mixture of genres—aphorisms, essays, diaries, letters, and a 
sermon” (63). Schlegel did, after all, think of novels as “the Socratic dialogues of our time” that 
are anchored in “the ideas and rhetorics of irony and parody,” so what we see in The Seducer’s 
Diary is an attempt to parody the parody, and to split the Socratic dialogue into the monologue of 
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a diarist, as though the text itself were missing its other half that would make it a novel, 
simulating the division of the primordial lovers (Schlegel 112; Smyth 13).  
The Seducer’s Diary replaces the earnest, cloying tone of Lucinde with the “playfulness” 
and “witty irony” that he wishes Schlegel would have used. Johannes, like Julius, also represents 
an ethically dubious ‘I,’ but one who does not fall “under the laws of the flesh and of drives.” 
Johannes is more cerebral; he contemplates a contribution to a theory of the kiss instead of 
performing the act. But the Platonic image of lovers stuck in a kiss is what Kierkegaard 
highlights in his criticism of Lucinde, noting that, “one of Julius’s great tasks is to picture to 
himself an eternal embrace, presumably as the one and only true actuality” (291).  
Kierkegaard dismisses this actuality, and suggests it as a theory instead—and not even 
that, but a contribution to one. He supplements this image with its opposite: just as much as these 
Platonic lovers kiss without disengaging, Kierkegaard gives us a disengagement without kissing. 
The only kiss Cordelia ever gives Johannes is described as “vague” and hardly pleasurable to 
either him or her: “…she kisses me as vaguely as the sky kisses the sea,” he writes (153). He 
waits for the moment when “her passion will be definite, energetic, determined, dialectical; her 
kissing will be consummate, her embrace not hiatic” (154).  
But this moment never arrives for him, and the kiss is what pivots Johannes’s relationship 
to her as one of a self-fashioned artist, animating her like Pygmalion animates Galatea, to one of 
a passive, helpless witness, as when he imagines himself as “witness to this farewell scene” 
when “nature, like a tender and luxuriant mother,” releases Cordelia “from the land of illusions” 
into the world (101): 
…I saw how that fond mother embraced her once again in farewell, and I heard her say, 
‘Go out into the world now, my child… Take now this kiss as a seal upon your lips. It is a 
 299 
seal that guards the sanctuary; it cannot be broken by anyone if you yourself do not want 
it to be, but when the right one comes you will know him.’ And she pressed a kiss upon 
her lips, a kiss, unlike a human kiss, which subtracts something, but rather a divine kiss, 
which gives everything, which gives the girl the power of the kiss. (101-102) 
The Seducer’s Diary, then, is the account of a kiss withheld, told from the perspective of a 
seducer who fails at his own seduction.  
Lukács thinks of Johannes as “the Platonic idea of the seducer, who is so deeply a 
seducer and nothing else that really he is not even that” (53). Johannes even deludes himself into 
saying, “I am and remain an optimist,” but the irony that he had used to instruct Cordelia—and, 
by extension, the reader—allows us to take away an opposite interpretation, especially when he 
sneers at another seemingly happy couple walking past him, making fun of their “infallible 
hope” and the “harmonia praestabilita [preestablished harmony]”—a phrase taken from Leibniz 
(Monadology 262-63)—“in all their movements” (27; 81). Johannes understands that he is not 
“the right one” who will come to receive Cordelia’s kiss, except from a distance, where he can 
only witness her “leap” away from him: “Her leap is a gliding. And once she has reached the 
other side, she stands there again, not exhausted by the effort, but more beautiful, more soulful 
than ever; she throws a kiss over to us who stand on this side” (126-27). Johannes’s contribution 
to a theory of the kiss fails, as he writes: “…it is my opinion that a kiss comes closer to the idea 
when a man kisses a girl than when a girl kisses a man” (160). But Cordelia here has “the power 





Kierkegaard as Novel Theorist 
Just as much as we can read The Seducer’s Diary as a parody of either Lucinde, The 
Sorrows of Young Werther, or the novel form at large, Victor Eremita, Kierkegaard’s fictional 
editor of Either/Or, has this to say about it:  
We sometimes come upon novels in which specific characters represent contrasting 
views of life. They usually end with one persuading the other. The point of view ought to 
speak for itself, but instead the reader is furnished with the historical result that the other 
was persuaded. I consider it fortunate that these papers provide no enlightenment in this 
respect. (Either/Or I.14) 
Kierkegaard also makes reference to The Seducer’s Diary in a note to a passage from a draft of 
The Concept of Anxiety, where he says that anyone who “looks at it closely… will see that this is 
something quite different from a novel, that it has completely different categories up its sleeve” 
(qtd. in Walsh 91). These categories, in his mind, have to do with narrative. In his journal, he 
wrote that, “The only thing this work lacks is a narrative, which I did begin but omitted… It was 
to be called ‘Unhappy Love.’ It was to form a contrast to the Seducer” (Either/Or I.xii). What he 
wanted to write in “Unhappy Love” is more or less the same story, except the girl “surrendered” 
to the man and “loved with all the enthusiasm a young girl has—then he became unhappy, went 
into a depression, pulled back; he could struggle with the whole world but not with himself. His 
love made him indescribably happy at the moment; as soon as he thought of time, he despaired” 
(xii).  
 What distinguishes the purportedly non-narrative Seducer’s Diary from the unwritten 
narrative of “Unhappy Love,” shelved along with the plans for his unwritten Agnete and the 
Merman (which could have been one and the same project), is only that the latter introduces time 
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as a central thematic concern rather than just a structural arrangement of temporality. This is an 
idiosyncratic understanding of narrative, since The Seducer’s Diary does take place across a 
narrative sequence of events. A introduces the work with his own gloss, followed by three of 
Cordelia’s letters to Johannes. Johannes’s first entry is dated “April 4th,” but without a year. 
Even so, the question of time in The Seducer’s Diary catches Eremita’s attention enough for him 
to figure out that the year Johannes begins the diary is 1834.96 But in subsequent entries, 
Johannes occasionally drops the month, and then the entire date altogether, the more he 
contemplates love as a feature of eternity, envisioning Cordelia moving “eternally forward” 
(124). The Unhappy Lover, by contrast—perhaps an analogue to Hegel’s “Unhappy 
Consciousness” in The Phenomenology of Spirit (126) and a preview of Heidegger’s Dasein—is 
bound by his finitude, his consciousness of being as time. 
If The Seducer’s Diary is not a novel and not even a narrative, then that point was surely 
lost on its early reviewers, one of whom compared all of Either/Or to the novels of Edward 
Bulwer-Lytton and Eugène Sue (Pattison 39). The earliest articles about Kierkegaard in English 
also situated him in the context of Flaubert and Dostoevsky (39). Lukács acknowledges him as 
the direct influence on his own Theory of the Novel, and Adrian Leverkühn’s first encounter with 
Mephistopheles occurs while he is reading Kierkegaard in Thomas Mann’s Doctor Faustus. 
Kierkegaard no doubt shaped the history of the novel and of novel theory, but his own 
relationship to the novel is worth exploring. “What Bakhtin sees occurring in the novel applies 
fairly directly to Kierkegaard,” George Pattison notes, reading Either/Or as a kind of 
Bildungsroman that offers “a set of choices about personal, cultural, and religious values that 
 
96 Coincidentally, it happens to be just over a century before the birth of Lolita. If she is twelve years old when 
Humbert first meets her in 1947, then she would have to be born in 1935. This year and the preceding one were also 
when Nabokov began writing the earliest premise for the novel (Proffer 3-4).  
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related to the life situation of its likely readers” in “an exceptionally carnivalesque multiplicity of 
styles and genres” (45-47).  
Scholars like Edward F. Mooney disagree. “Kierkegaard is not a novelist,” he says 
emphatically, “though ‘The Seducer’s Diary,’ from the first volume of Either/Or, reads like a 
novella” (56). But maybe he overstates the point by insisting that Kierkegaard “has no wish that 
a new genre be inaugurated in his honor, and no wish to found a new philosophical style” (60). 
Joakim Garff, though, offers more nuance when he writes: 
Kierkegaard never wrote a Bildungsroman; indeed, it is a matter of debate whether any 
text among the mountains of written paper he left behind can meaningfully be called a 
novel. It is indisputable, however, that Kierkegaard thinks in character types and 
populates his work with textual characters that he either imports from the rich stock of 
world literature or single-handedly conjures up from the magical darkness of the ink 
bottle. (89) 
If The Seducer’s Diary is not a novel (or a novel within a novel), it still engages in dialogue with 
the genre, “which is sometimes said to hold a mirror to its time, but Kierkegaard held a 
kaleidoscope to a kaleidoscopic time” (Pattison 50). 
One thing that cannot be disputed, however, was that Kierkegaard was actively thinking 
about the novel—its aesthetic form and social function—throughout his career. It’s not for 
nothing that his dissertation, The Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates, veers 
away from Socrates into a sustained criticism of Schlegel not so much as a philosopher but as a 
novelist. Smyth sees in Schlegel’s “prescription for a novelistic theory of the novel… an instance 
of that perennial but deceptive fruit: an ironical theory of irony” (13). So for Kierkegaard to 
think through the concept of irony, it was necessary for him to think through Schlegel and the 
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novel. And while Kierkegaard was still a graduate student procrastinating on this dissertation, he 
published his first major work, oddly titled: From the Papers of One Still Living, Published 
Against His Will—a work that he actually fought very hard to get published, with all his will.97 
This cryptically titled work is a review of Hans Christian Andersen’s novel, Only a Fiddler, 
published in the same year as “The Little Mermaid.” At twenty-five years old and already eight 
years into his graduate program, Kierkegaard was antsy about getting anything published at this 
point. While hard at work on this review, his journal entries were ebullient, describing “an 
indescribable joy” and inspiration, even going so far as to say, “I would like to write a novella 
with my own mottoes” (Early Polemical Writings xxiv; The Concept of Irony vii). 
It must have been an awkward situation when, as Andersen describes it, Kierkegaard ran 
into him on the street in Copenhagen, telling him that he would write a positive review of the 
novel, and saying that most critics misunderstood Andersen (Early Polemical Writings xxv). 
Either Kierkegaard was lying, or he had changed his mind, because the review was scathing.98 It 
may have been as a result of this interaction that Kierkegaard wrote a puzzling preface to the 
book-length review, signed by “The Publisher” as opposed to the author of the review, as though 
another person were critiquing the critic, even alluding to the “quarrel I have had for quite a long 
 
97 The review was published by J.L. Heiberg, who led “an exclusive group of the leading writers, scholars, and 
actors of the city,” known as the “Heiberg circle” (Ong 50). Andersen had fallen out of favor with the Heiberg circle 
at the same time that Kierkegaard caught their attention, and “[i]nsinuating himself into this influential group of 
Danish literary elites [was] a cherished ambition of the young Kierkegaard, who often show[ed] up at their 
gatherings uninvited and [would] later send Heiberg unsolicited copies of all of his works” (50). 
98 Kierkegaard did seem to have warned Andersen after this exchange that the review would not be favorable. One 
week before the review’s publication, Andersen “noted in his calendar that he felt an agony of mind over 
‘Kierkegaard’s still unpublished review’” (Early Polemical Writings xxv). When the review was finally published, 
Andersen reports, upon reading it, having to be given “cooling powders. Walked as if in a coma” (qtd. in Ong 49). A 
year later, though, Andersen gloated in a letter to a friend about how everyone liked his novel abroad, and that there 
was only one sour local review that had a tone of “whimsicality” to it (Early Polemical Writings xxvi). Moreover, 
relations between Andersen and Kierkegaard seemed to thaw a decade after that, when Kierkegaard sent Andersen a 
copy of the second edition of Either/Or, to which Andersen responded, “You have given me really great pleasure by 
sending me your Either/Or. I was, as you can well understand, quite surprised; I had no idea at all that you 
entertained friendly thoughts of me, and yet I now find it to be so. God bless you for it! Thank you, thank you!” (qtd. 
in Either/Or I.xix).  
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time with the actual author of this essay” (55). And then, quoting a verse from a popular song, he 
writes:  
Although I love him ‘with tongue and mouth and from the bottom of my heart’ and truly 
regard him as my sincere friend, my alter ego [other self], I am still far from being able to 
describe our relationship by substituting another expression that might perhaps seem 
identical: alter idem [another of the same kind]. (55) 
The image of two sides of the same self, or two selves coming together both in erotic union and 
in quarrelsome contradiction, “perpetually in conflict with each other, although under it all we 
are united by the deepest, most sacred, indissoluble ties,” is this same image from Symposium 
that would later haunt The Seducer’s Diary. He describes this erotic dialectic in terms of 
“magnetic repulsion,” “yet… we are still, in the strongest sense of the word, inseparable…” (55). 
It is not so much “as if one soul resided in two bodies,” but “that with respect to us it must rather 
seem as if two souls resided in one body” (55).99 Maybe this is what he sees in the tragic 
condition of the two lovers clinging to each other in front of Hephaistos—not that they share one 
soul, but that, as a result of the incision, they now have two souls, and try—but fail—to recreate 
what it was like to have one body. This alter idem “is actually close to casting a gloom over 
me”—and it is precisely this gloomy, pessimistic image of two lovers clinging to each other that 
becomes the guiding emblem for Kierkegaard’s reflections on the novel, from this review to The 
Seducer’s Diary (56).    
 
99 Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong read this line instead as an allusion to Aristotle, when he writes in Magna 
Moralia, “When we wish to describe a very great friend, we say ‘my soul and his are one’” (qtd. in Early Polemical 
Writings 248, fn.5). But the fact that Kierkegaard ends up saying the reverse of this statement, that his relationship is 
defined as two distinct souls in one body, could suggest a movement from Aristotle to Plato, especially in light of 
the prevalence of other references to Plato’s erotic texts throughout his work.  
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The fact that the review was so harsh ended up being of little consequence, because 
hardly anyone read it anyway, due to its inordinate length for a review and its heavy, plodding, 
Hegelian style, even though Kierkegaard tries hiding this insecurity by disparaging “graduate-
student prose” in this work (xxvi-xxvii; 67). But it is Kierkegaard’s first articulation of what it 
means to be an “authentic individual who does not depend on external events in order to survive” 
(xxix). Only a Fiddler is about a man by the name of Christian (Andersen’s middle name), a 
genius who dies in poverty after failing to find any funding from a patron that would allow him 
to pursue his art. Kierkegaard’s problem with Andersen is that the novel is too saturated with his 
own autobiography—a general point that Schlegel defends in his “Letter about the Novel,” 
which may in part be why Kierkegaard argues against Schlegel in his dissertation (Schlegel 103). 
For Kierkegaard, the “authentic novel must express an authentic view of life and not be a 
projection of personal problems and a revelation of other deficiencies” (Early Polemical 
Writings xxix).  
Kierkegaard begins his review in a way that both echoes “Hegel’s great attempt to begin 
with nothing” and rehearses Heidegger’s later procedure for outlining the problem of the 
forgetting of Being (61)100: 
Far from remembering with thankfulness the struggles and hardships the world has 
endured in order to become what it is, the whole newer development—in order to begin 
again from the beginning—has a great tendency even to forget, if possible, the results this 
development has gained in the sweat of its brow. (61) 
 
100 “…Hegel, who, in order to avoid starting his philosophy at an arbitrary point, tried to get behind all intellectual 
assumptions and arrive at what he claimed was a basic presuppositionless foundation concept. He saw this in the 
concept of being (Sein)—being, stripped of all intellectual definitions or conceptual distinguishing marks, hence 
pure and abstract and therefore also describable as nothing (Nichts). Thus Kierkegaard also speaks in the essay 
(pp.62, 64) of ‘beginning from nothing’” (Early Polemical Writings 249 fn.20). Heidegger, too, begins the 
Introduction to Being in Time with Par. 1, “The Necessity for Explicitly Restating the Question of Being,” with: 
“This question has today been forgotten” (21). See also the beginning of Kierkegaard’s Concept of Anxiety (14).  
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He then proceeds to disparage the “gaping mob” against the authentic individual, the same way 
that Heidegger would distinguish das Man from authentic Dasein (62).  
This rant turns into an ad hominem attack against Andersen, who “early in life was 
wrapped up in himself,” and subsequently “felt thrown back on himself like a superfluous 
cornflower amid the useful grain” (73). This detail of the useless cornflower could also be a barb 
against his recently published “The Little Mermaid”—which also must have struck Kierkegaard 
as too autobiographical in its own way—in which the nameless mermaid lives far out at sea, 
where “the water is as blue as the petals of the prettiest cornflowers…” (Andersen 120). This 
mermaid, too, is artistic, but she gives up her musical talents by giving away her voice, and then 
passively waits to be accepted and loved by the prince. This must have struck Kierkegaard as a 
narrative of absolute inauthenticity. And he continues to attack Andersen: 
 And because he was thus continually thrust down in the funnel of his own personality, 
inasmuch as his original elegiac mood modified itself through such reflection to a certain 
gloom and bitterness against the world, his poetic powers, productive in their self-
consuming activity, must manifest themselves to a low flame that again and again flares 
up rather than, as would be the case with a more significant personality, as an 
underground fire that by its eruption terrifies the world. (73) 
This excoriation seems as much an appraisal of Kierkegaard’s own “gloom and bitterness against 
the world” as it is of Andersen’s. It is as though in Andersen he sees his own alter idem that he 
identifies in the preface, the one who “is actually close to casting a gloom over me,” but whom 
he clings to nonetheless, as a part of his own being (56). Smyth notes how Kierkegaard “reserves 
his most… sarcastic and dismissive… assaults for those positions most dangerously close to his 
own. This indeed is essentially characteristic of irony and the ironist per se, and Kierkegaard 
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himself is fully aware of this tendency” (112). Maybe this was also an exercise at articulating his 
own anxiety over not being “a more significant personality” that “terrifies the world” with its 
erupting flames of genius. Kierkegaard returns to this image of flames in an artistic setting when 
he later writes in Either/Or: “A fire broke out backstage in a theater. The clown came out to 
warn the public; they thought it was a joke and applauded. He repeated it; the acclaim was even 
greater. I think that’s just how the world will come to an end: to general applause from wits who 
believe it’s a joke” (I.30). In both cases, the flames make no difference, which is the little 
consolation that could end up redeeming the “gloom and bitterness against the world.” 
What Andersen lacks most is a “life-view,” which is “more than a quintessence or a sum 
of propositions maintained in abstract neutrality” (76). It is, instead, “an unshakable certainty in 
oneself won from all experience” (76).101 A life-view is more than just a perspective, but 
something closer to what Lukács would call “form” in the novel: “A life-view is really 
providence in the novel; it is its deeper unity, which makes the novel have the center of gravity 
in itself. A life-view frees it from being arbitrary or purposeless” (81). When a life-view is 
lacking, the novel disintegrates into either dogma or thinly-veiled autobiography (81). If the 
author is speaking in their own voice, then there would be no space for irony, the driving motor 
of the novel—and also the method of Kierkegaard’s “indirect communication” (Seducer’s Diary 
xii). The reality of the outer world would then violate the fictional reality created in the space of 
the novel. As Ong interprets it, “the reader’s failure to be convinced by the reality of the novel 
 
101 We can compare this to what Bakhtin would later call “point of view.” In The Dialogic Imagination, he writes, 
“Epic disintegrates when the search begins for a new point of view on one’s own self (without any admixture of 
others’ points of view)” (34). The new form that accommodates this new point of view on one’s own self, in the 
wake of epic’s disintegration, is the novel. There is also a parallel between “one’s own point of view” with 
Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, as there is between the “admixture of others’ points of view” and Heidegger’s 
concept of inauthenticity. The next chapter will flesh out these parallels more.  
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registers in a growing awareness either of herself or of an authorial presence, who awkwardly 
intervenes within the unfolding of the work itself and thereby falsifies it” (19).102  
Kierkegaard took his concept of “life-view” from Friedrich Schleiermacher’s application 
of the epistemological category of Weltanschauung to “aesthetic and existential registers in 
Confidential Letters Concerning Schlegel’s ‘Lucinde’ [which was] highly regarded by 
Kierkegaard” (Ong 53). In his journal from 1835, three years before he wrote From the Papers of 
One Still Living, Kierkegaard cites Schleiermacher’s critique of Lucinde as “an example of how 
a review can be highly productive” and “a true work of art” (qtd. in Ong 53). So even through his 
critique of Andersen, he is still engaging Schlegel’s take on the novel, and the life-view that 
Kierkegaard identified as the crux of the novel is what he ended up cultivating throughout the 
rest of his writings.103 In his posthumously published Point of View for my Activity as an Author, 
“he says in effect that the pseudonymity was designed to let the works express views of life 
without the reader being led to think they might be the actual views of the author” (A Literary 
Review vii). It wasn’t that Kierkegaard was looking to equate a life-view with an author’s 
autobiographical point of view (that was actually exactly what he railed against), but that a life-
view would be an autonomous structure that would hold a novel together. 
Bakhtin takes Kierkegaard’s concept of the life-view when he analyzes the role of 
character in Dostoevsky’s novels: 
…the hero interests Dostoevsky not as some manifestation of reality that possesses fixed 
and specific socially typical or individual characteristic traits, nor as a specific profile 
 
102 Paraphrasing Kierkegaard’s argument, Ong writes, “In his attempt to resolve his ongoing and inconclusive 
struggles with life within the work of art, Andersen not only runs the risk of passing along this disintegrated self to 
both the protagonist and the reader of the novel, but he also creates a weak and unpersuasive work of art, one that 
never succeeds in coming to life because its author has not yet consented to live” (62). 
103 Ong argues that the section of his dissertation on Schlegel “was most likely written during or immediately 
following his completion of From the Papers of One Still Living” (60). 
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assembled out of unambiguous and objective features… [but] as a particular point of 
view on the world and on oneself, as the position enabling a person to interpret and 
evaluate his own self and his surrounding reality. (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 47) 
Bakhtin, like Lukács, was not only open about the influence of Kierkegaard on his work as a 
novel theorist, but proud of the fact that he seemed to have discovered Kierkegaard before he 
came into vogue throughout Europe in the 1920s. In an interview with the literary journal 
Tjelovek, Bakhtin boasts about how he was:  
…the first Russian… to study Søren Kierkegaard. …Dostoevsky was, of course, unaware 
of Kierkegaard’s existence, despite the fact that they were nearly contemporaries. The 
sympathy, however, between the concerns of these two authors and the depth of their 
insights is astounding. (Qtd. in Ong 103) 
While Bakhtin and Lukács were explicitly working through Kierkegaard to make sense of the 
novel at a time when Kierkegaard, to them at least, seemed to be everywhere, one of their 
contemporaries was conspicuously silent about acknowledging the debt he owed to Kierkegaard, 




BEING AND TIME AS THE NOVEL IT NEVER WAS 
 
Heidegger’s Anxiety of Influence 
 April 1964. It was the 150th anniversary of Kierkegaard’s birth, and UNESCO had 
organized a conference in Paris called “Kierkegaard vivant” (Carlisle 422). In attendance were 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Karl Jaspers, Emmanuel Levinas, and other luminaries. But the star of the 
conference was Heidegger, who had dramatically overcome metaphysics with his magnum opus 
Being and Time in 1927, which marked a definitive break from thousands of years of Western 
ontology, rethinking the human subject not in terms of subjectivity anymore, but as Dasein, a 
historical mode of existence that eluded static categories of theorization (Huntington 46). Despite 
his somewhat exaggerated claims to originality, Heidegger still acknowledged the way thinkers 
like Heraclitus, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche shaped his thought. Already in his seventies at this 
point, he had not yet given the same treatment to Kierkegaard. This conference would be the 
momentous occasion for such an acknowledgment, and the conference participants were eager to 
hear his own take on how Kierkegaard lived on in his work.  
Even when Being and Time was first published in 1927, it “was initially considered a 
crucial supplement to and extension of general existentialist and specifically Kierkegaardian 
themes” (43). And still today, Claire Carlisle asks, “to what extent is a contemporary reader’s 
interpretation of Kierkegaard already shaped by Heidegger’s philosophy?—and, indeed, is one 
also reading Heidegger in the light of Kierkegaard?” (422). We see symptoms of this crossover 
when scholars like Edward F. Mooney say that Kierkegaard “creates anxiety, that forerunner of 
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change of self or recovery of soul,” something that could just as easily be said of Heidegger 
(Mooney 61). Mooney goes on to say, using Heideggerian language, that: 
Kierkegaard makes an existential contribution that only I can complete. His contribution 
is to offer me an existential space distinct from social space. If I accept this offer, I accept 
the open space where existential possibilities are vividly acknowledged, and then I close 
that radical openness through decisive resolution and action. (63)  
Heidegger’s entire philosophy is predicated on offering an “existential space distinct from social 
space.” This is what he calls “authenticity”—Eigentlichkeit in German, my “own-ness,” which is 
why Mooney italicizes the “I.” Authenticity, in Heidegger’s jargon, is the “decisive resolution 
and action” that only I can take for my own existence. And yet we’re not even talking about 
Heidegger here, but Kierkegaard. That Kierkegaard had an “undeniable influence” on Heidegger 
was never in dispute; some scholars even refer to his impact as “obvious” (Buben 967; Carlisle 
422). The only thing that was missing was Heidegger coming out and saying so.  
The only thing that was also missing from the Kierkegaard conference, it turned out, 
ended up being Heidegger himself, despite his much anticipated role. He had sent a written 
lecture in his absence, called, “La fin de la philosophie et la tâche de la pensée” [“The End of 
Philosophy and the Task of Thought”]. There wasn’t a single mention of Kierkegaard in the 
paper. In the discussion that followed, Jean Beaufret, who was tasked with the unfortunate role 
of presenting it at the conference, uncomfortably and somewhat apologetically addressed the 
elephant that wasn’t even in the room, of how his mentor “had spoken without speaking of 
Kierkegaard” (qtd. in Carlisle 422). Jean Wahl, also in attendance, sneered at how Heidegger still 
“kept Kierkegaard in the shadows” (qtd. in Carlisle 422).  
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Before Heidegger was famous for reinventing philosophy, he didn’t always go out of his 
way to hide his fascination with Kierkegaard. Between 1910 and 1914, he admitted to 
“enthusiastically reading Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, and Kierkegaard” (Buben 969). Kierkegaard 
had already been widely translated into German before the twentieth century, and new 
translations preceded the Kierkegaard renaissance of the 1920s. Theodor Haecker’s translations 
with accompanying commentary appeared in Der Brenner, an Austrian journal of cultural and 
literary criticism, which Heidegger had subscribed to from 1911 until it went out of business in 
1954 (969). In 1919, he reviewed Karl Jaspers’s book The Psychology of Worldviews, which 
discusses Kierkegaard’s concept of the moment in The Concept of Anxiety, and which would 
become central to Being and Time (Carlisle 429). In the courses he taught right before the 
publication of Being and Time, Heidegger quoted Either/Or and Practice in Christianity 
regularly (Buben 969).  
But an abrupt shift happened when Being and Time was published. Kierkegaard was 
buried in the footnotes, just as someone who “remained completely dominated by Hegel” and 
was not “correspondingly successful” in his ontology (Being and Time 494 fn.vi; 497 fn.iii). And 
by the time Heidegger taught his lecture course, “What is Called Thinking?” in 1950-51, he was 
more brazen and flippant in his dismissal: “But about the decisive question—the essential nature 
of Being—Kierkegaard has nothing whatever to say” (What is Called Thinking? 213).  
Kierkegaard, however, is not the only influential figure whom Heidegger dismissed, 
ignored, or relegated to footnotes in his work. Lukács and Tolstoy also suffer the same fate in 
Heidegger’s thought. The purpose of this chapter is not to rehash all the ways in which 
Kierkegaard had influenced Heidegger, especially since they are so “obvious,” but, in light of the 
larger project at hand, to demonstrate the extent to which reflections on the novel as a site of 
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pessimism shaped Being and Time, and how Heidegger absorbed these specific reflections on the 
novel from Kierkegaard, Lukács, and Tolstoy. What is at stake for Heidegger in trying to hide 
the traces of the novel or novel theory in his work? And when these traces are brought to light, 
how do they shape our understanding of Being and Time as work that, despite itself, is in 
conversation with the novel? 
 For this, we have to pick up with Kierkegaard where we left him at the end of the 
previous chapter. From the Papers of One Still Living wasn’t Kierkegaard’s only novel review. 
After nearly a decade of writing under his pseudonyms, he published under his own name again, 
this time for two Danish novels that were popular at the time, A Story of Everyday Life and Two 
Ages. This review was translated into German for Der Brenner in 1914, at the same time when 
Heidegger still professed to read Kierkegaard enthusiastically (Buben 970). Kierkegaard used 
this review of these novels as a pretext to address the issue of average everydayness, taking up 
his pessimistic task “to begin with the inadequate views and convey somehow the ways in which 
they were deficient” (A Literary Review vii). In his review of these novels, he “relates such 
failure on the part of the individual to features of society and cultural life at large” (vii). And 
although this review, unlike From the Papers of One Still Living, begins with praise, it ends up 
“preparing the way for a far more pessimistic account of the present age” (xv). 
Being and Time, like Kierkegaard’s A Literary Review, is also a portrait of Being in its 
“average everydayness,” negotiating between the idle chatter, curiosity, and ambiguity of fallen 
inauthenticity as one mode of existence, versus the silence, care, and anticipatory resoluteness of 
projected authenticity as another mode (Being and Time 38). Authentic Dasein is, quite literally, 
when Dasein is its own self—as opposed to the inauthentic existence of “the ‘they’” [das Man], 
which can also be thought of as “the public”:  
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In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services such as 
the newspaper, every Other is like the next. This Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s 
own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of ‘the Others,’ in such a way, indeed, that 
the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this 
inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the ‘they’ is unfolded. 
We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] take pleasure; we read, see, and 
judge about literature and art as they see and judge… The ‘they’ which is nothing 
definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of 
everydayness. (164) 
To Heidegger, one does not so much “fall” into the inauthentic existence of “the ‘they’” as much 
as one has always already fallen (210; 219). We are “thrown” into a world that we fall into; this 
is the facticity of existence (223). “In falling,” though, “Dasein turns away from itself” (230). To 
turn back toward itself—to essentially become itself—Dasein can provide a counter-movement 
against this movement of falling, of being thrown, twisting itself away from inauthenticity into 
authenticity. This is called Projection [Entwurf] (219).104 
Kierkegaard has a startlingly similar analysis of everyday life in A Literary Review. 
Instead of “falling,” he uses the term “levelling,” a process that subsumes the individual into a 
“monstrous abstraction,” pressuring the individual to conform to the tastes and ideology of the 
“all-encompassing something that is nothing, a mirage—this phantom is the public” (80). 
Kierkegaard, like Heidegger, blames newspapers and journals for the levelling of modern 
 
104 A synonym for Entwurf is Projekt, hence the English translation of “Projection.” It could be that Heidegger took 
this concept from Schlegel, along with Schlegel’s challenge to the subject-object binary, in this quote from his 
Athenaeum Fragments: “A project [Projekt] is the subjective embryo of a developing object. A perfect project 
should be at once completely subjective and completely objective, should be an indivisible and living individual” 
(§64, 122).  
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culture, in which—as in “falling”—“everything impotently sinks down” (80-83; 75). On the 
contrary, a single individual can be “the head of an uprising,” but levelling rises above nothing; it 
just absorbs individuals as it sinks, as it falls (75). “You might say that a person belongs to the 
public for a few hours a day,” Kierkegaard writes, “that is, during the hours when he is nothing; 
because during the hours in which he is the definite person he is, he does not belong to the 
public” (83). The time that he does not belong to the public is the time that he is (what Heidegger 
would call) authentic.105 
So already the supposedly groundbreaking work of Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein 
as a historical entity, caught between the demands of the public and the call of its own distinct 
self, had been worked out by Kierkegaard in his review of novels. The parallels don’t end there. 
One of the features of “the ‘they” for Heidegger is what he calls “idle talk” [Gerede]—the 
chatter, the rambling, the gossip, the logorrhea that superficially hides over the fact that this kind 
of language is a language that ultimately is about nothing, but disguises this nothing with empty 
words as a distraction (Being and Time 211). When it comes to idle talk, though, Kierkegaard 
asks:  
What is it to chat? It is to have repealed the passionate disjunction between being silent 
and speaking. Only the person who can remain essentially silent can essentially speak; 
 
105 Both Kierkegaard and Heidegger, however, come to the conclusion that this moment of authenticity can only just 
be a moment—an Øiblikket to Kierkegaard, or an Augenblick to Heidegger, both of which literally mean “glance of 
an eye” or “moment of vision”: “Just as Kierkegaard’s ‘moment’ signifies a meeting point of time and eternity that 
encompasses all three temporal dimensions, so Heidegger’s ‘moment of vision,’ in being joined with ‘repetition’ (of 
the past) and ‘anticipation’ (of the future), testifies to the ‘ecstatic’ character of Dasein’s temporality. And, as for 
Kierkegaard the individual’s encounter with ‘the eternal,’ or God, within the time of her own life is an ethical call to 
responsibility, so for Heidegger the moment of vision is a time for resolution or decision. However, this resoluteness 
connects the individual not to God, but to her whole temporal existence, stretched between what has been and what 
is to come. […] If, as Heidegger wants to argue in Being and Time, the human being simply is its time, and if the 
human being equally is its relationship to itself and to its world, then existing authentically—that is to say, in a way 
that is true to one’s own being—is to take up or appropriate one’s own past and future in each moment” (Carlisle 
432). Heidegger also takes Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety from The Concept of Anxiety.  
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only the person who can remain essentially silent can essentially act. Silence is 
inwardness. Talking forestalls essential speaking, and reflection’s utterance weakens 
action by stealing a march on it. (A Literary Review 87) 
To Heidegger, idle chatter is also the opposite of true discourse [Rede], which emerges only in 
silence, in the Nothing that clears the space for one to hear the authentic call of conscience (56): 
What does the conscience call to him to whom it appeals? Taken strictly, nothing. The 
call asserts nothing, gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell. Least of 
all does it try to set going a ‘soliloquy’ in the Self to which it has appealed. ‘Nothing’ 
gets called to [zu-gerufen] this Self, but it has been summoned [aufgerufen] to itself—that 
is, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. […] Conscience discourses solely and 
constantly in the mode of keeping silent. (Being and Time 318)106 
To Kierkegaard, “Talkativeness gains in extensity: it has everything to talk about and goes on 
incessantly. […] But chat dreads the moment of silence that would make the emptiness plain” (A 
Literary Review 87). That “moment of silence that would make the emptiness plain” is precisely 
the Nothing that gets called forth in authenticity, according to Heidegger.  
Kierkegaard has an ambiguous stance toward idle talk in the novel. “In the novel,” he 
writes, “one finds excellent examples of this kind of chatting, a matter of mere trifles but always 
about specific persons mentioned by name, whose trivial circumstances are interesting as much 
as anything for their names” (89). It is as though idle talk is only tolerable to Kierkegaard within 
the context of a novel, and for that context to be ironic—something that he found lacking in 
 
106 Here is another corresponding passage from A Literary Review that illustrates this point Heidegger is making 
about silence: “Anyone who experiences something originally also experiences, through ideality, the possibilities of 
the same and the possibility of the opposite. These possibilities are his literary legal property. But his own private, 
personal actuality is not. His speaking, his producing, are thus borne by silence. The ideal perfection of his speaking, 
his producing, will correspond to his silence, and the absolute expression of that silence will be that the ideality 
contains the qualitatively opposite possibility” (87-88). Where Kierkegaard uses the word “original,” Heidegger uses 
the word “authentic.” 
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Andersen, the subject of his previous review. Except for a footnote, Heidegger never mentions 
the novel outright in Being and Time, even though he does disparage “scribbling [das 
Geschreibe]” as a form of idle talk (212). It is unclear whether he would relegate the novel to 
this category of writing. “In ‘poetical discourse,’” he concedes, however, that “the 
communication of the existential possibilities of one’s state-of-mind can become an aim in itself, 
and this amounts to a disclosing of existence” (215). Would this ‘poetical’ discourse include or 
exclude a prosaic or novelistic discourse? If Heidegger is trying to capture the experience of 
average everydayness, would prosaic discourse belong to idle talk? 
Dasein seems poetic only to the extent that it hears and belongs (hören and gehören) to 
the logos. It is poetic in that it dwells in poiesis—in making, in doing. “Dasein understands itself 
in terms of that which it is customarily concerned. ‘One is’ what one does” (283). Existing in (or 
rather, as) ecstatic temporality, Dasein for Heidegger is “das Eks-tatische.” The same hyphen 
that emphasizes the Eks-, the state of being outside of oneself,107 also draws attention to the         
-tatische. Dasein is the result of a Tat, a deed, a process of existential action instead of material 
substance.108 Dasein is thus tatisch, “deedly.” Dasein outdoes itself; that is, it outdoes its Self in 
being the Eks-tatische. But it is in this poetry, in this ecstasy, that Dasein paradoxically finds 
itself in a world of prose, and it is this prose of average everydayness that Heidegger analyzes. 
But, as Eugene Thacker notes, “The problem with the world is that one must always speak from 
within it” (Infinite Resignation 122). Heidegger’s answer to this problem is to come up with a 
 
107 Dasein is always “ahead-of-itself” in that “in Dasein there is always something still outstanding [noch etwas 
aussteht], which, as a potentiality-for-Being for Dasein itself, has not yet become ‘actual’” (Being and Time 279). 
The English translators, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, point out that, “The verb ‘ausstehen’ and the noun 
‘Ausstand’ (which we usually translate as ‘something still outstanding,’ etc.) are ordinarily used in German to apply 
to a debt or a bank deposit which, from the point of view of the lender or depositor, has yet to be repaid to him, 
liquidated, or withdrawn” (279 fn.1). Dasein, always in excess of itself, is therefore always outside of itself. The 
associations of existence with debt and ecstasy are clearly Nietzschean. 
108 Cf. Goethe, whose Faust abandons the biblical line, “In the beginning was the Word” and instead writes, “In the 
beginning was the Deed!” [“Im Anfang war die Tat!”] (Faust I.1224;1237). 
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jargon and syntax so far removed from the prose of average everydayness so that he can have the 
proper distance to carry out his analysis of it, and essentially narrate Dasein’s heroic account of 
discovering its authenticity in silent Discourse as opposed to idle talk, removed from the 
publicness of ‘the ‘they.’”  
Bakhtin, on the other hand, sees the novel almost as the precise opposite of Heidegger’s 
heroic account: 
In following epochs, man’s image was distorted by his increasing participation in the 
mute and invisible spheres of existence. He was literally drenched in muteness and 
invisibility. And with them entered loneliness. The personal and detached human being—
‘the man who exists for himself’—lost the unity and wholeness that had been a product 
of his public origin. Once having lost the popular chronotope of the public square, his 
self-consciousness could not find an equally real, unified and whole chronotope; it 
therefore broke down and lost its integrity, it became abstract and idealistic. (Dialogic 
Imagination 135-36) 
We can compare Bakhtin’s account of this loneliness with Benjamin’s. As opposed to the figure 
of the storyteller, the novelist to Benjamin “has isolated himself. The birthplace of the novel is 
the solitary individual who is no longer able to express himself by giving examples of his most 
important concerns, is himself uncounseled, and cannot counsel others” (Illuminations 87). 
Benjamin sees this as “the earliest symptom of a process whose end is the decline of storytelling 
[and] is the rise of the novel at the beginning of modern times” (87). This pessimistic account of 
the novel as the site of alienation also echoes Lukács’s characterization of the novel as an 
expression of “transcendental homelessness” (Theory of the Novel 92). But Bakhtin, despite his 
focus on loneliness, sees in the novel a Kierkegaardian opportunity to acquire a life-view, and to 
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make one’s world one’s “own”: “A man must educate or re-educate for a life in a world that is, 
from his point of view, enormous and foreign; he must make it his own, domesticate it” 
(Dialogic Imagination 234). 
Maybe Heidegger stuck to the idea of “poetical discourse” as opposed to a prosaic 
discourse in communicating “the existential possibilities of one’s state-of-mind,” and ultimately 
“a disclosing of existence,” because he saw that Kierkegaard, too, defines prose as 
“unconstrained speech… so prosiness is an unconcern that does not know a decorum” (Being 
and Time 215; A Literary Review 56). Furthermore, “prosiness lacks a concept” (56). This must 
have struck a chord with Heidegger, who tries to come up with a language for Dasein in its 
authenticity, abiding by a structure of care—the very opposite of the inauthentic “unconcern” 
with which Kierkegaard diagnosed prose. This clumsy, awkward—albeit precise—language that 
Heidegger comes up with, though, is not to everyone’s taste, least of all novelists. 
 
“Should not Such Writing be Subject to Punishment?” 
 “Heidegger—I could never stand this Nazi par existence. The challenge of reading his 
philosophical jargon of terror made it difficult to keep hold of the book. One’s own-ness! Should 
not such writing be subject to punishment?” One can almost picture the derisive smirk on 
Thomas Mann’s face as he penned these words to Paul Tillich in 1944 from his sun-drenched 
California home, a few houses away from his fellow expatriate Theodor Adorno, Tillich’s former 
student, who would later take his own opportunity at slamming Heidegger with his Jargon of 
Authenticity (Durantaye 395).109 Like Nietzsche, who also preferred hurling his insults at 
Wagner’s boorish German nationalism from a sunnier climate, Mann cuts through Heidegger’s 
 
109 Tillich was also the professor who had finally accepted Adorno’s dissertation on Kierkegaard in 1936 after it had 
been rejected by Hans Cornelius three years earlier (Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic xii). 
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Nazism with a French barb. Heidegger is the Nazi “par existence,” not par excellence, as one 
would expect this phrase to read; this is more than just an excellent Nazi—this is a man whose 
entire existence is that of a Nazi. Here he is, this Nazi railing against “the dictatorship of the 
‘they’”—of newspapers and journals that, in part, are established to help foster an informed, 
critical public—while having enjoyed the ceremony of being sworn in as Nazi Rector of the 
University of Freiburg in 1933. Even though he stepped down as Rector a year later, he 
benefitted from the fascist regime that he never denounced without any kind of equivocation. But 
it would be a mistake to read Mann’s dismissal as one of political affiliation alone. Mann 
reserves his harshest words not for Heidegger’s politics, but for his writing. It is Heidegger’s 
philosophical writing that ought to be subject to the punishment of the novelist’s ridicule. 
The antipathy Mann expresses for Heidegger is emblematic of the larger rift between 
philosophers and novelists. One thinks of D.H. Lawrence writing to Bertrand Russell only a 
generation before, “Do stop working and writing altogether and become a creature instead of a 
mechanical instrument” (Letters II 547).110 In Chapter 1, I had already gone through the history 
of how the novel had largely been kept in the dark as the dramatic antagonism between 
philosophy and literature had played itself out since Plato. There are certainly exceptions, as with 
Rousseau, Diderot, and Voltaire, who each wrote novels in their own right. But it is not until 
Kierkegaard that we get a thinker who reflects on the novel as providing us with the tools to 
approach philosophy’s most fundamental questions about what it means to exist in modernity—
reflections that provide the blueprint for Heidegger’s Being and Time.  
 
110 Russell’s misplaced optimism was no match for Lawrence’s pessimism. In 1930, as the threat of fascism was 
looming overhead, Russell published The Conquest of Happiness, a naïve and tone-deaf work that chalked up the 
unhappiness of modern life to “mistaken views of the world, mistaken ethics, [and] mistaken habits of life,” saying, 
furthermore, that our fears have “no obvious external cause” (24).  
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And yet Heidegger chose to belong to the philosophical tradition of ignoring the novel—
but at a time when no one else was anymore. Being and Time was published in the decade that 
witnessed the most exhilarating novelistic experiments, when the reputations of Kafka, Mann, 
Rilke, Proust, Joyce, and Woolf were firmly cemented in the public consciousness. Furthermore, 
scholars—taking Kierkegaard’s cue—were now beginning to take the novel as an art form 
seriously, though many of these scholarly works would be published in the coming decades—
decades in which Heidegger would stick ever more steadfastly to poetry as the beacon of 
literature, even going so far as to write a number of embarrassing poems himself.  
Even so, Lukács—just as steeped in Kierkegaard as Heidegger was—published The 
Theory of the Novel in 1915, well before the publication of Being and Time. Bakhtin, influenced 
not only by Kierkegaard, but also by Max Scheler111 and the Marburg School at the time 
Heidegger was teaching there, began writing his essays on the novel that would later be 
published as The Dialogical Imagination.112 Benjamin wrote his influential essay on Goethe’s 
Elective Affinities—rather than Faust, which philosophers like Nietzsche felt more comfortable 
quoting—in 1922. Auerbach had written his Habilitationsschrift on the Early Renaissance 
novella a year earlier, laying the groundwork for his monumental Mimesis in 1946, devoting half 
of his study of “Representation of Reality in Western Literature” exclusively to the rise of the 
novel. Heidegger, it seems, had to go out of his way to avoid writing about the novel, especially 
in a work that takes on the same project as the novel in its portrait of average everydayness.  
 
 
111 Heidegger cites Scheler five times in Being and Time (73). 
112 Bakhtin trained in “especially classical and German thinkers,” and through the 1920s “thought of himself 
essentially as a philosopher and not as a literary scholar” (The Dialogic Imagination xxii-xxiii). Heidegger was 
teaching at Marburg University from 1923-28, and Isaič Kagan, Bakhtin’s “best friend in these years,” had “spent 
almost ten years studying at Marburg and Berlin. He had been close to the Marburg neo-Kantians” (xxiii).   
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Ontological Guilt in the Novel: Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Kafka 
It seems that we can learn more about Being and Time from what Heidegger leaves out of 
it, or from what he hides in its footnotes, than what he says outright in the text. Although he 
doesn’t acknowledge Kierkegaard’s work on the novel as an influence, he does cite Tolstoy in a 
fleeting remark. The footnote appears in §51, in Heidegger’s treatment of Being-towards-death 
and the everydayness of Dasein: “In his story ‘The Death of Ivan Ilyitch’ Leo Tolstoi has 
presented the phenomenon of the disruption and breakdown of having ‘someone die’” (495 
fn.xii).113 That’s certainly the bare minimum of an acknowledgment, and maybe there’s more to 
this Tolstoy connection than Heidegger is willing to let on. While William Irwin maintains that 
as “a novelist and a philosopher, Tolstoy and Heidegger are doing very different things,” just 
how “very different” these things are remains dubious (15).   
In The Death of Ivan Ilyich, the eponymous antihero epitomizes the character of “the 
‘they.’” His “life had been most simple and most ordinary and most terrible” (Tolstoy 89). His 
being is the being of others, even as everyone else views his death as an irritating inconvenience:  
The awful, terrible act of his dying was, he could see, reduced by those around him to the 
level of a casual, unpleasant, almost indecorous incident (as if someone entered a 
drawing-room diffusing an unpleasant odor) and this was done by that very decorum 
which he had served his whole life long. (115)114  
 
113 Nabokov considers The Death of Ivan Ilyich second only to Anna Karenina as “the supreme masterpiece of 
nineteenth-century literature” (Strong Opinions 147). 
114 Cf. An earlier passage: “Besides considerations as to possible transfers and promotions likely to result from Ivan 
Ilyich’s death, the mere fact of the death of a near acquaintance aroused, as usual, in all who heard of it the 
complacent feeling that, ‘it’s he who is dead and not I’” (84). In “The Storyteller,” where Benjamin defines the 
novel as the pessimistic site of the “solitary individual,” he writes, “Dying was once a public process in the life of 
the individual and a most exemplary one. […] In the course of modern times dying has been pushed further and 
further out of the perceptual world of the living” (Illuminations 93-4).   
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Heidegger dissects this phenomenon when he writes, “Indeed the dying of Others is seen often 
enough as a social inconvenience, if not even a downright tactlessness, against which the public 
is to be guarded,” echoing Kierkegaard’s critique of the public “for not know[ing] a decorum” 
(Being and Time 298; A Literary Review 56). He inserts the footnote at the end of this sentence, 
alluding to the experience of witnessing another’s death. In Tolstoy’s novella, Ivan Ilyich 
himself is the Other witnessing the death that hardly seems to be his own. The tragedy, though, is 
that it can only be his own. On the verge of death, he—like every Dasein—“had to live thus all 
alone on the brink of an abyss, with no one who understood him…” (Tolstoy 107).115 
Perhaps Heidegger’s understanding of inauthenticity as an act of “falling” derives from 
Ivan Ilyich’s final thoughts: “And the example of a stone falling downwards with increasing 
velocity entered his mind. Life, a series of increasing sufferings, flies further and further towards 
its end—the most terrible suffering” (124). He muses over the course of his life, thinking, “It is 
as if I had been going downhill while I imagined I was going up. And that’s really what it was. I 
was going up in public opinion, but to the same extent life was ebbing away from me. And now 
it’s all over and there’s only death” (122). In this vertigo of experience, rising in the world of 
“the ‘they’” corresponds to a state of falling away from authenticity, from owning one’s Self. If 
Heidegger understands falling in this way, then it is hardly convincing when he tries stripping his 
discussion of inauthenticity from any normative or ethical denunciation, trying to insist that “the 
inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any ‘less’ Being or any ‘lower’ degree of Being” (68). 
It is puzzling to imagine a world in which falling to inauthenticity does not signify a process of 
 
115 Maurice Blanchot revises Heidegger’s claims about death, to make it much more pessimistic, and also in the 
context of analyzing Tolstoy’s fiction: “He dies alone because he dies as everyone; and this too makes for great 
solitude. From this we also see why death rarely seems to be achieved. To those who remain and surround the dying 
person, death comes as a death to be died still more. And it rests with them: they must preserve and prolong it until 
the moment when, time being at an end, everyone will die joyfully together. In this sense everyone is in agony till 
the end of the world” (The Space of Literature 165). The work in question is Tolstoy’s “Master and Man.”   
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lowering oneself, but even if it were a lateral movement, Heidegger clearly seems to favor the 
authentic over the inauthentic.116  
Ivan Ilyich’s call of conscience, arresting the movement of falling, also abides by a 
structure that Heidegger would later work out in Being and Time: “Then he grew quiet and not 
only ceased weeping, but even held his breath and became all attention. It was as though he were 
listening not to an audible voice, but to the voice of his soul…” (122). In response to the 
inaudible call, Ivan cries out, “But I’m not guilty!” (123). Dasein, despite any protestation, is 
always already guilty—not in a moral sense, but in an ontological sense of lack, of being 
schuldig (Heidegger 325). This “primordial Being-guilty” makes possible the basis of Dasein’s 
Being, which is essentially the basis of a nullity. 
Perhaps this concept of guilt, which Heidegger takes great pains to distinguish from prior 
moralistic conceptions of it (even though Nietzsche had already articulated just as much in On 
the Genealogy of Morals §2), can be read back into the history of novels. Maybe Ivan Ilyich is 
also alluding to guilt ontologically, referring to the lack that has constituted his life, and the final 
lack, the final nothingness, which the remains of his life are hurtling towards. Maybe this is the 
ontological guilt that also pervades Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, a novel that explores 
every iteration of guilt, beginning with Dmitri’s debt of three thousand roubles to Katerina 
Ivanovna (Dostoevsky 618). He is found guilty of his father’s murder by a court of law, even 
 
116 This unconvincing attempt at disguising an ethically normative claim as an ontologically descriptive one is also 
symptomatic of Heidegger’s inability to distance himself enough from Kierkegaard, leaving scholars like Patricia J. 
Huntington in the awkward position of unsuccessfully vouching for Heidegger, claiming that, “…by ontologizing 
Kierkegaard’s existential categories, Heidegger depletes the latter’s thought of its ethical import, central to the focus 
on personal edification. For this reason, I believe Being and Time constitutes not a development and extension of 
Kierkegaard’s thought but rather a significant transmutation” (Huntington 44). Byung-Chul Han notes how, 
“Heidegger does not consistently describe the they or idle talk in phenomenologically neutral terms. Frequently his 
interpretation is colored by value judgments or representations with clearly religious roots. Idle talk retains a 
‘disparaging sense’” (Good Entertainment 72-73).   
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though Smerdyakov, who had just hanged himself, was the one who dealt the final deathblow to 
Fyodor Pavlovich.   
Smerdyakov is guilt personified. He is the nothingness that constitutes the lives of the 
Karamazovs. At once the unacknowledged brother and also just their lackey, he is born out of 
silence, out of illiteracy, out of suppressed language. His mother, Stinking Lizaveta, “could not 
even speak a word, and would only rarely move her tongue and mumble…” (98). Even the 
narrator, after sparse description, relegates him back to silence by writing:  
I ought to say a little more about him in particular, but I am ashamed to distract my 
reader’s attention for such a long time to such ordinary lackeys, and therefore I shall go 
back to my narrative, hoping that with regard to Smerdyakov things will somehow work 
themselves out in the future course of the story. (100)  
The “future course of the story” is folded back in to this anterior past before the novel’s 
beginning, making possible the unfolding of events in a proto-Heideggerian display of “ecstatic 
temporality.”  
Smerdyakov’s non-being pervades all the brothers Karamazov. He emerges as Ivan’s 
own potentiality-for-Being, turning his own confession into an indictment of Ivan when he tells 
him, “still you are guilty of everything, sir…” (627). Ivan, anticipating the following chapter 
with his dialogue with the Devil, tells Smerdyakov, “You know what; I’m afraid you’re a dream, 
a ghost sitting there in front of me” (623). Perhaps it is this Devil, both Ivan’s and Smerdyakov’s 
double, who is the “black smear” that is enunciated in the name “Karamazov” (201).117 Everyone 
is a Karamazov to the extent that everyone is born with this “black smear,” and so everyone is 
 
117 Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky provide a footnote to Arina Petrovna’s mispronunciation of 
“Karamazov” as “Chernomazov”: “Arina Petrovna inadvertently brings out the implicit meaning of Alyosha’s 
surname: cherny is Russian for ‘black’; however, in the Turkish and Tartar languages, kara also means ‘black’ (the 
root, maz, in Russian conveys the idea of ‘paint’ or ‘smear’)” (784n.2.4.6.2). 
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guilty of Fyodor Pavlovich’s murder. Even Katerina Ivanovna, who brings Dmitri’s letter as 
evidence to the court—although she knows that he is not the one who killed his father—says at 
the end, “I am the cause of it all, I alone am guilty!” (759). On the witness stand, Rakitin asks, 
“Who could say which of them was to blame or calculate who owed what to whom, with all that 
muddled Karamazovism, in which no one could either define or understand himself?” (667). In 
the words of Zosima, “each of us is guilty before everyone, for everyone and everything” (289). 
Dostoevsky’s murder mystery, then, is just a cipher for a project of articulating a primordial guilt 
that cannot be explained away by law or theology, given the farce of Dmitri’s trial and the 
persuasiveness of Ivan’s atheism. This is a primordial, pre-ethical absence at the core of Being. 
Dasein responds to this verdict of ontological guilt with anticipatory resoluteness 
[vorlaufene Entschlossenheit]. “Anticipatory resoluteness discloses the current Situation of the 
‘there’ in such a way that existence, in taking action, is circumspectively concerned with what is 
factically ready-to-hand environmentally” (Being and Time 373). In Kafka, it is this mood of 
anticipatory resoluteness that characterizes K.’s factical resoluteness in insisting that he must 
fulfill the role of Land Surveyor in The Castle [Der Schloss], despite the bureaucratic machinery 
informing him that he is mistaken. K.’s Entschlossenheit is what discloses the Schloss of the 
title—the Situation, the place, the ‘there,’ the Da of his Dasein. The Schloss also represents the 
limits of his understanding, what Heidegger—and later Lacan—would call “the Real” as 
opposed to just “reality” (Being and Time 255). K. is there to take action, but he is impotent and 
inconsequential in the village, in the world of “the ‘they.’” K.’s “anticipatory resoluteness 
understands Dasein in its own essential Being-guilty” (Being and Time 373). He is not 
persecuted for a crime he has not committed, like Josef K. in The Trial, but both of them 
understand their existence in relation to a lack. The question, then, is whether Josef K. even has 
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Dasein, since he dies, “Like a dog!” and Dasein’s death must be distinguished from “the going-
out-of-the-world of that which merely has life” (Kafka 229; Heidegger 284). If dogs do not have 
Dasein, their death is merely a perishing of a lower order. And yet Dostoevsky demonstrates, in 
The Brothers Karamazov, that when Smerdyakov teaches Ilyusha how to feed the dog Zhuchka a 
piece of bread with a needle in it, that the death of a dog marks as great an absence as the death 
of a human. 
 
The Novel as Fundamental Ontology 
 “For the first time in the history of Western philosophical inquiry,” Yi-Ping Ong says of 
Being and Time, “Heidegger gives ontological primacy to those facets of the world that are 
privileged in the realist novel more than any other philosophical text” (163). Heidegger “argues 
that any ontological consideration of Dasein must begin by showing it ‘as it is proximally and for 
the most part—in its average everydayness,’ within a world of tools, idle chatter, neighbors, 
newspapers, and mortality” (Ong 163; Being and Time 37-38). I brought Kafka into the 
discussion in order to challenge Ong’s limitation of Heidegger’s engagement with just “the 
realist novel,” because I see Heidegger giving ontological primacy to the facets of the world that 
are privileged in the novel at large, as does Milan Kundera. In his Art of the Novel, Kundera 
writes: 
…all the great existential themes Heidegger analyzes in Being and Time—considering 
them to have been neglected by all European philosophy—had been unveiled, displayed, 
illuminated by four centuries of the novel… In its own way, through its own logic, the 
novel discovered the various dimensions of existence one by one. (5) 
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Guido Mazzoni also uses Heideggerian language to describe his project in his own Theory of the 
Novel: “…only in mimesis and fiction do human beings become aware of themselves as 
individual, particular beings, thrown into time, located in a world, and placed among others” 
(Mazzoni 13). Furthermore, he defines the “everyday” as what “represents the heart of the 
private condition. It is the life that barely juts out: it is particular existence in its pure being-
there” (229).  
It is difficult even to theorize about the novel without Heidegger, or without the material 
that Heidegger was working with. The reverse should also be true. Heidegger believes that what 
he is doing in Being and Time is giving us a “fundamental ontology, from which alone all other 
ontologies can take their rise,” and which “must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein” 
(Being and Time 34). He is explicit about his understanding of other disciplines and other modes 
of inquiry into knowledge, including psychology, anthropology, and biology as derivative of 
fundamental ontology (75). But more fundamental than fundamental ontology, then, is the 
advent of the novel—which Heidegger himself demonstrates in his debt to Tolstoy.  
In The Death of Ivan Ilyich, we have the entire ontic analytic laid out, from falling to the 
call of conscience in the void, from the understanding of existence as Being-towards-death to a 
portrait of “the ‘they.’” The novel is, then, what fundamental ontology is derived from. “I’m too 
fearful of the professors for whom art is only a derivative of philosophical trends,” Kundera 
writes: 
The novel dealt with the unconscious before Freud, the class struggle before Marx, it 
practiced phenomenology (the investigation of the essence of human situations) before 
the phenomenologists. What superb ‘phenomenological descriptions’ in Proust, who 
never even knew a phenomenologist! (Art of the Novel 32) 
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The novel is not derived from modern philosophy, but takes up similar questions adjacent to—
and even prior to—it. For this reason, Heidegger, “a poetry lover, was wrong to disregard the 
history of the novel, for it contains the greatest treasury of existential wisdom” (Testaments 
Betrayed 165).118 Kundera defines a self as “determined by the essence of its existential 
problem,” which is what a novelist works out through character—“not a simulation of a living 
being. It is an imaginary being. An experimental self” (Art of the Novel 32-34). If Being is Time, 
then a self is one of the myriad possibilities of an intersection between time and world unfolding 
into each other. This is precisely how Bakhtin also characterizes the innovation of the novel: 
“For the first time in artistic-ideological consciousness, time and the world become historical; 
they unfold, albeit at first still unclearly and confusedly, as becoming…” (Dialogic Imagination 
30).119 However revolutionary Heidegger’s concept of time may seem, Bakhtin sees this 
revolution taking place in the novel long before: “The novel, from the very beginning, developed 
as a genre that had at its core a new way of conceptualizing time” (38).  
In tracing Heidegger’s project of Being and Time back to the advent of the novel, 
Kundera supports “Hermann Broch’s insistence in repeating: The sole raison d’être of a novel is 
 
118 Curiously, though, Kundera traces the origin of the rapprochement between philosophy and the novel not to 
Heidegger, but to Nietzsche, who adamantly despised novels. However, “Nietzsche’s refusal of systematic thought 
has another consequence: an immense broadening of theme; barriers between the various philosophical disciplines, 
which have kept the real world from being seen in its full range, are fallen, and from then on everything human can 
become the object of a philosopher’s thought. That too brings philosophy nearer to the novel: for the first time 
philosophy is pondering not epistemology, not aesthetics or ethics, the phenomenology of mind or the critique of 
reason, etc. but everything human” (Testaments Betrayed 175). Mazzoni also identifies Nietzsche as the philosopher 
who recognized that the “search for permanent forms, for universal and eternal laws concealed inside and beneath 
the flow of phenomena, is displaced by the idea that everything, starting with concepts, is temporary and situated—
because there are no constants, but rather only contingencies thrown into time and space, interwoven with other 
equivalent contingencies in a web of actions, conflicts, negotiations, victories, and defeats” (351). This material is 
handled more by the novel than philosophy. In the Nachlass, Nietzsche sides with this subject matter against 
Leibniz: “What divides us most radically from all Platonic or Leibnizian ways of thinking is this: we do not believe 
in eternal concepts, eternal values, eternal forms; and insofar as philosophy is science and not legislation, for us it 
represents simply the broadest extension of the concept of ‘history’” (qtd. in Mazzoni 358). 
119 Bakhtin also sees the novel as the space in which “Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh” (Dialogic 
Imagination 84). Like Heidegger’s concept of Dasein as Being-towards-death, Bakhtin identifies this as “a time 
maximally tensed toward the future” (207).  
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to discover what only the novel can discover” (Art of the Novel 5-6). Instead of reading 
Heidegger against the novel, then, perhaps it is possible—if not more challenging—to read Being 
and Time as a kind of novelistic experiment in its own right, if not a crucial corollary text that 
coincides with the contemporary innovation of the modernist novel. Both the novel and Being 
and Time overlap in their shared project of discovery as dis-covery [Ent-deckung], of un-
covering the truth (aletheia in Greek, which, to Heidegger, operates by a movement of covering 
and uncovering, concealment and unconcealment).120 “Dasein,” Heidegger writes, as though it 
were not just a character in a novel, but the character in every novel, “in its familiarity with 
significance, is the ontical condition for the possibility of discovering entities which are 
encountered in a world with involvement (readiness-to-hand) as their kind of Being, and which 
can thus make themselves known as they are in themselves [in seinem An-sich]” (Being and Time 
120).   
It is worth noting that Lukács ends his Theory of the Novel with an analysis of Tolstoy. 
Heidegger seems to pick up where Lukács left off, organizing Being and Time around his own 
interpretation of Tolstoy while trying to hide the traces. Lukács defines the novel as a kind of 
phenomenological exercise in which the “contingent world and the problematic individual are 
realities which mutually determine one another” (Theory of the Novel 78). By “problematic,” 
Lukács understands the individual as someone for whom the meaning of existence is an issue. 
This is exactly how Heidegger defines Dasein: “…the Being of Dasein, for which, in its Being, 
that very Being is essentially an issue” (Being and Time 116-17). And when Heidegger speaks of 
“world” as “a characteristic of Dasein itself,” this contingent world seems to abide by the 
 
120 Writing about James Joyce, Kundera identifies his project as “a matter of a discovery that might be termed 
ontological: the discovery of the structure of the present moment; the discovery of the perpetual coexistence of the 
banal and the dramatic that underlies our lives” (Testaments Betrayed 131). 
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Lukácsian model of the novel (92).121 It is a world that derives meaning from a network of 
referentiality. As Heidegger explains, “the ‘wherein’ of an act of understanding which assigns or 
refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to 
involvements; and this ‘wherein’ is the phenomenon of the world” (119, italics in original).  
This logic of referentiality is precisely what is at work in the novel, in order to unconceal 
the phenomenon of the world.122 Bakhtin writes of “the language of the novel” also as a 
referential “system of languages that mutually and ideologically interanimate each other. It is 
impossible to describe and analyze it as a single unitary language” (Dialogic Imagination 47). 
And Ian Watt, too, maintains that, “the function of language is much more largely referential in 
the novel than in other literary works” (30). “Novels do not reproduce reality,” John Brenkman 
adds, “they refer to it, with deep awareness of its elusiveness. […The] novelist invents worlds to 
unmask the world” (811). 
This referentiality of this “wherein” is also responsible for Heidegger’s dissolution of the 
Kantian subject-object split into Being-in-the-world. In Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, there 
are no subjects or objects per se, but Dasein and equipment.123 Dasein is no longer a subject 
because it is always already involved in the world, in its ontic facticity; it is always running 
 
121 Bakhtin has a similar understanding of “world.” In “Epic and Novel: Toward a Methodology for the Study of the 
Novel,” he characterizes the shift from epic to novel in terms of its world-view: “The world has already opened up; 
one’s own monolithic and closed world (the world of the epic) has been replaced by the great world of one’s own 
plus ‘the others’” (Dialogic Imagination 29). This would also correspond to Heidegger’s account of “world” as 
“Being-in-the-world.” The “great world of one’s own plus ‘the others’” would translate to a world composed just as 
much of one’s own authenticity as “the ‘they’” of the others. The world for Bakhtin, as for Lukács, is constitutive: 
“Through contact with the present, an object is attracted to the incomplete process of a world-in-the-making” (30). 
122 Mazzoni writes, “Of all the language games our culture has developed, the novel is the one that shows in the 
most detail what it means to exist in time and in a world” (351). 
123 One would be hard-pressed to locate a tradition of anatomy here, as one sees readily in the novel. And yet the 
term he uses for equipment (sometimes translated as “tool”) in German, Zeug, is the translation of the Greek word 
for “organ.”   
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ahead of itself, so it is always “outside” of itself. Heidegger thereby deconstructs the binary of 
interiority and exteriority. As Ong puts it: 
  …Heidegger claims that to encounter Dasein ‘in its average everydayness’ is precisely 
to encounter Dasein in a world, as Being-in-the-world. Worldhood is an implicit structure 
of Dasein that manifests in its everyday lived experience as the constellation of material 
objects, people, practices, activities, and cultural and sociohistorical webs of context that 
yield certain life possibilities for Dasein. The ‘in’ of ‘Being-in-the-world’ is not the ‘in’ 
of location, in the sense of spatial coordinates, but rather the ‘in’ of involvement, 
implication, embeddedness. […] To claim that we only ever encounter Dasein embedded 
in a world is to claim that it makes no sense to abstract Dasein from the world, whether as 
a perceiving subject separate from its objects, a pure center of agency, or an utterly 
passive entity to be impressed upon by various forces. (Ong 163) 
This also corresponds to what Sartre, both a philosopher and a novelist (and playwright), calls 
“Situation”: 
The situation cannot be subjective, for it is neither the sum nor the unity of the 
impressions which things make on us. …But neither can the situation be objective in the 
sense that it would be a pure given which the subject would establish without being in 
any way engaged in the system thus constituted. …It is the total facticity, the absolute 
contingency of the world… (Being and Nothingness 548)124 
It is this “absolute contingency of the world” that brings us back to Lukács, whom Heidegger 
ignores and dismisses just as much as he ignores Kierkegaard, perhaps because he took so much 
 
124 In Sartre’s explanation of the “Situation,” Ong sees “philosophy struggl[ing] to enter into the condition of the 
novel, in its desire to achieve the impossible—call it necessarily fictional—aim of reflecting existence upon itself” 
(165). 
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from them while trying to take the credit for originality. In The Theory of the Novel, Lukács 
writes, “In its experience of nature, the subject, which alone is real, dissolves the whole outside 
world in mood, and itself becomes mood by virtue of the inexorable identity of essence between 
the contemplative subject and its object” (65).  
Heidegger translates Lukács’s understanding of “mood” into “State-of-mind” 
[Befindlichkeit], which is one of the three equiprimordial terms of the existential (authentic) 
disclosure of Being, the other two being Understanding [Verstehen] and Discourse [Rede], as 
opposed to the corresponding categories in inauthentic facticity, which are curiosity, ambiguity, 
and idle talk (Being and Time 172). Authenticity for Heidegger reveals the nothingness 
underlying all Being, which also parallels Lukács’s observation that, “All the fragments live only 
by the grace of the mood in which they are experienced, but the totality reveals the nothingness 
of this mood in terms of reflexion [sic.]” (Theory of the Novel 118-19). Furthermore, Lukács’s 
“inexorable identity of essence between the contemplative subject and object” also prefigures 
Heidegger’s dissolution of the subject-object binary into Being-in-the-world.125 In dissolving this 
binary before Heidegger, Lukács also seems to have foreshadowed Heidegger’s concept of 
ecstatic temporality when he writes, “The duality of interiority and the outside world can be 
abolished for the subject if he (the subject) glimpses in the organic unity of his whole life 
through the process by which the living present has grown from the stream of his past dammed 
up within his memory” (127). 
Authenticity is the disclosure of Being in the mode of anxiety. Like Heidegger’s concept 
of guilt, “anxiety” for him is not psychological, but ontological. It is “a kind of entranced calm,” 
 
125 There is also a correspondence between this dissolution of the subject-object binary and Bakhtin’s. Bakhtin 
argues that the image of the human in the Greeks had “neither an inner nor an outer, and was similar to nature as 
Goethe saw it” (Dialogic Imagination 135). 
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a silent confrontation with Being as Nothingness (“What is Metaphysics?” 90).126 The Greeks 
did not have a concept of anxiety. There was rage, for sure—the legendary rage of Achilles, for 
instance, which inaugurates all of Western literature. But anxiety is the authentic condition of 
Dasein in modernity. And nothing quite illustrates this movement like the novel, particularly 
Albert Camus’s The Stranger, which ends with Meursault coming to terms with his impending 
death:  
As if that blind rage had washed me clean, rid me of hope; for the first time, in that night 
alive with signs and stars, I opened myself to the gentle indifference of the world. 
Finding it so much like myself—so like a brother, really—I felt that I had been happy and 
that I was happy again. For everything to be consummated, for me to feel less alone, I 
had only to wish that there be a large crowd of spectators the day of my execution and 
that they greet me with cries of hate. (122-23)  
This passage moves from the ancient affect of rage to the Heideggerian mode of anxiety, in 
which Dasein “opened” itself “to the gentle indifference of the world” (122). In “blind rage” we 
also hear echoes of Schopenhauer, washing him clean of hope. But there is almost a kind of 
subdued, unnerving cheerfulness in Meursault’s tone. To Heidegger, the “anxiety of those who 
are daring” is actually “in secret alliance with the cheerfulness and gentleness of creative 
longing” (“What is Metaphysics?” 93). Perhaps he wrote this in response to Nietzsche, who 
wanted to figure out why the Greeks were so cheerful. The answer is that they were pessimists; 
like Cassandra, they dared to look into the abyss, and danced in joy as a result. We can read 
 
126 Heidegger explains this more clearly in his later essay, “What is Metaphysics?”: “By such anxiety we do not 
mean the quite common anxiousness, ultimately reducible to fearfulness, which all too readily comes over us. 
Anxiety is fundamentally different from fear. […] Much to the contrary, a peculiar calm pervades it” (88). Fear is 
always a specific fear “in the face of” something (88). Anxiety, by contrast, is “in the face” of “the nothing.” 
Because Dasein itself is nothing (“Da-sein means: being held out into the nothing”), anxiety is the mode of 
authenticity, the mode by which Dasein finds itself, its “own-ness” (91). 
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Meursault as a reincarnation of this kind of pessimist who cheerfully indulges in his absence of 
hope, who identifies a “brother” in the “indifference of the world” disclosed to him by the “signs 
and stars” that are just as indifferent to his fate as he is to theirs. These are signs that signify 
nothing. In tragedy, Lukács tells us, the soul that, in its loneliness, “has attained itself through its 
destiny can have brothers among the stars, but never an earthly companion…” (Theory of the 
Novel 45). In the novel, though, that genre which emerges in a world “beyond all hope,” the 
lonely soul can’t find brotherhood even in the stars, and the only brotherhood it can find in the 
world is one marked by indifference (38).  
If Meursault has any “brotherhood” with anyone, it would be with the likes of Ishmael 
from Moby-Dick, who demonstrates this Heideggerian anxiety as a form of joyful calm when he 
writes that, “amid the tornadoed Atlantic of my being, do I myself still for ever centrally disport 
in mute calm; and while ponderous planets of unwaning woe revolve around me, deep down and 
deep inland there I still bathe me in eternal mildness and joy” (561). He also seems to share a 
brotherhood with Hamlet right before his death, which may not be actually as tragic as it is 
pessimistic. Both of them are strangers in the works that supposedly refer to them in their titles. 
Hamlet, by nature, is a comic genius who, as though by mistake, stumbles into a tragedy that 
he’s not quite ready to be a part of. He speaks his first line as an aside, on the periphery of his 
own play, closer to us than anyone else on stage, because he doesn’t actually belong there, in this 
play that bears his name but largely carries on without him. He refuses to act because everyone 
else is doing enough acting and performing as it is, so he sits and thinks. And enough time goes 
by so that he does actually end up answering his question, the question. In the choice of “To be 
or not to be,” Hamlet chooses neither, but comes across a third option, right before his duel with 
Laertes: “Let be” (5.2.238). Hamlet and Meursault, both of them “let be.” Heidegger, in response 
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to his own question of the meaning of Being, comes to the same answer: Gelassenheit, what is 
often translated as “letting-be,” or “releasement,” or—with some poetic license and inspiration 
from Kundera—may be rendered as “the unbearable lightness of being.” Gelassenheit is the 
“openness to the mystery” of that “which shows itself and at the same time withdraws,” 
following the dance of concealment and unconcealment inscribed in the Greek word for “Truth,” 
aletheia (Discourse on Thinking 55). This letting-be is therefore the truth of the meaning of 
Being. It is in this space that happiness can be achieved—but just for a moment, for a 
Heideggerian Augenblick—before Meursault slips back into inauthenticity, in the mode of “the 
‘they,’” viewing his life from the perspective of the “large crowd of spectators,” sinking back to 
their level, because spite is too delicious to give up for the pessimist, and their cries of hate will 
be his last taste of it.  
In this single passage of the novel, we get the dramatic fluctuation of Dasein across 
history, and across the temporal boundaries between authenticity and inauthenticity. Heidegger 
ultimately reveals that Being is the passage of Time; the point of Being and Time is that Being is 
Time (488). And to Lukács, “only the novel, the literary form of the transcendent homelessness 
of the idea, includes real time… among its constitutive principles” (Theory of the Novel 122). 
Moreover, he continues, in an insight that Heidegger takes without any attribution: “Time is the 
fullness of life, although the fullness of time is the self-abolition of life and, with it, of time 
itself” (123).127        
If the novel marks the turn away from the world of extraordinary figures like Achilles, 
Odysseus, and Oedipus to the ordinariness of Tristram Shandy, Clarissa Dalloway, and 
Meursault, then Being and Time shares the same contemplation of the experience of average 
 
127 Lukács also writes, “…time gives them the essential quality of their existence” (125). 
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everydayness [durchschnittlichen Alltäglichkeit]. Lukács even uses this phrase to describe the 
novel when he sees it as a study of “the average , everyday nature of the real world” (Theory of 
the Novel 99). Heidegger’s own study of Dasein in its average everydayness is no less novelistic 
than George Eliot’s in Middlemarch, which itself claims to be a “Study” in its subtitle, of 
provincial life (perhaps an ambitious translator would render the title Durchschrittlichkeit).128 As 
with the fictional character of Dasein in Being and Time, Eliot’s characters are most vividly 
sketched in terms of what they grasp with their hands and ears. The same hand that Casaubon 
uses to write his failed manuscript, The Key to all Mythologies, becomes the hand that reaches 
from the grave in Book V, “The Dead Hand,” dictating his wife Dorothea’s future with the 
marriage codicil in his will (267). At the root of ordinary experience, both for Eliot and for 
Heidegger, is what can and cannot be grasped, what can and cannot be heard: “If we had a keen 
vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the 
squirrel’s heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence. As it 
is, the quickest of us walk about well wadded with stupidity” (124).   
Perhaps this roar on the other side of silence is the roar of the call of conscience, a call 
that shatters the stupidity of “the ‘they.’” It is this same roar that Don DeLillo accesses in White 
Noise, when the world-weary professor Jack Gladney—Chair of Hitler Studies, no less—finds 
himself buying groceries in the supermarket: “I realized the place was awash in noise. The 
toneless systems, the jangle and skid of carts, the loudspeaker and coffee-making machines, the 
cries of children. And over it all, or under it all, a dull and unlocatable roar, as of some form of 
swarming life just outside the range of human apprehension” (36). The paradox is that it is just as 
difficult to communicate the obviousness of everydayness as it is to communicate the roar on the 
 
128 The portmanteau would combine Schritt (a step, a march) with Durchschnittlichkeit (averageness, a state of being 
in the middle). 
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other side of silence, and Heidegger—like Eliot before him and DeLillo after him—attempts to 
do both.   
Like every other novelist of his time, he resorts to foregrounding the means of 
communication itself, radicalizing the expectations and possibilities for language to narrate the 
banality of quotidian life. “That which is ontically so familiar in the way Dasein has been 
factically interpreted that we never pay any heed to it, hides enigma after enigma existential-
ontologically” (423). By adding yet another layer of enigmatic language, thereby defamiliarizing 
the familiar, Heidegger draws attention to the mystery of everydayness. It is as though he 
performs the process of authenticity on the level of style, taking the prose of “the ‘they’” and 
modifying it into something else, something that cannot be called poetry, but a prose of a 
different order—a prose that, for lack of a better characterization, is entirely its own. It is 
eigentlich, distinctively Heideggerian in its disavowal of the cliché even as it aggressively 
interrogates and works its way through it. It is a prose that only tenuously relies on the 
scaffolding of prior philosophical discourse, climbing up the latter of metaphysics only to kick it 
from under, once having reached a certain aerial perspective.  
Karl Ove Knausgaard, in an interview with James Wood, spoke of the Russian 
formalists’ treatment of Tolstoy: “As the Russian formalists showed, the reason Tolstoy is so 
good is that he makes the world strange, so you can see it” (The Paris Review). Heidegger 
perhaps shared the same insight into Tolstoy as the Russian formalists, using Being and Time as 
a means of also making the phenomenon of the world strange, with his strange use of language, 
so we can see it. His project is very much about discovering or inventing the proper form and 
style for his content, a false binary that he deconstructs early on: “The right way of presenting it 
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is so far from self-evident that to determine what form it shall take is itself an essential part of 
the ontological analytic of this entity” (69).  
In this Lukácsian take on form as inseparable from content,129 the tension between the 
banality of the experience and the unusual means of expressing it is where the durchschnittlich 
and the durchsichtig become the durchbrechend, where the average and transparent become the 
groundbreaking and the opaque, and where the simple is rendered baroque. Since ordinariness is 
always already a cliché, the task of the novel—and, ostensibly, of Being and Time—is to 
refashion this cliché with a new kind of language, a new kind of approach. At stake in Being and 
Time is the “task of liberating grammar from logic[, which] requires beforehand a positive 
understanding of the basic a priori structure of discourse in general as an existentiale” (209). He 
is wrestling with what, to Kundera, “goes to the deepest conviction of every novelist: there is 
nothing so thoroughly disguised as the prose of life…” (Testaments Betrayed 132-33). In order 
to unmask—to dis-cover—the disguise of truth, he must also unmask the prose of life with a new 
kind of prose. And if we take Kundera’s point that the novel’s “discovery of prose is its 
ontological mission, which no art but the novel can take on entirely,” then it is impossible to 
think of Being and Time as something removed from the project of the novel (133).      
Heidegger’s reflection of his own prose may just as well apply to Joyce’s later fiction: 
“With regard to the awkwardness and ‘inelegance’ of expression in the analyses to come, we 
may remark that it is one thing to give a report in which we tell about entities, but another to 
grasp entities in their Being. For the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, 
the ‘grammar’” (Being and Time 63). Modernist novels move away from representation and 
 
129 Bakhtin also writes that, “Form and content in discourse are one, once we understand that verbal discourse is a 
social phenomenon…” (Dialogic Imagination 259). 
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standardized grammar in an effort to “grasp entities in their Being,” in a gesture of performing 
Being itself.   
“Grasping” implies seizing and arresting. There is a remarkable velocity to Dasein, a 
turbulence, which is at odds with the painstakingly slow text that narrates its frenzied, ecstatic 
movements. The heavy plodding of the prose also enacts the process of authenticity, itself, by 
arresting the subject matter in its movement and taking multiple panoramic shots of its 
suspension in high resolution—or, as Heidegger would have it, in high resoluteness. It is a 
technique akin to the shifting structure of Woolf’s The Waves, published four years after Being 
and Time. The kaleidoscopic perspective of the novel moves through the individual experiences 
of a group of friends across time, each one focusing their attention on the absent center, Percival, 
whose death early on in the novel marks a principle of nothingness that both organizes and 
dissolves their lives. Percival’s non-being is inscribed into the being of everyone who 
contemplates him, including the reader.  
And, of course, Woolf rehearsed this technique in To the Lighthouse, published in the 
same year as Being and Time, in which Mrs. Ramsay marks the absent center of the novel. And 
we see the development of Lily Briscoe coming into her own, discovering herself at the moment 
of completing her painting, when she “had had her vision”—what Heidegger would call her 
Augenblick, the moment of authenticity that emphasizes, in its etymology, vision itself (To the 
Lighthouse 170; Being and Time 387).130  
 
130 “That Present which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is authentic itself, we call the ‘moment of 
vision’ [‘Augenblick’]” (Being and Time 387). Earlier, Heidegger writes, “When resolute, Dasein has brought itself 
back from falling, and has done so precisely in order to be more authentically ‘there’ in the ‘moment of vision’ as 
regards the Situation which has been disclosed” (376). Macquarrie and Robinson provide the following gloss on this 
passage, which in German reads: “‘Entschlossen hat sich das Dasein gerade zurückgeholt aus dem Verfallen, um 
desto eigentlicher im ‘Augenblick’ auf die erschlossene Situation ‘da’ zu sein.’ The German word ‘Augenblick’ has 
hitherto been translated simply as ‘moment’; but here, and in many later passages, Heidegger has in mind its more 
literal meaning—‘a glance of the eye.’ In such passages it seems more appropriate to translate it as ‘moment of 
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Being and Time: A Road Novel 
Heidegger does not narrate the experience of just any Being, but our Being, just as the 
sinuous sentences of Woolf, Joyce, and Proust mimic the movement and pattern of the reader’s 
own wandering mind even as it lapses over passages of lush detail. The hero of Ulysses is not so 
much Bloom as it is the reader of the novel, struggling to find our way back home to meaning 
after setting on the epic journey through Joyce’s language. In epic, the hero finds his way home, 
but Lukács defines the novel as an expression of “transcendental homelessness” (Theory of the 
Novel 41). He quotes Novalis in the beginning of his study, who expressed that “Philosophy is 
really homesickness… it is the urge to be at home everywhere” (29). Both homesick and 
homeless, the philosopher and the novelist struggle and ultimately fail at making a stable home 
of meaning in a world of “falling,” of inauthenticity, of ambiguity, idle talk, and curiosity (Being 
and Time 210-19). To Lukács, the “artistic task” of the novelist “consists of revealing the point at 
which such a character’s being-there and being-thus coincides with his inevitable failure” (116). 
Dasein—Lukács’s italicized “being-there”—is a failed project, a project that Heidegger would 
later reformulate in Being and Time as Articulated Thrown Projection.     
Like Don Quixote imposing his imagination on a world that remains indifferent and 
unchanged in response to his valiant efforts, the philosopher and the novelist embark on a similar 
quest, both employing the motif of the road to chart their journey through a Lukácsian 
transcendental homelessness, reformulated by Heidegger as “uncanniness,” toward a tenuous 
sense of meaning (Being and Time 233).131 “Can our analysis of Dasein up to this point give us 
 
vision’” (376 fn.2). That the English translators settled on this typical Woolfian phrase, which she in turn borrows 
from Hardy and Conrad, seems more than just a happy coincidence (Bazin 22). 
131 “In anxiety one feels uncanny. […] But here ‘uncanniness’ also means ‘not-being-at-home’ [das Nicht-zuhause-
sein]” (Being and Time 233). The German word for “uncanny” is unheimlich, literally “un-home-like.” 
 342 
any prescriptions for the ontological task we have now set ourselves,” Heidegger asks, “so that 
what we have before us may be kept on a road of which we can be sure?” (304). Earlier, 
Heidegger implicitly refers to the road in his example of the motor car to illustrate his concept of 
signs announcing themselves as a ready-to-hand totality of referential signals (108-9).   
The novel, in a sense, moves philosophy out of the comfortable homes of attractive, 
hospitable young Greek men and into the unsheltered and often hostile expanse of the open road. 
Unlike the epic, in which the gods presided over the travels and travails of Odysseus and Aeneas, 
the novel “is the epic of a world abandoned by God” (Lukács 88).132 From Cervantes to Kerouac 
to Cormac McCarthy, the road enables Being to reveal and conceal itself by turns, just as “the 
novel seeks, by giving form, to uncover and construct the concealed totality of life” (60). The 
narrator of Stendhal’s The Red and the Black says that “a novel is a mirror moving along a 
highway” (297). Being and Time is likewise a kind of road novel of Dasein, narrating its 
“running ahead” into its own realm of possibility, its Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit (306 fn.3). 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology aims to document the concealment and unconcealment of 
Truth in its totality, and does so in the same terms of failure, of impotence, of “being-there” that 
Lukács uses in his Theory of the Novel (Being and Time 57 fn.1).133 
Even the metaphorical cliché of the twists and turns of a plot becomes literal only in the 
image of a road, and Heidegger reimagines this metaphor, simulating its movement, its twisting 
and turning, in his structure of care as Articulated Thrown Projection. Dasein is thrown into a 
world marked by inauthenticity, but it is the twisting and turning and projecting away from 
inauthenticity that Dasein discovers—in an act of dis-covering, of uncovering—its authentic 
 
132 Cf. In the famous Der Spiegel interview, Heidegger views the world in the same way that Lukács views the 
novel, lamenting that, “Only a god can save us” (1). 
133 In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger writes, “Truth is un-truth, insofar as there belongs to it the 
reservoir of the not-yet-covered, the un-covered, in the sense of concealment” (58).  
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selfhood. Therein lies the plot, the heroic effort of Dasein wresting itself away from “the ‘they’” 
by violently hurling itself into the void, and only for brief, discrete moments in time. This plot is 
revealed in the mood of anxiety [Angst], of being-towards-death, of drowning out the white noise 
of “the ‘they’” with the silence of authenticity in the same way that, in George Eliot’s Silas 
Marner, “Anxiety went on, though in noisy Christmas company; refusing to be utterly quieted 
even by much drinking” (88). In DeLillo’s White Noise, Jack Gladney says, “All plots tend to 
move deathward. This is the nature of plots. Political plots, terrorist plots, lovers’ plots, narrative 
plots, plots that are part of children’s games. We edge nearer death every time we plot” (26).   
The structure of care reveals the plot of Dasein not only as a narrative plot across time, 
hurtling toward its own death, but as a situated plot, as a designated space of anticipatory 
resoluteness. “The existential attributes of any possible resolute Dasein include the items 
constitutive for an existential phenomenon which we call a ‘Situation’…  In the term ‘Situation’ 
(‘situation’ – ‘to be in a situation’) there is an overtone of a signification that is spatial” (Being 
and Time 346). Time and space then intersect in Dasein in similar ways as it does with Bakhtin’s 
concept of the chronotope—literally the category of the ‘time-space,’ like Heidegger’s 
Zeitraum—that lies at the core of the novel for him. “Of special importance” for Bakhtin is the 
chronotope of the road, where time and space are both in motion, and coincide to reveal 
character (Dialogic Imagination 98). Unlike Kant, who explores time and space as a priori 
categories devoid of content, both Bakhtin and Heidegger understand these categories as always 
already constituted by material in which we are concernfully absorbed: “…the image of man is 
always intrinsically chronotopic” (85). 
The chronotope of the road, then, signifies as much of an adventure through time as 
through space. It is an adventure in the root sense of the term, of adventure as avenir, as Zukunft.  
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Adventure is futural—it is what is to come, à venir. No medium of writing lends itself more to 
thoroughly exhibiting Heidegger’s concept of ecstatic temporality, of the future coming toward 
Dasein, than the novel. Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu is not so much a search for lost 
time as a recovery of it, and the recovery is only possible through the constancy of the Self, even 
in all of its neurotic contradictions. For Proust, it is the future of the writer’s vocation that allows 
the younger Marcel’s experiences to be disclosed. In the constant oscillation between different 
modes of temporality, memory is not just passive, but experiential and existential in its non-
linear traversing of time. Memory is the vehicle that drives Dasein towards itself, that views the 
Zukunft as the Zu-kunft.  In this de-distancing, or Ent-fernung, of time and space, Proust employs 
involuntary memory as a means of experiencing sober anxiety, of the moment—the 
Augenblick—that attunes his Being not just to a past time, but to the nature of temporality itself. 
Mazzoni defines time in the novel as “a manifestation of an imbalance to which finite beings are 
ontologically exposed simply by becoming,” arguing that this is what fuels desire (47). While 
erotic desire is not explicitly explored in Being and Time, the closest we get to it is this account 
of time. This is Heidegger’s Angst in the sense of joy, in the sense of rapture, highlighting the 
ecstasy in ecstatic temporality. Writing about Proust, Cioran calls this phenomenon the “ecstasy 
of the void” (Temptation to Exist 139). It is the disclosure of being as nothingness in its elaborate 
choreographed movements across time. 
 
“An Impossible Fiction” 
If chronotope charts the trajectory of a character in a novel, then the structure of care 
charts the trajectory of Dasein in attaining the possibility of authenticity. In the introductory 
paragraph of the First Analytic, Heidegger writes that, “That entity which in its Being has this 
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very Being as an issue, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility” (68). Dasein 
comports itself towards its Being in the optative mood, in the subjunctive mood, in the mood of 
possibility. What else are novels if not an exploration of possibilities for the self? “All novels, of 
every age, are concerned with the enigma of the self,” says Kundera, echoing Heidegger’s 
formulation of Dasein as an enigma (Art of the Novel 23). “We must first let the full enigmatical 
character of this Being emerge, even if all we can do is to come to a genuine breakdown over its 
‘solution,’ and to formulate anew the question about the Being of thrown projective Being-in-
the-world” (Being and Time 188).  
Being is an enigma, a riddle—a Rätsel—without a solution. What was once the answer to 
the Sphinx’s riddle in forms of literature prior to the advent of the novel now becomes an 
uncanny repetition—a Heideggerian (and Kierkegaardian) Wiederholung134—of the same term, 
but there is no stable unity of meaning every time the term is reiterated. What was once the 
answer (and the answerer) to that original riddle, “Man,” now also becomes the question and the 
questioner, and yet there is no identical meaning of this term every time it is uttered. Dasein is 
what Dasein itself calls into question, but it is a question called forth, and answered, in silence. 
The reticence of the Sphinx now becomes the reticence of Dasein in confrontation with itself 
through the call of conscience. What the call discloses is not any information; it is not anything 
at all. It is nothing, and this nothing reveals Dasein as nothing, as well. Between the Niemand 
[nobody] of das Man [the ‘they’] and the Nichts [the nothing] of anxiety, Dasein oscillates 
between varying modes of nothingness. 
 
134 “If Being-as-having-been is authentic, we call it ‘repetition’” (Being and Time 388). He elaborates later: 
“…anxiety brings one back to one’s thrownness as something possible, which can be repeated. And in this way it 
also reveals the possibility of an authentic potentiality-for-Being—a potentiality which must, in repeating, come 
back to the thrown ‘there,’ but come back as something futural which comes towards [zukünftiges]. The character of 
having been is constitutive for the state-of-mind of anxiety; and bringing one face to face with repeatability is the 
specific ecstatical mode of this character” (394). Kierkegaard wrote an entire work on the subject in this manner 
called Repetition, published in 1843. 
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But nothingness opens a clearing for a multitude of possibilities, and the discourse most 
aptly suited to the exploration of possibilities is the discourse of the novel. Even Heidegger 
himself thinks of nothingness in relation to Dasein as a modification of “an impossible fiction” 
into “something positive”: “A free-floating call from which ‘nothing ensues’ is an impossible 
fiction when seen existentially. With regard to Dasein, ‘that nothing ensues’ signifies something 
positive” (324). Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is a way of grasping this positively 
transformed fiction without recourse to derivative modes of understanding, such as psychology, 
anthropology, and epistemology. Likewise, Kundera sees the novel in similar terms:  
What lies beyond the so-called psychological novel? Or, put another way: What is the 
nonpsychological means to apprehend the self? To apprehend the self in my novels 
means to grasp the essence of its existential problem. […] A novel examines not reality 
but existence. And existence is not what has occurred, existence is the realm of human 
possibilities, everything that man can become, everything he’s capable of. Novelists draw 
up the map of existence by discovering this or that human possibility.  But… to exist 
means: ‘being-in-the-world.’ Thus both character and his world must be understood as 
possibilities. (Art of the Novel 29) 
Perhaps more successful than Kundera in exploring the realm of possibilities is Musil, whose 
comical antihero Ulrich, in The Man without Qualities, takes a “vacation from life” in order to 
dwell in the realm of possibilities that emerge from the “Baroque of the Void” (1:286). By 
perpetually postponing every moment in August 1913—conceivably so as not to enter the 
European nightmare beginning exactly a year later—Ulrich slips into “The Other Condition” in 
the second volume of the uncompleted work, where the conditional and the possible become the 
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new reality. Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften becomes the man with all the possibilities of own-
ness, of authenticity, of Eigentlichkeit, by approaching a kind of zero-state of Being.  
The Man Without Qualities also illustrates Heidegger’s account of inauthentic time, 
“which is accessible to the ordinary understanding [as it consists], among other things, precisely 
in the fact that it is a pure sequence of ‘nows,’ without beginning and without end, in which the 
ecstatical character of primordial temporality has been levelled off” (Being and Time 377). Using 
Kierkegaard’s concept of “levelling,” Heidegger contrasts this concept of inauthentic time with 
the authentic experience of non-linear time, of ecstatic temporality, in which past, present, and 
future, all unfold out of each other, outside of the “pure sequence of ‘nows.’”135 In Musil’s novel, 
Ulrich reflects on time in similar terms, and these reflections lead this novelistic character to 
insights into the nature of the novel as a genre: 
It struck him that when one is overburdened and dreams of simplifying one’s life, the 
basic law of this life, the law one longs for, is nothing other than that of narrative order, 
the simple order that enables one to say: ‘First this happened and then that happened…’ 
[…] This is the trick the novel artificially turns to account… this tried and true 
‘foreshortening of the mind’s perspective’… It now came to Ulrich that he had lost this 
elementary, narrative mode of thought to which private life still clings, even though 
everything in public has already ceased to be narrative and no longer follows a thread, but 
instead spreads out as infinitely interwoven surface. (I.708-9).136  
 
135 Heidegger reiterates this point later on, even italicizing the term “levelled off”: “In the ordinary interpretations of 
time as a sequence of ‘nows,’ both datability and significance are missing. These two structures are not permitted to 
‘come to the fore’ when time is characterized as a pure succession. The ordinary interpretation of time covers them 
up. When these are covered up, the ecstatico-horizontal constitution of temporality, in which the datability and the 
significance of the ‘now’ are grounded, gets levelled off” (Being and Time 474).  
136 Faulkner also explores these two modes of experiencing time in The Sound and the Fury, when Quentin’s father 
tells him, “time is dead as long as it is being clicked off by little wheels; only when the clock stops does time come 
to life” (54). He visualizes this pessimistic account of time as a “gull on an invisible wire attached through space 
dragged. You carry the symbol of your frustration into eternity” (66). 
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The “law of this life” is then to live as if one were in a novel with its narrative sequence. But the 
paradox is that this particular novel undoes the “trick” that the novel “artificially turns to 
account.” The novel reinvents itself to accommodate new experiences of temporality, and 
Musil’s narrative—if it can even be called that—also “spreads out as infinitely interwoven 
surface,” never-ending in its unfinished state of nearly 2,000 pages. This may seem to be a 
feature of “the public,” of “the ‘they,” but this narrative technique allows Ulrich actually to 
escape from “the ‘they’” and enter “The Other Condition” [der andere Zustand], a condition that 
“enables us to see what isn’t there” (2:1206).  
To “see what isn’t there” is the Pauline message of messianism embedded in Heidegger’s 
understanding of the call of conscience, but it is also the injunction of every novel to every 
reader. If the novel is an epic in a world abandoned by God, according to Lukács’s formulation, 
then it is a kind of secular messianism that calls on its reader to hold oneself out to the nothing of 
the novel’s fictional universe and to see not only that which is not in the world, but to see the 
world itself as if it is not.137 This is the kind of apocalyptic vision we see in Lady Chatterley’s 
Lover, in Lolita, and even in the “Time Passes” section of To the Lighthouse. Both the novel and 
Heidegger’s ontology reveal being as non-being—to on as to me on, in Greek. Or, as Beckett 
would have it, playing with this preposition as though it were a verb, “On. Say on. Be said on. 
Somehow on. Till nohow on. Said nohow on” (“Worstward Ho” 89).   
The reader approaches the novel as Dasein approaches the world: full of fascination and 
meaning, towards which Dasein “comports itself understandingly” (Heidegger 78). Both the 
 
137 The history of the novel, based on the epistolary tradition, is predicated on the call. That the rise of the novel 
coincides with the rise of the silent reading public demonstrates the link Heidegger makes between silence and the 
call. Fredric Jameson says that it “would be better to translate the term bildungsroman as the novel of a calling or 
vocation, a Beruf, to use that word which Max Weber charged with its most intense Lutheran accents in order to 
make his point about the new innerworldliness of Protestant behavior and virtue” (102). 
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reader and the characters are absorbed, entangled, in Bewandtnis, which is the existential 
meaning of Being-in-the-world. The characters’ struggles derive from the tension between 
thrownness and projection, which we understand meaningfully. But behind the meaning is the 
anxiety that reveals the nothing of the world and the contrived fictionality of the novel. This 
anxiety is the uncanniness of Don Quixote coming across a book called Don Quixote in Part II of 
the novel. It is Isabel Archer refusing her own novelist, Henry James, to narrate the events of her 
inheritance, her marriage proposal, and the death of her child, so that she stands as more of a 
cipher of nothingness, of fictionality, that in some ways may even reflect the nothingness of the 
reader. She does not belong in The Portrait of a Lady anymore than we do. If anything, she is 
just a parody of that other archer, Gwendolen Harleth, from George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda. Or, 
as the transgender beauty queen Brandy Alexander tells Shannon McFarland in Chuck 
Palahniuk’s road novel Invisible Monsters, “There isn’t any real you in you” (217). “Relax,” she 
says, her boyfriend Manus tied up in the trunk of their car as they cross state lines—and as the 
narrative crosses boundaries in both genre and gender—“Nothing of you is all-the-way yours” 
(218).      
 
Irony and Vomit 
Heidegger may take issue with the novel as a medium of expressing authentic Dasein 
because of its embrace of inauthenticity, of its demonstration that “Nothing of you is all-the-way 
yours.” In its simulation of idle talk, the novel seems to stand as far away from the project of 
Being and Time as possible.138 One thinks of the stupid prattle of Lydia Bennett in Pride and 
Prejudice or the insipid garrulousness of Mme. Verdurin in Swann’s Way. The novel is very 
 
138 To Bakhtin, though, “it is only in the novel that discourse can reveal all its specific potential and achieve its true 
depth” (Dialogic Imagination 50). 
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much a product of the Offentlichkeit, the offending public, that Heidegger interprets as the 
“dictatorship of the ‘they’” with its use of newspapers and public transportation (Being and Time 
164). The novel, which owes much of its history to the rise of the newspaper with its 
serialization, conceivably belongs to this category of inauthenticity, with its idle talk, its 
curiosity, its ambiguity, although Heidegger never specifies either way. As such, it represents a 
kind of cowardly fleeing from one’s existence and wasting one’s time in evasive immersion in 
fictional characters’ lives and struggles as opposed to allowing the reader to confront, in anxiety, 
the state of their own nothingness.   
But there is something to be said for the use of irony in the novel, for the ways in which 
Austen and Proust ironize themselves out of inauthenticity by the very language of inauthenticity 
itself, deftly tracing the oscillations of characters between modes of existentiality and facticity. 
Mazzoni sees the novel arising out of an age 
…in which it has become clear that our life, the life that we have led ourselves to view as 
our own property, is always constitutively improper, uneigentlich, in the sense that 
Heidegger gives to this word. The ideas, habits, and behaviors that we have introjected 
precede us: they are products of the world that includes us; they do not really belong to 
us. If observed with an attitude of estrangement, they reveal that we are serial beings, like 
everyone else. (372) 
But this “attitude of estrangement” can also propel us out of this inauthentic torpor to a 
realization of authenticity, in the same way that Mooney reads Kierkegaard as a writer who 
“creates anxiety, that forerunner of change of self or recovery of soul” (61). Recall that 
Kierkegaard, for Mooney, “makes an existential contribution that only I can complete. His 
contribution is to offer me an existential space distinct from social space… where existential 
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possibilities are vividly acknowledged, and then I close that radical openness through decisive 
resolution and action” (63). What Mooney is saying about Kierkegaard—in heavy-handed 
Heideggerian language—may just as well apply to the novel. Novels also provide an “existential 
space distinct from social space,” in which one can observe social space from a distance and see 
the array of “existential possibilities” from which one may learn, in one’s own life, how to “close 
that radical openness through decisive resolution and action.” Or, as Gabriel Josipovici puts it, 
also in Heideggerian terms: 
Kierkegaard… remind[s] us that we cannot begin to understand what novels are, what 
fiction is, until we recognize that how we think about fiction depends on how we think 
about ourselves. In other words, if the concept of fiction cannot be taken for granted, it is 
because story-telling is intimately bound up with what we are, not in any absolute sense 
but in our concrete social and historical reality. (“Kierkegaard and the Novel” 114) 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the novel, then, all seem to converge at this point of irony. Irony 
constitutes both the organizing principle of Kierkegaard’s thought and Kundera’s Heideggerian 
definition of the novel: “…the novel is, by definition, the ironic art: its ‘truth’ is concealed, 
undeclared, undeclarable. […] Irony irritates. Not because it mocks or attacks but because it 
denies us our certainties by unmasking the world as an ambiguity” (Art of the Novel 134). As if 
the novel itself were a character like Humbert Humbert, it ironically masks itself in order “to 
unmask the world” (Brenkman 811). And in this seemingly Nabokovian universe of the novel, 
we get a “paradox that only seems one: the more calculated the construction machinery, the more 
real and natural the characters” (Testaments Betrayed 19). 
In this ironic art, on the opposite side of the spectrum from the idle talk of Lydia Bennett 
and Mme. Verdurin, we have characters who dwell in the silence of authenticity, like Melville’s 
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Billy Budd and Bartleby, Faulkner’s Benjy, Grass’s Oskar Matzerath, and Palahniuk’s Shannon 
McFarland, all of whom seem to exist outside of language, only to break into it in brief moments 
of devastating violence. It is this violence that Dasein performs on itself in order to attain 
authenticity: “Existential analysis… constantly has the character of doing violence 
[Gewaltsamkeit], whether to the claims of the everyday interpretation, or to its complacency and 
its tranquillized obviousness” (359).    
Dasein performs violence on itself in order to risk “the mode of evasion” that 
“tranquillizes” us into inauthenticity (298). Evasion keeps us from ourselves, relegating us to the 
inauthentic existence of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Heidegger seems to lift this concept 
straight out of A Literary Review again, where Kierkegaard writes, “One person is curious about 
another, all wait in indecision and versed in evasion for someone to come along who wills 
something…” (94). However, Levinas, in response to Heidegger’s take on Kierkegaard, offers a 
different account of evasion. In De l’évasion, he identifies evasion itself as the “experience of 
pure being” (67). But for Levinas, evasion is experienced as nausea. In contrast to the abstract 
construct of Dasein, Levinas grounds Being in all its sordid physicality. This is not the 
metaphorical nausea of Sartre’s Roquentin—it is the literal “state of nausea that precedes 
vomiting,” a nausea that does not comply with any Heideggerian tendency of being-towards-
death, but of being-towards-nakedness: “…death is not the exit toward which escape thrusts us. 
Death can only appear to it if escape reflects upon itself. As such, nausea discovers only the 
nakedness of being in its plenitude and in its utterly binding presence” (66-7). Escape runs up 
against the limits of Being, in which one experiences one’s own Being not in terms of 
Heideggerian possibility, but precisely in terms of its opposite, of impossibility: “In nausea – 
which amounts to an impossibility of being what one is—we are at the same time riveted to 
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ourselves, enclosed in a tight circle that smothers. We are there, and there is nothing to be done” 
(66-67).   
Nausea can be interpreted not only as a prevalent motif of the novel, but as its structural 
principle. The novel is a genre that regurgitates prior genres (Cascardi 163). Moby-Dick can be 
read as an instructional manual for the whaling industry in the same way that Fight Club is a 
manual for how to make homemade bombs. Like Water for Chocolate is a recipe book. Lolita is 
a road map. Carmen was first marketed as a travelogue. The novel is new, is truly “novel,” to the 
extent that it coughs up old forms in new guises. Beckett recognizes this in Proust, when he 
writes, “habit is the ballast that chains a dog to his vomit” (19). Marcel’s habits are indicative of 
the literary habits of other writers that Proust mimics, re-presents, and ultimately surpasses in his 
Recherche.   
The novel is a vomitorium of barely digested modes of storytelling, as it is in the 
encyclopedic Don Quixote. Early on, Quixote and Sancho Panza violently puke on each other 
when they drink what they think is a holy balm, a balm that makes Quixote—after recovering 
from “the nausea and spasms of vomiting”—think “that he could engage in fights from then on 
without any fear of disasters, battles, or clashes, no matter how perilous they might be” 
(Cervantes 133). The “holy balm” is aligned with the imaginary world of chivalric romance, a 
world that Quixote literally and figuratively imbibes. But this ventriloquized imaginary world 
sharply collides with his material reality, drawing attention to the materiality of the novel, to the 
fact that the novel is the first form of literature in which the work of art could not be 
distinguished from its material commodity (Brenkman 829). This is material language, as 
Roberto González Echevarría explains: 
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Vomiting here and in the inn suggests the existence of a concretely repulsive language of 
pure meanings, language whose effect is repulsion, mutual repulsion, but that is 
nevertheless a form of communication. One vomit elicits the other, as in dialogue. It is in 
this sense that it is a pure language, an ironic fusion of words and things. If you think that 
words reflect reality, vomit is reality itself expressed as words through the mouth. Vomit 
contains objects, not signs… (78) 
Don Quixote is not an isolated example. In fact, every turning point in the history of the novel 
seems to be marked not just by nausea, but by vomit. Emma Bovary, who consumes cheap 
romance novels in the same way that Quixote consumes chivalric romances, dies after chasing 
her own windmills of erotic desire. Her mind—and the novel—is just as saturated with clichéd 
narratives as her bloated corpse is saturated with the black bile that oozes out of her mouth. It is 
as though vomit functions as an ironizing principle, distancing the overall project of the novel 
from the hackneyed tropes it consumes but can hardly stomach.   
This image appears again in Sanctuary, a novel Faulkner purportedly wrote in a cynical 
stab at lurid pulp fiction—by definition, a pastiche of a well-worn form that becomes something 
different and far more sinister in Faulkner’s hands. Horace Benbow imagines seeing Temple, 
after having already been raped with a corncob, with “something black and furious go roaring 
out of her pale body… the blackness streaming in rigid threads overhead” (Faulkner 223). Like 
the “black smear” inscribed in the name “Karamazov,” the melancholic black bile in Sanctuary 
and Madame Bovary signals at once both an excess and a lack at the core of Dasein, which is 
simultaneously in excess of running ahead of itself as well as being founded on a null basis.   
It is also no coincidence that Henry Miller dismisses Ulysses as “a vomit spilled by a 
delicate child whose stomach has been overloaded with sweetmeats” (qtd. in Bluefarb). Both the 
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language of Being and Time and of Ulysses seem to become present-at-hand, with a jarring effect 
that jolts us into considering what rarely rises to the level of consideration.139 The words 
themselves become material strewn out across the page—the litter of literature, they are objects 
of speculation, like debris from a language that no longer can be used.140 “When its unusability is 
thus discovered,” says Heidegger, “equipment becomes conspicuous” (102). And language, the 
primordial equipment of Dasein’s Being, becomes no more conspicuous than in the Nighttown 
chapter, when “The End of the World,” the gong, and the gramophone all perform lines as if they 
were characters in a play. A “Dummymummy” even inquires, “Bbbbbllllbbblblodschbg?” 
(Ulysses 550).   
Before this exploration of language as a material object, the novel begins with Stephen 
Dedalus overlooking the Dublin bay, where he “saw the sea hailed as a great sweet mother… 
[that] held a dull green mass of liquid,” which makes him think of his own deceased mother and 
the “bowl of white china [that] had stood beside her deathbed holding the green sluggish bile 
which she had torn up from her rotting liver by fits of loud groaning vomiting” (5). Joyce’s novel 
is “a vomit” indeed, a vomit that pukes out every established literary form, unifying these forms 
with the black liquid that could only come from Joyce’s pen. 
Does Dasein vomit? Heidegger never specifies, although it is tempting to think of care as 
cura, at once a cure and a poison like Socrates’ pharmakon, or the emetic that doubles as Don 
Quixote’s holy balm. In light of Echevarría’s analysis, one can almost visualize Articulated 
Thrown Projection as the thrown-up projectile of articulated words. But articulation, or discourse 
 
139 Heidegger himself does not see language as present-at-hand, even though his own language seems to gesture in 
that direction despite himself (Heidegger 201).  
140 This passage from Joyce’s Finnegans Wake exemplifies this littered literary landscape: “But by writing 
thithaways end to end and turning, turning and end to end hithaways writing and with lines of litters slittering up and 
louds of latters slettering down, the old semetomyplace and jupetbackagain from tham Let Rise till Hum Lit. Sleep, 
where in the waste is the wisdom?” (114.16-20) 
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[Rede] for Heidegger does not necessarily have to rise to the level of language, or even orality.141 
Dasein is authentic in its reticence, in its withdrawal from the idle talk—the prose—that narrates 
“the ‘they.’” It is as though Dasein favors the tragic space of Aeschylean tragedy with its staged 
silences rather than the vomit of words that characterizes novelistic irony.   
Heidegger signals his own irony with the use of quotation marks, as though ejecting the 
quoted terms from his own text, or at least keeping them at arm’s length. These terms are handy, 
as are all things in Heidegger’s universe, but handy from a distance—as though handling the 
contents of a motion sickness bag in the turbulence, the Wirbel, of Dasein’s falling (Being and 
Time 223). But perhaps there are further layers of irony in Being and Time, even if unbeknownst 
to its author. Heidegger spends an awful lot of his own prose narrating the silence that he 
supposedly values so much. As if his insistent baroque refrain of previously established 
definitions were not rambling enough, he resorts to spaced out lettering for emphasis, as well as 
italics, as well as italics-in-bold, as well as a combination of italicized and unitalicized words in 
bold. Despite his brilliant etymological constellations, his style is loud, loquacious, and 
awkward, even as he disparages the monotony and the noise of “the ‘they.’”    
Knausgaard satirizes Heidegger’s verbosity in his novel My Struggle, the first volume of 
which begins with a graphic description of what happens to the body in death, and of the “black 
substance in the Mesencephalon” that accumulates (3). In the fourth volume, the protagonist Karl 
Ove, who is as related to the actual author as the fictionalized Marcel is to Proust, sits down for 
supper with his extended family when his uncle Kjartan goes for a “ten-minute monologue” 
about Heidegger. “Not everyone here has heard about Heidegger,” Yngve chimes in. “Surely 
there must be other topics we can discuss apart from some obscure German philosopher” (226). 
 
141 “The discourse of the conscience never comes to utterance” (Being and Time 342). Also: “Vocal utterance… is 
not essential for discourse, and therefore not for the call either; this must not be overlooked” (316). 
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In one line, the most influential thinker of the twentieth century is demoted to the status of “some 
obscure German philosopher.”  Kjartan retorts: 
Yes, I suppose there are… We can talk about the weather. But what shall we talk about 
then? The weather is what it always is. The weather is what existence reveals itself 
through. Just as we reveal ourselves through the mood we are in through what we feel at 
any given moment. It’s not possible to imagine a world without weather or ourselves 
without feelings. But both elements automate das Man [the ‘they’]. Das Man talks about 
the weather as though there is nothing special about it, in other words he doesn’t see it… 
(226-27) 
Of course the joke is that das Man may actually know nothing about the weather, but 
Heidegger—the veteran meteorologist—certainly did.   
 As much as Knausgaard sharply pokes fun at Heidegger, he may be embarking on a 
Heideggerian project of his own. His entire work is a process of articulating authenticity, of his 
ownness, of the struggle that is his. The irony is that the allusion in the title indicates someone 
else’s struggle entirely, posing a rather awkward conundrum for his German translators (who 
settled on the anodyne Sterben [To Die], maintaining a kind of Heideggerian being-towards-
death). Knausgaard’s struggle, though, is one of renewing the world:  
I try to imagine a world without words, a world without language, and the world 
collapses. It’s nothing. It’s chaos. Language is the thing that makes the world, and it’s the 
thing that makes the world disappear. Writing is a kind of ongoing struggle to renew the 
world. (The Paris Review)   
Here he sheds light on Heidegger’s insight of the primordiality of discourse [Rede], and how 
Rede is inseparable from the world that it constitutes.  
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In this same interview, he laments the state of novels in the same way that Heidegger 
laments the state of philosophy for its forgetting of Being, for its covering up of the world: 
“Before I wrote My Struggle, I had a feeling that novels tend to obscure the world instead of 
showing it, because their form is so much alike from novel to novel.” Perhaps this lament is 
endemic to the chutzpah of every novelist who thinks that their novel will have killed and 
brought back to new life the novel form itself. The novel is a form that novelists love to claim 
having killed—like the painter Nikolai who rushes to confess to the murder he hadn’t committed 
in Crime and Punishment—only to find themselves in a position where they magnanimously 
resurrect it on their own terms. In the same way Heidegger sought to overcome metaphysics, 
Joyce wrote the “novel to end all novels,” and Knausgaard apparently came with his own 
unprecedented novel—that is, unprecedented in that every novel claims to have no precedent. 
The resilience of the Phoenix-like genre of the novel, with all its hybridity, lies in the very fact 
that it is always absorbing, appropriating, and vomiting prior forms.  
The novel never seems to escape being a parody of itself, and of everything that had 
come before it. “Why must almost everything appear to me as its own parody?” asks Adrian 
Leverkühn in Doctor Faustus, the novel Mann was in the process of writing when he coolly 
dismissed Heidegger as the “Nazi par existence” (143). In Leverkühn, Mann sketched the 
ultimate heroic act of Eigentlichkeit, of seeking his own authenticity through an effort of 
achieving a musical art that parodies nothing. And yet this non-parody is what deprives 
Leverkühn of his humanity, and Mann restores the humanity back to the text by framing the 
story in a novel, a genre of parodies.   
As much as Leverkühn aspires to a state of Eigentlichkeit, the narrator, Dr. Serenus 
Zeitblom, moves in the opposite direction, dispersing his identity and dissolving it into his text, 
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which he repeatedly insists is “not… a novel,” a protestation ultimately negated by Mann, 
himself (348). Zeitblom’s “own-ness,” if it is possible to use a Heideggerian term that grated on 
Mann’s nerves, is an own-ness that cannot possibly be his: “And what is closest and most 
intriguing, most truly my own,” Zeitblom says of Leverkühn, “is not mere ‘material,’ it is the 
person himself…” (187, emphasis added). Perhaps Doctor Faustus makes the case for an ethical 
inauthenticity against the very jargon that Mann saw as precipitating the events of the Second 
World War and the Holocaust, using the novel as a form to disrupt the philosophy he saw 
governing his nation, an “all too docile people, a people all too happy to live by a theory!” (506). 
 
“The Greatest Seduction” 
September 2014. The latest installments of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks from 1931 to 
1941 had just been published, sending shockwaves throughout the academic community. I was in 
the audience of an international conference organized at The Graduate Center to see scholars 
perform their outrage, disbelief, and apparent shock that yes, Heidegger—a Nazi who had never 
condemned the Holocaust—was also an anti-Semite. From an anthropological point of view, it 
was fascinating and a bit cringeworthy to see scholars who had had the evidence in their faces 
for decades just now wake up to the realization of what he always was. Were they really once 
this seduced by this most original of thinkers into assuming his politics weren’t more despicable 
than what we had already known? Did they also not realize that he wasn’t terribly original, 
either, and that he took more from Kierkegaard than he had ever admitted?  
We can trace Heidegger’s defensive attitude against Kierkegaard back to a letter he had 
sent to Karl Löwith in 1920, where he writes: 
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What is of importance in Kierkegaard must be appropriated anew, but in a strict critique 
that grows out of our own situation. Blind appropriation is the greatest seduction… Not 
everyone who talks of ‘existence’ has to be a Kierkegaardian. My approaches have 
already been misinterpreted in this way. (Qtd. in Kisiel and Sheehan 98) 
The lady doth protest too much, methinks. He had spent his entire career trying to control his 
image, his reception, and his legacy. Maybe now is the time, given the new willingness to 
reconsider Heidegger overall in the aftermath of the Black Notebooks—not to dismiss him, but to 
situate him in a different context.   
In light of the correspondence between Being and Time and the history of novels, I would 
like to make a modest interjection in the otherwise vicious spat between Thomas Sheehan and 
Emmanuel Faye, which I was mortified to have witnessed at this conference. The audience was 
so taken by their showdown that no one paid much attention to the self-described fascist in the 
Q&A session who was eagerly trying to steal the spotlight. Faye calls for Heidegger’s works to 
be thrown off the philosophy shelves and relocated to the “historical archives of Nazism and 
Hitlerism” (319).  Sheehan, in turn, wants to do the same to Faye’s work on Heidegger, but 
relocate that to HV6691 .F353, in the history of fraud section (Sheehan 4).   
Would Heidegger really want Being and Time on the philosophy shelves anyway, after 
having ostensibly overcome metaphysics? Wouldn’t he bristle at the idea of being sandwiched 
between Hegel and Husserl, despite his passive aggressive dedication to his former colleague? 
The thought of being moved to the “historical archives of Nazism and Hitlerism” would be a 
rather fortuitous event if it were to occur in DeLillo’s novelistic world of White Noise, where 
Jack Gladney is struggling to maintain his status as “the most prominent figure of Hitler studies 
in North America” (31). Would that make more people read it? 
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If Being and Time cannot be read as a novel, perhaps it can be read as a way of 
understanding novels, from Cervantes to DeLillo and beyond. Maybe in this light, there might be 
a welcome space on the shelves of Literary Theory to accept it (not far from de Man, Paul—
another indispensable critic, despite his Nazi past). If there can be Freudian and Marxist theories 
of literary criticism, then why not a Heideggerian theory of the novel? Aristotle’s Poetics falls 
under Literary Theory, not Philosophy, and perhaps that strange work is not so much a normative 
statement of aesthetics as it is an observation of the natural sciences, a kind of anatomy, its 
emphasis on the natural order of tragedy corresponding to the natural development of humans. 
Perhaps his concept of mimesis praxeos is just as much an account of how people learn to take 
action through imitation as it is a commentary on how a play is staged.142 If Aristotle’s Poetics is 
a kind of phenomenological treatise, then can Being and Time, Heidegger’s phenomenological 
treatment of Aristotle, be read as a kind of Prosaics, a study of Being in its average everydayness 
instead of its imitation of a noble action, switching out the dramatic tragic form for the novel as 
its ideal expression?   
Either way, maybe moving Heidegger around the library is not such a terrible idea, since 
it would dramatically call into question how we think of him in terms of all of the other books 
we have read and have yet to read. Maybe it would only be appropriate for Being and Time, in 
performing the ecstatic movements of Dasein, to float ecstatically across various sections 
without being tethered to one. Maybe the next section, after it has made its way from Philosophy 
to Nazi History to Fiction to Literary Theory, would be Music, so we could listen to it better—as, 
indeed, it instructs us to do.  Wherever it is shelved, there is a tendency to keep on falling back to 
 
142 I owe this reading to Charles Snyder, who articulated this interpretation of Aristotle far more eloquently in 
person.   
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Being and Time, and—in the shadow of Kierkegaard—to keep on thinking of the way it 




SEDUCTION AGAINST PRODUCTION: THE NOVEL AS A TOOL OF PEDAGOGY IN A 
WORLD DOOMED TO NEOLIBERAL OPTIMISM 
 
The Eros of Failure 
In Being and Time, we see the culmination of a fraught history between philosophy and 
the novel, from its origins in Plato’s Symposium, finally coming to reflect and inform each other, 
despite whatever Heidegger’s intentions may have been for the project. As seemingly different as 
these works are, and as odd as they may be to compare, what we get in Symposium is the 
narrative of a self divided in two, these halves of the self reaching out across the void to find 
each other. In Being and Time, we have a novelistic Dasein also reaching out into the void in 
order to find itself, but without a sense of fragmentation, or of physicality, or maybe even—on 
the surface, at least—of any kind of erotic activity. But what is it exactly that impels Dasein to 
twist itself out of inauthenticity for a moment? Where does this call of conscience come from? 
To say it comes from nothing is somewhat of a tautology; Dasein recognizes itself, in 
authenticity, as nothing, so that answer doesn’t help. Could it actually be eros, after all—an eros 
for itself, an eros for the nothing that “is”? 
This would certainly be an idiosyncratic interpretation to take. Heidegger thinks in terms 
of the One—of Dasein as a singularity caught up in “the ‘they,’” before it comes into its own, its 
unique selfhood, in authenticity. This leaves much to be desired when it comes to ethics. What is 
Dasein’s ethical commitment to someone else? Are ethical bonds, as mediations between the Self 
and the Other, strictly relegated to the mode of inauthenticity? Can there be an ethics of 
authenticity? Is it even possible to have an ontology without ethics? Heidegger doesn’t address 
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these points outside of his discussion of multiplying Dasein into das Volk—and we’ve already 
seen in history what kind of ethical catastrophe that has led to. 
Where Heidegger thinks the One, Levinas thinks the Two. This is why Levinas is so 
concerned with the role of ethics in philosophy. Another post-Heideggerian thinker who thinks 
the Two is Alain Badiou, who, in response to Heidegger’s distracting silence on the topic, asks, 
“what kind of world does one see when one experiences it from the point of view of two and not 
one? What is the world like when it is experienced, developed and lived from the point of view 
of difference and not identity? That is what I believe love to be” (In Praise of Love 22). Love is a 
“two scene” as opposed to the silent monologue of Dasein in the moment of its authenticity (75). 
Challenging Heidegger’s rhetoric of falling, and offering a new existential analytic in its place, 
Badiou specifies that, “Love doesn’t take me ‘above’ or indeed ‘below.’ It is an existential 
project: to construct a world from a decentered point of view other than that of my mere impulse 
to survive or re-affirm my own identity” (25).  
For all its falling, how come we never see Dasein fall in love? It is curious that in Being 
and Time, we get no direct account of eros. There are afflictions and addictions; Dasein is both 
stimulated and tranquillized; but eros is one of the many glaring omissions from this supposed 
study of existence in its average everydayness. There is no eros because there is no body. Aside 
from its handedness and its ability to hear, there is no concrete description of Dasein’s 
physicality, which is perhaps why Levinas responds to his notion of evasion with the most 
visceral of bodily processes, to remind us that we are not abstract concepts (what exactly “is” 
Dasein, after all? who qualifies for this title? who doesn’t?), but embodied beings whose 
physicality cannot be dismissed or ignored. 
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Heidegger’s approach to physicality, like his approach to Kierkegaard and the novel, is to 
hide it, to undermine its importance in his thinking. There is an awkwardness in leaving this out 
of an account of Dasein that nevertheless includes other seemingly less important details about 
its existence, like reading newspapers or driving cars. Could physicality, could eros, really be 
this unimportant to Heidegger’s understanding of average everydayness? It turns out that 
Heidegger’s omission is disingenuous, as evidenced by a letter to his wife in 1950, when he 
writes about dedicating his work on Plato to her. With Plato then explicitly on his mind, he 
writes this: 
The other thing, inseparable in a different way from my love for you and from my 
thinking, is difficult to say. I call it Eros, the oldest of the gods according to Parmenides. 
[…] 
The beat of that god’s wings moves me every time I take a substantial step in my 
thinking and venture onto untrodden paths. It moves me perhaps more powerfully and 
uncannily [starker und unheimlicher] than others when something long intuited is to be 
led across into the realm of the sayable and when what has been said must after all be left 
in solitude for a long time to come. To live up to this purely and yet retain what is ours, to 
follow the flight and yet return home safely, to accomplish both things as equally 
essential and pertinent, this is where I fail too easily and then either stray into pure 
sensuality [bloße Sinnlichkeit] or try to force the unforceable through sheer work [bloßes 
Arbeiten]. (qtd. in Han,  Agony of Eros 47) 
The struggle, the agon, to convert thought into the “sayable,” is an agon rooted in eros. In The 
Agony of Eros, in which Byung-Chul Han laments the evacuation of eros from contemporary 
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life—a life governed and controlled by Big Data, digital technology, and an ethics and ontology 
of neoliberal selfhood143—Han reads this letter as evidence that:  
Without seduction by the atopic Other, which sparks erotic desire, thinking withers into 
mere work, which always reproduces the Same. Calculative thought lacks the negativity 
of atopia. It is work on the positive. No negativity inspires disquiet or unrest in it. 
Heidegger speaks of the ‘sheer’ or ‘mere’ work into which thinking degrades when it is 
not driven by eros to venture down ‘untrodden paths,’ into the incalculable. Thinking 
grows ‘more powerful’ and ‘uncannier’ when moved by the beating wings of Eros, as it 
seeks to translate the wordless, atopic Other into language. Calculating, data-driven 
thought utterly lacks the resistance offered by the atopic Other. Without eros, thinking is 
merely repetitive and additive. Likewise, love without eros and the spiritual lift it 
provides deteriorates into mere ‘sensuality.’ Sensuality and work belong to the same 
order. They both lack spirit and desire. (47-48) 
 
143 The term “neoliberal” is at risk of being seen as an empty buzzword and as a way to shut down arguments. While 
I insist on using this term in a pejorative sense, it is important to specify exactly what it means, and its economic 
history in the disastrous policies of deregulation from the Thatcher and Reagan era. The pre-history of 
neoliberalism, however, has roots in the utilitarian philosophy of John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, and the 
fetishism of statistics, which we can trace back even to Francis Bacon. Edgar Cabanas and Eva Illouz give a 
comprehensive definition of neoliberalism in their book Manufacturing Happy Citizens: “…neoliberalism should be 
understood as a new stage of capitalism characterized by the relentless expansion of the field and scope of 
economics to all cultural strata; the rising demand for technical-scientific criteria to account for political and social 
decision-making; a renewed emphasis on utilitarian principles of choice, efficiency and profit maximization; the 
exponential increase of labor uncertainty, economic instability, market competition, risk-taking behavior, and 
organizational flexibilization and decentralization; the increasing commodification of the symbolic and immaterial, 
including identities, feelings and lifestyles; and the consolidation of a therapeutic ethos that places both emotional 
health and the need for individual self-realization at the core of social progress and institutional interventions” (50-
51). Han sees neoliberalism as abiding by a “psychic turn” in capitalism, moving away from the exploitation of 
bodies and objects to the exploitation and commodification of information and programs aimed at “optimizing 
psychic or mental processes”—this is why he calls the politics of neoliberalism “Psychopolitics” (Psychopolitics 
25). Cabanas and Illouz similarly coin the phrase “psytizen” to describe “an individualistic and consumerist 
subjectivity that renders citizens of neoliberal societies as clients for whom the pursuit of happiness has become 
second nature, upon the conviction that their full functionality and value as individuals are strongly tied to their 
continuous self-optimization through psychological means” (116). 
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What does Han mean when he refers to “the seduction by the atopic Other?” Behind this elusive 
figure in his analysis of Heidegger is the image of Socrates: “It is not by chance that Socrates the 
lover is called atopos. The Other, whom I desire and who fascinates me, is placeless” (1).144  
What Socrates represents in this placelessness is the root of our contemporary “crisis of 
love,” which “does not derive from too many others so much as from the erosion of the Other. 
This erosion is occurring in all spheres of life; its corollary is the mounting narcissification of the 
Self” (1). In the absence of eros, the narcissistic Self engages in transactional pursuits of pleasure 
instead. Eros has been reduced and “positivized into sexuality, and by the same token, subjected 
to a commandment to perform” (12). In our neoliberal understanding of existence, sex becomes a 
function of what Heidegger would call “mere work.” It “means achievement and performance,” 
and sexiness is “capital to be increased.” Neoliberalism reduces the body to a commodity so that 
“one cannot love—one can only consume” (12).  
There is no eros, but plenty of porn—a flattening of sexuality into images that dictate our 
desires. Porn is the allegory of capitalism itself: people are reduced to bodies, which in turn are 
reduced to interchangeable, disposable commodities, each one competing for attention by being 
faster, harder, bigger, stronger, cheaper than the next. Porn is the substitution of erotics with 
economics. Love under neoliberalism is an industry that profits from images representing 
“profiles,” which are arranged according to algorithms that convert identities into data, boiling 
down to the binary that governs computer science, a binary of zeroes and ones: swipe left or 
swipe right—the gradation of infinite ambiguity limited to a new Manichaeism. “Matches” lead 
 
144 Cf. Barthes writes in A Lover’s Discourse that the “atopia of Socrates is linked to Eros… The other whom I love 
and who fascinates me is atopos. I cannot classify the other, for the other is, precisely, Unique, the singular Image 
which has miraculously come to correspond to the specialty of my desire. The other is the figure of my truth, and 
cannot be imprisoned in any stereotype (which is the truth of others)” (34).  
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to dialogues that either dwell in clichés or read as bad pastiches of Pinter or Beckett at their most 
terse. Often they lead to no exchange of words whatsoever. 
In A Literary Review, Kierkegaard anticipated the future of what would replace eros in 
modernity: 
And just as the public is a pure abstraction, so in the end will it be with human speech—
there will no longer be someone speaking but an objective reflection will gradually 
impart an atmospheric something, an abstract sound that will render human speech 
redundant, just as machines make workers redundant. In Germany there are even manuals 
for lovers, so it will probably end with lovers sitting and speaking anonymously to each 
other. (93)  
“Lovers sitting and speaking anonymously to each other”—nothing else better captures the 
essence of online dating and pornography. The same mechanics at work in the machines that 
“make workers redundant” operates here, as well, in a tendency that will eventually “render 
human speech redundant.”  
The redundancy of human speech coincides with the redundancy of philosophy and the 
evacuation of eros. Han does not see this as a coincidence, arguing that, “Until now, attention has 
hardly been paid to the remarkable fact that at the very beginning of philosophy and theory, 
logos and eros entered into such an intimate relation. Logos is powerless without the force of 
eros” (Agony of Eros 52). As evidence, he cites Plato’s Symposium, where Alcibiades says that 
no other orator, not even Pericles, can say anything “that grips or unsettles him” the way 
Socrates can because their “words lack the erotic power of seduction” (52). Philosophy, then—
from Plato to Kierkegaard to Heidegger to Badiou—is nothing but seduction. By the means of 
eros, it “leads and seduces (führt und verführt) thinking down untrodden paths…” (52). 
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Philosophy “is the translation of eros into logos. Heidegger follows Plato’s theory of eros when 
he remarks that the beat of the god’s wing touches him as soon as he makes a substantial step in 
his thinking and ventures onto untrodden paths” (52). 
This is a compelling argument to make; one may even call it seductive. Except that there 
is one mistake. Han gets a bit too carried away when he writes that, “Until now, attention has 
hardly been paid” to this “remarkable fact.” Attention has been paid, over and over again, to this 
connection between eros, logos, and thought in the history of the novel. Kierkegaard comes to 
this conclusion in his reflections on the novel, and in Death in Venice, Aschenbach—in an erotic 
rapture that leads him to fantasize about being Socrates engaging in silent discourse with 
Phaedrus, a role played by Tadzio on the beach—says in his unspoken dialogue, “Eros is in the 
word” (86). Lady Chatterley’s Lover is a work that wrestles with the crisis of language after the 
First World War, with the “hypocrisy of words” that covers over “the only reality,” which is “a 
reality of nothingness” (50). Connie and Mellors seem to reinvent language as they have to 
reinvent eros out of the ashes of the War, approaching them as interchangeable. To Connie, “sex 
is just another form of talk, where you act the words instead of saying them”—but it is talk 
nonetheless, or something closer to what Heidegger meant by Rede [discourse], which dwells in 
silence, the same kind of silence that Aschenbach dwells in to ironically link the word with eros 
(34).  
And just as Heidegger wrote in the letter to his wife about his struggle to reach “across 
into the realm of the sayable” with philosophy, Woolf, in a letter to Vita Sackville-West, wrote 
that the novel is the space that allows one to access the “far side of a gulf, which words can’t 
cross… a novel, as I saw, to be good should seem, before one writes, something unwriteable…” 
(qtd. in Dalgarno 1). And in To the Lighthouse, her novel modeled on Symposium, she comes to 
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the same conclusion about love and eros as Mann and Lawrence, even though she is more 
subdued in its articulation. As Mrs. Ramsay comes closer to her husband in bed, “she could feel 
his mind like a raised hand shadowing her mind; and he was beginning now that her thoughts 
took a turn he disliked—toward this ‘pessimism’ as he called it—to fidget, though he said 
nothing…” (99). But even in this pessimism, “she began to smile, for though she had not said a 
word, he knew, of course he knew, that she loved him” (100). Eros resides in the word of their 
wordless, telepathic conversation. And Humbert, too, plays on the tension between the wordiness 
and wordlessness of eros, silencing Lolita as if she were the little mermaid, but then lamenting, 
“Oh, my Lolita, I have only words to play with!’ (32)  
In order to understand how we have arrived at this eros-deprived age, we need to stop 
ignoring the role of the novel in articulating possibilities of lived experience across modern 
history. Jonathan Arac takes a Hegelian approach when he invokes arguments for the “death of 
the novel” (193). These arguments largely emerge from Lukács, who sees the history of the 
novel beginning with Don Quixote and ending with Dostoevsky. Arac points out that: 
Among Lukács’s English-speaking contemporaries, Virginia Woolf too saw ‘the 
Russians’ as ending the old novel of H.G. Wells, John Galsworthy, and Arnold Bennett, 
and D.H. Lawrence even more closely approximated Lukács’s sense of crisis in the novel 
as part of the crisis of the Western soul at the moment of the Great War. (191) 
Woolf and Lawrence are then more aligned than one might initially assume—not necessarily in 
terms of their aesthetic styles or literary techniques, but in their overall vison of the role of the 
novel in culture. The death of the novel, for Arac, is just a recognition that “the novel generally 
no longer does what it used to” (194). But he concedes that, “in the United States now, and for 
some decades past, perhaps only in those cases in which new groups gain a powerful relationship 
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to print can the novel again seem fully consequential, as for instance with Toni Morrison’s 
Beloved” (194). 
This point is well taken, and difficult to dispute, even with fascinating, important, and 
recent exceptions—such as Margaret Atwood’s The Testaments (2019), a novel written not only 
as a sequel to The Handmaid’s Tale (1985), but to the Hulu series that it inspired in the wake of 
the last presidential election. This example complicates the argument that the novel has largely 
become obsolete due to different media and technology in film and television. The recent 
election also saw publishing houses reprinting George Orwell’s 1984 and Sinclair Lewis’s It 
Can’t Happen Here to a point that even Amazon could not keep up with the demand (Lange, 
TheWeek.com). Even so, it’s not like either Orwell’s or Lewis’s novels surpass a sixth-grade 
level of intellectual stimulation. And the Nobel Prize, once an illustrious recognition of world-
historical literary writers, mainly novelists, who had their fingers on the pulse of our culture at 
the given moment, and who were also voices of a moral conscience—giants like Thomas Mann, 
William Faulkner, Jean-Paul Sartre, Toni Morrison—has now recognized Bob Dylan and Peter 
Handke for their work. Dylan is more of a music legend than a literary icon, and Handke is a 
genocide apologist who defended Milosević’s war crimes at a time when global politics are 
shifting further and further to the neofascist right.  
It is difficult to imagine a society in which a demanding novel like Middlemarch could 
reach as much of a wide readership if it were published for the first time today as it did in 1871. 
Or if a work like Ulysses were published for the first time today—would anyone outside of 
academia bother with it? The novel is not what it once was, and neither is the novelist. The 
novelistic word has lost the grip it once had on the world. Maybe it has lost its eros. Han, who 
only ever really cites Handke when he veers into the territory of the novel at all—and not in a 
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critical way, but in a way that seems to celebrate his parallels with Heidegger without 
recognizing just how problematic both figures are in comparison with each other—doesn’t 
recognize the novel as a cite of exploring how our society today, stuck in “the inferno of the 
same,” has turned its back on eros, the “atopic Other” (Agony of Eros 3). And yet he sounds 
remarkably like D.H. Lawrence when he writes, “In the inferno of the same, the arrival of the 
atopic Other can assume apocalyptic form. In other words: today, only an apocalypse can 
liberate—indeed, redeem—us from the inferno of the same, and lead us toward the Other” (3). 
Here we see a romanticized vison of apocalypse, a vision that only makes sense in the 
kind of universe that the Tristan lovers inhabit, and that Lawrence invokes in Lady Chatterley’s 
Lover. In the tradition of apophatic medieval mysticism, Han writes, “Only the negativity of 
withdrawal brings forth the Other in its atopic otherness” (38). But maybe there is something 
even too optimistic in Han’s apocalyptic vision, something too tethered to a Christian 
metaphysics with its claim to redemption. Even so, this is the only alternative he can imagine to 
the achievement-society of neoliberalism, the society that rewards every aspect of our being that 
can be monetized and rewarded according to our achievement, performance, and ability.  
Ours is a society that replaces prohibitions with injunctions of “I can,” encouraging an 
“auto-compulsion” that ultimately leads to “exploitation without domination,” and consequently 
burnout and depression (9-11). The only resistance to this ontology is an embrace of apocalyptic 
eros—and with it, failure: “Eros is a relationship to the Other situated beyond achievement, 
performance, and ability. Being able not to be able (Nicht-Können-Können) represents its 
negative counterpart” (11). If neoliberal ideology fetishizes success and achievement so much, 
maybe failure is the only recourse available to us. Han explains that, “A successful relationship 
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with the Other finds expression as a kind of failure. Only by way of being able not to be able 
does the Other appear” (11). He draws on Levinas here, who illustrates this point further: 
Can this relationship with the other through Eros be characterized as a failure? Once 
again, the answer is yes, if one adopts the terminology of current descriptions, if one 
wants to characterize the erotic by ‘grasping,’ ‘possessing,’ or ‘knowing.’ But there is 
nothing of all this, or the failure of all this, in eros. If one could possess, grasp, and know 
the other, it would not be other. Possessing, knowing, and grasping are synonyms of 
power. (Time and the Other 90) 
“Possessing, knowing, and grasping” are also all synonyms of philosophy. These are the gestures 
of philosophy traced by the image of grasping hands (linking greifen to begreifen) as traced in 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation. What is missing from this discourse of failure is the most obvious: 
pessimism, that thing that philosophy tries keeping at arm’s length, pushing it away with its 
hands while pessimism kicks back with its feet. And, more specifically, it is the novel that is at 
the heart of this discourse. If we stop artificially drawing distinctions between philosophy, 
pessimism, and the novel, and view them instead through the lens of an erotic union, we can 
fully flesh out this discourse of failure as a way of understanding what is at stake in a neoliberal 
society that is endangering itself with pathological levels of optimism and positivity. 
 
“Optimism is the Opium of the People” 
The self-help guru Tony Robbins—who can still be booked for speaking engagements at 
a million-dollar price tag, despite multiple allegations of sexual assault, who sells nutritional 
supplements on his website, and at one point also sold pendants that “supposedly protected the 
wearer from cell phone radiation”—wants to give you advice (Alexander, USA Today; 
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Ehrenreich 98). He advises us to improve ourselves constantly by setting goals like our own 
taskmaster: “When you set a goal, you’ve committed to CANI (Constant, Never-Ending 
Improvement)! You’ve acknowledged the need that all human beings have for constant, never-
ending improvement” (qtd. in Ehrenreich 94).  
Is it really accurate that “all human beings” have a “need” for “constant, never-ending 
improvement?” The narcissistic, neoliberal ethos of self-improvement replaces the ethos of eros 
that leads us outside of ourselves and binds us to, as Han puts it, the atopic Other. The gimmicky 
acronym of “CANI” is awkwardly supposed to come off as an exclamatory assertion, and yet the 
grammar necessarily insists that it is a question, revealing an ominous tone of anxiety it struggles 
so hard to deny: “Can I?”  
In the quintessentially American “Can-Do” attitude that we are brainwashed with as 
something worthy of aspiring to, we become entrepreneurs of ourselves. “As an ‘entrepreneur of 
himself,’” Han explains, “the neoliberal achievement-subject engages in auto-exploitation 
willingly—and even passionately. The self-as-a-work-of-art amounts to a beautiful but deceptive 
illusion that the neoliberal regime maintains in order to exhaust its resources entirely” 
(Psychopolitics 28).  
Is this going too far? Are pessimists just being cantankerous about self-help gurus and the 
nauseating job title of “life coach” or “Chief Happiness Officer,” or an in-house “Jolly Good 
Fellow,” which is an actual role that exists at Google? (Davies 4). What’s so wrong with constant 
self-improvement, anyway? Maybe we should calm down a bit, and take the more reserved 
approach like that of Clarke Caywood, a Northwestern marketing professor, who admits that he’s 
too “over-educated and cynical” for this kind of motivation and optimism, but insists that it 
“can’t hurt…” (qtd. in Ehrenreich 107). 
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Can’t it, though? Tony Robbins’s “CANI” approach shares in its “never-ending” rhetoric 
a similarity with both capitalism and cancer with their destructive forces of never-ending growth. 
Barbara Ehrenreich documents her own harrowing experience of battling breast cancer in her 
book Bright-Sided: How Positive Thinking is Undermining America. In her experience, she was 
inundated with the oppressive optimism she was subjected to—“to the point that unhappiness 
requires a kind of apology” (26). Any kind of articulation of despair would often be met with 
admonishment in support groups and online forums, where the “axiomatic” attitude was that 
thinking positive thoughts was, ultimately, the cure for cancer (33). The dark side of that logic is 
that cancer—or succumbing to cancer in death—is the patient’s fault. She reports that some 
women had been expelled from their support groups “when their cancers metastasized and it 
became clear they would never graduate to the rank of ‘survivor’” (27).  
Charitable foundations, such as the prominent Susan G. Komen Foundation, headed by 
the Republican donor Nancy Brinker, seem beyond reproach (22). And yet the suffocating 
optimism of this Foundation dominates the narrative, especially with its high-profile Race for the 
Cure events. “The stars… were runners, the ‘survivors,’ who seemed to offer living proof the 
disease isn’t so bad after all” (27). In The First Year of the Rest of Your Life, “a collection of 
brief narratives with a foreword by Nancy Brinker and a share of the royalties going to the 
Komen Foundation,” there are first-person accounts of having the disease, including statements 
such as, “I can honestly say I am happier now than I have ever been in my life—even before the 
breast cancer,” and “For me, breast cancer has provided a good kick in the rear to get me started 
rethinking life…” (qtd. in Ehrenreich 28). One survivor even calls it a “gift” (28). This is not to 
undermine the personal experiences of these survivors, but they are articulated almost as an 
expectation, if not a threat: “…cheerfulness is required, dissent a kind of treason” (31). If 
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someone is lucky enough to have the good fortune and good health insurance to beat cancer and 
get through it with a positive attitude, this is certainly cause for celebration. But when these same 
people, with their good fortune, their good health insurance, and positive support groups founded 
by a donor to the Republican party—which has made it its mission to deny public healthcare to 
the less fortunate and less wealthy—turn around and demand this same optimism from the 
victims of both the disease and of Republican policies, then they are complicit in one of the 
ugliest forms of nationwide cruelty.               
Optimism isn’t just potentially harmful among cancer patients, but in every sphere of 
society. Ehrenreich interviewed a computer technician in Minneapolis who had “lost one job for 
uttering a stray remark that was never identified for him but taken as evidence of sarcasm and a 
‘negative attitude’” (54). T. Harv Elker, the author of the 2005 bestseller Secrets of the 
Millionaire Mind, advises you to “Identify a situation or a person who is a downer in your life. 
Remove yourself from that situation or association. If it’s family, choose to be around them less” 
(qtd. in Ehrenreich 55). The motivational speaker and coach Jeffrey Gitomer writes in all caps, 
“GET RID OF NEGATIVE PEOPLE IN YOUR LIFE” (qtd. in Ehrenreich 55). What this 
amounts to is “a warning: smile and be agreeable, go with the flow—or prepare to be ostracized” 
(57).  
This is the scenario that Kundera essentially constructs in his novel The Joke. In 
Communist Czechoslovakia, a young student named Ludvik sends a postcard to his love-interest 
Marketa, an earnest, optimistic Communist with no sense of irony, who was away for two weeks 
at a Party training course. In his “embarrassment and awkwardness,” he often “showed off in 
front of Marketa, disagreeing with her at every opportunity or just poking fun at her opinions…” 
(33-34). Because “she should be so happy and I was missing her so much” while she was away, 
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he sends her a postcard that reads: “Optimism is the opium of the people! A healthy atmosphere 
stinks of stupidity! Long live Trotsky! Ludvik” (34). 
At this point, he had never even read Trotsky, and hardly knew what he stood for. He 
doesn’t even necessarily believe what he had written in the postcard. He just wrote it in an 
offhand way, “to hurt, shock, and confuse her,” but also just as a simple joke (34). He hardly 
even remembers that he had written it when he is approached by Party member officials who 
interrogate him, expel him from the Party, and end up derailing his entire life. Kundera himself 
was expelled from the Communist party, and his works were removed from Czech libraries and 
bookstores as a result of writing this novel, which has largely been read by Americans in the 
context of its Cold War politics. 
Today, the novel strikes a somewhat different note, especially when we revisit the 
interrogation scene, written in one long paragraph with no quotation marks—Kafaesque both in 
style and matter—that contributes to the sense of being overwhelmed by a force you can’t fight 
against. One interrogator sneers, “I wonder what our workers… would say if they were to learn 
that the optimism spurring them on to overfulfill the plan was opium…” (37). This interrogator 
could easily be the CEO of a corporation, and the setting could easily be the capitalist United 
States today, where you can be fired for not being optimistic. Capitalists may be quick to point 
out that the consequences of pessimism here are nowhere near as dire as they were in Communist 
countries during the Cold War, but being fired from a job (as I nearly was, when I got written up 
for not greeting customers enthusiastically and loudly enough during a stint of work in retail), 
could have dire consequences. This job that could fire you for not smiling enough, for not 
performing optimism enough, could be the only barrier between you and homelessness. If your 
 378 
healthcare is contingent on your job, which it is for most Americans thanks to Republican policy, 
then being fired could be a death sentence.  
The American rejoinder of “just find another job” sounds easy enough, but obscures a 
bleak reality for masses of unemployed or underemployed people desperately trying to find work 
while being passed off from one job to the next due to overqualification, market saturation, or 
increasingly, the fact that job application portals are run by algorithms that are pre-programmed 
to filter out cover letters and resumés that don’t include key terms or job experience, regardless 
of comparable skills. If you are underqualified for a job, you are told to get more certification 
and higher degrees. If you can’t pay tuition, you take out student loans. So with student loans and 
health insurance payments, many are stuck in the Kafkaesque position of not even being able to 
afford a low-paying job. Ehrenreich notes how one woman was working five other jobs when she 
was also employed at the Home Depot call center in order to make her student loan payments, 
and, despite not “saying anything to anyone outside the lines of ‘I’m happy to have a job,’” was 
called into her boss’s office where she was reprimanded because, in her boss’s words, she 
“obviously wasn’t happy enough to be there” (54).  
Optimism governs by terror and submission, and this is what Americans understand by 
“freedom.” The same kinds of Americans who dismiss these points as overreactions are the same 
kinds of people in Communist countries who dismissed the gulags and insisted that one should 
just change one’s attitude and conform to the reigning ideology so as to avoid the punishment. 
Terry Eagleton rightly observes that:  
Along with North Korea, the United States is one of the few countries on earth in which 
optimism is almost a state ideology. For large sectors of the nation, to be bullish is to be 
patriotic, while negativity is a species of thought crime. […] Even in the most despondent 
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of times, a collective fantasy of omnipotence and infinity continues to haunt the national 
unconscious. […] An American historian remarked recently that ‘presidential inaugural 
speeches are always optimistic whatever the times.’ The comment was not intended as a 
criticism. There is a compulsive cheeriness about some aspects of American culture, an I-
can-do-anything-I-want rhetoric which betrays a quasi-pathological fear of failure. (Hope 
Without Optimism 10) 
This quasi-pathological fear—and punishment—of failure is inculcated, like any state ideology, 
early on, and perpetuated by our broken education system. In 2009, Ehrenreich noted how the 
cancerous growth of “positive thinking had ceased to be just a balm for the anxious or a cure for 
the psychosomatically distressed. It was beginning to be an obligation imposed on all American 
adults” (96). But on May 16th, 2018, Newsweek ran an article exposing the fact that optimism 
was an obligation imposed not only on all American adults, but American children, as well: 
Northern Lebanon School District students in Pennsylvania must smile while walking the 
hallways at the institution or they will be punished, according to a report. 
 Students who do not smile in the hallways between periods will be instructed to, 
and if they refuse, they will be sent to the guidance counselor’s office to talk through 
their problems, reported Lebanon Daily News. Meanwhile, parents claim that reports of 
bullying in the district are mostly ignored by administrators. (Zhao, Newsweek.com)   
This is perhaps the most succinct, microcosmic portrait of how optimism functions. Coinciding 
with systems of power, it operates by punishment, by bullying, and by pathologizing any traces 
of dissidence or even just a simple lack of enthusiasm. Or, as William Davies puts it, “…a 
culture which values only optimism will produce pathologies of pessimism…” (177). Students 
are essentially being catcalled into smiling by their public school district, and if they don’t return 
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this predatory catcall with a smile—at all times—then the problem seems to lie with them, and is 
serious enough to warrant a visit to the guidance counselor, which would interrupt their studies. 
Just the thought of seeing teenagers with manic smiles plastered on their faces instead of sulking 
in a pissed off way—the affect that is, if not the most natural, at least the most conducive to 
developing a critical faculty in adolescence—is alarming in itself. Long gone are the days when 
it actually smelled like teen spirit. 
The ideal American student, then, is one who is constantly cheerful—a cheerleader, that 
“distinctly American innovation” (Ehrenreich 10). This student, with the help of wealth and 
family ties, eventually grows up to be in politics, shaping the lives of countless others, and—like 
George W. Bush—eventually becomes President, seeing his presidency as an opportunity to 
“continue in that line of work” of cheerleading, which is how he had spent his youth in prep 
school (10). “If he repeatedly laid claim to a single adjective, it was ‘optimistic,’” and, according 
to Bob Woodward, Condoleeza Rice “failed to express some of her worries because, she said, 
‘the president almost demanded optimism. He didn’t like pessimism, hand-wringing, or doubt’” 
(10). To Eagleton,  
The ‘faith-based’ rather than ‘reality-based’ politics of the George W. Bush White House 
pressed a familiar American attitude to the point of lunacy. Reality is a pessimist to 
whose treasonable talk one must shut one’s ears. […] It is a vein of optimism not easy to 
distinguish from mental illness. Cheerfulness of this kind is a form of psychological 
disavowal. For all its square-jawed vigor, it is really a moral evasion. (Hope Without 
Optimism 11) 
9/11 and the dot-com bust under Bush’s tenure “was later attributed to a ‘failure of imagination.’ 
But actually there was plenty of imagination at work—imagining an invulnerable nation and an 
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ever-booming economy—there was simply no ability or inclination to imagine the worst” 
(Ehrenreich 10). The worst—so far—has been realized in the next Republican president, a 
walking allegory of capital itself, whose unshakeable confidence in himself goes several steps 
beyond Bush in dismissing any kind of criticism as “fake news,” and in issuing dog whistles to 
crush opposition, by violence if necessary. Just recently, in response to Greta Thunberg’s alarm 
at the climate crisis, Trump said, “This is not a time for pessimism. Fear and doubt is not a good 
thought process” (qtd. in Landler and Sengupta, The New York Times). More recently, and 
devastatingly, the Politico reporter Dan Diamond told Terry Gross that the Coronavirus has 
grown out of control in this country in part because Trump has “created an environment where 
his aides have been afraid to tell him bad news, and that has skewed what the Trump 
administration ends up pursuing. If the president is only willing to look at the most optimistic 
scenario, it makes it very hard to do worst-case planning” (Fresh Air). 
There is no greater ringing endorsement for pessimism than the fact that Trump is such a 
devout optimist. And it is no coincidence that his optimism leads him to cozy up to some of the 
most oppressive tyrants in the world. This “familiar American attitude” that was “pressed to the 
point of lunacy” under Bush is what is responsible for the catastrophes that have besieged us 
under Trump, all for the sake of a man who is convinced of his own invincibility. Disbanding a 
government pandemic task force two years in advance of the crisis, taunting war with Iran, 
separating families at the border strewn with concentration camps, removing terminally ill 
patients from support groups, and firing employees for not having positive vibes is what 





 How did we get here? How did we normalize celebrating pathologically delusional 
leaders while punishing students, employees, and citizens for not smiling, for not being 
optimistic? The answer may have more to do with the history of the novel than we might think. 
In Manufacturing Happy Citizens: How the Science and Industry of Happiness Control our 
Lives, Edgar Cabanas and Eva Illouz trace the different kinds of movements, initiatives, and 
policies that are organized around optimism and positivity. “One of the most prominent (and 
failed) attempts,” they write, “stems from the Self-Esteem Movement in the 1980s and 1990s, at 
which time an apparent epidemic of low self-esteem had caused the term to take root in popular 
jargon” (78). The leading figure of this movement was Nathaniel Branden, who stated that there 
was not “a single psychological problem—from anxiety and depression, to fear of intimacy or of 
success, to spousal battery or child molestation—that is not traceable to the problem of low self-
esteem” (qtd. in Cabanas and Illouz 78). Luckily the grunge scene retaliated, with bands like The 
Offspring releasing their angry teen anthem banger “Self-Esteem” in 1994, hilariously 
celebrating low self-esteem as a radical, anti-establishment stance, which in turn fueled the ‘90s 
teen attitude that culminated in shows like Daria on MTV, premiering with its pilot episode 
entitled “Esteemsters” in March 1997, its constantly unimpressed protagonist rolling her eyes in 
response to anything that smacked of cheerfulness or self-esteem. 
But Branden’s theory of self-esteem, beyond the failure of its immediate movement in the 
1980s and 1990s, has come back with a vengeance, significantly impacting the world of self-help 
and cognitive psychology, which “holds that by changing one’s thinking one can change one’s 
feelings and behavior” (Anne C. Heller 227). Social media has revived self-esteem on steroids, 
encouraging its users—especially teenagers—to project images of an aggressively positive self-
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esteem that crosses over into unbridled narcissism, something that would make the teenagers of 
the ‘90s cringe. Branden “exalted rationality, productivity, and achievement. Achievement is the 
most important source of a person’s pride in self, and pride in self is a requisite for 
independence” (227). This is the ontology of the “achievement-subject” that defines life under 
neoliberalism, and which, to thinkers like Han, is destroying our humanity (Psychopolitics 28).   
It is important to trace who Nathaniel Branden was in order to understand how this 
movement took hold of our nation, confirming the neoliberal tendencies that have now ossified 
into something Americans regard as human nature, but which is actually just a consequence of 
wealthy people with power and influence. Or, as Heidegger puts it, “What seems natural to us is 
probably just something familiar in a long tradition that has forgotten the unfamiliar source from 
which it arose” (“Origin of the Work of Art” 24).145 This tradition is worth tracing, exposing, and 
ultimately dismantling. For one thing, Nathaniel Branden wasn’t even Nathaniel Branden—he 
was Nathaniel Blumenthal, who had published his first piece of writing in the UCLA newspaper 
when he was still a student there. It was a letter to the editor, written “in protest of an editorial 
that was sympathetic to a Communist professor who had committed suicide” (Heller 254). At the 
age of nineteen, he read The Fountainhead and wrote a letter to its author, Ayn Rand, because 
her so-called “philosophy” of “Objectivism” celebrated the cult of the ego, self-worship, and 
capitalism. Her characters are single-dimensional superheroes with Aryan features, deprived of 
all psychology, ambiguity, or irony, and who enjoy pontificating in lengthy speeches about the 
virtues of selfishness. In Atlas Shrugged, an heir to a copper mining operation drones on about 
how money is the root of all good. Someone else named John Galt essentially repeats the same 
speech several hundred pages later, but goes on, uninterrupted, for the length of sixty-four pages. 
 
145 Cf. Nietzsche’s essay “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” (Philosophy and Truth 84). 
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That’s supposed to be the climax of the novel, which reads like a Fox News target audience’s 
wet dream.  
Already in her fifties by the time this wide-eyed teenager got in touch with her, Rand 
invited him to her home, and after a few years of obsessing over each other, while each was still 
married to other people, they subsequently had a tumultuous affair that would make him later 
recall “the pleasure he took in playing the role of sexual aggressor with a woman who was 
ravenous for the experience of sexual surrender” (259). As if the situation weren’t Oedipal 
enough, he legally changed his last name from Blumenthal to Branden, “which is a perfect 
anagram of the common Hebrew formulation for ‘son of Rand’: ‘ben Rand’” (254). The 
impressionable young man soaked up all the ideas of his lover, who “claimed that she could 
account rationally for every emotion she ever had…” (227).  
Rand, born Alyssa Rosenbaum in the Soviet Union, had escaped to the United States and 
lived out the rest of her life devoted to denouncing Communism, even eagerly volunteering to be 
interviewed at the McCarthy trials, where she bored everyone in attendance with her manic 
celebration of capitalism. She, like her fictional characters, could tolerate no intellectual 
opposition whatsoever (249). Branden mirrored her personality and her reductive, delusional 
take on psychology. He “stressed that holding any idea that contradicted any other was to ‘kill 
one’s capacity to be certain of anything’” (341).146 There is no room for any ambiguity, any 
Zweideutigkeit—that concept which thinks the “two,” the zwei, instead of the “one.” This view 
reduces everything just as much to the Leibnizian monad as to the embodied monolith, 
demanding the same kind of worship that Rand’s superheroes demanded. Branden would 
 
146 As though Kierkegaard were responding to Branden a century in advance, he wrote, “In existence, nullifying the 
principle of contradiction is the expression for being in contradiction with oneself… The principle of contradiction 
strengthens the individual in faithfulness to himself” (A Literary Review 86-87). 
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“display a seductive mixture of self-assurance, poise, and wit, as well as a tone of moral 
seriousness and a hint of moral threat” (341). He pioneered the style that would later become the 
trademark of self-help gurus everywhere, a style that “was manic, adrenaline-filled, abrupt,” 
using a technique that he described as: “Act as if you know everything, and stir up the emotions 
of [the] audience” (341).  
Rand, meanwhile, publicly declared Branden her “best intellectual heir” when she was 
interviewed by Mike Wallace (309). She even dedicated Atlas Shrugged to him, but after their 
bitter falling out years later, rescinded his name in the dedication page in all future printings of 
the novel. In another interview, two months after the novel’s publication, she was asked if she 
thought of herself as “the most creative thinker alive today” (292). Her response was, “If anyone 
can pick a single rational flaw in my philosophy, I would be delighted to acknowledge him and 
learn something from him. Until then—I am” (qtd. in Heller 292). Never mind the internalized 
misogyny in Rand’s response, the same kind of misogyny we see in Ann Coulter and the 53% of 
white women who voted for Trump (Donegan, The Guardian). Or the fact that she did actually 
think of herself as “the most creative thinker alive” at the time of the interview in 1957, when, as 
Corey Robin reminds us in an article entitled “Garbage and Gravitas,” “Arendt, Quine, Sartre, 
Camus, Lukács, Adorno, Murdoch, Heidegger, Beauvoir, Rawls, Anscombe and Popper were all 
at work. It was also the year of the first performance of Endgame and the publication of Pnin, 
Doctor Zhivago and The Cat in the Hat” (The Nation). Perhaps the most outlandish thing about 
this response is that she refers to her “philosophy” when, at this point, “she hadn’t yet published 
a single line of nonfiction philosophical writing” (Heller 292). When she did get around to it, she 
mainly quoted the fictional characters from her own novels.  
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Rand was not a philosopher, but a novelist—and a bad one at that. She tried fulfilling the 
dream of uniting the novel with philosophy, but she had neither the intellectual capacity nor 
artistic skill for either. Kierkegaard would have dismissed her as being too doctrinaire and too 
autobiographical to properly be called a novelist. Or maybe he wouldn’t even have wasted his 
time on her. It is rumored that, at a cocktail party in New York, Nabokov was approached and 
asked about his opinions of Rand at the height of her fame, to which he deliciously answered, in 
classic Nabokovian style, that he wasn’t terribly familiar with her work, but would be delighted 
to give her writing lessons.147 Coincidentally, his sister Olga was Rand’s best friend while they 
grew up in Russia, and the Nabokovs’ home was the inspiration for Kira Argounova’s pre-
Revolution home in her first novel, We the Living (26). Both Ayn and Vladimir, as children, had 
the same literature teacher, a well-known literary critic named V.V. Gippius, but clearly 
Nabokov thought that Rand was in need of further literary instruction, and beyond this 
apocryphal statement, never acknowledged her (18). She, for her part, said that she couldn’t 
make it through Lolita (312). 
Where Nabokov demands intellectual rigor from his readers, Rand provides the opposite 
in her juvenile attempts at fiction. And this is likely what made her such a celebrity; her work is 
easy, too easy, to digest—but it carries a pompous aura of intellectual depth that fools anyone 
severely lacking in critical insight, like adolescents or Republicans. Her celebrity was large 
enough to arrange the publication of Branden’s book, The Psychology of Self-Esteem, in 1969. 
Up until that point, he was an unremarkable student who had enrolled in an MA program in 
psychology at NYU. After completing the program, he was denied a New York State license to 
practice therapy, but nevertheless “began to offer therapy based on Rand’s and his ideas at low 
 
147 Conversation with Helene McClean, January 2008.  
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prices to members” of what Rand ironically called “the Collective,” a close-knit group of like-
minded capitalist friends (263). Branden’s wife at the time, Barbara, described these sessions as 
“savagery” (267). He enjoyed sadistically tearing people down for not sufficiently living up to 
the ideals of Rand’s superheroes. Albert Mannheimer, whom Rand had described as one of her 
“only friends of any duration from her arrival in the United States” sought Branden for therapy 
(232). After a few sessions with him, Mannheimer shot himself.  
But under the tutelage of Rand, Branden was unstoppable. He established the Nathaniel 
Branden Institute, in which “enrollees were not only required to read Atlas Shrugged but also to 
declare their agreement with the major tenets of John Galt’s speech, according to a report from 
the Saturday Evening Post” (301). In fleeing Stalinism, Rand promoted a vision of society, 
rooted in the Nathaniel Branden Institute—later re-branded as the Objectivist Institute and then 
the Ayn Rand Institute, still active today—that would replicate Stalinist devotion and 
enthusiasm. In this regard, she is closer to L. Ron Hubbard than any philosopher, who based his 
entire tyrannical religion of Scientology on the cult-worship of his cheesy science fiction novels, 
which he passes off as religious truth. As with people in positions of power in Scientology, or 
with any cult or religion, disagreeing with either Rand or Branden “was tantamount to admitting 
one’s own moral weakness” (341).  
This is the kind of “positivity” that he and Rand so aggressively promoted, and it had 
gained enough traction so that by 1991, The New York Times reported that Atlas Shrugged was 
the second most influential book in the United States after The Bible (Fein C26). It may also 
perhaps be the second most dogmatic book after The Bible, as well. Americans love dogmatism 
as much as they claim to love freedom, and the space that erupts in this cognitive dissonance is 
the space where optimism and its corollary movements in psychology and politics emerge as the 
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dominant American ideology. Among Rand’s loyalists was Alan Greenspan, who had published 
in The Objectivist Newsletter and who had steered our economy into collapse, saying three years 
before the 2008 crash that the “impressive performance of the U.S. economy over the past couple 
of decades offers clear evidence of the benefits of increased market flexibility,” with “flexibility” 
meaning “freedom from regulation and burdensome trade unions” (qtd. in Ehrenreich 191).  
One would think that 2008 would have been a wake-up call to the unethical practices of 
aggressive optimism and deregulated capitalism. But the “purveyors of positive thinking did not 
slink off into the night like foreclosed-upon homeowners when the prospects for instant wealth 
tanked in the late years of the decade. Not at all. In fact, they seemed to redouble their efforts” 
(192). By February 2009, The Economist reported that Atlas Shrugged skyrocketed to an average 
monthly Amazon ranking of 127 from 542 since the crash, and even climbed up to rank 30 
(“Atlas Felt a Sense of Déjà vu”). Ehrenreich notes how, “Positive thinking has always thrived in 
adversity, with the Great Depression bringing forth such classics of self-delusion as Napoleon 
Hill’s Think and Grow Rich!” (192). Feel-good success stories abounded, justifying the 
precarious neoliberal system with the logic that, “If just one person can get rich during a crash or 
economic downturn, then no one has an excuse for whining” (194). This is the same kind of 
logic that prompts the dismissive response of “just find another job” to people who are already 
desperately applying for as many jobs as possible, holding on to anything just to survive while 
being blamed for systemic problems outside of their control, problems directly caused by those 
who buy into the optimism peddled by Rand’s dogmatic novels.  
It is no coincidence that Trump, despite his illiteracy, cites The Fountainhead as one of 
the few works of fiction he likes (Freedland, The Guardian). Maybe it’s just one of the few 
works of fiction he had ever read. In his words, The Fountainhead is a book that “relates to… 
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everything” (qtd. in ibid.). This “everything” is telling—it underscores the total, if not 
totalitarian, direction he is leading our country into. Daniel Hannan, the Tory MEP who is the 
“intellectual architect of Brexit, keeps a photograph of Rand on his Brussels desk” (Ibid.). U.S. 
Senator Rand Paul was named by his father after her, and is converting her vision into policy 
(Ibid.). Among her other admirers today include Paul Ryan, Rex Tillerson, and Mike Pompeo, 
who says Atlas Shrugged “really had an impact on me” (qtd. in Ibid.). All of these people are 
making or have made decisions that have dire consequences for the citizens they claim to govern, 
and these decisions are rooted in the bullishly optimistic vision of Rand’s novels. “We’ve gone 
so far down this yellow brick road that ‘positive’ seems to us not only normal but normative—
the way you should be” (Ehrenreich 195).          
 
The Pursuit of Happiness 
It definitely took more than just one novel, or even one novelist, to create the nightmare 
of optimism that we are living in today. The question of optimism is not merely, as Ehrenreich, 
Eagleton, and William Davies in his work The Happiness Industry argue, a question of hope. A 
pessimist can have hope, as evidenced by Antonio Gramsci’s Marxist slogan of, “Pessimism of 
the intellect, optimism of the will.” Pessimists can still make ethical commitments, even as 
things tend to get worse, for the sake of the commitments themselves rather than the bleak 
outcomes that the world may have in store for us, as we’ve seen with Connie and Mellors in 
Lady Chatterley’s Lover. The question of optimism is, instead, a question of happiness. 
Pessimists, too, are not incapable of happiness—we’ve seen how Mrs. Ramsay thinks of herself 
as a happy pessimist (To the Lighthouse 100). It’s just that pessimists don’t fetishize happiness 
the way optimists do.  
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The obsession with happiness is only a few centuries old, and has little, if anything, to do 
with the “good life” that the ancients thinkers debated. “Count no mortal happy,” the Chorus tells 
us at the end of Oedipus the King, “till / he has passed the final limit of his life secure from pain” 
(l.1529-30). Happiness is something that can only be achieved, or not, after death, and in 
retrospect. It is, therefore, not something to be enjoyed in life, if it is to be found at all. Socrates 
surprisingly makes the same argument even in his denouncement of tragedy, saying that “a 
human being becomes happiest” only after having gone to Hades, waiting to be reincarnated 
(Republic 619A-B). And in Hades, when Odysseus sees the shade of Achilles, he makes the 
mistake of addressing him by the epithet of “happy man”: “but was there ever a man more blest 
by fortune / than you, Akhilleus? Can there ever be? We ranked you with immortals in your 
lifetime, / we Argives did, and here your power is royal / among the dead men’s shades” 
(Odyssey XI.569-73; cf. Mazzoni 23). But Achilles is quick to correct him, saying that he hates it 
down there, that he would rather “break sod as a farm hand / for some poor country man, on iron 
rations, than lord it over all the exhausted dead” (XI.579-882). Odysseus greeting Achilles with 
this epithet of “happy man” is like the wide smiles with which we greet each other under 
neoliberalism, performing our happiness to each other and maybe even to ourselves, despite 
living in what Han calls “the inferno of the same” (Agony of Eros 3). 
To Freud, happiness can only ever be fleeting. Maybe there is some correspondence here 
with Heidegger’s brief “moment” of authenticity. Or maybe only a pessimist could spot 
happiness in Heidegger’s discussion of anxiety. Adorno begins his most pessimistic work, 
Minima Moralia, written in exile during the Second World War, with a meditation on “the 
teaching of the good life. What the philosophers once knew as life has become the sphere of 
private existence and now of mere consumption, dragged along as an appendage of the process 
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of material production, without autonomy or substance of its own” (15). The happiness industry 
is part of the culture industry—part of the capitalist process that erodes our autonomy into an 
experience of “mere consumption.”  
“Man does not strive after happiness,” Nietzsche writes in Twilight of the Idols, “only the 
Englishman does that” (33). To this, he should have added: the American, too. But regardless of 
nationality, optimists are hell-bent on seizing happiness and injecting it with the false promise of 
longevity. Pessimists don’t see the point in this, and don’t appreciate being hijacked by a world 
that aggressively promotes and enforces this false promise, on pain of punishment, ostracism, 
and even one’s livelihood for deviating from it. There are values worth holding in higher esteem 
than happiness. Cabanas and Illouz write of the “happiness industry that aims at controlling us: it 
not only blurs and confuses our very capacity to know the conditions that shape our existence; it 
also makes them irrelevant. Knowledge and justice, rather than happiness, remain the 
revolutionary purpose of our lives” (183).  
The novel emerges out of a historical consciousness that addresses this question of 
happiness. It reflects the pessimistic shift to modernity in Europe, which, to Franco Moretti, 
“gives rise to unexpected hopes, thereby generating an interiority not only fuller than before, but 
also—as Hegel clearly saw, even though he deplored it—perennially dissatisfied and restless” 
(The Way of the World 4). To Guido Mazzoni, “Nonheroic individuals are particular because the 
person who exists in the age of prose is only an accidental fragment of the whole: his or her 
actions do not decide the destiny of a community; at most they determine a small, private matter 
of happiness or unhappiness” (254). By definition, the happiness or unhappiness of these 
nonheroic individuals—or characters in a novel—is more or less inconsequential, which is more 
of a pessimistic outlook than an optimistic one. Mazzoni traces the “novel of personal destinies” 
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to its Christian archetype in the spiritual autobiography, but “now it is situated in a secular, 
earthly horizon: instead of saving one’s soul, the goal is to achieve happiness in this world” 
(268). Despite this goal, however, the novel at its core “shows the objective tragedy of the 
human condition: it shows that happiness or unhappiness do not stem only from the merits or 
demerits of the individual, but also above all from the power of circumstances” (58).  
The “power of circumstances,” then—or as Lukács defined it, “contingency”—is the 
guiding principle of the novel, which situates happiness in terms of happenstance. Happiness is 
more a product of luck, of circumstance, of whatever lies beyond the characters’ control and 
responds no more to their desires than the stars do to their earthly lives. Circumstance becomes 
the secularized version of fate, not in terms of any kind of determinism, but as a power that 
cannot be mastered by sheer will or hard work. The novel is more concerned simply with what 
happens than with happiness. In 1785, Clara Reeve defined the novel in these terms:  
The Romance in lofty and elevated language, describes what never happened nor is likely 
to happen.—The Novel gives a familiar relation of such things, as pass every day before 
our eyes, such as may happen to our friend, or to ourselves; and the perfection of it, is to 
represent every scene, in so easy and natural a manner, and to make them appear so 
probable, as to deceive us into a persuasion (at least while we are reading) that all is real, 
until we are affected by the joys or distresses, or the persons in the story, as if they were 
our own. (Reeve I.111, emphasis added.) 
The novel seduces us into the “every day” portrait of circumstances that expand the range of 
possibilities we may find ourselves in, which is why we respond to this portrait with such 
sympathy, when it’s done right. By this definition, Rand’s drivel does not belong to the novel, 
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but to romance—and in an age that has long surpassed it, leaving the genre in the checkout aisle 
of a supermarket. 
Reeve was writing at a time when happiness was very much the center of political and 
philosophical discussion, and she chooses to focus simply on what happens instead. Not even a 
decade had passed from the time that Britain had lost thirteen of its colonies to the newly formed 
United States of America, a nation built on optimism. It’s no coincidence that this was also the 
era that D.H. Lawrence identified as the foundation for the self-help genre that he despised so 
much, especially in the writings of Benjamin Franklin (Blum 120). Reviling this genre, 
Lawrence turned to the novel as a way to reclaim pessimism and, with it, humanity. 
This new nation was founded on the optimism of wealthy men who could only feel so 
positive in their outlook on the backs of slaves, in land cleared by genocide. Happiness, in fact, 
was running so high that it was even inscribed into the nation’s Declaration of Independence, 
which adopted John Locke’s idea that citizens should have rights to “life, liberty, and property,” 
but with a slight modification. The “pursuit of happiness” certainly sounds prettier than 
“property,” but it conceals an ugly motive. In a footnote to In Defense of Lost Causes, Slavoj 
Žižek writes that “the somewhat awkward ‘pursuit of happiness’” replaces Locke’s idea of a 
right to property “during negotiations of the drafting of the Declaration, as a way to negate the 
black slaves’ right to property” (492 fn.43).  
It should be noted that, right after the Civil War less than a century later, new American 
colleges were established with close ties to the business world, ties that would grow even closer 
as time wore on. The world’s first business school, Wharton Pennsylvania, was established in 
1881. “Management,” the core principle of business, “originated as a technique for controlling 
slaves on plantations…” (Davies 124). In the nominal eradication of slavery in this country, its 
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principles and its strategies nevertheless transitioned perfectly well into the construction of 
corporate America. Friedrich Engels, who had covered the Civil War as a foreign correspondent 
for Die Presse in Vienna, saw this trend a few decades earlier in England, where he observed 
that: 
The only difference as compared with the old, outspoken slavery is this, that the worker 
of today seems to be free because he is not sold once and for all, but piecemeal by the 
day, the week, the year, and because no one owner sells him to another, but he is forced 
to sell himself in this way instead, being the slave of no particular person, but of the 
whole property-holding class. (The Condition of the Working Class 114-15)  
The rage that Communists expressed at this injustice was met with the infuriating response of the 
capitalist class of executives and entrepreneurs. Instead of ameliorating the dismal 
socioeconomic conditions that have been giving rise to this rage, capitalists instead address only 
the rage itself, paternalistically trying to defuse it with the ideology of happiness as an individual 
pursuit, selling the mendacious narrative that hard work will be rewarded, and if we all just shut 
up, get back to work, and quit whining, we’ll be happy. In this, their slogans sound ominously 
familiar: Arbeit macht frei. 
Executives after the Civil War must have lamented that employees were not technically 
slaves—at least not legally—but the idea that labor would be tethered to one’s sense of identity 
and one’s own pursuit of happiness gradually became a job requirement, so that the word 
“passionate” became a buzzword in job descriptions of every kind, concealing the ideological 
motivation behind using such a word. If someone is passionate about something, they don’t need 
to be properly compensated for it, since they love doing it anyway. It is not enough simply to get 
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the job done; one must do it with—yet another insidious buzzword of neoliberalism—“gratitude” 
for the opportunity to devote one’s life, one’s mind, and one’s identity to labor. 
Foucault, in fact, cites gratitude as a modern form of acquiescing to punishment in 
prisons—a kind of prisoner’s Stockholm Syndrome: “At each visit, a few benevolent words flow 
from this honest mouth [of the warder] and bring to the heart of the inmate gratitude, hope and 
consolation; he loves his warder; and he loves him because he is gentle and sympathetic” 
(Discipline and Punish 239). By the early twentieth century, a businessman named Elton Mayo 
sought to extend this warder-prisoner relationship to the workplace. Mayo believed that 
“socialism was a symptom of physical fatigue and psychiatric illness,” and came up with the idea 
that the only solution to workplace dissatisfaction was “coming to provide forms of 
psychoanalytic therapy to their employees, which would soothe them, bringing them closer into 
the arms of their employers. Employees who resisted the authority of their managers were in 
need of treatment” (Davies 121). Since “an unhappy worker was also an unproductive worker, 
and the unhappiness stemmed from a deep-set feeling of isolation,” Mayo proposed to cultivate a 
“thriving and collaborative group identity, [which] could do far more for an employee’s 
happiness, and hence for the manager’s bottom line, than a pay rise” (123). On the basis of this 
idea, Mayo was hired by the Harvard Business School (122).  
It is because of Mayo that we “now hear that managers must focus on the ‘whole person,’ 
and not just the ‘employee,’ or that employee happiness is critical to the bottom line, or that we 
must ‘love what we do’ or bring an ‘authentic’ version of ourselves to work…” (123-4). This is 
the same pernicious logic of employers who won’t pay a living wage, but offer free yoga 
sessions or “mindfulness” training to combat stress, or organize “team-building” events or work 
parties for “fun” at the expense of employees’ already limited time outside of work—a time 
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when they can still be reached and harassed by bosses and co-workers via email, text, phone, or 
now even the cruelly and ironically titled “Slack” app. Even employers who do offer higher 
salaries may throw in free gym membership and free counselling as ways to extract more labor 
from their employees, since Gallup has estimated that the unhappiness of employees costs the 
U.S. economy $500 billion a year in “lost productivity, lost tax receipts, and health-care costs” 
(135; 9).  
At the same time that American universities in the wake of the Civil War began to 
aggressively operate in collusion with Big Business to promote capitalist interests rather than do 
what the university was established to do—namely, educate citizens in the art of critique—
education in England took a different turn. The English major was a brand new academic 
discipline that “was first institutionalized not in the Universities, but in the Mechanics’ Institutes, 
working men’s colleges and extension lecturing circuits” (Eagleton, Literary Theory 23). English 
“was literally the poor man’s Classics—a way of providing a cheapish ‘liberal’ education for 
those beyond the charmed circles of public school and Oxbridge” (23). The emphasis of this new 
discipline “was on solidarity between the social classes, the cultivation of ‘larger sympathies,’ 
the instillation of national pride and the transmission of ‘moral’ values” (23). What this 
curriculum included was not only Shakespeare and poetry, but, for the first time, the 
contemporary novel—written in a vernacular that was readily accessible to people of all 
backgrounds and prior levels of education.  
The novel was now deemed an item worthy of academic study, and not just a form of 
cheap entertainment. It was this new form of education that made its way through the poorest 
mining towns of England, which is how D.H. Lawrence was given the opportunity to read and 
study the novel before writing his own. By the time he wrote Lady Chatterley’s Lover in 1928, 
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the study of English Language and Literature had not only made its way into Oxford and 
Cambridge, but became “the most central subject of all,” as students and professors increasingly 
saw in this subject the receptacle of culture and critique in a world that was eroding it with 
destructive forces (28).  
Nabokov, who had emigrated from Russia as a result of the Revolution and enrolled at 
Trinity College in Cambridge to study zoology in 1919, ended up switching tracks to study 
Slavic and Romance Languages, graduating with his B.A. in 1922. This year was “the dividing 
line in literary history” (Goldstein 1). It was the year that saw the publication of Ulysses, Jacob’s 
Room, Aaron’s Rod, and Siddhartha. Proust had just died that year, too, having transformed the 
novel, and consciousness with it, into a seismograph of modernity, already available to English 
readers with C.K. Scott Moncrieff’s translation. All eyes were on the novel at this time—in 
addition, of course, to The Waste Land—and Nabokov, by virtue of being in Cambridge at this 
time, was at the epicenter of the novel’s newly found attention, which in turn later informed his 
own fiction. Although he insisted that he spent his Cambridge days playing football and writing 
Russian verse, he wasn’t immune to the grip that the novel had on everyone there (Strong 
Opinions 70). He may have massaged the truth about his “first real contact with Ulysses” in the 
1930s, when he deemed himself “immune to any literary influence,” because he admits, 
elsewhere, that his “first brief contact with Ulysses was around 1920 at Cambridge University, 
when a friend, Peter Mrozovski, who had brought a copy from Paris, chanced to read to me, as 
he stomped up and down my digs, one or two spicy passages from Molly’s monologue…” (71; 
102-3).  
This was also around the time when Woolf, despite her snobbery and classism, was 
writing The Common Reader—the first edition published in 1925, and the second in 1932. This 
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is a selection of brief essays introducing readers, with an engaging tone and breezy style, to some 
of the masterpieces in European (not just English) literature—without any condescension or 
scholarly jargon. The essays cover Chaucer and Elizabethan drama, but they overwhelmingly 
come back to the novel, from Defoe and Austen to the Brontës and George Eliot, and even going 
all the way up to Joseph Conrad, who had just died a year before the first edition of The Common 
Reader was published. Woolf saw herself as actively participating in the public life of England 
as an informal educator, much like Socrates in Athens. And, like the Socrates of Symposium, she 
imagines The Common Reader itself as a kind of “tea-table training,” inviting her common 
readers over to relax, eat, and drink, which is a more natural setting to discuss literature than in 
the formal classroom (qtd. in Common Reader xiii): 
I see myself handing plates of buns to shy young men and asking them, not directly and 
simply about their poems and their novels, but whether they like cream as well as sugar… 
[This] surface manner allows one to say a great many things which would be inaudible if 
one marched straight up and spoke out. (xiii) 
Woolf was writing The Common Reader while working on To the Lighthouse, which may 
explain why Plato’s Symposium suffuses the entire work. In her essay “Notes on an Elizabethan 
Play,” for example, she writes: 
For we are apt to forget… how great a power the body of literature possesses to impose 
itself: how it will not suffer itself to be read passively, but takes us and reads us; flouts 
our preconceptions; questions principles which we had got into the habit of taking for 
granted, and, in fact, splits us into two parts as we read, making us, even as we enjoy, 
yield our ground or stick to our guns. (48) 
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If we read correctly, we allow the body of literature to read us. And when this body reads us, it is 
as though this body “splits” our own “into two parts as we read.” How do we learn to read 
correctly? In the casual company of a great mentor, of a Socrates or a Woolf, invited over either 
to nurse a hangover as many of the interlocutors do in the Symposium—or, more modestly, to 
drink tea. And through this training, we learn how to change our reading habits from the passive 
to the passionate. And in this passionate mode, we learn how to question “principles which we 
had got into the habit of taking for granted.” Woolf, Lawrence, and Nabokov all approach the 
novel in this way: as a form of education, as a form of critique, and as a form of eros. For us 
common readers, Woolf ignites our eros for the novel just as much as Socrates ignites his 
common listeners’ eros for philosophy. 
The study of the novel, then, arises out of an emancipatory effort that recognizes the need 
for everyone, of all strata of society, to have a right to leisure. And in this leisure, freed from the 
constraints of the workplace, one could participate in the life of the mind, independent of 
capitalist forces. It is this sphere where one is most human. The academic collusion with Big 
Business, however, represents the opposite tendency: people must work as much as possible so 
that most of their time is swallowed up by labor, leaving them little time or space for thoughtful 
reflection, which could breed critique—and, by extension, retaliatory political action. A society 
governed by Big Business treats the subject of literature as a frivolous luxury rather than a 
central social principle to be explored in ludic freedom.  
Both the study of the novel (with its origins in class solidarity) and the study of business 
management (with its origins in running plantations on slavery) represent opposite poles of what 
it means to be human, and the history of the modern university is the history of a hijacking to the 
latter, leaving the study of the human—the humanities—in the precarious state it is in today. Just 
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the absurd notion that one must answer to Big Business in order to justify the study of the 
humanities is itself the problem. For centuries, we have seen the case for poetry made by some of 
the greatest minds, like Sidney and Shelley, naming their tracts as an “Apology” or a “Defense.” 
Maybe what’s needed for the novel, instead, is the genre of the attack, the offense, the venomous 
insult aimed at anyone who dismisses it. This is the instinct that the Marquis de Sade acts on 
when he answers the utilitarian question, “Of what use are novels?” His exasperated, irate 
answer is worth quoting at length, and ought to be emblazoned on the entrance of every 
Provost’s office in every university as a reminder of what values the university is here to defend: 
Of what use, indeed! hypocritical and perverse men, for you alone ask this ridiculous 
question: they are useful in portraying you as you are, proud creatures who wish to elude 
the painter’s brush, since you fear the results, for the novel is… the representation of 
secular customs, and is therefore, for the philosopher who wishes to understand man, as 
essential as is the knowledge of history. For the etching needle of history only depicts 
man when he reveals himself publicly, and then ‘tis no longer he: ambition, pride cover 
his brow with a mask which portrays for us naught but these two passions, and not the 
man. The novelist’s brush, on the contrary, portrays from within… seizes him when he 
drops this mask, and the description, which is far more interesting, is at the same time 
more faithful. This, then, is the usefulness of novels, O you cold censors who dislike the 
novel… (“Reflections on the Novel” 109-110) 
In Lolita, Nabokov’s own sadistic novel of masks, the scene at Beardsley—where headmistress 
Pratt explains the optimistic school philosophy as “turn[ing] our backs to the fog and squarely 
fac[ing] the sunshine”—must have struck its initial readers as obviously a moment of absurd 
humor. This is a school that has gotten rid of “irrelevant topics” like Shakespeare from its 
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curriculum, for a “financially remunerative modern touch” (178). What is unsettling is that this is 
exactly the direction that education is heading in today.148 An optimistic rhetoric of progress, 
armed with the newest technology, joins the forces of Big Business and Big Data to eviscerate 
the humanities. Soon a degree in English Literature will be interchangeable with a degree in Data 
Analysis, and gone will be the days when you could just show up to class with a book and 
discuss it in depth, without any digital gadgets or distractions or log-ins to accounts of companies 
that sell your private information. This is the result of having to answer to Big Business. 
Prefacing university budget requirements with Marquis de Sade’s statement on the role of the 
novel is not as absurd as seeing the humanities gradually slip into the reductive practice of data 
analysis, which is becoming aggressively in vogue.  
 
The Novel as a Site of Resistance: Lawrence and Melville 
The novel, especially the ones explored here by Woolf, Lawrence, and Nabokov, is a 
space where education and eros intersect. But Big Business has hijacked the rhetoric of love, as 
well, exploiting its terminology to sell the myth of happiness for profit. At the far corner of the 
Comparative Literature lounge, where the hall meets a dead end, the window overlooking 34th St. 
shows the building opposite, which for years bore the infuriating banner with the following 
imperative, scrawled out like a threat: “Do What You Love.” It was an advertisement for 
WeWork, a company that recently laid off 20% of its staff, while the CEO Adam Neumann 
 
148 “…the British Columbia Ministry of Education clearly stated in 2008 that the ideal students of today were those 
who possess ‘management and organizational skills… and market [their] skills and abilities in the same way as 
[they] would a business” (qtd. in Cabanas and Ilouz 74-75). Cabanas and Illouz cite a number of different “positive 
education” initiatives across North America and Europe that cut the humanities for the sake of business skills and 
anything else that involve data rather than critical thinking (74-80). 
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walked away with roughly $1 billion (Eavis, The New York Times). One must “love” working at 
an underpaid job that could let you go at a moment’s notice. This is the pursuit of happiness.  
It is against this hijacked rhetoric of passion, co-opted by the corporate workplace, that 
the novels of D.H. Lawrence acquire a new sense of urgency today. In Lady Chatterley’s Lover, 
we see what a resuscitation of passion actually looks like, and how it represents a force that 
shields the lovers from “that outside Thing that sparkled viciously in the electric lights,” that 
monolith of industrial capitalism, reducing humans to machines (120). In their pessimism, 
though, the lovers know that this shield will not last long. But there is the recognition of a private 
humanity governed by eros struggling against the forces of dehumanization. The corporate use of 
the word “passion” is fundamentally dehumanizing; reading Lawrence today wrests the word 
from the corporate and restores it to the corporeal, breathing new life into the word, but a new 
life that is also actually ancient and medieval, conjuring up the spirits of the Tristan lovers. As 
the narrator remarks, it is not just passion in this specific novel, but passion in the novel at large, 
which, “properly handled, can reveal the most secret places of life: for it is in the passional 
secret places of life, above all, that the tide of sensitive awareness needs to ebb and flow…” 
(101).  
In a world where social media and corporate interests like the Big Data firm Acxiom, 
which promises clients a “360-degree customer view” of nearly 300 million U.S. citizens—
officially knowing more about our daily lives than the FBI, to which it sells its information—any 
sense of, or right to, our own individual interiority, feels like an impossibility (Psychopolitics 56; 
65). But Lawrence carves out this space for us. The novel is one of the last vestiges of interiority 
that we have left. Erich Fromm notes how the “emphasis on team spirit, mutual tolerance and so 
forth,” which are part of the propaganda of Big Business, “is a relatively recent development. It 
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was preceded, in the years after the First World War, by a concept of love in which mutual 
sexual satisfaction was supposed to be the basis for satisfactory love relations…” (69). Lawrence 
was a key proponent in this specific concept and context of love—a love that is intolerant of 
what Big Business stands for, a love that rejects “team spirit” for private passion.  
While rediscovering passion, both of the body and of the novel, can be one form of 
resisting the neoliberal pillaging of this word, another response of resistance could be its exact 
opposite. If employers or other figures of authority demand passion, one way of defending one’s 
sense of interiority is to express passionlessness. This is the stance of Bartleby, who belongs to a 
work that can be regarded as a failed novel, nowhere near the length of Moby-Dick, which 
Melville had just published, and which had received mild to terrible reviews. While there was so 
much to say about Captain Ahab, hundreds of pages documenting this man passionate to the 
point of obsession, the narrator of Bartleby laments that “no materials exist for a full and 
satisfactory biography of this man. It is an irreparable loss to literature” (4). The pessimistic 
work itself is already announced as a loss, as something incomplete, as a biography or a novel 
that never was. And in this ghost of a novel, Bartleby is also described as a “ghost” and an 
“apparition” (15-16). As if he were all that remained of Melville’s broken spirit after the poor 
reception of Moby-Dick, Bartleby is described as “alone, absolutely alone in the universe. A bit 
of wreck in the mid-Atlantic” (22).149  
In Moby-Dick, Ishmael marvels at the austerity of the whale, asking, “what has the whale 
to say? Seldom have I known any profound being that had anything to say to this world, unless 
forced to stammer out something by way of getting a living. Oh! happy that the world is such an 
 
149 In 1851, while still working on Moby-Dick, Melville wrote to Nathaniel Hawthorne, who was enjoying 
significantly greater success as a writer despite the fact that his work is far inferior to Melville’s, “My dear Sir, a 
presentiment is on me, —I shall at last be worn and perish. […] What I feel most moved to write, that is banned, —it 
will not pay. Yet, altogether, write the other way I cannot” (qtd. in Leo Marx 239). 
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excellent listener!” (538). The world of Bartleby, though, is not quite so happy, and is not an 
excellent listener. It doesn’t even know how to listen to Bartleby, perhaps this reincarnation of 
the sublime, “profound being,” whose reticence itself is a sign of his profundity. But he is 
someone “forced to stammer out something by way of getting a living.” So he applies for a job 
as a scrivener, or law-copyist, spending all day transcribing dense, dull, legal prose that is not 
even his own. His employer, the narrator, makes an implicit comparison between Bartleby and 
the archetype of Romantic poetry and passion, writing, “…I cannot credit that the mettlesome 
poet Byron would have contentedly sat down with Bartleby to examine a law document of, say, 
five hundred pages, closely written in a crimped hand” (10). Maybe Bartleby—like Melville 
himself—was thrown into a world that could not recognize his talents; maybe a Byron was 
lurking inside him, but could not be noticed by the Wall Street bureaucrats he has to work for. 
Walled in by Wall Street, Bartleby—all that remains of the profound vision of the White 
Whale—is rendered inert, staring at a white wall. 
Melville attacks optimism and happiness for its cruel, dismissive stance toward suffering: 
“…happiness courts the light, so we deem the world is gay; but misery hides aloof, so we deem 
that misery there is none” (18). Bartleby, always aloof, finally comes to the point where he says 
hardly anything else except for, “I would prefer not to” (11). This is the only autonomy he can 
win for himself, embodying Han’s principle of Nicht-Können-Können [“Being able to not be 
able”] (Agony of Eros 11). By showing up to work and not doing it, but just staring straight at the 
wall in front of him, he exposes the uselessness and utter meaninglessness of this drudgery, this 
ritual business and busy-ness of capitalism, of what boils down to what Agamben would call 
“bare life,” or what Heidegger wrote in his letter to his wife about eros, “mere work.” Bartleby is 
the opposite of a D.H. Lawrence character. Whatever passion he may have never rises to the 
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level of expression. Instead of radical passion, resistance here takes on the form of radical 
passivity.  
Here we see Bartleby as an unlikely relative of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, emptied out of 
all exuberance and sermonizing, but still abiding by Zarathustra’s contempt for the life of hectic 
work that is somehow supposed to fill the gap of meaninglessness in existence: 
All of you who are in love with hectic work and whatever is fast, new, strange—you find 
it hard to bear yourselves, your diligence is escape and the will to forget yourself. If you 
believed more in life, you would hurl yourself less into the moment. But you do not have 
enough content in yourselves for waiting—not even for laziness! (Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra 32) 
All the self-help nonsense about “living in the moment” shatters to pieces in light of Zarathustra 
and Bartleby. But Bartleby’s autonomy, in Melville’s pessimistic vision, is hardly a consolation, 
and is ultimately stripped away when he is thrown into prison. The fact that he does not fit into 
the capitalist order of things, the fact that he does not value optimism or productivity or work for 
the sake of work, makes him a criminal. In the final, puzzling line, the narrator cries out, “Ah 
Bartleby! Ah humanity!” (34). Here is the pessimistic realization that humanity itself dies with 
Bartleby, and with people like him. There is no humanity to be found in the optimistic insistence 
on labor and drudgery, on profits and workplace dynamics. These dynamics are what kill 
humanity, which is why Leo Marx reads this as a parable not only of Wall Street, but of the walls 
that Wall Street represents, “the walls which hem in the meditative artist and for that matter 
every reflective man” (241). Life in a world run by Wall Street is reduced to a choice between 
“submission”—a word used like a leitmotif by Bartleby’s co-workers, Nippers, Turkey, and 
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Ginger-Nut (their nicknames also indicative of consumption under capitalism)—and a stance of 
“I would prefer not to,” which eventually leads to prison.      
 
“Nonsense Upon Stilts”: Bentham’s Ideology of Happiness and His Assault on Narrative 
Despite the Civil War, slavery hasn’t gone away. During the transatlantic slave trade, 13 
million people were captured and sold as slaves between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Today, the UN International Labor Organization estimates that 40.3 million people are living 
under slavery, often euphemistically referred to as “human trafficking” (Hodal, The Guardian). 
Slavery, if anything, has become more and more lucrative over the centuries, and is central to the 
functioning of global capital. It is hardly a coincidence that the governments and private interests 
that perpetuate the rise of slavery are the same ones that are the most aggressive in their 
discourse of happiness as a matter of policy: 
…countries characterized by widespread poverty, constant human rights violations, and 
high rates of malnutrition, infant mortality and suicide, such as the United Arab Emirates 
and India, have resolved to adopt happiness measures to assess the impact of their 
national policies. In 2014, the prime minster and ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin 
Rashid al-Maktoum, ordered the installation of several touchscreens around the city to 
retrieve real-time feedback on people’s satisfaction with the aim of constructing the 
‘happiest city in the world’. Following this measure, in 2016 there was announced the 
most far-reaching government reorganization in the country’s forty-four-year history, 
which included, as a star measure, the opening of a ‘Ministry of Happiness’ to create 
‘social good and satisfaction.’ (Cabanas and Illouz 45) 
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Dubai also happens to be a human trafficking hub (Noueihed, Reuters). The 2019 Human Rights 
Watch World Report has documented its “sustained assault on freedom of expression and 
association,” in addition to its dismal labor laws, discrimination on the basis of sex and gender, 
sexual orientation, and permission by law of domestic violence. Its Minister of Happiness, 
Ohood Al Roumi, told CNN that the role of the country was “to create an environment where 
people can flourish—can reach their potential—and choose to be happy” (qtd. in Cabanas and 
Illouz 45). There’s not much of a choice, though, when choice itself is stripped away, and when 
subversive expression is punished. Those who can ostensibly “choose” to be happy are the ones 
wealthy and lucky enough to live outside of slavery or exploitation while benefitting from it.  
This rhetoric of “choosing” to be happy, instead of seeing happiness as what its term 
originally meant—as something that just happens—is endemic to the global politics of 
conservatism as a way of deflecting “attention from more objective and complex socio-economic 
indicators of welfare and the good life, such as redistribution of income, material inequalities, 
social segregation, gender inequality, democratic health, corruption and transparency, [and] 
objective vs. perceived opportunities…” (44). The conservatives David Cameron and Nicholas 
Sarkozy also “ordered their respective national statistics bureau to start gathering information on 
people’s happiness. The idea was to introduce the concept of Gross Happiness Product (GHP) as 
an indicator that went beyond Gross National Product (GNP)…” (35). These conservative 
practices are bolstered by so-called “research” such as a report published in a 2017 issue of 
Social Science Research, in which social scientists like Jonathan Kelley and M.D.R. Evans can 
actually get away with writing, “In developing countries, inequality if anything increases 
happiness. This suggests that current efforts by such agencies as the World Bank directed 
towards reducing income inequality are potentially harmful to the well-being of the citizens of 
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poor countries” (35). The discourse of happiness, or the pursuit of happiness, allows 
governments to place the blame of its predatory policies on its own citizens (or subjects), 
insisting that individuals ought to turn critique inwards to themselves in order to find happiness 
instead of critiquing the government for systemic failures that threaten their livelihoods, if not 
their lives. 
This inversion, or perversion, of critique is what serves as the ideological basis of the 
“happiness industry,” a confluence of economic, medical, and political interventions that violate 
individual autonomy in the name of happiness, well-being, and positivity (Davies 11). In Eros 
and Civilization, Herbert Marcuse notes how this industry “alters the contents of happiness” 
itself so that the  
individual does not really know what is going on; the overpowering machine of education 
and entertainment unites him with all the others in a state of anaesthesia from which all 
detrimental ideas tend to be excluded. And since knowledge of the whole truth is hardly 
conducive to happiness, such general anaesthesia makes individuals happy. (103-4) 
Against the anaesthetic is the aesthetic; against the political imperatives of happiness and 
optimism is the novel as a site of pessimism. Whereas the happiness industry operates by 
inspection, the novel provides a space for introspection. As the English translator of Foucault 
notes in Discipline and Punish, “Jeremy Bentham used the term ‘inspect’—which Foucault 
translates as ‘surveiller’ in the French title Surveillir et punir” (1). Introspection is done by the 
subject on itself; inspection is done by another as an act of subjection and subjugation. Foucault 
identifies Bentham’s vision of the Panopticon as a key shift in our understanding of modern 
subjectivity. “Modernity,” to Foucault, “is characterized by a shift in penal justice” (7). We 
 409 
cannot understand who we are as modern subjects without understanding the rise of modern 
technologies in surveillance and punishment. 
To Nancy Armstrong, “the history of the novel and the history of the modern subject are, 
quite literally, one and the same” (3). Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, then, can be read as a 
parallel history of the novel. In describing Bentham’s Panopticon, he notes how a “real 
subjection is born mechanically from a fictitious relation,” and how the Panopticon itself was a 
“way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men” (205). It works in a 
“diffused, multiple, polyvalent way throughout the whole social body” as though performing a 
Bakhtinian kind of heteroglossia (208-9). Modernity is characterized by the minute attention that 
surveillance is given to the lives of its subjects in average everydayness, which is why the novel 
best captures this experience. As psychiatry rose as a discipline to enforce punishment and 
docility, it also engaged a new form of writing: “For a long time ordinary individuality—the 
everyday individuality of everybody—remained below the threshold of description. To be looked 
at, observed, described in detail, followed from day to day by an uninterrupted writing was a 
privilege” (191). And finally Foucault explicitly makes the connection between the history of 
modern punishment and the rise of the novel himself:  
…the normal took over from the ancestral, and measurement from status, thus 
substituting for the individuality of the memorable man that of the calculable man, that 
moment when the sciences of man became possible is the moment when a new 
technology of power and a new political anatomy of the body were implemented. And if 
from the early Middle Ages to the present day the ‘adventure’ is an account of 
individuality, the passage from the epic to the novel, from the noble deed to the secret 
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singularity, from long exiles to the internal search for childhood, from combats to 
phantasies, it is also inscribed in the formation of a disciplinary society. (193) 
 In Chapter 1, we have already seen how the rise of anatomy intersects with the criminal 
biography to give us the modern novel, a genre that both reflects and resists new forms of 
authority. Bacon used the modern innovations of anatomy as a metaphor for his project in The 
New Organon, a project that optimistically aimed to encompass all knowledge and “remov[e]… 
despair” through scientific methods and machinery, inaugurating the tradition that Bentham 
would later inherit (Bacon CVIII, 100).  
Anatomy also gave rise to the practice of orthopedics, which was crucial especially to the 
military, seeking new ways to extract more service even from its maimed soldiers, but it also had 
ramifications that led to the identification of civilians as soldier-like in their docility to authority. 
A “body viewed as a replaceable part of a military unit, and itself composed of replaceable parts, 
not only intensified the dehumanization of soldiers, but also revealed the meaning of the human 
itself as constructed by authority” (Engelstein 17). The body then becomes the site of a debate 
between nature and artifice, between instinct and conditioning, and how these categories can be 
exploited by the state and the market.  
Anatomy originated largely from the search to locate the organ of the soul, and new 
technological advances “inaugurated an epistemological optimism that raised hopes for medical 
cures as well as for the legibility of intention and character on the body” (18). It was the novel as 
a genre, though, that responded to such optimism with critique—and even pessimism. Goethe, a 
natural scientist in his own right, “acknowledges the unique critical power of literature by 
situating his most potent commentary on natural history neither in a work of natural history nor 
in an examination of methodology, but in a novel” (8). The novel in question is Elective 
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Affinities, a work that frustrates any reader’s attempt to impose on it any kind of systematic 
meaning. Stefani Engelstein reads it as “much more pessimistic about the possibility of arriving 
at knowledge or self-knowledge, than the naturalist works in which Goethe recommended this 
approach” (16). The novel demonstrates how “natural history proceeds only through motivated, 
mediated, and biased interpretations of phenomena” (24).  
Mary Shelley was another novelist who responded vehemently against the “optimistic 
image that… renders nature transparent and gives humans both benevolent passions and superior 
judgment, which facilitate their ability to decipher the world” (188). She adds a “more 
pessimistic note to the congratulatory atmosphere that credits an anthropomorphized Nature with 
a grand and useful design” (188). In writing Frankenstein, she takes aim particularly at the 
French materialist Constantin François Volney, whose Ruins of Empires of 1796 is one of the 
books that the Creature reads to educate himself about the cruel humanity that shuns him. Volney 
advocates for self-love and happiness as a natural law, but Shelley exposes how self-love leads to 
narcissism and a lack of empathy for others. The Creature is driven to violence only because he 
is judged and excluded so harshly on the basis of his appearance.  
The legibility of the body for signs of criminality is the impetus for modern practices of 
punishment, from Bentham’s fantasy of the Panopticon to the photographic genre of mug shots. 
In The Novel and the Police, D.A. Miller sees the “novelistic techniques of ‘panoptic narration’ 
[as] normaliz[ing] a sophisticated process of surveillance with which the reader is made 
complicit,” and Gérard Genette also speaks of “an omniscient narrator, capable like God himself 
of seeing beyond actions and of sounding body and soul” (Ong 31; Miller 24: Genette 209). Both 
of these views echo Ian Watt, who compares characters’ minds to their domestic spaces, 
allowing the reader to survey the contents of both (Ong 31; Watt 175). But Ong cites other 
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critics, like Jonathan Culler and Ann Banfield, who disagree with this thesis (32). To Culler, this 
is just “a fantasy of omniscience, which… oppresses at the same time that it obfuscates the 
narrative effects that lead us to posit it” (Culler 201).  
By the time we get to Lolita, even the first-person narrator aspires but fails to achieve 
omniscient narration, laying bare the blind spots of so-called “panoptic narration.” In Fathers 
and Sons, the narrator—who, for lack of a better word, is “omniscient”—hardly presumes to 
know what’s going on in Bazarov’s mind, writing, “God knows where his thoughts wandered,” 
and instead just describes the “expression on his face,” which “was intense and gloomy” 
(Turgenev 14). One could even argue that in novels like The Portrait of a Lady, Isabel Archer 
resists the novelist’s narration of key moments in her life; we never see her being told of her 
inheritance, we never see the proposal scene and the terms on which her marriage is agreed, and 
we never see the death of her child. James thematizes power itself on the level of the narrative, a 
power that even an omniscient narrator has no access to. Bartleby, too, is a work that 
fundamentally could not be told by any kind of omniscient narrator, which is why Melville 
narrates it from the first-person voice of Bartleby’s former employer. The text revolves around 
Bartleby’s inaccessible interiority, the one space he has left for himself in a world walled up by 
Wall Street.  
If anything, we can read the novel as a site of resistance against panopticism. Bentham, 
the “Enlightenment optimist and modernizer” responsible for the panopticon, hated descriptive 
language just as much as he hated the idea of human rights (Davies 14). “Natural rights is simple 
nonsense,” he wrote, “…natural and imprescriptable rights, rhetorical nonsense—nonsense upon 
stilts” (qtd. in Davies 17). The problem of politics, in his mind, was that it was built on such 
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stilts, and it dwelled too much in what he called “the tyranny of sounds”—description, 
abstraction, metaphysics, rhetoric.  
He inherited this distrust of language from Bacon, who wrote in his New Organon that, 
words have “rendered philosophy and the sciences sophistical and inactive” (LIX 56). Words for 
Bacon “stand in the way,” and “even definitions cannot cure this evil in dealing with natural and 
material things, since the definitions consist of words, and those words beget others” (LIX 56-
57). This is the problem with all prior philosophy to him, beginning with Aristotle, which has 
been a practice that can only ever “affirm something positive in words, than about the inner truth 
of things” (LXIII 60). The problem with words, specifically, is that they have too much of an 
ambiguously wide semantic field of possible meaning, and “will not bear to be reduced to any 
constant meaning” (LX 57). Language is fundamentally too ambiguous, too zweideutig, to be the 
proper conduit for either knowledge or happiness. Bacon’s project, ironically through language 
itself, is to liberate “human thought” from the “bondslave of words” (LXIX 66-67). But Bentham 
goes further, wanting to establish a politics that would do away with all of that altogether, a 
politics that would replace language with science. He therefore is the “inventor of what has since 
come to be known as ‘evidence-based policy-making,’ the idea that government interventions 
can be cleansed of any moral or ideological principles, and be guided purely by facts and 
figures” (Davies 17). It is because of Bentham that a policy is either proposed or eliminated 
based on a cost-benefit analysis (17).  
Charles Dickens, who used the novel as a way to leverage critique against the status quo, 
satirizes Bentham and his data-fetishist followers in his novel Hard Times, which begins with 
Superintendent Thomas Gradgrind insisting that: 
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Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are 
wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else. You can only form the 
minds of reasoning animals upon Facts: nothing else will ever be of any service to them. 
This is the principle on which I bring up my own children, and this is the principle on 
which I bring up these children. Stick to Facts, sir! (9) 
In response to this command, the “speaker, and the schoolmaster, and the third grown person 
present, all backed up a little, and swept with their eyes the inclined plane of little vessels then 
and there arranged in order, ready to have imperial gallons of facts poured into them…” (10). 
What Dickens exposes about Bentham is that there is no room for the human in utilitarian 
philosophy. Humans are either “reasoning animals” or “vessels” who view “facts” as 
ideologically neutral: “What is called Taste, is only another name for Fact” (15). It makes sense 
for someone who espouses this philosophy to be such a disciplinarian. Even Gradgrind’s face is 
described as “utilitarian, matter-of-fact” (120). Dickens often slips into sentimental territory, but 
he satirically nails the Benthamite spirit when Gradgrind only accepts, as a definition of a horse, 
the following answer from one of his pupils: “Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely 
twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy 
countries, sheds hoofs, too. Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with iron” (13).  
In addition to Louisa and Thomas, Gradgrind has three other children, one of whom is 
named Adam Smith, and the other Malthus, named after the thinkers who, along with Bentham, 
privileged data and statistics over any other form of knowledge. He walks Louisa through the 
“statistics of marriage, so far as they have yet been obtained, in England and Wales” of age 
disparity between partners when suggesting that Louisa marry Bounderby (119). As though 
writing in response to Gradgrind, Bentham, and his like, Nietzsche exclaims in frustration, “And 
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way up at the top, where the great minds are, you no longer can make any calculations at all: 
when, for example, have great artists ever gotten married! You are hopeless, you who want to 
discover a law in this” (Unpublished Writings 208).  
It is from the viewpoint of the novel that Benthamite philosophy comes into relief, 
exposed for the ridiculous, reductive, and damaging tenets that it upholds. We see iterations of 
Thomas Gradgrind reincarnated through the history of the novel after Bentham, leading up to 
Woolf’s gently mocking portrait of Mr. Ramsay as someone who sternly believes that everyone 
“should be aware from childhood that life is difficult; facts uncompromising…” (8). We also see 
this figure in Dr. Sloper from Henry James’s Washington Square, who “cares for nothing but 
facts; he must be met by facts!” (89). Dr. Sloper, armed with facts, prides himself on “dividing 
people into classes, into types” (78). Perhaps this is why his own daughter Catherine is the 
source of so much frustration, because he cannot quite classify her. He hardly even knows who 
she is, from his scientific perspective. He speaks of his convictions as “geometrical 
propositions,” and says that, “Catherine and her young man are my surfaces; I have taken their 
measure” (115). Just as Gradgrind stands for “the necessity of infinite grinding at the mill of 
knowledge,” in Dr. Sloper’s name we can discern his perspective as one that looks down the 
slope of his geometric scheme from his wealthy position to condescend to Morris Townsend and 
to keep his daughter under control (Dickens 71).  
The issue is that Catherine resists this control with a passivity that aligns her with 
Bartleby. No one quite knows how to read her, or how to access her interiority. Like Bartleby, 
she also appears as a “ghost,” and maybe even the opposite of a ghost: “…though you are still 
here in body, you are already absent in spirit” (99; 176). Whether she is described as a spirit with 
no body or a body with no spirit, she is not fully realized or imagined; there is a vacuous space of 
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character that all the surrounding characters struggle to fill in and control, but are unable to do 
so. She is therefore a “disappointment” to her father, who thinks that she is “about as intelligent 
as the bundle of shawls,” but her intelligence may reside precisely in the fact that she is able to 
elude his scientific scrutiny (5; 131). Who she is as a person cannot be measured, counted, and 
accounted for. It can only be recounted. When her suitor Morris Townsend tells Dr. Sloper that 
she “seems to me quite her own mistress,” he responds, “Literally, she is” (65).  
What Dickens, James, and Woolf demonstrate, in the wake of Benthamism, is what 
Melville and Lawrence also engage in their treatment of the novel. The novel is a space that turns 
Bentham on his head; data and facts are extraneous to narrative, to meaning, to humanity. 
Anyone who subscribes to utilitarianism in the novel is seen as woefully comical in their limited 
pursuit of a highly specified and inconsequential kind of knowledge. Even a sympathetically 
sketched character like Bazarov in Fathers and Sons cannot sustain the curious combination of 
nihilism and positivism throughout the entire novel. When visiting his friend Arkady’s home, he 
arrogantly tells Arkady’s father, Pavel Petrovich, “We act on the basis of what we recognize as 
useful” (Turgenev 38). But all of his fetishism of utility and his scientific experiments do not 
bring him any closer to knowledge than his frustrated experience of eros, which de-stabilizes and 
dissolves his rigid ideological beliefs, as though eros itself were performing an anatomy of his 
soul, however much he wants to ignore it by performing his own anatomy of the body, carrying 
out an autopsy on a corpse without taking proper precaution, and contracting typhus as a result. 
This most nihilistic and utilitarian character dies with a “passionate, sinful, rebellious… heart” 
(157). This is the same passion that G.H. eventually realizes in her disavowal of facts for 
something else: “G.H. had lived a good bit, by which I mean, had lived many facts. Perhaps I 
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was in some kind of rush to live everything there was to live all at once so I’d have time left over 
to… to live without facts? to live… and be free to go in search of my tragedy” (Lispector 17).   
The pessimism comes in, however, because the world largely adopted by Bentham’s 
philosophy renders the novel inconsequential. As Adorno lamented, “Anything that is not reified, 
cannot be counted and measured, ceases to exist” (Minima Moralia 47). A figure whom Bentham 
influenced greatly was the mechanical engineer Frederick Winslow Taylor, the world’s first 
management consultant. Born into wealth, he never had to work under toil, but he enjoyed 
watching and inspecting others who did, measuring their accuracy and efficiency of output 
(Davies 117). He “broke production down into individual tasks to be logged and rationalized,” 
turning micromanagement into a nightmarish science of precision, and viewing laborers as 
nothing more than machines (118). This becomes central not only to the history of labor and 
management (establishing the foundation for notoriously ruthless consulting firms like 
McKinsey & Co., Accenture, and Price Waterhouse Cooper), but to the history of the novel. 
Yevgeny Zamyatin satirized Taylorism in the first dystopian novel of the twentieth century, 
We—which would later influence Brave New World and 1984. Set in the distant future, the 
protagonist D-503 writes of having to do his “Taylor exercises” before bed (Zamyatin 13). These 
Taylor exercises are supposed to lead to happiness—a “Taylorized happiness”—but, D-503 
admits, “Even we haven’t yet solved the problem of happiness with 100 percent accuracy” (44; 
13).  
The guiding principle of Bentham’s political philosophy was happiness, which he had 
learned from Bacon’s “new philosophy” of “the removing of despair and the raising of hope 
through the dismissal or rectification of the errors of past time.” To Bacon, “Truth… and utility 
are… the very same things” (CXXIV, 114). But he also took this utilitarian understanding of 
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truth and happiness from the English religious reformer and founder of the Unitarian Church, 
Joseph Priestley. Priestley had written that, “The good and happiness of the members, that is, the 
majority of the members, of any state, is the great standard by which everything relating to that 
state must finally be determined” (qtd. in Davies 13). This is the birth of utilitarianism, and in 
Bentham’s mind, all happiness could be reduced to the economy of pleasure and pain. The free 
market would be responsible for pleasure, and his proposal of the Panopticon prison, a circular 
structure in which every subject would be viewable at all times by a central tower, would address 
the pain of society. Instead of the “tyranny of sounds,” Bentham proposed an actual tyranny, 
something that Napoleon would fantasize about:  
[Napoleon] wished to arrange around him a mechanism of power that would enable him 
to see the smallest event that occurred in the state he governed; he intended, by means of 
the rigorous discipline that he imposed, ‘to embrace the whole of this vast machine 
without the slightest detail escaping his attention.’ (Discipline and Punish 141) 
This is the groundwork of totalitarianism, one that demands absolute docility, obedience, and 
happiness. Adorno recognized  
…a straight line of development between the gospel of happiness and the construction of 
camps of extermination so far off in Poland that each of our own countrymen can 
convince himself that he cannot hear the screams of pain. That is the model of an 
unhampered happiness. (Minima Moralia 63)  
Everything in Bentham’s totalitarian vision of happiness would be reduced to calculation and 
science; any nuance provided by description would be rendered superfluous. This is the 
fulfillment of Bacon’s Renaissance dream to guide the mind “at every step” away from despair, 
“and the business be done as if by machinery” (Bacon 33). Davies traces a frightening genealogy 
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of influence from Bentham through the history of economics, medicine, and politics, which all 
demonstrate a suspicion of language and narrative, favoring numerical figures instead. At the 
doctor’s office, you are given a scale of 1 to 10 to indicate pain—as though this scale were any 
more accurate than an attempt at describing one’s particular experience. Neuroscientists like 
Martin Lindstrom make careers out of the notion that “people lie, but brains don’t” (qtd. in 
Davies 32). Facial recognition software now detects smiles as an indicator of happiness (36). But 
how would it detect an axe-wielding Jack Nicholson smiling in The Shining? “Happiness 
science” has now emerged on the premise that happiness can be located in the brain, and that the 
nucleus accumbens is what triggers decisions to buy a product (67). 
What parades as cutting-edge science on this front is no more of an advance than those 
Renaissance barber-surgeons who were poking around the human anatomy in search of the soul. 
It would be comical if it didn’t have such sinister repercussions. “Why would anyone believe 
that, in our fundamental biological nature,” Davies asks, “we operate like accounting machines? 
The answer is simple: to rescue the discipline of economics and, with it, the moral authority of 
money” (67). This moral authority of money is a view popularized by the “Chicago School” of 
economics, which, like Bentham, viewed all human behavior through statistics instead of 
description, and believed that there is nothing morally wrong with hoarding as much wealth at 
the expense of other people’s survival (154). Money is equated with happiness, so more money 
would equal more happiness to whoever has it. Milton Friedman, who had advised Pinochet on 
economic matters, wrote in The New York Times that the single moral duty of a corporation is to 
make as much money as possible (159).  
Gary Becker, also of the Chicago School, came up with the term “human capital,” a 
“concept that has helped shape and justify the privatization of higher education through 
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demonstrating that individuals receive a monetary return from ‘investment’ in their skills” (151). 
The entire student loan crisis today can be traced back to this lie. For all their fetishization of 
“facts” and data, economists who are blinded by this ideology—the same economists influencing 
policy—ignore the overwhelming data that proves there is little monetary return from 
“investment” in skills today, but just the opposite. Our generation is worse off financially than 
the previous generation precisely because of student loans, but we are the ones to blame for this 
policy we had no hand in shaping. But this was the plan all along for these Chicago School 
economists. Education was never about equality or opportunity, but rather about solidifying class 
lines and rewarding the already wealthy by punishing the already poor. To the Chicago School, 
school itself is a Ponzi scheme. And as long as someone like Betsy DeVos is profiting from it, 
the scheme is justified in their eyes. 
This is not to mention the wider problem that money itself is a fictional entity, abiding by 
a made-up narrative authored every day on Wall Street and in government treasuries. The values 
that are arbitrarily and magically assigned to commodities, services, and any area of lived 
experience that could be exploited under neoliberalism is a fantasy that is rendered a reality only 
by the agreement of the wealthy in positions of power. But there is nothing natural about this 
value. The paradox of this Benthamite tradition is that it rejects language and novels as fiction, 
while scripting a fiction of its own, forcing the rest of us to live by its terms. The fictional “truth” 
expressed by money engages Nietzsche’s definition of truth, but in reverse: “Truths are illusions 
which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have 
been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as 
metal and no longer as coins” (Philosophy and Truth 84). The fiction of money is that we are 
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expected to treat it as coins rather than metal—and not even that anymore, but some kind of 
immaterial, digital fantasy of finance.  
“More diffusely,” Davies points out, the influence of this aggressive capitalist ideology 
peddled by the Chicago School, and specifically by Becker, “has been felt in an approach that 
reduces all moral and legal questions to problems of cost-benefit analysis” (151). This economic 
theory coincided with Ayn Rand’s novels, laying the groundwork for the Reagan administration 
that began the deregulation of corporations under Alan Greenspan, which in turn snowballed into 
the economic crisis of 2008, and from which hardly anyone has recovered except for the 
wealthy.  
As the Chicago School was taking off, and as Rand was gaining notoriety for her novels, 
pharmaceutical experiments in the 1950s led to the discovery of iproniazid, which had been 
trialed for tuberculosis, and imprimamine (162). The problem is that the researchers didn’t know 
exactly what these drugs could do, but they “simply seemed to make people feel more truly 
themselves, restoring their optimism about life in general” (162). The researchers decided to call 
these drugs “antidepressants” as a result, which were celebrated for their “alleged selectivity and 
their non-specificity” (163). To this day, “it remains the case that nobody has ever discovered 
precisely how or why they work, to the extent that they do” (166). What we do know is that a 
“drug that is selective immediately weakens the responsibility of the physician or psychiatrist to 
identify precisely what is wrong with a patient. It can therefore be prescribed in a non-specific 
way…” (165). 
Up until the discovery of these drugs, psychiatrists and psychologists had no interest in 
the idea of happiness (164). The focus instead was on relieving debilitating illness. Now, a 
simple lack of happiness could warrant a prescription for anti-depressants. At the same time that 
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pharmaceutical companies took an interest in these new drugs, the DSM-III (The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual for psychological disorders) contained 292 categories over 597 pages, as 
opposed to the DSM-II, which contained 180 categories over 134 pages (174). A symptom 
previously had to exist for one month to be diagnosed; now it was reduced to two weeks (174). 
“In the run up to the DSM-V, published in 2013, it was reported that the pharmaceutical industry 
was responsible for half of the APA’s $50 million budget, and that eight of the eleven-strong 
committee which advised on diagnostic criteria had links to pharmaceutical firms” (177).  
Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the practice of psychology in the United States is 
that it has 
…no philosophical heritage. It was born into a world of big business and rapid social 
change, which risked spiraling out of control. If it couldn’t offer to alleviate the problems 
that were afflicting American industry and society, then it had no reason to exist at all. 
That, at any rate, was the view expressed by leaders of the new league of universities, 
who were eager to please their corporate benefactors. (85) 150 
The roots of the practice of psychology in this country are in the so-called “behaviorism” 
theorized by an animal psychologist named John B. Watson, who gave an influential lecture on 
animal behavior at Columbia University in 1913, which led to his subsequent position of 
president of the American Psychological Association. “The remarkable thing is that by this stage 
he had never even studied a single human being” (87). By studying rats, he thought he had an 
 
150 Adorno writes, “Ready-made enlightenment turns not only spontaneous reflection but also analytical insights—
whose power equals the energy and suffering that it cost to gain them—into mass-produced articles, and the painful 
secrets of the individual history, which the orthodox method is already inclined to reduce to formulae, into 
commonplace conventions. Dispelling rationalizations becomes itself rationalization. […] Terror before the abyss of 
the self is removed by the consciousness of being concerned with nothing so very different from arthritis or sinus 
trouble. Thus conflicts lose their menace. They are accepted, but by no means cured, being merely fitted as an 
unavoidable component into the surface of standardized life. At the same time they are absorbed, as a general evil, 
by the mechanism directly identifying the individual with social authority…” (Minima Moralia 65). 
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accurate account of what happens with humans, a prejudice that still persists to this day. 
Moreover, Watson—like Bentham—had a fundamental distrust of language, and wrote that, 
“The reader will find no discussion of consciousness and no reference to such terms as sensation, 
perception, attention, will, image and the like. […] I frankly do not know what they mean” (qtd. 
in Davies 89).  
Psychology under Watson’s tenure was a discipline that reduced itself to numbers and 
statistics only. He wanted to observe a patient’s soul without having to bother with how they 
narrated their experience, dismissing this as unwanted “verbal behavior” (223). Nearly a century 
later, Martin Seligman, who was elected president of the APA in 1998, had arrived at a theory of 
“learned helplessness” by electrocuting dogs, and adapted both Watson’s prejudices and 
Branden’s aggressive style and narcissistic ideology to the movement of “positive psychology,” 
which essentially pathologizes negative thoughts in favor of optimism (165). Seligman attracted 
massive funds from Republican donors and millions from the Templeton Foundation, an 
organization aimed at putting “religion on an equal footing as science,” and which also gave 
Milton Friedman an award for his ruthlessly optimistic economic theories (Ehrenreich 166-8). 
Since Walter Benjamin diagnosed capitalism as a religious cult “that creates guilt, not 
atonement,” it makes perfect sense to trace the connections between religion, capital, Republican 
funds, and the aggressive ideology of positive thinking (“Capitalism as Religion” 281). John 
Templeton, whom the Foundation is named after, wrote in one of his self-help books: “Don’t 
think of ‘thought control’ as a repressive tool out of George Orwell’s 1984. Rather, think of it as 
a positive force that will leave your mind clearer, more directed, and more effective” (Templeton 
118). 
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Seligman doubles down on this religion of optimism as thought control, extrapolating 
from his dubious experiments on dogs the idea that we can train our minds into positive thinking 
regardless of circumstances, and publishing these findings in the Harvard Business Review, 
which in itself demonstrates how the practice of psychology is a thin veneer for the practice of 
business, guided by profits for the wealthy rather than help for the vulnerable (Cabanas and 
Illouz 163). And he couches his audacious claims in lazy attempts at an illusion of scientific 
rigor, boiling the equation of happiness down to “H=S+C+V,” in which H is “your enduring 
level of happiness, S is your set range, C is the circumstances of your life, and V represents 
factors under your voluntary control” (Ehrenreich 155). Why this equation is arranged as a 
formula of addition instead of some more complex mathematical relationship is never clarified. 
On top of this, and based on nothing, he maintains that “90 per cent of human happiness is 
attributable to individual and psychological factors” (Cabanas and Illouz 57). He has also spoken 
about his “learned helplessness” experiments with dogs at “one of the military’s SERE (Survival, 
Evasion, Resistance, Escape) schools, which were originally designed to help U.S. troops survive 
capture but changed their mission, post-9/11, to devising new forms of torture for suspected 
terrorists” (Ehrenreich 169). 
Ehrenreich sees the “real conservatism of positive psychology” in “its attachment to the 
status quo, with all its inequalities and abuses of power. Positive psychologists’ tests of 
happiness and well-being, for example, rest heavily on measures of personal contentment with 
things as they are” (170). Moreover, positive psychologists “dismiss changing circumstances 
instead of changing your attitude because changing circumstances is ‘impractical and 
expensive,’” an argument which “has of course been used against almost every progressive 
reform from the abolition of slavery to pay equality for women” (171). Based on this logic of 
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positive psychology and optimism, “Why advocate for better jobs and schools, safer 
neighborhoods, universal health insurance, or any other liberal desideratum if these measures 
will do little to make people happy?” (172).  
Optimism tells us instead to shut up and smile, peddling the ideology of gratitude while 
eroding our autonomy, our rights, our circumstances, and even our planet. Optimism and the 
neoliberal politics that enforce it render any kind of speaking up or speaking out superfluous in a 
world of their making, a world where narrative, language, and lived experience are washed away 
by numbers and data. In the legacy of Watson, Branden, and Seligman, here are the effects: 
In place of opinion-polling, sentiment-tracking companies such as General Sentiment 
scrape data from 60 million sources every day, to produce interpretations of what the 
public thinks. In place of users’ satisfaction surveys, public service providers and health-
care providers are analyzing social media sentiment for more conclusive evaluations. And 
in place of traditional market research, data analytics apparently reveals our deepest 
tastes and desires. (Davies 223) 
What we have here are competing accounts of average everydayness, but accounts that are 
reduced to accounting, while foregoing all accountability. It is laughable to think that experience 
can be communicated through numbers, through algorithms, through the binary of zeroes and 
ones, through metrics and analytics. None of these data-driven measurements can come close to 
the portrait of experience as it is articulated by the novel. It is on the grounds of the novel, 
between Ayn Rand and L. Ron Hubbard on one side, and writers like Goethe, Shelley, Dickens, 
James, Lawrence, and Zamyatin on the other, that the conflict between optimism and pessimism 
are dramatized. Even Erich Fromm, writing in 1956, resorts to the novel to provide an accurate 
account of lived experience:  
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Modern man is actually close to the picture Huxley describes in his Brave New World…: 
‘Everybody is happy nowadays.’ Man’s happiness today consists of ‘having fun.’ Having 
fun lies in the satisfaction of consuming and ‘taking in’ commodities, sights, food, drinks, 
cigarettes, people, lectures, books, movies—all are consumed, swallowed. The world is 
one great object for our appetite…: we are the sucklers, the eternally expectant ones, the 
hopeful ones—and the eternally disappointed ones. (The Art of Loving 69) 
We are “eternally disappointed” because of this false hope for happiness that neoliberalism has 
promised us, and the novel emerges not only as a site to articulate this eternal disappointment, 
but as a site of resistance against the Benthamite optimism that strives for a world governed 
purely by data alone, at the expense of language. Language is where meaning is made, where 
values are explored in their rich ambiguity and complexity that defy the reductionism of data. As 
Heidegger puts it, “…in thinking Being comes to language. Language is the house of Being” 
(“Letter on Humanism” 217). The swarms of data that are used to render language useless gnaw 
away at this house like termites. A world governed strictly by data is a world where one can no 
longer think—where one can no longer even be. “The widely and rapidly spreading devastation 
of language,” Heidegger writes, “not only undermines aesthetic and moral responsibility in every 
use of language; it arises from a threat to the essence of humanity” (222). 
And maybe here, as in Being and Time, we can see Heidegger engaging the role of the 
novel, despite his claim that we need “less literature, but more cultivation of the letter” (265). 
Literature is the cultivation of the letter. And when Heidegger writes that, “Homelessness is 
coming to be the destiny of the world”—in the context of a surprising nod to Marx, whose “view 
of history is superior to that of other historical accounts”—it is difficult not to hear echoes of that 
other Marxist, Lukács, who defines the novel as the expression of “transcendental homelessness” 
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(“Letter on Humanism” 243; Theory of the Novel 41).151 “Thinking,” for Heidegger, “does not 
overcome metaphysics by climbing still higher, surmounting it, transcending it somehow or 
other; thinking overcomes metaphysics by climbing back down into the nearness of the nearest” 
(254). What form of language captures the “nearness of the nearest” better than the prose of the 
novel? Heidegger may claim to have “overcome metaphysics,” with his dis-covery of 
fundamental ontology, but, as Kundera reminds us, what Heidegger calls fundamental 
ontology—the portrait of Dasein in its average everydayness, “de-distanced” [Ent-fernung] so 
that it is the nearest phenomenon to us—is what the novel had been practicing since Cervantes 
(Art of the Novel 5). The novel, as the guardian of Being, is the enemy of Big Data and the 
positivity and positivism it stands for. But it’s losing the fight.     
 
A Pedagogy of Pessimism 
 “‘We invented happiness,’ say the last men, and they blink” (Nietzsche 7). Thus spoke 
Zarathustra. In Malcolm Gladwell’s bestseller Blink, the nauseating subtitle of which is The 
Power of Thinking Without Thinking, he rehashes the positive psychology mantra of conditioning 
one’s mind to make good choices on the spur of the moment. Or something like that. He even 
cites a psychologist, à la Thomas Gradgrind, who can supposedly tell whether a marriage will 
last within minutes of meeting a couple. This is the kind of stupidity that our culture has sunk to, 
while fascism is on the rise again. The inventors of happiness, as Nietzsche saw it, may very well 
be the “last men,” the last inhabitants of this earth, blinking at the white light of nuclear 
annihilation or irreparable climate change. It seems almost silly to invoke the novel as a form of 
resistance to such catastrophic forces looming over the horizon. The fact that it may articulate a 
 
151 Gianni Vattimo writes that in Heidegger’s concept of anxiety, “things become unfamiliar, so that Dasein finds 
itself in a condition of homelessness” (70).  
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critique, or a rant, or an exposure of dire circumstances, may be a mild palliative in this 
dangerously optimistic culture that values happiness more than justice.  
In a 2008 issue of Wired, Chris Anderson gleefully proclaimed, in a way that seemed to 
ventriloquize the specter of Bentham haunting the whole world: 
Out with every theory of human behavior, from linguistics to sociology. Forget 
taxonomy, ontology, and psychology. Who knows why people do what they do? The 
point is that they do it, and we can track and measure it with unprecedented fidelity. With 
enough data, the numbers speak for themselves. (Qtd. in Agony of Eros 48) 
The problem is that numbers do not, in fact, speak for themselves. They don’t even speak at all. 
As Han reminds us, “There is no such thing as data-driven thinking. Only calculation is data-
driven. The negativity of the incalculable is inscribed in thinking. As such, it is prior and 
superordinate to ‘data’…” (49). He argues, instead, that, “Strong theories such as Plato’s 
doctrine of Ideas or Hegel’s phenomenology of Spirit are not models that could be replaced by 
data analysis. They are founded on thinking in the emphatic sense” (49). Theory, as opposed to 
data analysis, “is a primary, primordial decision, which determines what counts and what does 
not—what is or should be, and what does not matter” (49). By invoking “the negativity of the 
incalculable,” Han identifies theory as the space of negativity that provides a clearing for 
thought.  
Heidegger made this point in “What is Metaphysics?,” a work that examines the role of 
the sciences in the academic institution. Tauntingly, and with some wry humor, he writes: 
The nothing—what else can it be for science but an outrage and a phantasm? If science is 
right, then only one thing is sure: science wishes to know nothing of the nothing. 
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Ultimately this is the scientifically rigorous conception of the nothing. We know it, the 
nothing, in that we wish to know nothing about it. (84) 
Dasein, of course, “is” nothing. So to take the scientific prejudice of not wanting to investigate 
the nothing is to say that you don’t want to know anything about the meaning of Being—that is 
to say, anything about us, about who we are. Since we are the ones doing the investigating, 
aggressively avoiding this blind spot is anti-intellectual and counter to the role of the university. 
Science, then, ought to be a branch of the humanities, rather than what is happening today with 
the humanities being increasingly annexed to the sciences, filtered through the narrow lens of 
positivism and data analysis. In “What Calls for Thinking?” Heidegger is more blunt: 
Science does not think. This is a shocking statement. Let the statement be shocking, even 
though we immediately add the supplementary statement that nonetheless science always 
and in its own fashion has to do with thinking. That fashion, however, is genuine and 
consequently fruitful only after the gulf has become visible that lies between thinking and 
the sciences, lies there unbridgeably. There is no bridge here—only the leap. Hence there 
is nothing but mischief in all the makeshift ties and asses’ bridges by which men today 
would set up a comfortable commerce between thinking and the sciences. Hence we, 
those of us who come from the sciences, must endure what is shocking and strange about 
thinking—assuming we are ready to learn thinking. To learn means to make everything 
we do answer to whatever addresses itself to us as essential. (373) 
Heidegger counters the positivism of science with the negativity of theory. This is not a 
polemical position for him, but an ontological one (378). He is not opposed to science, but to 
scientism, to the privileging of science and statistics as a way of accessing the most meaningful 
truth, a prejudice that has only become more and more ingrained with the data revolution. All 
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inquiry must begin with the nothing: “We assert that the nothing is more originary than the ‘not’ 
and negation” (“What is Metaphysics?” 86). Since the nothing is the foundation of all 
knowledge, this is where all academic study, research, and instruction ought to proceed from: 
Only because the nothing is manifest in the ground of Dasein can the total strangeness of 
beings overwhelm us. Only when the strangeness of beings oppresses us does it arouse 
and evoke wonder. Only on the ground of wonder—the manifestness of the nothing—
does the ‘why?’ loom before us. Only because the ‘why’ is possible as such can we in a 
definite way inquire into the grounds and ground things. Only because we can question 
and ground things is the destiny of our existence placed in the hands of the researcher. 
(95-96) 
Positivism cannot address this “why,” this inquiry into the way things are. Only a discipline 
paradoxically grounded in the nothing can. To Han, this negativity takes on the form of theory, 
which he specifies is a form of narration as opposed to data accumulation. “As highly selective 
narration, it cuts a clearing of differentiation through untrodden terrain” (Agony of Eros 49). 
Narration is the opposite of what the ideology behind Big Data stands for. We have 
already traced its strong association with right-wing politics under the veneer of optimism. 
Moving away from language is also what the Nazi political theorist Carl Schmitt advocated, 
rejecting parliamentarianism, and with it, the root parler, “to talk” (Topology of Violence 41). He 
instead championed “the Latin decidere, which means ‘to cut off.’ Decisions are made by 
grabbing the other, the enemy, and slitting his throat. One cuts off whatever the enemy is trying 
to say. A decision is an unmediated verdict made with the sword” (42). The dictator doesn’t 
discuss, but uses language only to the extent of dictating, of deciding. In a recent issue of the 
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New York Review of Books, Tamsin Shaw demonstrates how Attorney General William Barr is 
the “Carl Schmitt of our Time.” This is the current techno-political situation we are living in.  
Fundamentally opposed to Big Data, narration is what links the novel to theory. Han sees 
theory as conferring “form on the world,” essentially reiterating Lukács’s point in Theory of the 
Novel (50). Data just represents an accumulation of information. But after “a certain point, 
information ceases to be informative. It becomes deformative. Likewise, communication stops 
being communicative; henceforth, it is only cumulative” (In the Swarm 61). Where theory and 
narration confer form, information overload ultimately deforms. Michael Butor, “the 
representative of the nouveau roman in France,” writes of a “literary crisis” in which the 
“tremendous noise” caused by the “new means of communication” and its emergent technologies 
are drowning out literature (50). Since thinking for Han, as it is for Butor and Heidegger, is “an 
expedition into quietness,” it is fundamentally opposed to the “tremendous noise” generated by 
the information overflow of digital technology (50). “Clearly, digital communication is 
destroying quiet and calm” (19).  
The aspiration of Big Data is “making it possible to predict human behavior. This means 
that the future is becoming calculable and controllable. […] Big Data has announced the end of 
the person who possesses free will” (12). This is why it fuels a new kind of totalitarian politics 
that twentieth-century tyrants could only dream of. Does the end of the novel, as Arac defines it, 
coincide with Nancy Armstrong’s observation that “the history of novel and the history of the 
modern subject are quite literally one and the same?” (3). Is that history over? Has it been 
subsumed by Big Data? If not, it is well on its way.  
This pessimism may seem far-flung. Even critics of optimism and positivity are quick to 
avoid slipping into this kind of pessimism. Often, for whatever bizarre reason, they turn around 
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and give the same kind of treatment to pessimists, too, as if the pessimist and the optimist were 
two rowdy children in need of a time out. It’s the same kind of move that neoliberal centrists use 
when they point at “both sides” on the extremes of the political spectrum as deserving equal 
blame for our situation, when one side is putting children in cages and the other is advocating for 
universal healthcare. Ehrenreich is quick to dismiss pessimism as a “romantic attachment to 
suffering as a source of insight or virtue,” making it clear that she is not writing her book “in a 
spirit of sourness or personal disappointment of any kind,” as if that would somehow be 
inexcusable or something worth apologizing for (12). Eagleton is also quick to point out that 
“pessimism involves much the same kind of spiritual kink” as optimism, and that both involve 
the same kind of knee-jerk reactions and thoughtlessness (Hope Without Optimism 2). He 
condescends to the American form of pessimism, which “is thought to be vaguely subversive,” 
an easy and smug comment to make for someone protected by the NHS and a six-figure salary, 
who isn’t living here and can thereby avoid the particular policies—both on the government and 
corporate level—as well as the overall effects of damaging optimism in this country (10). And 
it’s not as if his endeavor to separate hope from optimism is the most intellectually challenging 
thing to do, either.  
But what is most irritating about Eagleton, despite his flashes of brilliance, is the kind of 
bizarre maneuvering through terms, such as distinguishing between Leibnizian “optimalism” and 
“optimism”: “Optimism is not as optimistic as optimalism. For the optimalist, we already enjoy 
the best of all possible cosmic arrangements; the optimist, by contrast, may acknowledge the 
shortcomings of the present while looking to a more lustrous future” (4). Okay, I guess. But 
when Voltaire was attacking Leibniz in Candide, his subtitle was “L’optimisme,” not 
“L’optimalisme.” Eagleton does a similar maneuver again, more crucially, in his discussion of 
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Benjamin, who “built his revolutionary vision on a distrust of historical progress, as well as on a 
profound melancholia. Benjamin himself calls this outlook ‘pessimism,’ but one might equally 
see it as realism, that most difficult of moral conditions to attain” (5-6). 
This kind of rhetorical dodging and projection is a tired trope, as if somehow pessimists 
are incapable of discerning reality, and are just as deluded as optimists. Eagleton himself 
displays a knee-jerk reaction to edit Benjamin, as if Benjamin didn’t quite choose his own words 
properly, because surely he couldn’t have meant pessimism, right? But what if pessimism is 
realism? The word “realism” itself is so fraught and problematic as to be thoroughly unhelpful. 
Anyone will invoke it to defend their ideology, in the same way that people will invoke the 
hackneyed line, “Just look at the facts.” These are lazy strategies that are also used by optimists 
to defend their own positions. Maybe we ought to take Benjamin at his word, and trust that he 
knows what he’s doing when he writes about his philosophy as a pessimistic one. Benjamin 
…speaks of the urgent need to ‘organize’ pessimism for political ends, countering the 
facile optimism of certain sectors on the left. There is, he writes, a need for ‘pessimism 
all along the line. Absolutely. Mistrust of the fate of literature, mistrust of the fate of 
freedom, mistrust of the fate of European humanity, but three times mistrust of all 
reconciliation between classes, between nations, between individuals.’ (6) 
Why is this pessimism somehow illegitimate, and why does Eagleton feel the need to water it 
down as “realism,” and then later as “skepticism”? (6). This is pessimism through and through, 
even—and especially—as it works “in the service of human welfare. It is an attempt to remain 
coldly unmystified for the sake of constructive action” (6).  
Benjamin’s pessimism is a most welcome antidote to much of the embarrassing optimism 
on the left, like that of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, who end their book Empire with the 
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deafening sounds of premature triumph: “This is a revolution that no power will control—
because biopower and communism, cooperation and revolution remain together, in love, 
simplicity, and also innocence. This is the irrepressible lightness and joy of being a communist” 
(413). Yikes. I’ll take Benjamin’s pessimistic communism instead, please.152 Hannah Arendt 
actually notes how, “Without realizing it, Benjamin actually had more in common with 
[Heidegger]… than he did with the dialectical subtleties of his Marxist friends” (46). And, like 
both Heidegger and Lukács, Benjamin 
…is out to promote a revolutionary version of an unstaunchable homesickness for the 
past—one in which, as in Proust’s great novel, past events are brought to fruition under 
the retroactive gaze of the present, and as such appear more charged with meaning than 
they did the first time around. Einmal ist keinmal [Once is never], observes the novelist 
Milan Kundera. For Benjamin, events without an afterlife have an air of ontological 
fragility about them and, without such rituals of remembrance as radical historiography, 
are always in danger of sinking without trace into the political unconscious. (Hope 
Without Optimism 33) 
Both Benjamin and Eagleton flesh out this “homesickness” in novelistic terms, which also bears 
overtones of Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition. Isn’t this, too, the strategy that Woolf takes in 
To the Lighthouse, using her own literary narrative and, within it, Lily’s painting, to shore up the 
fragments of the past in order to preserve their afterlives? Isn’t this what Woolf’s tripartite 
architecture of the novel demands—for the last section to reiterate the first one across the mirror 
 
152 Adorno also has no patience for this facile left-wing optimism: “The optimism of the left repeats the insidious 
bourgeois superstition that one should not talk of the devil but look on the bright side. ‘The gentleman does not find 
the world to his liking? Then let him go and look for a better one’—such is the popular parlance of socialist realism” 
(Minima Moralia 114-15).  
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of “Time Passes,” so that what was seen through “The Window” could be commemorated in 
Lily’s painting?   
What Woolf and her characters achieve through their artistry, through their memory, 
cannot be reduced to data. The information overload wrought by Big Data is threatening the 
afterlives of history, and of the novel itself, eroding our memory. Han sees memory as “a 
progressive, living, narrative process. In this, it differs from data storage. Technological data 
storage strips all life from what has been. It is without time. Thus, a total present prevails today. 
It is abolishing the irretrievable moment. Time without moments is merely additive and no 
longer situative” (Agony of Eros 15).  
Maybe this is why Benjamin theorized “messianic time” as the time of memory. The 
“angel of history” has his face turned to the past, where he “sees one single catastrophe which 
keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage, and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to 
stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed” (Illuminations 257). He can’t 
tend to the dead because a storm is blowing him away, “into the future to which his back is 
turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress” 
(258). It is in the name of progress that memory, that history itself, could erode into this pile of 
wreckage, accumulating monstrously at his feet, which explains Benjamin’s pessimistic mistrust 
of the fate of literature. Adorno asks, “Is not memory inseparable from love, which seeks to 
preserve what yet must pass away?” (Minima Moralia 122). In this way, a pessimistic 
communist politics is one that, as in Plato’s Symposium, clings erotically to the vestiges of its 
past as a reminder of who we are. It is an answer to Heidegger’s reactionary take to the problem 
of the forgetting of Being. Without this historical memory, we lose our identity, our autonomy, 
our sense of self, and our sense of meaning. 
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There is good reason to share Benjamin’s mistrust in the fate of literature and of 
humanity. The neoliberal politics of Big Data markets this storm of progress to us as something 
we should embrace, as something seductive. It “seduces the soul; it preempts it in lieu of 
opposing it. It carefully protocols desires, needs, and wishes instead of ‘depatterning’ them. By 
means of calculated prognoses, it anticipates actions—and acts ahead of them instead of 
cancelling them out” (Psychopolitics 36). The Greeks had a term for “seduction of the soul”: 
psychagogia, which is also the literal definition of education, its Latin root ducere signifying that 
one’s soul is being led. This is what Socrates lambasted the Sophists for. They bewitched and 
seduced the souls of people who weren’t critical enough to discern the truth. But the only way he 
could fight against this seduction was to provide a seduction of his own, an education of his own, 
to lure the young men of Athens into another kind of love, a love of wisdom, of philosophy 
against sophistry. This is the same strategy he uses in The Republic, to “chant this argument we 
are making to ourselves as a countercharm, taking care against falling back again into this 
love…” (X.608a).   
Big Data seduces without eros, but “without eros, logos is deteriorating into data-driven 
calculation, which is incapable of reckoning the event, the incalculable” (Agony of Eros 43). 
Maybe we are not so much seduced by Big Data as numbed by it, or, as Heidegger would say, 
“tranquillized.” One would think that academia would be one of the last bastions for us to take 
seriously thought itself—which, in Han’s terms, amounts to theory as narration, and which 
would also set up barriers against Big Data. The study of the novel, then, would be crucial to 
education. Outside of academia, it is increasingly more difficult to hold on to this promise of 
education. If you are working five jobs to make ends meet, chances are that you don’t have time 
to indulge in a novel, which is part of the design of this neoliberal machinery—to extract as 
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much labor, as much profit, as possible from its subjects, even in their leisure time, or to exhaust 
them so much that they can’t use their leisure for the kind of attention and stimulation demanded 
by the novel. The more we are dumbed down, or threatened on the pain of losing employment, 
the easier it is for our society to slip into the fascist nightmare that is taking shape.  
But the problem is that Big Data has infiltrated into the academy itself, dooming the 
humanities to a new discipline, oxymoronically called “Digital Humanities,” in which art and 
literature are reduced to data, spreadsheets, algorithms, and apps. Or, in Heideggerian terms, the 
Digital Humanities turn the university into a technological power plant [Kraftwerk] that 
pulverizes the artwork [Kunstwerk] into technical statistics, the exact opposite of art itself (“The 
Question Concerning Technology” 21; Hanssen 84). While data analysis is perfectly appropriate 
for the sciences, it sounds the death knell for the humanities. In the study of literature 
specifically, the Digital Humanities work in the opposite direction of thought itself, replacing 
literary research with administrative procedures that amount to little more than tabulation and 
reductive claims, but with flashy charts and graphs or other forms of data visualization. Instead 
of training literary scholars, the Digital Humanities produce technicians, reducing the Kunstwerk 
to the Kraftwerk.  
Heidegger foresaw this trend that would doom the academic study of the humanities back 
in 1947, when he noted how philosophy is placed in the humiliating, undignified, and 
unwarranted position of: 
…having to justify its existence before the ‘sciences.’ It believes it can do that most 
effectively by elevating itself to the rank of a science. But such an effort is the 
abandonment of the essence of thinking. Philosophy is hounded by the fear that it loses 
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prestige and validity if it is not a science. Not to be a science is taken as a failing that is 
equivalent to being unscientific. (“Letter on Humanism” 218-219)   
In a rare moment of stylistic beauty for Heidegger, he argues passionately against reducing 
philosophy into a science, saying that, “To think against ‘logic’ does not mean to break a lance 
for the illogical but simply to trace in thought the logos and its essence, which appeared in the 
dawn of thinking, that is, to exert ourselves for the first time in preparing for such reflection” 
(251). Prior to logic is always the logos; logic stems from language, not the other way around. 
The humanities ought to proceed from this premise; if it were reversed, the humanities would no 
longer be the humanities, which is the threat that the Digital Humanities pose. In the Digital 
Humanities, or DH, as it is referred to in its acronym form, language exists just for the sake of 
data. There is something fundamentally dishonest about this discipline—which is less of a 
discipline than an ideology. Data aspires to some kind of objectivity, some kind of 
Enlightenment principle of objective measurement and valuation. But Heidegger points out that, 
“Every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does not let beings: be. 
Rather, valuing lets beings: be valid—solely as the objects of its doing. The bizarre effort to 
prove the objectivity of values does not know what it is doing” (251). To transform art into data 
is to deny it from being. The point that Heidegger is making is that science ought to answer to 
the humanities.153 He reverses the prejudice that science is the most foundational and hence the 
 
153 “When in the course of existential ontological analysis we ask how theoretical discovery ‘arises’ out of 
circumspective concern, this implies already that we are not making a problem of the ontical history and 
development of science, or of the factical occasions for it, or of its proximate goals. In seeking the ontological 
genesis for the theoretical attitude, we are asking which of those conditions implied in Dasein’s state of Being are 
existentially necessary for the possibility of Dasein’s existing in the way of scientific research. This formulation of 
the question is aimed at an existential conception of science. This must be distinguished from the ‘logical’ 
conception which understands science with regard to its results and defines it as ‘something established on an 
interconnection of true propositions—that is, propositions counted as valid.’ The existential conception understands 
science as a way of existence and thus as a mode of Being-in-the-world, which discovers or discloses either entities 
or Being” (Being and Time 408). 
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best explanation for the phenomena of the world, demonstrating instead that science is 
derivative. It partakes of an a priori practical view of the world as present-at-hand, as inert and 
reducible to monism, which is a philosophical stance, not a scientific one. In order to practice 
science at all, one must examine the philosophical underpinnings that allow science to be 
understandable at all. 
Nabokov, a celebrated scientist in his own right for his contributions to lepidoptery, made 
a gesture toward dismissing C.P. Snow’s debate about the gulf between the “two cultures” of the 
literary and scientific communities, which Heidegger was taking up (Strong Opinions 78). Both 
“utilitarian technology” and “B-grade novels” were the same kinds of philistinism to him (78). 
But he fundamentally agreed with Heidegger, saying, “I don’t believe that any science today has 
pierced any mystery. We, as newspaper readers, are inclined to call ‘science’ the cleverness of an 
electrician or a psychiatrist’s mumbo jumbo” (44). He goes on to say, however, that, “even in a 
better sense of ‘science’—as the study of visible and palpable nature, or the poetry of pure 
mathematics and pure philosophy—the situation remains as hopeless as ever” (45). This 
hopelessness is marked by the fact that, “We shall never know the origin of life, or the meaning 
of life, or the nature of space and time, or the nature of nature, or the nature of thought” (45). 
Science cannot bring us any closer to these questions. For that, we have the humanities. 
What would the academic landscape look like if, instead of hijacking the humanities to 
the scientific method, to positivism, to Big Data, the reverse were true? Heidegger is not the only 
one who sees the crisis of valuation, and the ideology that threatens the humanities in the name 
of positivism, progress, and optimism. Nietzsche was also highly suspicious of this tendency 
back in the nineteenth century, writing in The Birth of Tragedy that “science, spurred by its 
powerful illusion, speeds irresistibly toward its limits where its optimism, concealed by the 
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essence of logic, suffers shipwreck” (§15, 97). The struggles fought “in the highest spheres” of 
Nietzsche’s “contemporary world” are the struggles “between insatiable optimistic knowledge 
and the tragic need for art” (§16, 99). Here he turns Socrates’s fantasy of exiling the tragic poets 
from his ideal republic on its head, asking, “Perhaps there is a realm of wisdom from which the 
logician is exiled?” (93). 
But elsewhere, Nietzsche writes that it’s not so much “a question of annihilating science, 
but of controlling it,” inverting the way that science now controls the humanities (Philosophy 
and Truth 8). “Science is totally dependent upon philosophical opinions for all of its goals and 
methods, though it easily forgets this. But that philosophy which gains control also has to 
consider the problem of the level to which science should be permitted to develop: it has to 
determine value” (8). This vision of a new academic order, this alternative to the optimism and 
hierarchy of science and of Big Data, can only be the fantasy of disgruntled pessimists, who 
know that the heart of all academic inquiry originates in the humanities, not the sciences, who 
shouldn’t be made to answer to the scientific method when art and language precede it, who 
know that this is how things ought to be, and who also know that it won’t happen. Maybe, 
catching ourselves in this fantasy, we finally deem it too optimistic, and are embarrassed to have 
indulged in this fantasy in the first place, typing this complaint out on a digital word processor. 
The pessimist: not just a hypocrite lecteur, but a hypocritical writer, as well—a writer who, with 
digital technology, can also never be much more than just a typist.   
Eagleton reminds us that the rise of studying literature at the university, beyond just the 
classics, emerged out of a deep-seated social mission at the end of the nineteenth century:  
George Gordon, early Professor of English Literature at Oxford, commented in his 
inaugural lecture that ‘England is sick, and… English literature must save it. The 
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Churches (as I understand) having failed, and social remedies being slow, English 
literature has now a triple function: still, I suppose, to delight and instruct us, but also, 
and above all, to save our souls and heal the State.’ (Eagleton, Literary Theory 20) 
Gordon’s message may come off as trite, as overly Romantic, but I believe that pessimists 
today—being failed Romantics, which explains our disappointment—would agree with the 
diagnosis, and agree even with the proposed cure, but wouldn’t believe that this cure will 
actually cure anything now. It was precisely this mission that, by the 1930s, made English “not 
just one discipline among many but the most central subject of all, immeasurably superior to law, 
science, politics, philosophy, or history” (28). There’s not much hope of that happening again. 
Our society today is also sick, sick with Big Data, and this sickness is eroding the study of 
literature.  
But the reality is that DH is going nowhere. And in addition to its myopic ideology and 
its unsound intellectual basis in the realm of literary study, behind the technology of DH is a 
highly alarming and sick political agenda, such as the ubiquitously used software platforms Git 
and GitHub, which are often required for many students and professors of DH. GitHub’s CEO 
Nat Friedman recently renewed a contract with ICE, so participating on his platform is 
participating in the brutal, inhumane, and fascist treatment of refugees and immigrants in this 
country. In classic neoliberal fashion, Friedman refused to cancel the contract after employees 
responded with outrage, but donated half a million dollars to organizations helping refugees, as if 
he were a Greek god in the Trojan War, occasionally switching sides just to see how the carnage 
would play out for his entertainment (Tiku, The Washington Post).  
From the point of view of a financially struggling graduate student, when funding for DH 
projects and fellowships is significantly higher than other kinds of work on campus (or anywhere 
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for a graduate student), this predicament is a nightmare. It is noble to refuse any such work that 
violates one’s morals and one’s innermost sense of what the university—and specifically the 
humanities—ought to stand for, but it is also a luxury to be able to do so. As DH attracts more 
and more funding, research that doesn’t embrace this kind of technology does not see the same 
kinds of funds, especially as the neoliberal rhetoric of “progress” is supposed to encourage us to 
incorporate new technology even as it may risk eroding thought and critique itself. This may 
seem like the conservative position Socrates takes against writing as a technology of memory in 
Phaedrus, but the conservative position in this case, and the neofascist politics it espouses, is the 
one represented by Big Data.  
Now, during the outbreak of the Coronavirus, DH has its moment to shine, proving just 
how indispensable it is to the university, transferring all in-person classes to an online setting. 
But, in light of Naomi Klein’s “shock doctrine” thesis of capitalism, the expectations moving 
forward, from a university administrator’s perspective, is that everything in-person could 
actually be done online—and possibly for less pay while demanding more labor (Kornbluh, The 
Chronicle of Higher Education). There isn’t sufficient dialogue right now about how the 
information from our online lessons and discussion forums will later be used by companies like 
Blackboard, Zoom, and WebEx, in ways to serve their corporate interests as they mine us for 
data that could translate to their profits—nor should there be this dialogue at this specific 
moment, when people ought to focus on just surviving right now. And that’s the capitalist bind: 
even in times of crisis, we are still expected to adhere to the gospel of productivity, absurdly 
trying to make the crisis conform to capitalism and go on with business as usual, even if it has to 
be done remotely. The CEO of Zoom, Eric Yuan, “expects the coronavirus outbreak to make 
remote work, which was already gaining traction, even more” common and expected after this is 
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over (Zaveri, Business Insider). He intends this to be a “fundamental, permanent shift in how 
people work” (Levy, GeekWire). Yuan may be celebrated now for offering his company’s 
technology to educators for free, but the return on investment is what he’s after. This is precisely 
what Naomi Klein diagnoses as “disaster capitalism”: “…orchestrated raids on the public sphere 
in the wake of catastrophic events, combined with the treatment of disasters as exciting market 
opportunities…” (6). While digital technology is no doubt coming to our aid in this crisis, we 
should be identifying the dialectic of Enlightenment that comes with it, and turning to thinkers 
like Adorno, Horkheimer, and Klein to articulate the alarming and predatory politics that this 
technology bolsters, even as it is marketed as magnanimous, beneficial, and indispensable to our 
lives.  
Heidegger does make it clear, in “The Question Concerning Technology,” that there is no 
point in being a Luddite. We are not confined, as he says, “to a stultified compulsion to push on 
blindly with technology or, what comes to the same, to rebel helplessly against it and curse it as 
the work of the devil” (330). He leaves the helpless rebellion to the pessimists. But it’s difficult 
to argue that we are not in a “stultified compulsion to push on blindly with technology.” The 
presence of DH itself has already thrown the gauntlet, despite its officious claims to “engaging” 
or “advancing” the humanities. Its message is clear: convert or perish. Teaching without digital 
technology, or with minimal technology, is seen as quaint, old-fashioned, and maybe even 
wrong. Teaching evaluations even include a column for how technology was used, resting on the 
assumption that technology in itself is something worth celebrating in any academic context; the 
opposite view is not even considered. The logic, therefore, is that further down the line, one 
could be punished for not embracing this technology, for not teaching D.H. Lawrence with DH. 
There is something wrong with an education system that values “Smart Classrooms” over smart 
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people, and there is something wrong with an education system that manages budgets based on 
the ostensible utility of research instead of the investigation of meaning. What is wrong, 
specifically, is the Benthamite philosophy that undergirds pedagogy, politics, and the economy 
today. 
 
A Note on Irony 
One of the many glaring blind spots of DH is its fundamental incapacity to register irony 
and ambiguity, despite the zealous attempts of DH technicians who try to apply algorithms in 
Sentiment Analysis or Natural Language Tool-Kit or other data-driven programs, trying to fix 
and pin down single, concrete meanings the way Humbert wants to pin down Lolita, as if she 
were a butterfly. But Lolita is not a butterfly, and the novel cannot be fixed or reduced to any 
datum of meaning. This dissertation began with conflicting definitions of the novel, but novel 
theorists overwhelmingly agree that “the novel is, by definition, the ironic art,” as Kundera 
writes (Art of the Novel 134). Lukács sees irony as the “normative mentality of the novel” 
(Theory of the Novel 84). As an “epic in an age abandoned by God,” and an articulation of our 
“transcendental homelessness,” the novel employs irony to “see where God is to be found in a 
world abandoned by God; irony sees the lost, utopian home of the idea that has become an 
ideal…” (92). Bakhtin also identifies the novel as fundamentally ironic in its function of parody, 
and McKeon traces its history as one that arises precisely out of the contradictions inherent in 
ambiguity and irony. Its origins in anatomy lead Frye to see its operations of sparagmos, or 
bodily dismemberment, as belonging to the “archetypal theme of irony and satire” (192). 
Do DH technicians realize that, in poking around the “corpus” of texts to isolate some 
kind of meaning attributable to linguistic data, they are in the same exact position of the 
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Renaissance barber-surgeons cutting up a corpse in search of material traces of the soul? Is irony, 
then, those noxious fumes hiding in the organs of words that, when removed or amputated from 
their context, evaporate into nothing? This is what makes irony, as Han would see it, “atopos”—
his term for the placelessness of eros (Agony of Eros 1). It is also the term used to describe 
Socrates’ seduction (1). Irony, like eros, cannot be located, trapped in a set of parameters. It can’t 
be isolated. It is a negativity that can only ever be discerned indirectly, relationally, contextually. 
This is why Kierkegaard, the master ironist, favors “indirect communication” (Seducer’s Diary 
xii). But we also see traces of this negativity in Hegel: 
 But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death, and keeps itself untouched by 
devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth 
only when in utter dismemberment [Zerissenheit] it finds itself. It is this power, not as 
something positive, which closes its eyes to the negative, as when we say of something 
that it is nothing or false, and then having done with it, turn away and pass on to 
something else; on the contrary, Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the 
face and tarrying with it. This tarrying with the negative is the magical power that 
converts it into being. (Phenomenology of Spirit 19) 
Spirit is what can be discerned by a different kind of anatomy from the anatomy that DH 
technicians try to perform on the text, treating their method as an autopsy of a dead “corpus” or 
corpse instead of treating the text as something vibrating with irony, with eros, with spirit. 
Positivist ideology would be quick to dismiss this approach as mystical, because anything that 
doesn’t narrowly compute into its arbitrary methods needs to be brushed off. But for strong 
thinkers, like philosophers from Hegel to Han, Spirit is the name we give precisely to the 
negativity of theory itself: “Spirit—which originally meant unrest—owes its spiritedness, its 
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animacy, to negativity” (Agony of Eros 51). This is the unrest of the Hegelian dialectic and of the 
Socratic dialogue. But these complex motors of thought are now being jammed and discarded by 
an overload of positive data, which are accompanied by alarmingly rudimentary intellectual 
processes. “Correlations are replacing causality. That’s-how-it-is stands where How so? once 
wavered. The data-driven quantification of reality is driving Spirit from the realm of knowledge” 
(Psychopolitics 68).  
The indirect relationship necessitated by irony is already a relationship that is more 
complex than a simple correlation. Following its processes can bring us back to Spirit. “Irony has 
a form,” David M. Halperin writes, “but it is not itself a formal property of language. It has no 
fixed or unambiguous linguistic markers. It requires a community of understanding” (48). 
Furthermore, “Irony is unlimited. It cannot be contained” (49). Good luck explaining that to a 
DH technician. On top of this, “Americans have an international reputation for being deaf to 
irony: they are only ever able to hear, or mean, one thing at a time” (49). Maybe this is due to the 
national ideology of optimism, an ideology that must dispel ambiguity, that must affirm every 
thought, every experience, as positive.   
Is the young, sexy, hunky Alcibiades ironic in Symposium when he pines for the ugly, 
older Socrates, begging him to be his lover? Can he be both ironic and sincere, depending on 
how we hear his words? Can he be ironic, but with traces of sincerity, or vice versa? Do we ever 
only just signify one meaning with our words? Are we always aware of our irony, or the extent 
of our irony? Irony and ambiguity seem to be that space that opens up in division, as when we 
were divided in two—this is the Zweideutigkeit, two meanings inhering in one utterance, or 
maybe even more than two. Irony is precisely the negativity of this space. Its immeasurability by 
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definition cannot be positivized, no matter how hyperbolic the promises of DH software and 
ideology may be. 
This dissertation on pessimism and the novel began with Schlegel as a starting point for a 
way to approach the novel, and we can now return to him with a way of approaching irony, 
which is the soul of the novel. To Schlegel, irony is also an expression of pessimism, limning the 
asymptote of comprehension, beyond which all understanding fails. Paul de Man cites Schlegel’s 
essay on irony, “Über die Unverständlichkeit” [“On Incomprehensibility”] in response to Wayne 
Booth, who, in 1974, understood irony as a feature of rhetoric. “If indeed irony is doomed from 
the start,” de Man writes, 
…because, if irony is of understanding, no understanding of irony will be able to control 
irony and to stop it, as [Booth] proposes to do, and if this is indeed the case that what is at 
stake in irony is the possibility of understanding, the possibility of reading, the readability 
of texts, the possibility of deciding on a meaning or on multiple sets of meanings or on a 
controlled polysemy of meanings, then we can see that irony would indeed be very 
dangerous. There would be irony in something very threatening, against which 
interpreters of literature, who have a stake in the understandability of literature, would 
want to put themselves on their guard—very legitimate to want, as Booth wants to stop, 
to stabilize, to control the trope. (“The Concept of Irony” 166-67) 
De Man’s Schlegelian understanding of irony demands a different kind of rigor in literary study 
than what the New Criticism of Booth or the current technologies of DH can offer. Richard 
Bernstein notes how the “chasm between Booth’s and de Man’s approach to irony is indicated by 
what each of them says about Schlegel” (5). Booth responds to the doom of Schlegel’s and de 
Man’s position by writing, “But, fellow romantics, do not push irony too far, or you will pass 
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from the joyful laughter of Tristram Shandy into Teutonic gloom. Read Schlegel” (A Rhetoric of 
Irony 212).  
Maybe Booth just doesn’t get that Teutonic gloom can, actually, give rise to joyful 
laughter? Does he not get that pessimism can be funny? And that maybe this is exactly the 
movement of irony itself, the motor of Bakhtinian laughter that drives the novel? Is he really 
deaf to the Teutonic laughter of Nietzsche? Or of Kierkegaard, who writes in Either/Or, “I 
choose one thing—that I may always have the laughter on my side”? (I.43). De Man doubles 
down, insisting: “[I]f you are interested in the problem and the theory of irony you have to take it 
in the German tradition. That’s where the problem is worked out. You have to take it in Friedrich 
Schlegel…and also in… Kleist, Jean Paul, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and all the way up to 
Nietzsche…” (167).   
In Kierkegaard’s dissertation, The Concept of Irony, he writes, “Just as philosophy begins 
with doubt, so also a life that may be called human begins with irony” (7). This line was 
originally written in Latin, in the frontispiece of his dissertation: “Ut a dubitatione philosophia 
sic ab ironia vita Digna, quae humana vocetur, incipit” (6). Bernstein observes that the “Latin 
phrase ‘vita digna’ can also be translated as a “a life worthy of being human begins with irony” 
(79). If the humanities are the study of a life that may be called human, or may be worthy of 
being human, then irony is necessarily at the core of this study. Otherwise, whatever it is 
studying can hardly be said to correspond to human life. The Digital Humanities are not worthy 
of examining a life that may be called human. The Digital Humanities have as much to do with 
the humanities as National Socialism had to do with socialism. It isn’t a study of the humanities, 
but only a study of the digital. Digital technology can only ever aspire to simulation, while irony 
is the art of dissimulation. The two are fundamentally incompatible.  
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Kierkegaard, like Schlegel before him and de Man after him, understood irony not as a 
rhetorical trope, but as a way of life, exemplified in the life of Socrates, who lived negatively—
who insisted that all he knew was that he didn’t know, which is a statement that “both affirms 
and denies that he possesses knowledge, and this ironic stance enables him to profess genuine 
admiration for other people’s expertise even as he sets about to demolish it” (Halperin 52). 
Socrates educates his interlocutors not by transmitting positive data, but by negating positively 
held beliefs through questions, or through what Heidegger would call “clearings.” Kierkegaard 
sounds especially proto-Heideggerian when he writes, “Irony as the negative is the way; it is not 
the truth but the way” (Concept of Irony 327). And Socrates paved this way. He didn’t give his 
interlocutors knowledge, but served as their midwife, which is how we get the maieutic method, 
the method that Kierkegaard embodies in the figure of his ironic Seducer, of Johannes, who 
seduces Cordelia precisely in order to have her break off the relationship with him, and thereby 
arrive at a deeper knowledge of herself. At the heart of irony, like the cœur of Cordelia, “There is 
a longing, an Eros, a passion that transforms us” (Bernstein 99).  
Irony, for all its effects of distancing, is fundamentally a seduction. Bernstein sees behind 
the four main contemporary philosophers of irony—Jonathan Lear, Richard Rorty, Gregory 
Vlastos, and Alexander Nehamas—the “ghost of Kierkegaard,” who has seduced them all into 
his account of irony (10). To Vlastos, Kierkegaard’s “treatment of irony… seduces him into 
finding in the Platonic texts he purports to be glossing the vagaries of a romantic novella” (75). 
And maybe it is this romantic novella, emerging out of the negative space in the Platonic texts, 
that Kierkegaard ends up writing himself in The Seducer’s Diary. The irony that Kierkegaard 
uses in this novella is, as Bernstein observes, “far more difficult” to detect “than one might at 
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first imagine” (77). Like Nabokov, “Kierkegaard sets all sorts of traps and obstacles in our way,” 
traps that could never be dismantled by digital technology (77). 
To make matters more complicated, Kierkegaard’s fictional character Johannes 
Climacus, from Concluding Unscientific Postscript, even makes fun of Kierkegaard’s take on 
irony in The Concept of Irony, calling into question the nature of authorship over a century 
before Nabokov thematizes this question in Lolita and Barthes and Foucault theorize it in their 
own essays. To Halperin, “Irony allows the speaker to disappear as a guarantor of authenticity, to 
become unfindable in the utterance, to escape responsibility for meaning” (48). Like Pessoa’s 
heteronyms who review and criticize each other’s works, Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms do the 
same, and even retract works they had written. “Kierkegaard warns us over and over again not to 
confuse what is said in these books with his views” (77). This is part of the same seductive 
project that Kierkegaard identifies in Plato: 
…Nehamas argued that, in his early dialogues, Plato seduces us into thinking that we can 
identify with the ironic stance that Socrates takes toward his interlocutors. Thus we feel a 
sense of superiority that we are not as dumb or obtuse as some of Socrates’ interlocutors. 
But the real sting of Platonic irony is to make us—the readers—feel uncomfortable and 
disoriented when it dawns on us that we don’t really have any better answers to Socrates’ 
questions than the ‘Euthyphros’ of this world. (78)  
This realization of the reader, of us, is what incites us to knowledge—and specifically the 
knowledge that we do not know. It awakens us to our own subjectivity, which, to Kierkegaard, 
“means the sheer power to ironically negate” (88). This, to K.B. Söderquist, is the “perquisite for 
authentic selfhood” (qtd. in Bernstein 89). It demands a kind of inwardness, a discrepancy 
between outer and inner experience. This is the last bastion of selfhood against the prying forces 
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of Big Data, claiming to read our minds and determine our desires. The acknowledgment of my 
own thoughts to myself, which may be at odds with what I say or what I do, is the last trace of 
autonomy I can have for myself. It is the novel, that genre of extended inwardness, that best 
articulates this autonomy, even as it is fraying in the digital landscape. Anna Karenina reading 
her English novel silently on the train, while her thoughts, unuttered to anyone else, running in 
parallel tracks to the plot of the novel she is reading, is precisely this embodiment of autonomy.     
This account of autonomy, won through irony, is not an optimistic one, though. It 
certainly doesn’t get Anna Karenina very far. And as for Socrates, who never instructed anyone 
how to live, we have no evidence that any of his  
…encounters enable his interlocutors to lead more virtuous lives. Many of them (like 
Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides) turn out to be tyrants. At the same time, Plato 
presents Socrates as living a just, moderate, courageous and wise life—without ever 
telling us precisely how Socrates managed to do this. (99)  
It is “no accident that Plato, the first person on record in Western history to formulate a theory of 
erotic desire, is also the source of our concept of irony” (51). And throughout the history of 
literature, we see irony and eros intertwining paths, wending their way from Alcibiades to Anna 
Karenina, endowing these characters both with an inner sense of autonomy and with their own 
undoing. Irony and eros, as we read them in Plato, ultimately merge in pessimism, revealing that, 
“You do not know what you love, or why. What you seek to possess in love is not what you 
desire. The desire you feel cannot be expressed or fulfilled. No particular object corresponds to 
your love” (52). And yet, “Irony is the very condition of love, its mode of being” (52). Halperin 
explains that, “Love is an ironic condition insofar as it produces a necessary doubling of 
 452 
perspective,” like the doubling of perspective that emerges out of our cosmic division—a 
doubling that acts as a gesture of reunification, a gesture that can never be completed (53).  
Because of the fundamentally ironic, if not pessimistic, nature of love, Halperin says that 
only a “unique literary form” that presses against the limit of what could possibly be rendered 
into language would be necessary to accommodate the articulation of love: 
Like all great literary forms, the ironic story of love teases us with the contradictions built 
into its design. What distinguishes it is the way it holds opposed perspectives in unstable 
and dynamic equipoise. It thereby pushes to an extreme limit what all good writing aims 
to do—to impress on us a lively consciousness of what it does not, or what it cannot, say. 
(58) 
Halperin never gives a name to this form, but marvels at the fact that Symposium belongs to it, 
along with Lolita. “Plato composed the Symposium in such a way that it could not be classified 
according to any of the specific formal criteria that had previously been used to define epic or 
lyric or tragedy or comedy or history or oratory or natural science. The Symposium belongs to a 
category for which not even Aristotle had a word” (58). 
That word could very well be “novel.” This is what puts Symposium in the same genre as 
Lolita. Symposium is the blueprint for both Schlegel’s theory of the novel and for Woolf’s To the 
Lighthouse. Its spirit courses through Lady Chatterley’s Lover and The Seducer’s Diary. Both 
Schlegel and Bakhtin think of Platonic dialogues as the origin of the modern novel, and it could 
very well be that they had this dialogue in mind more than any other. It is the novel that brings 
the estranged couples of irony and eros, pessimism and philosophy, back together. Each one of 
the novels I focused on could be arranged along a spectrum of irony, with Lolita being perhaps 
the most ironic novel ever written, aside from The Seducer’s Diary, and Lady Chatterley’s Lover 
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as one of the most earnest. Halperin writes that, “The three cardinal experiences that demand the 
elimination of irony, or that cannot survive irony, are raw grief or suffering, religious transport, 
and sexual passion. Little wonder, then, if they tend to merge” (49). They do all tend to merge in 
the experiences narrated in Lady Chatterley’s Lover. But there are elements of these categories in 
Lolita, as well. And maybe, if Humbert does intend to tell us these experiences in rare moments 
of sincerity, this is a case of the boy crying wolf, which Nabokov says is the origin of all 
literature (Lolita 347). In To the Lighthouse, we get a gentle irony—for instance, in the 
characterization of Mr. Ramsay’s irritation, and also even in Mrs. Ramsay’s condescension. But 
the raw grief in “Time Passes” breaks up this irony, and the novel ends on a note of something 
akin to a secularized religious transport with Lily finishing her painting.  
Each of these novelists approach education as seduction, even as the portraits of 
education in their own novels take on a pessimistic charge. Both the education of Beardsley and 
of Humbert fail Dolores Haze. Like Bartleby and Catherine Sloper, she retains her own 
interiority, withdrawing away from the “sunshine” and back into the “fog” inscribed in her last 
name, but it is an interiority she can’t even have past the age of seventeen. As a shadow text to 
this novel, “The Little Mermaid” also tells the story of a voiceless girl whose education about 
humans is tethered to a destructive erotic force. In the same vein, Kierkegaard’s Seducer sees 
himself as an educator, seducing Cordelia not so much to himself as to herself. In Lady 
Chatterley’s Lover, Mellors tutors Mrs. Bolton in anatomy and then tutors Connie in sex, in the 
same way that Tristan, as Tantris, was originally Isolde’s tutor of the arts before their love took 
on an apocalyptic tenor. And To the Lighthouse is essentially a Künstlerroman, whereby Lily 
Briscoe teaches herself how to paint by learning how to train her eye on detail and sitting on the 
question of form for a decade, while the formal figures of academic education, Mr. Ramsay and 
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Charles Tansley, don’t offer nearly as much intellectual insight as she does. Lily’s struggle with 
form mirrors Woolf’s own formal arrangement of the novel, modeled on Plato’s Symposium, 
where we come back to Socrates as the most famous educator and the most famous seducer, 
whose education has seduced not only Alcibiades, but every philosopher since, all the way up to 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Badiou, and Han. In Symposium, we see the origins of the novel in a 
pessimistic anatomy of love. This text is a masterclass in irony, and in it we can see philosophy 
and the novel reach for each other just as much as the severed lovers reach across the void of 
their separation for the little consolation they can share together on this earth.    
If we yield the study of literature to DH, we will lose sight of this irony, this insight into 
what it means to be human, what it means to have interiority and subjectivity outside of a 
neoliberal ontology. “Data-driven, positive science produces neither insight nor truth,” Han 
warns us. “Information is only cognized. But cognition is not yet re-cognition—that is, insight. 
Because of its positivity, it is additive and cumulative. As positivity, information changes 
nothing and announces nothing. It is utterly inconsequential. In contrast, insight is negativity” 
(Agony of Eros 51). Negativity is what draws the “atopic Other,” the seductive figure of 
Socrates, whose afterlives live on in the novel until we give him up to the anti-ironic forces of 




CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT 
 
A Ludicrous Interpretation of a Ludicrous Interruption: Mimesis From Homer to 
Ludacris 
In the troubling new genre of “quit lit,” in which academics with great promise and talent 
leave academia because of the neoliberal circumstances that squeeze them out of the field—
whether it is a poor salary that is incommensurate with both experience and with the student 
loans it took to get the degree in the first place, or the increasing bureaucratization of the job, or 
budget cuts, a toxic work environment, or a number of other debilitating factors—Tim Parks 
contributed his own account in The New York Review of Books. The reason he was quitting 
academia was the rampant digital technology that “changed the cognitive skills required of 
individuals. Learning is more and more a matter of mastering various arbitrary software 
procedures than they allow information to be accessed…” (“The Dying Art of Instruction in the 
Digital Classroom”). As a result of this digital infiltration, the “idea of a relationship between 
teacher and class, professor and students, is consequently eroded.” And with “the erosion of that 
relationship goes the environment that nurtured it: the segregated space of the classroom where, 
for an hour or so, all attention was focused on a single person who brought all of his or her 
experience to the service of the group”: 
There was an element of seduction in this; it required a certain performance, the ability to 
impose what in the best circumstances you might call a collective enchantment. One 
thinks of the lesson that D.H. Lawrence, himself a schoolteacher, describes in Women in 
Love: Lawrence has his teacher, Ursula, ‘absorbed in the passion of instruction,’ while 
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her students are so hypnotized by her lesson that the arrival of an unexpected visitor is 
experienced as a shocking intrusion. (“The Dying Art”) 
At the heart of teaching and of learning is seduction itself. Digital technology erodes this 
fundamental classroom dynamic because it erodes all traces of eros. Nabokov, like Lawrence, 
also approached the classroom with eros for his material, saying that, “Every lecture I delivered 
had been carefully, lovingly handwritten…” (Strong Opinions 104). And Woolf, delivering 
lectures of her own to universities, also wrote the Common Reader as a way of educating her 
readers in the way Plato educated his with Symposium, which she nods to in the conceit of 
discussing literature as a kind of “tea-table training” (xiii).  
In Lawrence’s image of Ursula interrupted by the arrival of an unexpected visitor while 
“absorbed in the passion of instruction,” we see the history not only of education itself, but of 
mimesis. There is a genealogy of this image that we can trace back to The Iliad when Achilles is 
playing on his lyre to the Myrmidons, with his lover Patroclus in the front row, and is interrupted 
by Odysseus, Ajax, and Phoenix, sent by Agamemnon in an attempt to assuage Achilles’ wrath 
and win him over so that they can fight the Trojans as a united front: 
So these two walked along the strand of the sea deep-thundering 
with many prayers to the holder and shaker of the earth, that they 
might readily persuade the great heart of Aiakides. 
Now they came beside the shelters and ships of the Myrmidons 
and they found Achilleus delighting his heart in a lyre, clear-sounding, 
splendid and carefully wrought, with a bridge of silver upon it, 
which he won out of the spoils when he ruined Eëtion’s city. 
With this he was pleasuring his heart, and singing of men’s fame, 
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as Patroklos was sitting over against him, alone, in silence, 
watching Aiakides and the time he would leave off singing. 
Now these two came forward, as brilliant Odysseus led them, 
and stood in his presence. Achilleus rose to his feet in amazement 
holding the lyre as it was, leaving the place where he was sitting. 
In the same way Patroklos, when he saw the men come, stood up. 
And in greeting Achilleus the swift of foot spoke to them: 
‘Welcome. You are my friends who have come, and greatly I need you, 
Who even to this my anger are dearest of all the Achaians.’ (IX.185-98) 
Mazzoni points to this passage as the “most ancient Western representation of storytelling, the 
practice that Plato would later identify using the inclusive term of mimesis” (20). What we see 
here is the “function of the epic song” itself, which “is hedonistic, commemorative, celebratory, 
and pedagogic” (21). I’d like to look at this passage a bit more closely, though, to see what else 
emerges here about the elements of storytelling, narrative, and pedagogy that would eventually 
find their way into the novel. 
For one thing, the notion of the world’s instability, its penchant for fragmentation rather 
than wholeness, is somehow passed off as distinctly modern, but it undergirds the entire Greek 
understanding of their relationship to earth and world, emblemized by the moody Poseidon, the 
“holder and shaker of the earth” in the second quoted line, who in an instant can disrupt human 
relations in catastrophic, devastating ways with no notice whatsoever. Existence itself is 
predicated on interruption, on intrusion, and it’s often violent. Homer focuses on this aspect of 
existence more clearly in the sequel, The Odyssey—just a series of incidents that keep him away 
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from home for an additional ten years after fighting the Trojan War, because Poseidon disrupts 
his journey. 
Homer here also interrupts the image of Achilles as the archetype of wrath personified, 
the interpretation that has been hammered into us by bad high school teachers and less astute 
readers who just latch on to the first line of the epic and refuse to see him in any other light. But 
Achilles here is “delighting his heart” and “pleasuring his heart” in artistry that is “splendid and 
carefully wrought.” Maybe wrath really never was what twenty-first century readers might call 
his dominant affect. Maybe, more than just a highly skilled warrior, he’s even more of a highly 
skilled artist who can’t do what he’s meant to do except for in this brief episode. He had done 
everything he could to avoid being drafted into the war, because in his heart of hearts he never 
felt like he was a warrior. He had even tried that artistic trick used centuries later by the first 
Greek actors—themselves war veterans, from the Persian War to the Peloponnesian War—when 
they invented tragedy: he dressed up as a woman. But even this travesty couldn’t help him avoid 
his fate.  
So yes, he was in a bad mood, like any pessimist who sees the promising trajectory of his 
life suddenly give out from under him, and he let anyone and everyone in his vicinity know that 
he was pissed off. (Odysseus went to far greater lengths to avoid conscription, by some accounts 
either feigning madness or actually going mad). Things obviously didn’t get much better when 
Agamemnon took Briseis away from him. And it’s just at that moment when Homer begins to 
tell his story. But in Book IX we see him in his element—yet even in this all too brief glimpse 
into Achilles’ identity, otherwise shielded under so many layers of pain and aggression, he’s 
interrupted, he can’t finish his damn song. If he’s really that cliché of rage and wrath, he would 
have thrown a fit at this interruption, but instead he welcomes his new guests politely, even 
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warmly right here, and later hears them out, but sees through their nonsense. He asks Odysseus 
not to patronize him with the promise of gifts and rewards for reconciling with Agamemnon. He 
may be characterized as enraged, but he gives—with the eloquence of an artist—a lucid, 
coherent insight into why this war is stupid, absurd, and why he shouldn’t be fighting in it: 
…Yet why must the Argives fight with the Trojans? 
And why was it the son of Atreus assembled and led here 
these people? Was it not for the sake of lovely-haired Helen? 
And the sons of Atreus alone among mortal men the ones 
who love their wives? Since any who is a good man, and careful, 
loves her who is his own and cares for her, even as I now 
loved this one from my heart, though it was my spear that won her. (IX.337-43)  
Who is the hothead now? Helen left Menelaus, so now his brother Agamemnon is fighting this 
war for him, and dragging Achilles into it—while having the gall to take Briseis from him, the 
same kind of action that spurred on the Trojan War from the beginning. Achilles’ response, 
unlike the unhinged Menelaus, who is the true figure of unbridled wrath in this story, is the 
opposite: he wants to withdraw from war altogether, and be an artist instead, to be in this sacred 
space where he can sing to his listeners in a work of art that simultaneously instructs them about 
their own history. But he can’t. He’s interrupted. And it’s not even Odysseus or Ajax or Phoenix 
who end up being able to persuade him, despite their talents. He ends up persuading himself, 
knowing that works of art are composed of valiant heroes. If he can’t sing his story, he may as 
well be sung about. In art, he then lets himself be the creator and the created, Homer singing his 
rage through the Muse. He is split apart, anatomized across these different aesthetic categories.   
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What Mazzoni leaves out from his analysis of this first moment of mimesis in Western 
literature is who exactly is doing the mimesis. This may seem like a pedantic point: obviously 
it’s Achilles, the artist, singing on his lyre. But this is a musical moment of creation rather than 
mimesis per se; Schopenhauer argues that, “music does not, like all the other arts, exhibit the 
Ideas or grades of the will’s objectification, but directly the will itself…” (The World as Will and 
Representation 448). It’s an art that belongs to will, not representation. He may be “singing of 
men’s fame,” but that’s not quite the same thing as singing the fame itself, the way that Homer 
invokes the Muse to “Sing, goddess, the anger of Peleus’ son Achilleus”—to sing the anger 
itself, to channel it in its immediate form, rather than sing about the anger (I.1). So there’s 
actually not much mimesis coming from him. If anything, what he’s doing is closer in genre to 
what Thucydides would later include in his History of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles’ “Funeral 
Oration,” accompanied by a lyre. The only imitation we actually see belongs to the audience, 
namely to Patroclus himself, who, when Agamemnon’s ambassadors arrive, imitates the actions 
of the artist—he “stood up” only after his lover “rose to his feet in amazement.” Patroclus, in the 
presence of Achilles, always “obeyed his beloved companion” (IX.205). 
So much of literary theory focuses on mimesis as a one-sided phenomenon, originating 
from the artist. But what about those of us on the other side of that aesthetic threshold, on the 
other side of the stage, of the page, or of the lectern? Socrates speaks of tragedy’s audience as 
passive vessels of these mimetic products, who may be corrupted as a result of seeing such a 
spectacle and may behave in questionable or even dangerous ways after leaving the theater. But 
is it possible to think of the recipient of art taking a more active role—not in the way that reader-
response theory has tried to propose—but in the constitutive act of mimesis in the process of its 
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own creation? That there is a certain performativity at work in us when we see a work of art we 
love, and that it’s love itself that binds creator to the creation, as well as to the beholder?  
This, of course, is how Socrates illustrates Eros in Phaedrus. The pursued beloved is 
seduced by his own image conjured up in the words of the lover. Socrates calls this “backlove” 
(255D-E). Is this not mimesis at work? Is the lover, who is pursuing the beloved with language, 
with rhetoric, with persuasion, not an artist? A transformation happens; the passive beloved 
awakens to what is stirred in him, which has been awoken by the lover. Now they’re both active, 
participating in a backlove that goes back and forth and back again, corresponding with each 
other in dialogue rather than monologue. The artist seduces us to ourselves, but a self at this 
moment is something that opens up to the art and to the artist. The self is not an entity apart; it is 
being-in-the-world, but a world that is mutually created and triangulated between the artist, the 
art, and the audience, each of these terms constituting their own kind of equiprimordiality. Every 
work of art, then, is a work of love, and every work of love is split between the artist and the 
beholder, both of whom animate each other through the work.  
Socrates reminds us that when we see beauty, we recollect our former lives when we 
would travel cosmic distances with wings. As these wings fell in our descent to earth, the limbs 
we had to rely on in order to move are now our legs. But in beauty, in love, in art, we do not so 
much move as let ourselves be moved. Stationary and silent, and in the shadows like Patroclus, 
we give up motion for emotion—whether we’re in the theater or reading a novel that happens to 
seduce us into its world. The memory of our wings comes back, encouraging us to stand up and 
see what it’s like to be transported by these wings, restored to us in love, rather than our legs. 
Sitting in the shadows, something in us also shadows the movement of the work of art before us 
so that when Achilles stands up, Patroclus stands up too.  
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Artists from Homer to Ludacris have intuitively understood this. Ludacris’s number one 
hip-hop single from 2003, “Stand Up,” features the call of his own lyrics (“When I move, you 
move”) with the response of Shawnna (“Just like that?”) before they switch lines. In the music 
video, the dancers, representing Ludacris’s audience, are separated into couples during this 
sequence, each one erotically leaning into each other, back and forth, mirroring each other’s 
moves, with every repetition of the chorus. Is this not the movement, distilled in its purest form, 
of mimesis throughout its entire history?  
This kind of mimetic shadowing is also demonstrated in J.M. Barrie’s Peter Pan, which 
is fundamentally a work about the role of the audience shadowing the movements in a work of 
art. The novel, based on the play, opens with the Darling children listening to a bedtime story, 
but when Peter Pan loses his shadow among this audience, they actively participate in the story 
they had been passively listening to. Wendy successfully manages to sew his shadow back on to 
him, but in the process seems to shadow this shadow. What ends up happening is that she and her 
siblings become further iterations of his own shadow themselves, taking flight and imitating his 
movements, following him to Neverland. The experience is, for Wendy at least, tinged with eros, 
and ultimately a sense of loss when she realizes that the utopian space of Neverland is a land she 
can never fully belong to. It is a space like the realm of Plato’s eternal forms that can only be 
seen in flight; a place without time, these forms never change, never grow old, never grow up. So 
Wendy becomes an Ariadne figure, using her thread to lead Peter Pan to his prize, that darker 
side of himself, and she falls in love with this adventurous Theseus figure only to be abandoned. 
And then, of course, there is the story of Paolo and Francesca in Dante’s Inferno, two 
lovers doomed to the realm of shades for their transgressive love, who learn to love through the 
act of reading, an erotic, Girardian triangulation that we’ve also seen with the Tristan lovers, 
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with Romeo who kisses Juliet “by the book,” with Werther and Lotte, Tatiana and Onegin, 
Emma Bovary and Léon and Rodolophe, Anna Karenina and Vronsky, Johannes and Cordelia, 
and Humbert and Dolores. The act of reading is an erotic act and a neurotic act, as we explore 
the different “experimental selves” that lie within us, learning about love and its futility, even 
when it is consummated (Kundera, Art of the Novel 34). In theater, at least, there is a ritual 
acknowledgment of this quasi-religious experience, when we, sitting in the shadows like 
Patroclus, are driven to imitate the imitators, rising to our feet as the actors stand before us. And 
our applause, when it is truly felt, is a kind of praise expressed through prayers—our hands 
coming together in quick, loud successions, as though these prayers were a plea to hold onto the 
magic of the performance that we know is now gone. 
Reading a novel, on the other hand, discourages the use of our feet and the superfluous 
noise of our hands, keeping us seated for longer than the average play and keeping our hands 
occupied with the turning of pages, relegating our somatic reactions to silence. The model for 
our mimetic reaction here is not Patroclus to Achilles, but the two halves of the original beings in 
Symposium holding onto each other in silent eros, miming each other as they come together. To 
Aristotle, mimesis is what picks us out as human beings:  
It can be seen that poetry was broadly engendered by a pair of causes, both natural. For it 
is an instinct of human beings, from childhood, to engage in mimesis (indeed, this 
distinguishes them from other animals: man is the most mimetic of all, and it is through 
mimesis that he develops his earliest understanding); and equally natural that everyone 
enjoys mimetic objects. A common occurrence indicates this: we enjoy contemplating the 
most precise images of things whose actual sight is painful to us, such as the forms of the 
vilest animals and of corpses. The explanation of this too is that understanding gives 
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great pleasure not only to philosophers but likewise to others too, though the latter have a 
smaller share in it. This is why people enjoy looking at images, because through 
contemplating them it comes about that they understand and infer what each element 
means, for instance that ‘this person is so-and-so.’ (Poetics 37-39) 
Mimesis here is linked to pain and understanding, to a fundamental pessimism at the core of life 
in portraying images of the worst. This is the “sadness at the back of life” that Woolf identified 
in the Greeks, the imitation of which paradoxically makes life more livable (Common Reader I 
58-59). She turned to the novel to put a silent language to this sadness, as did Lawrence and 
Nabokov, as well as the novelists who paved the way for them to achieve their literary 
innovations. The study of mimesis, then, as it has evolved through the ages in the form of the 
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